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Preface
The Symposium on Corporate Financial Reporting held in New Jersey
at the Seaview Country Club on November 7 and 8, 1968, was a pioneering
effort in that it was the first event jointly sponsored by the four leading
professional organizations concerned with financial reporting. The willing
ness of the American Institute of CPAs, the Financial Analysts Federation,
the Financial Executives Institute and the Robert Morris Associates to join
together and support such a meeting with a major commitment of their
human resources as well as financial sponsorship bodes well for continuing
improvement of the reporting environment.
The concept of such a Symposium to promote effective four-way com
munication and to generate new reporting ideas was originally that of
John Ingraham of the First National City Bank of N. Y., chairman of
the Robert Morris Associates’ Committee on Co-operation with Public
Accountants. He became dissatisfied with the limitations inherent in twoway communication among organizations when there were several parties
involved in corporate financial reporting, and he argued persuasively that
a common forum for discussion would be an important starting point for
the long-term improvement of such reporting.
His idea was rapidly endorsed by officers and staffs of the major
organizations involved. John Carey, Leonard Savoie and Donald Bevis of
the AICPA, George Hansen of the Financial Analysts Federation, James
Rutherford and Benjamin Makela of the Financial Executives Institute and
Dale Freed of Robert Morris Associates met with Ingraham on several
occasions to discuss the idea. The group gradually developed into a steering
committee to plan the Symposium after the concept had been approved by
the four organizations. The chairman and editor was recruited from the
Columbia Graduate School of Business and agreed to devote part of a
sabbatical year to the task of organizing the Symposium and editing the
proceedings.
The steering committee spent many hours agreeing upon the program
and identifying discussion leaders, paper and critique preparers and partici
pants. Those so identified undertook their tasks with enthusiasm and each
contributed significantly to the success of the program. While all their names
are included at a later point in this volume, the editor must express a
particular debt to his academic colleagues: Professors Robert Mautz,
Herbert Miller and Robert Sprouse. These men helped in the planning

process, led the discussions and assisted the final publication with their
comments. They and the steering committee are professionals whose con
tinuing assistance was invaluable.
Additionally, the arrangements at Seaview were flawlessly handled by
Norman Nestler of the AICPA, the tasks of distribution were smoothly
completed by Margaret Williams, and the publications staff of the AICPA
showed skill and forbearance in dealing with the manuscript and the editor.
All were essential to the end result.
Readers of these proceedings will feel on many occasions a sense of
frustration resulting from the brevity with which some of the subjects dis
cussed are covered. This is due primarily to the limited time available at
the Symposium and to the fact that speakers rightfully assumed considerable
experience and expertise in the audience to which they were speaking. Those
readers with an interest in sharing the background of the participants and
in studying the area of financial reporting in greater depth are referred to
the professional journals of the sponsoring organizations: The Journal of
Accountancy, the Financial Analysts Journal, the Financial Executive and
The Journal of Commercial Bank Lending. Many of the subjects considered
at the Symposium have been discussed at much greater length in these pro
ductive sources.
The editor would be remiss if he did not express a personal note of
appreciation to the steering committee for inviting his participation in what
was a highly stimulating intellectual experience. If there are any failures
in communicating this stimulation to non-participants through this volume,
they must be laid at the editor’s door.
John C. Burton
Graduate School of Business
Columbia University
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Introduction
In a society based upon the concept that economic progress can best
be achieved by the independent actions and reactions of a large number of
consumers, investors and businessmen, it is of paramount importance that
the society’s system of economic information be adequate to give these many
interested parties the data necessary to support rational action. There are
many dimensions to the data needed but certainly one of the most important
is the reporting of economic success or failure by the large economic units
that control and use a substantial portion of the nation’s capital resources.
Such reporting reflects the economic efficiency of the use of resources and
directs the flow of capital into the most productive channels. If an economic
society is to function effectively, it is important that this information be pre
sented in a timely and meaningful fashion, that it be reliable and that it
adequately measure economic performance. These are the objectives of
corporate financial reporting.
Because of its importance in appraising success and making decisions,
corporate financial reporting is an important interest of many professional
groups in our economic society. Managers charged with the responsibility
of reporting the results of their firms’ economic activities clearly have a pri
mary concern. So do public accountants who must review these financial
reports and attest to their fairness of presentation. Finally those who use
this information in decision making of various sorts are also vitally interested
in its form and content. Among such groups the financial analysts who must
make investment decisions and guide the decisions of others in allocating
resources among various investment opportunities in the economy have an
obvious interest. In addition, commercial bankers who lend depositors’
money to corporations depend significantly on the financial reports of their
clients.
In recent years there have been evidences of dissatisfaction with finan
cial reporting practices. Articles appearing in the financial press have sug
gested that managers reporting on their own results could substantially affect
the nature of these reports by selection of measurement criteria that do not
reflect the economic realities of their situation. Lawsuits have raised ques
tions about the adequacy of corporate disclosure and the reliability of the
information presented and have challenged the auditor’s responsibility in
attesting to it. There have been evidences of misuse of published data by
analysts and selected investors. While it would be overstating the situation
1

to say that a crisis exists in the reporting sphere, it does appear that there
are grounds for concern.
An analysis of the sources of complaint makes it apparent that a sub
stantial number of the problems that exist today are the result of communi
cation failures on the part of the various responsible parties charged with the
obligation of preparing and using financial reports. While many people on
both sides are complaining, too few are listening. User groups complain
that financial statements are not sufficiently uniform and do not provide the
information which they need, while at the same time preparers resist what
they consider attempts to put them in a reporting straitjacket which would
not give them sufficient latitude to report the economic reality of their opera
tions as they see it.
Within this environment it seems clear that improved communication
is important in order to make the various interested parties aware of the
problems of the others and to see what steps might be taken to improve
financial reporting where necessary. In addition, the institutional environ
ment surrounding financial reporting requires continuing review to determine
whether it can be made more effective both in dealing with the specific prob
lems which arise from time to time and in developing a systematic and
improving framework for corporate reporting.
To these ends, leading members of the four professional organizations
most concerned with financial reporting met and held a two-day Symposium
on the subject at Seaview, New Jersey on November 7 and 8, 1968. Attend
ing were representatives of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Financial Executives
Institute and the Robert Morris Associates.
The principal objectives of the Symposium were first to improve com
munication between the various persons in organizations vitally interested
in financial reporting, so that each could understand the thinking processes
of the others; second, to develop some innovative ideas about corporate
financial reporting in response to the needs of the various parties at interest;
and finally, to think about the future of corporate financial reporting and
consider the ways in which the assembled group might take action in the
light of this future. No attempt was planned nor was one made to produce
any formal conclusions from the group as a whole. All parties considered
this an opportunity to discuss, think and understand.
As a basis for the discussions a series of papers was prepared by the
members of the various groups from their differing points of view. In addi
tion, each group had members prepare a critique of each paper to obtain
additional viewpoints. The papers were designed to stimulate thought rather
than to report on the results of research efforts. These papers and critiques
were not delivered at the Symposium but were considered in advance by the
participants, and they therefore served as a background for the discussions.
Four university professors of accounting served as moderators for the session.
They began their efforts with a concise summary of the papers as a means
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of defining the subjects to be discussed. In large part, the professors attempted
to serve as catalysts to assure a meaningful interchange, rather than as dis
cussion leaders directing the group toward any specific ends. The Symposium
opened with introductory remarks delivered by Ralph Saul, president of the
American Stock Exchange, and the rest of the two days was devoted entirely
to discussion.
In the course of two days, a great deal of spirited discussion took place.
Virtually everyone who attended the program participated in the delibera
tions of the group, both in the formal sessions and in the informal consulta
tions which took place during meals and in the evenings. In the course of
these discussions, participants heard the views of others and made personal
arrangements for various forms of continuing dialogue to take place after
the Symposium. For the participants themselves, therefore, the seminar
achieved its objectives of increasing communication and understanding of
the various interests involved in financial reporting. The participants in
creased their understanding of the theoretical and institutional framework
for the development of accounting principles, and they came to recognize
that no simple answer existed to the questions of financial reporting raised
by the papers and critiques.
The participants left, therefore, with what one of them described as
“a feeling of warmth and accomplishment,” leaving the chairman and editor
of the proceedings with the problem of communicating the results of the
Symposium to the group that was not present to receive the personal advan
tages of attendance. To aid him they left 350 pages of transcript and the
memories of numerous stimulating discussions. The editor’s communication
problem, therefore, was acute.
One option was simply to reproduce the entire transcript with appro
priate grammatical changes where syntax had wandered. After a careful
reading of the transcript, however, it was apparent that such a course would
create a document that was hard to follow and would not communicate the
essence of the conclusions reached and not reached at this Symposium. In
the course of two days’ discussions, a number of subjects kept recurring and
were reconsidered at a number of points. In addition, there was a substan
tial amount of repetition of ideas as different members of the group reinforced
the arguments of others by repeating their position and elaborating somewhat
upon it.
The editor ultimately concluded, therefore, that the only viable approach
was to condense and group the comments made by the participants into
major subject areas and thus distill the essence of the discussions. This
decision necessitated the omission of many supporting comments and expres
sions of concurrence. Some participants will perhaps be concerned that their
words of wisdom are not made fully available to readers. Nevertheless it is
the feeling of the editor that the transcript which follows is faithful to the
basic conclusions and discussions of the two days. In such an editing job
the personal bias of the editor must show to some extent, but in no place were
3

new comments created after the Symposium simply to present an editorial
point of view.
Before the Symposium began, it was agreed that in the ultimate publica
tion participants in the discussion would not be identified by name. This was
done to enable people to speak without feeling that they were going on record
in any formal sense. The transcript does indicate the basic professional orien
tation of each speaker so that this can be associated with his comments.
The papers and critiques follow the edited transcript in this volume.
This rather unusual ordering was adopted because it was felt that it reflected
the relative emphasis placed on discussion in the organization of this Sympo
sium. The participants did not come to consider scholarly papers in sequence
but rather to exchange ideas. The papers and critiques served the purpose
of presenting background and stimulating ideas. The discussion ranged widely
and did not relate specifically to the papers in turn. The essence of the
Symposium proceedings, therefore, is contained in the edited transcript. Here
the flavor of both new and old ideas presented to the group is revealed, and
the conflicts and agreements are highlighted.
From the broad nature of the objectives of the Symposium and the
diverse points of view expressed, it is clear that no definitive statement of
policy can emerge from the Symposium. Even this edited transcript will not
chronicle all the expressed views of all the participants. Many ideas are dis
cussed on which there is no agreement despite spirited discussion. There are
some ideas where a consensus is achieved, and, in addition, there are thoughts
and innovations suggested about which there are many differences of opinion.

Comparability and Flexibility
The Symposium begins with the consideration of one of the most
important areas discussed: the need for comparability on the one hand and
flexibility on the other in financial reporting. The recent “literature of pro
test” emphasizes the deficiencies in financial reporting due to the acceptability
of varying accounting principles to describe the results of operations in finan
cial reports, the control that corporate management can exercise over reported
income as a result and the lack of comparability among the reports of different
companies.
It is apparent that the Symposium group feels that while a problem
exists, it is not as acute as many outsiders believe. Both financial executives
and public accountants point to many situations in which different accounting
principles are used because the economic realities involved are different.
They emphasize the enormous diversity of fact that exists, and the virtual
impossibility of prescribing a single set of accounting procedures that would
fit every diverse factual situation which might arise. In addition, while it is
acknowledged that some firms may take advantage of diverse accounting
4

principles to control reported income in a misleading way, such cases are
thought to be relatively rare.
On the other side, analysts point to several cases where it appears that
the same economic reality is being described differently as, for example, in the
diverse depreciation policies followed by computer leasing companies, and
to situations in which companies have changed accounting methods with
substantial effect upon income where there was no evidence that economic
facts had changed.
After considerable discussion, it seems apparent that the users of finan
cial information are not asking for absolute and rigid comparability, nor
are the preparers of this information seeking complete flexibility, and a
middle ground generally satisfactory to all emerges.
In approaching this consensus the users give up the idea of rigid defini
tion of all principles in favor of a plea that in any given set of circumstances
to which a number of alternative accounting practices might apply there
should be one of those practices which is recognized to be more appropriate
than any of the others. In seeking this practice, it is recognized that a given
practice might be appropriate in one industry and quite a contrary practice
in another. One practice may be appropriate in a given set of circumstances,
but changing circumstances might make another preferable.
In this approach, the group seems to move toward the suggestion in
William Norby’s paper that accounting principles should be outlined by
industry. These appropriate practices ought to be stated and known by users,
and any choice of another practice ought to be disclosed. It is generally agreed
that management does have the right to use another practice, but if this is
done, that fact should be highlighted and a justification given for the use of
the alternative procedure. In addition, the users feel that the effect of this
departure should be disclosed. Disclosure is not a complete substitute for
comparability, but where it is necessary to have departures, adequate dis
closure should be made and should include both a description of the departure,
the reasons why it is necessary in particular circumstances and its effect so
that users can judge its validity.
Finally, the user group feels that there should be as few alternative
practices as possible in order to have comparability in those situations where
economic facts are the same.
The financial executives emphasize their responsibility in presenting
financial statements. They identify reporting to the stockholders and the
public as an important part of their stewardship function. Accordingly, they
believe that the ultimate authority to decide the reporting principles followed
must rest with management, subject to the check of public accountants for
general acceptability and regulatory agencies for conformity to law.
In addition to feeling that it is appropriate to have responsibility and
authority for financial reporting go together, the preparers suggest that they
are in the best position to know what accounting describes the operations of
their company most meaningfully. Any financial statements rest to a sub
5

stantial extent on knowledge of a firm’s plans, expectations and intentions
about which management is best informed. Thus, where there are alternative
accounting methods available the management should have the freedom to
adopt that method which in their judgment best reveals the progress and
status of the firm within the peculiarities of its own condition and situation.
Additionally, they feel that they need the freedom to adopt a different method
when necessary to meet changing circumstances or conditions. Nevertheless,
preparers agree that some ground rules are necessary to make reporting useful
and they do not demand complete flexibility. This attitude, combined with
users’ acceptance of disclosure as at least a partial substitute for uniformity,
leads to the conclusion that the users’ and preparers’ viewpoints are recon
cilable if adequate communication exists between the groups.

The Role of the Auditor in Comparability
Despite this general conclusion, there is no clear definition of the role
that the public accountant should play in the selection among alternative
accounting principles. Several individual analysts and bankers express the
point of view that the auditor should be satisfied that the accounting principles
selected by management were the best accounting principles for the particular
situation, not just principles which fall within the broad range of acceptability.
At the extreme there are a few who feel that the auditor should be the
professional reporter presenting the results of the firm as he sees fit from the
financial records of the firm. This group argues that since it is management
that is being reported on, it is inequitable for management to select their own
principles.
The majority, however, seem to feel that management should take
primary responsibility but that the auditor should exercise a greater responsi
bility in determining that the principles followed were the best in the circum
stances rather than simply “generally acceptable.” This point of view is
probably best summed up by the participant who said, “I would like to think
that the certificate means that the auditor in reviewing the financial statements
has exercised his professional influence to have these presented in the best
way he can—not that he has searched through accounting literature to find
a means of supporting the way the management may have elected to present
something that he doesn’t really completely agree with himself.”

The Accounting Principles Board and Accounting Research
A second major part of the discussion centers on institutions for the
definition of principles of financial reporting and the way in which such
institutions should operate. General agreement exists that such institutions
will be most effective if they are developed voluntarily within the private
6

sector of the economy rather than through government action, although the
latter is considered inevitable if private groups do not act.
Despite some harsh words in papers and critiques, a rather surprising
consensus emerges from the discussions that the Accounting Principles Board
as currently constituted is an appropriate body to define accounting principles.
The participants seem to feel that professional accountants are the most suit
able group to consider and define accounting principles in general, and that
it is desirable to have the national professional body of accountants qualified
for public practice select Board members from its membership.
The questions as to whether or not there should be non-CPAs repre
sented on the Board is extensively discussed and the consensus of the group
seems to be that there is no need for such representation. The Board’s current
practice of including in its membership a limited number of individual CPAs
who are professors of accounting and financial executives is applauded, but
only a few feel that formal representation of other groups and non-CPAs
should be required.
On the other hand, the groups feel very strongly that there must be
extensive and early consultation by the Board with the various user and
preparer organizations both when it is establishing its agenda and when its
subcommittees are studying particular subjects. The members of the Board
generally indicate an enthusiastic support for such participation and indicate
that there are steps already being undertaken to encourage it.
Some participants suggest that a well-publicized institutional means for
communication with the Board be established so that specific subjects can
be referred by interested users. Analysts particularly believe that in the
course of their work they may become aware of accounting problem areas
arising at a very early stage, and that if they know that there is a group
charged with the responsibility of serving as an early warning system for the
Board they would be encouraged to contact it.
The structure of the Board is found in large part to be satisfactory.
There is some support for the idea that some or all members of the Board
serve on a full-time basis with appropriate compensation and prestige to
supervise the development of research and expedite the decision-making
process of the Board. Concern is expressed, however, that such a step would
reduce the very high quality of members of the current Board since firms
could not make senior partners available on a full-time basis. The majority
of the group seem to feel that additional high-quality staff support will serve
the desired purpose.
There is considerable discussion about the role of research in developing
principles of reporting and the way in which it should be accomplished. Some
participants argue for extensive basic and applied research while others feel
that in most cases the definition of the issue is quite clear, and what is needed
is a means of making a decision among alternatives after weighing the various
pros and cons.
This difference in viewpoint is also apparent in the discussion of whether
7

the best approach to improving financial reporting is to start with the basic
problem of what is being measured and deal with problems of application
only within a defined framework or if the topic-by-topic approach largely
adopted to date by the Board is the most practical one. No firm conclusion
is reached on this subject, but the majority of participants seem to lean
towards the latter approach, particularly after a somewhat frustrating attempt
by the group to achieve agreement on the objectives of financial reporting
and the definition of income in basic terms. At the same time, concern is
expressed at the lack of a coherent and stated framework of objectives for
financial reporting; there is considerable support for the position expressed
in the critique by Robert M. Trueblood that the Board should issue state
ments of accounting objectives both in general and in specific subject areas
and supplement these with practice bulletins on specific topics rather than
emphasize procedures as seems to be the current trend.
Despite expressed doubts about the effectiveness of research, most of
the group favor its expansion in the financial reporting area, particularly on
an applied basis. Some participants suggest a single research body which
would be supported by all organizations interested in the area and which
would control the research effort most effectively. Representatives of the
four organizations represented at the Symposium do not seem to favor this
approach as the sole means of achieving research, however. Members feel
that each organization should be encouraged to sponsor projects in the area,
but it is pointed out that most groups would have interests in research
projects in other areas as well as in financial reporting. It is also felt that
fund raising from members of each separate group for a central body would
be more difficult.
There seems agreement, however, that all research efforts in the area
should be carefully co-ordinated to avoid duplication and assure coverage of
vital areas, and the possibility of establishing a jointly supported research
co-ordinating group is mentioned as is the use of the Accounting Principles
Board research apparatus for this purpose.

The Auditor's Responsibility
The role of the auditor, both as it is and as it is perceived by the public,
is considered. From the comments made, it is evident that even within the
Symposium group there are many who are uncertain as to what an auditor
does and should do. It is agreed that the auditor’s function should be more
clearly explained to analysts, bankers and the general public; various means
of achieving this are considered. One such means is changing the auditor’s
standard short-form report to include more explanation of what he has done
and what he has not done. There is considerable support for changing the
form of the report, but there is also doubt as to whether this would achieve
the desired purpose.
8

There is some sentiment for expanding the auditor’s reporting function.
Some participants suggest that the auditor should regularly offer an opinion
on the adequacy of a client’s internal controls, while others suggest that the
auditor’s opinion should cover the entire annual report and perhaps the quar
terly reports of the corporation. Both public accountants and financial exec
utives point out the problem of setting standards in these areas, and no
general conclusion exists as to the desirability of expanding the auditor’s
report in these directions.
In discussing audit reports, a number of bankers indicate a desire to
continue to receive long-form audit reports with substantial supplemental data
about their clients, and members of the National Conference of Bankers and
CPAs explain the current efforts of that group to develop a standard report
ing format which banks can ask corporations to provide, perhaps on an
industry-by-industry basis. There is a general feeling among bankers present
that this is a productive effort, although most seem to feel that no special
accounting principles need to be developed for banks as long as there is ade
quate disclosure in financial statements.
The question of the auditor’s legal liability is discussed and the various
groups seem sympathetic to the problem mentioned by the CPA members of
disproportionate liability. In response to a specific question, there is a com
pletely favorable response to the possibility of auditors practicing in a cor
porate form, although it is not felt that this fully solves the liability problem.
During this discussion, the problem of independence is touched upon and
the auditor’s responsibility as a “public reporter” is examined.

Disclosure of Future Expectations
Some of the most significant and interesting ideas discussed in the two
days are those about which no consensus exists. In a group of involved men
with diverse interests and viewpoints, it is inevitable that several innovations
in reporting will be suggested which other members of the group view with
concern, and with worry about their practical implications.
Perhaps the most significant of these is the request by several of the
financial analysts for disclosure of future plans and expectations by corpora
tions. The analysts point out that investors are most interested in what will
happen and use past data to help in predicting the future. Since management
is most sophisticated in applying forecasting techniques and is most knowl
edgeable in respect to the factors which would affect the business, its expecta
tions would be more likely to be accurate than the guesses of outsiders. In
addition, it is pointed out that substantial sums are being spent on forecasting
by management and that virtually all management information systems today
include long-range plans and budgets which are used for the internal purposes
of the firm. Without being specific as to what data is desired, the analysts
press for disclosure of such future-oriented information.
In making these suggestions, it is apparent that even the strongest
9

advocates are aware of many of the legal and practical problems that would
arise, but they feel that the benefits in terms of improved data for investment
decisions would be such as to warrant serious consideration of these sug
gestions.
Most financial officers in responding to this suggestion indicate an even
more acute awareness of the problems involved. They speak of this as open
ing Pandora’s box, exposing the corporation to unknown and undefined
liabilities, and significantly dampening the innovative tendencies of corporate
management through increasing the costs of failure to include public dis
closure of the fact.
They feel that as disclosure expands, so does the danger that the infor
mation presented would mislead rather than enlighten the investor. This
might be the case even in expanded disclosure of historical information, as
in the case of product-line information, where users of the data would be
unaware of the necessary but arbitrary allocations of costs among products
and the interrelationships between different parts of the business and hence
might draw totally erroneous conclusions from the data. Were disclosure of
anticipated results to be required, the uncertainties would be magnified many
fold. Users’ understanding of the many estimates which go into budgets
and forecasts is limited, and there would be great danger that they would
take the forecasts as indicating assurance about the future that cannot exist.
One end product of a few bad experiences might be a loss of faith in all
financial data. Finally, the competitive disadvantage of revealing plans is
emphasized.
The CPAs in discussing this subject indicate a recognition of the need
but a severe concern about the practicalities of such disclosure and the prob
lems of attestation associated with such prospective financial data.
All present are concerned about the overemphasis on earnings per share
presently found in both the financial press and analysts’ reports, but there
are no good answers as to how to deal with the phenomenon. The analysts
feel that it would be useful if some index of the quality of earnings could be
developed, but there are no specific suggestions as to how this index could
be constructed. Some aspects of future disclosure are felt to be steps in this
direction.

Quality Control Over Financial Reporting
Another innovative suggestion that is presented and discussed is the
development of some institutional means of quality control over financial
reporting practices. Several analysts feel that it would be desirable to estab
lish some mechanism whereby they can call attention to situations in which
they feel that corporate reporting practices are less than satisfactory. They
mention that on the positive side they are now offering awards for the most
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informative disclosure, but they feel that there is no vehicle by which they
can bring inadequate reporting into the public eye in order to discourage it.
The present practice review procedure which is currently carried on
both at the AICPA and at the accountants’ state society levels is designed as
an educational tool, and no publicity is given to examples of deficient report
ing. In addition, the system is primarily designed to deal with the auditors’
certificate rather than with the adequacy of disclosure in financial statements.
The principal concern of users of financial reports is not necessarily
technically deficient auditors’ opinions but inadequate disclosure for the
complete analysis of financial statements. What constitutes incomplete dis
closure to an analyst may not be technically incorrect from the viewpoint of
a CPA. Practice review as currently constituted is felt to be ineffectual in
this regard. There seems agreement that some further investigation of possible
institutional arrangements for surveillance of public financial reporting should
be undertaken, but there is no consensus as to the kind of system that might
be appropriate.

Summary
The Symposium clearly achieved improved communication and under
standing among those attending. There was a general realization that finan
cial reporting cannot be the sole province of any one group, but that many
interested parties have a significant interest, need and right to be heard. Past
efforts at co-ordination have generally involved only two groups, and the
greatest strength of this gathering was the commitment of four organizations
to a dialogue which proved beneficial to all.
All parties listened to the others and came away with an increased
appreciation of the problems of other groups. Preparers recognized the needs
of users for comparable data and indicated a willingness to accept some con
straints on their freedom to report as they wished. Bankers and analysts, on
the other hand, increasingly recognized the difficulty of imposing a simple
set of measurement principles on a multidimensional reality.
Many unanswered questions remain. The need is great for research by
all parties into the basic need for financial statements and the appropriate
constraints on use of statements. The impact of the computer on both credit
analysis and security selection make the understanding and quality of the
underlying data increasingly significant. The computer forces its user into
the analysis of a problem through a series of logical steps, and the traditional
intuitive feel associated with interpreting financial data will have to be increas
ingly systematized.
While the Symposium was felt by its participants to have been successful,
there was general agreement that it was only the first step and its success
would ultimately be measured only by the actions which were taken subse
quently by the people and organizations participating. Plans for future meet
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ings, co-ordination of research activities, consultation in the development of
reporting principles and practices and other institutional contacts are all under
discussion, and the specific results are as yet unpredictable.
Final evaluation, therefore, must await the germination of the seeds
planted at the Seaview Symposium.

12

1

Symposium Discussions

Section I
The Problems of
Users and Preparers
In Financial Reporting
The largest amount of time at the Symposium is devoted to the meshing
of the viewpoints of users and preparers of financial statements. Four papers
and five critiques are devoted to this subject and about half of the group’s
discussion time is related to the area.
Professor Robert K. Mautz introduces the subject by summarizing the
papers and critiques and sets the stage in general for the discussions to follow.
Many subjects are touched upon in the discussion, but the four which seem
to recur regularly are the problem of comparability, the role of the Accounting
Principles Board and two new and unresolved issues: the need for reporting
of future expectations and the possible desirability of some form of institu
tional surveillance over financial reporting. The transcript is, therefore,
divided into these sections.

Introductory Remarks
Professor Robert K. Mautz
My attitude toward this assignment has passed through several stages
and at this point represents something of a compromise among them. On first
learning of the nature of the Symposium and receiving an invitation to take
part, my feelings were much like those of the small boy who learns that there
is about to be a fight in the neighborhood and that he has a particularly good
spot from which to view the carnage. Knowing the capabilities of some of
the participants at argument and intellectual infighting and the strong feelings
which some of you have on certain of the subjects before us, there was little
question in my mind but that the contest would be vigorous, skillfully fought,
and a spectacle to behold. Some of you have been waiting a long time for
just such an opportunity as this, an opportunity to exchange arguments with
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some of those who need to be set straight on a few important matters. No
one with any sporting blood at all would want to miss such a contest. I was
delighted to accept the generous offer of a ringside seat.
But with the passage of time, I am pleased to report, came a more
mature attitude toward this meeting. The obviously good intentions of the
members of the steering committee, the quality of the designated participants,
the importance of the subject matter, and the nagging feeling that unless this
group could clearly demonstrate an ability to compose differences and show
the way to co-operation in improving financial reporting the possibilities for
progress were slim indeed—all combined to impress upon me the very real
importance of this Symposium.
The first problem to confront me, if it may be called that, is in the nature
of an embarrassment of riches. Selecting from the generous offerings of the
contributors those items most warranting attention calls not only for sensitivity
and perception but also for a great deal of luck in not offending someone
whose favorite subjects are omitted.
The papers and critiques differ somewhat in the nature of the questions
which their authors think should be brought before this group. Some are
interested in the discussion of specific problems such as the recording of
merger and acquisition transactions in the accounts of the acquiring com
panies or the accounting for long-term leases. Others prefer to give attention
to more general topics such as the need for firm rules to provide a greater
degree of comparability in reported data. Some are much concerned with the
composition and method of operation of the Accounting Principles Board,
placing this ahead of all else at this meeting. Others would stress the possible
expansion of the responsibility of independent auditors into new areas, such
as the review of interim statements. Any one of these might consume our
entire discussion time; from among them only a portion can be selected for
any significant consideration.
A second, and perhaps the major, problem faced in preparation for this
discussion today is concerned with the method of presenting the topics
recommended for discussion.
Both Dudley Browne and Harry Meily in their critiques pointed out
that as they read the papers they found relatively little indication of a desire
to compromise, to meet other people halfway. The statements were vigorous
and strong and forceful—an “I’m going to straighten you people out”
approach. And I must say, as I read them, I found the same thing.
Time and again a writer will indicate that he understands the arguments
that the other side will advance, and he doesn’t think much of them. “We
know the other side of the issue, and we know it’s not very good. But we
don’t think they know our side of the issue, so we want them to listen.” Per
haps each one of us ought to be listening more ourselves.
A very useful thought is found in Clifford Heimbucher’s statement: “The
most important task that this Symposium could accomplish would be to build a
framework for a mutually acceptable system of developing, enunciating and
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applying accounting principles.” And I don’t think any of us would disagree.
In fact, the same thought was expressed a number of different ways by others.
But how are we to accomplish anything constructive if we all come to
the table only with demands, complaints and objections, only with a desire to
make the other man’s shortcomings known to him? On this point Dudley
Browne noted: “But, if the four papers I have read beforehand are repre
sentative of the others, then again, we are in grave danger of talking and not
listening, of seeking not to give but only to take. Let us resolve for once to
seek to understand views advanced by others that are at variance with our
own. Only in so doing are we likely to go away from this Symposium with
a sense of accomplishment.” What can we do in this discussion session to
put some effective emphasis on listening to one another so that we may work
toward the kind of goal Mr. Heimbucher suggests?
One should not read a criticism of those who wrote papers into these
remarks. Their task was to express a point of view as effectively and as articu
lately as possible. They were to put the issues before us, to point up contrast
ing views. This they have done remarkably well. The critics have likewise
performed well in further emphasizing differences of opinions and comment
ing on what they regard as omissions or other weaknesses in the papers. But
in view of the fact that this has been done so well for us, should we not now
proceed to the next step?
Given the choice, most of us here would delight in an opportunity to
point out to our fellow Symposium participants their shortcomings, their
errors, their failures to understand the realities of life as we do, their inability
to comprehend the inherent rightness of our own positions. Yet if we take
that course during this brief and precious time together, what will we gain?
True, we may have the time of our life joining in a thoroughly enjoyable
intellectual “rumble,” but we will have accomplished little, if anything, con
structive and may well have irritated one another to the point that any
significant co-operation among the members of this very important group
of leaders is lost completely. Unless we can listen as well as speak, unless we
can accept criticism as well as admonish others, unless we can give a little as
well as push, unless we can empathize as well as complain, the substantial
effort in bringing us here will be largely wasted—and so will one of the most
remarkable opportunities ever provided to advance the cause of financial
reporting.
If we were to try to outline the steps necessary in order to reconcile the
differences within a group like this so we could be constructive and move
toward the objective that Mr. Heimbucher and others suggested for us, the
steps might look something like this:
1. Seek a thorough understanding of the positions and claims of others.
Precisely what do they request and why do they do so?

2. Make a fair evaluation of the reasonableness and practicability of
such claims.
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3. Review our own position to determine whether we suffer injury or
only indignity in meeting such claims.
No doubt the majority of you have found that most people—at least
most people able enough to attain positions of responsibility—have reasons
for what they do. They do not act arbitrarily and without cause any more
than do we. Further, there is a generous amount of goodwill in the world,
of helpfulness, of appreciation for the problems and ambitions of others. Very
few of us would deliberately obstruct others if at no undue cost we could find
a way to facilitate rather than impede their progress. But first we must find
out what they want—not what we think they want but what they say they
want.
Let me make a few comments about the papers and critiques as a group.
A first impression is that they are forceful and vigorous expressions of strongly
held views. There is little attempt to be conciliatory, to seek compromise, to
ask questions. Most of them press claims, voice objections, and indicate dis
satisfactions. Of course these generalizations are not true of all papers and
critiques, but they reflect the general tendency. Even those who commented
on the force with which others made their claims found the tendency infectious
and succumbed to a similar approach.
The contributors often indicated at least some degree of familiarity with
the arguments which they anticipated others would use, but rarely was this
accompanied by an apparent respect for such arguments. In some cases,
assertions by authors of papers were read very critically by those assigned to
review them, thereby revealing a substantial sensitivity. But, in many in
stances, an automatic defensive reaction appears to make sympathetic under
standing of contrary positions difficult.
My reason for stressing this tendency on the part of some of the con
tributors is to remind us once again that we are here to seek some constructive
result, not merely to express our strong emotions.
In sum, the contributors express quite articulately the well-known argu
ments on each side of the principal issues and add to them a number of points
which, if not completely novel, at least throw additional light on some of the
issues. They keep reasonably well within the bounds of their assignments and
although there is some spilling over into the subject matter of later sessions,
this is not unexpected in view of the nature of the subject. Those who wrote
papers for other sessions faced the same difficulty.
Also not surprisingly, different contributors undertook their assignments
with differing degrees of enthusiasm and with varying talents. Some have
strongly presented their positions, apparently to be read, not only by those
they consider to be in opposition to their own views, but particularly by those
they “represent.” Others have passed judgment much more casually, evidently
feeling no responsibility to a “constituency.” Happily, some went beyond the
presentation of a position to suggest means by which progress in improving
accounting principles might be achieved.
Both Mr. Whitman and Mr. Russell urge the development of criteria to
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judge the appropriateness of alternative procedures as a means of reducing the
freedom of statement preparers to select from among a number of optional
accounting procedures entirely at will. Mr. Whitman writes:
The desirable goal of narrowing differences can best be achieved by
endeavoring to define the situations in which various methods are
most suitable rather than arbitrarily proscribing alternative procedures
which may provide the most realistic and informative financial pre
sentation in particular applications, especially where a reasonable
dichotomy of opinion exists.

Mr. Russell offers the same solution in slightly different words:
... an attempt must be made to narrow differences in accounting
methods which are not based on sound principles of accounting or
which are not justified by variations in factual circumstances. To
justify alternative methods, the criteria for alternate methods must
be established.

One of the subjects we should discuss today is the extent to which this pro
posal holds promise for mutually acceptable progress.
Granting that rather explicit instructions were given by the steering
committee to each participant, there is still remarkable agreement among
them on the issues they find most interesting. The several contributors start
from a common base; they find the financial data reported in published
annual reports of great importance, not only in their own professional activi
ties but as an influence on the decisions of others and on the economy at
large. The unanimity on this point is impressive. There seems little doubt
within this group that the subject before us is of sufficient significance to
warrant the attention we are here to give it.
They are almost equally agreed on the need for improvement in our
accounting and reporting practices. No contributor urged that we let well
enough alone. All agreed that improvement was not only necessary but a
matter of some urgency. One does find differences, however, in the speed
with which individual contributors advocate achieving such progress, some
urging a greatly increased output of pronouncements as rapidly as possible
while others counsel for more deliberate action and additional precautions
to forestall unwise statements.
Closely associated with the desire for improvement in financial reporting
is insistence upon integrity and reliability in financial data. Explication of
the importance of reliability led in two directions, one concerned with the
need for better accounting principles, the other directed at the responsibility
to be accepted by those who serve as independent auditors.
Although different contributors took different positions on major points,
the issues themselves stand out vividly. There appears little excuse for me to
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try to summarize the arguments advanced by those who took opposing
positions because you have their words before you. Hence the following
brief listing presents no more than the major issues implied in the contrib
utors’ writings.

1. The comparability/flexibility issue
a. The meaning of comparability
b. The meaning of flexibility
c. The “management” of earnings
d. The influence of materiality tests on comparability
e. The desirability/danger of firm rules
f. Recommended solutions to the comparability/flexibility issue
2. The authority/participation issue in the development and establishment
of accounting principles
a. Appropriate location of the right to establish authoritative accounting
principles
b. Extent of participation appropriate for each interest in financial
reporting
(1) Demanded by the interest
(2) Expected of the interest by others
c. The composition of the Accounting Principles Board
d. The “acceptability” of opinions by the business community as a con
dition precedent to their issuance by the Board
e. Certain operating procedures of the Board
(1) The “exposure draft” procedure
(2) Selection of topics for opinions
(3) Effectiveness and extent of reliance on research
(4) Increasing/decreasing the rate of output of the Board

3. The desirability/cost of extending the independent auditor’s responsibility
a. Adequacy of the responsibility now accepted for financial statements
b. Review of interim financial statements
c. Review of annual report material other than financial statements
d. Possible unbearable burdens of increased CPA liability
4. The desirability/hazards of additional disclosures
a. Evaluation of internal control
b. Forecasts and budgets
c. Contingent liabilities, special covenants, tax claims
d. Current values of assets
e. Accounting methods and accounting judgments

5. The significance/dangers of the earnings per share figure
6. Specific accounting problems
a. Recording acquisitions and mergers
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b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Segment reporting by diversified companies
Depreciation charged by computer-leasing companies
Accounting for research and development
Accounting for the investment credit
Accounting for long-term leases

If the unequivocal opinions expressed by the contributors are repre
sentative of the views of the others present, mere mention of these issues
should raise the temperature in this room an appreciable amount. For this
reason, if for no other, little good can come from using such a listing for our
discussion. One fears that raising the same issues would lead only to repeti
tious discussion of the points already made quite effectively in the papers and
critiques. Given these issues, how can we come to understand one another’s
positions on them more clearly? How can each of us, no matter what his own
views on these issues may be, come to understand more precisely, and hope
fully more sympathetically, what makes those of contrary views differ with
us? How can we discover more specifically just how we do differ so that we
can determine realistically whether we are close enough to one another for
compromise on a mutually acceptable solution?
Susanne Langer, the philosopher, has stated: “If we would have new
knowledge, we must get us a whole world of new questions.” Perhaps we
are not here seeking new knowledge in the sense that Miss Langer has used
the term, but we do badly need a new approach if we are to do anything
more than continue firing the same ammunition in the same old battle. So
I offer the following questions as a basis for our discussion in the hope that
if we turn our attention to illustration and specification rather than to argu
ment, we may come to understand one another better. This may in turn
provide for a more charitable evaluation of those who fail to see things quite
our way. And who knows what may come from a charitable attitude?

Questions for Discussion

I. On the comparability/flexibility issue—

A. Can users of accounting data supply, by example or otherwise, a
reasonably specific indication of the extent of comparability they
consider essential?
1. Can they illustrate inadequate and excessive comparability?

2. On what terms do they desire data to be comparable?
a. Results for the same company over time?
b. Companies in the same industry?
c. Companies in different industries?
d. Companies which have segments operating in similar in
dustries?
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B. Given Thomas Flynn’s working definition of operational compar
ability in accounting principles (“Accounting principles should help
make like things look alike, and unlike things look different”), can
illustrations be given of how and why differences among companies
require and justify flexibility in accounting principles?

1. What are some illustrations of appropriate flexibility necessitated
by company differences?

2. What are some illustrations of inappropriate flexibility?

3. Can reasonable controls be established to control misuse of such
flexibility?
C. Is there any significant gap between the minimum comparability
required by users and the minimum flexibility required by issuers?

D. Can criteria be developed which will, in all but rare cases, indicate
when one of a number of optional accounting practices is appropriate
and when it is not?
1. Would such criteria effectively eliminate all but one preferred
practice in a given situation?

2. Would development of such criteria meet the “firm rule” require
ment of those seeking greater comparability?
3. Can an illustration of such criteria be given?
II. On the authority/participation issue in the development and establish
ment of accounting principles—
A. What type of participation in the functioning of the Accounting
Principles Board does each of the following groups desire?

1. Bank credit officers
2. Financial analysts

3. Corporate financial executives
B. What contribution to the success of the Accounting Principles
Board’s activities can each of these groups make? What are the
responsibilities of each group to support the Board’s activities with
funds and efforts?

C. In view of the nature of the Board’s operations, can the “exposure
process” be made more effective (1) in terms of the number of people
invited to respond, (2) in terms of responsiveness by the Board to
comments on exposure drafts, and (3) in terms of obtaining the
kinds of response to exposure drafts that are most helpful to the
Board? If the exposure process is expanded to achieve greater par
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ticipation, will this unduly lengthen the total time needed for issu
ance of opinions?
D. What is implied in the emphasis on “greater acceptability to business”
of Board pronouncements?
1. What procedural steps that are not now followed would provide
for determining such acceptability?

2. Is there a feeling that objection by a large number of respondents
to exposure of a draft Opinion should block that proposed
Opinion from issuance by the Board as a generally accepted
accounting principle? If so, how large a response, or what pre
ponderance is required for that purpose?
E. Is the Accounting Principles Board, established as it now is as an
arm of the independent public accounting profession, the appropri
ate agency to develop and establish accounting principles as author
itative?

1. Does its present composition require modification?
If so, in what way?
2. What are the advantages of its present membership?
F. Are there practical means by which interests not now represented
on the Accounting Principles Board can offer (1) recommendations
for topics to be considered, and (2) comments or advice on subjects
before the Board?

G. What rate of progress can we reasonably expect from the Board in
(1) developing a basic statement of accounting principles, and (2)
providing solutions to specific problems? Are there specific sug
gestions by Board members or others of how this procedure can be
shortened?

III. On the desirability/hazards of additional disclosures—
A. In what specific form are additional disclosures desired?
1. For an evaluation of internal control?

2. For forecasts and budgets?
3. For current values of assets?

4. For accounting methods and accounting judgments?
B. What reasons explain present absence of these items in published
financial statements?

IV. On the significance/dangers of the earnings per share figures— Can the
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emphasis on earnings per share as a crucial measure of managerial and
enterprise performance be reduced in any significant degree?

The Problem of Comparability
Obtaining comparability among corporate reports has long been an
objective of users of financial reports. At first glance, there seems to be no
reason why a single set of accounting principles cannot be defined and used
by all. Much of the literature critical of financial statements is focused on
this problem. The conventional argument is buttressed by a few examples
of alternative acceptable procedures and concluded by a plea that somebody
should choose the best principle in each area and make everyone use it.
As the discussion develops, however, the difficulties inherent in this
simple answer soon become apparent. The same set of facts seldom exists in
different economic endeavors, and as the facts differ, so may the measure
ment principle that best describes economic reality. While a number of situa
tions are described where the accounting principles chosen by various firms
seem to show greater differences than the economic facts would warrant,
several other examples are at least in part refuted by the description of
changing facts by the financial managers involved. At the same time, the
need of analysts for comparable data so that they can make reasoned judg
ments between the many investment media available is also made clear.
While no formula is agreed upon, some understanding of the problems of
the other groups is developed in the discussion of the subject which follows.

CPA: I am one of the staunchest proponents of comparability, and
my concept of comparability applies not merely to a period of time in the
same company, but to the comparison of one company with another. That,
I feel, is in this practical world something that the users of accounting data
want and need.
At a minimum, then, I would imagine that the least we can agree upon
is comparability under the same set of facts. And this is not the case today.
To illustrate: In the case of the investment credit, the facts are identical, but
we have two ways of accounting for those same sets of facts that can yield
entirely different results over a period of time.
Another illustration might be the handling of intangible drilling costs
within the same set of circumstances. A million dollars of intangible costs
invested in a successful well may be capitalized, expensed or capitalized and
offset by a deferred tax.
The concept of comparability, as I see it, is limited to the same account
ing treatment under the same set of facts. In cases where the facts are not
the same, I do not envision that the use of the word “alternative” is appro
priate. If the facts are not the same, it is not a matter of alternatives. It’s a
different situation, therefore, calling for its own accounting treatment.
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Financial Executive: I can’t agree that the investment credit is an
area of complete comparability of facts. In the airline industry, for example,
you have problems of capital outlays that bunch in particular years, but in
the petroleum industry, or steel, you have on-going capital programs. These
are different facts. I don’t profess to know the answer to the investment tax
credit accounting question in the airline industry, but I think it’s very inappro
priate that the same answer be applied also to all other industries.
Analyst: A current example of where comparability might be useful
to a user occurs in the steel industry.
In this industry changes are being made in depreciation accounting
and the investment tax credit. For most of these companies, where they are
changing their investment tax credit accounting to the flow-through approach,
you can observe a change in their earnings of 5 to 10 per cent, resulting
from the accounting change.
In the depreciation area, where they are shifting from accelerated depre
ciation to straight line, changes are in the magnitude of 15 to 25 per cent
of the earnings per share reported.
The analyst would surely like to have comparability on this kind of item
within the steel industry, so that he can compare one steel stock with another
and with similar industries, such as the aluminum industry where straight-line
depreciation for stockholder purposes has long been customary.
This accounting change in the steel industry gives the analyst more
comparability, but the timing of this and how it happens is simply a choice
of the companies, and it tends to occur in a year in which earnings are bad
in a given industry.
Analyst: My view of the comparability question relates to the fact
that both lenders and investors have many options as to where they can place
their money. These options cross industry lines, and even if you get some
similarity of the accounting of companies in a given industry, it is still most
difficult for us to make comparisons between companies in different industries.
Examples might be a steel company versus a bank. We have to decide where
we are going to invest our money.
Because of that, I think what we really need in comparability is some
thing very close to economic reality. If the statements of those companies
describe economic realities, then we can make the comparisons we need
to make.
CPA: I am concerned that in order to reflect this economic reality and
in order to pick the depreciation method that we want everyone to use in a
comparable fashion, we have got to back up one step and ask again: What
is it that we are seeking to measure in economically realistic terms by the
depreciation process, and by the inventory-measurement decisions on which
cost flow method we are going to use?
I am concerned that in the effort to get a practical and immediate
answer to specific problems we may foreclose the possibility of getting a solu
tion that is going to be more satisfactory in the long run. And so I can’t
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help but enter the plea that, rather than jumping forward in saying that all
steel companies should use one depreciation method or another, maybe our
better step is to move backward and say what is it that the depreciation
process is realistically supposed to be measuring for steel companies.
CPA: I want to ask just what comparability really means. Let us take
a specific example such as depreciation. Does comparability mean that every
one uses straight-line depreciation, or does comparability and economic reality
mean that each management chooses the method of matching the expiration
of its equipment costs against its revenues in the way that it thinks is the
most appropriate?
Analyst: I think you probably should have ability to choose the
method that will produce the realistic results, but the question that then tends
to get raised by a user is whether there is a potential difference in realistic
results among any of the eight largest steel companies in depreciating their
steel plant. Is it realistic to suspect that one company could justify a 15-year
life, and another one as much different as 25? Or that for one company
double-declining balance depreciation really produces the most realistic
result, whereas another company in the same industry with the same kind of
plants could justify something as different from that as straight line?
And then, when you go even beyond the steel industry, what about the
aluminum industry or the paper industry or the chemical industry, or other
heavy capital businesses? Does reality really differ very much in fact? And
if it doesn’t, is it reasonable to let the management have the flexibility to
choose whichever method they feel to be more realistic?
Analyst: For many years the answer from the steel industry was that
reality varied in each company. There were different operating policies, and
different lives were necessary.
Now that the companies seem to be changing en masse to straight line,
one can only question the effectiveness of their arguments. I think in this
case, straight line should be defined as reality.
A better illustration of comparability problems occurs among the com
puter companies. I can imagine blast furnaces with different lives because
of different economic policies; but when the first-year depreciation of an IBM
computer is 40 per cent, and when the same computer is sold to a leasing
company it is 10 per cent, while comparable equipment has write-off rates
of 15 to 33 per cent in the case of other computer companies, I just can’t
imagine economic reality differing by this degree as a result of different
operating practices.
Financial Executive: We must remember that reporting is only one
facet of the entire business play. I think to focus on reporting when it’s just
a small part of management’s overall responsibility is an unfortunate thing.
I think that everybody could agree that management should have complete
flexibility in making and implementing their business decisions. If we then
say that every business shall account for such an item as depreciation on a
uniform basis, with uniform rates, we are overlooking the fact that reporting
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is a culmination of a management decision to invest in a plant or rehabilitate
a plant, or whatever.
I think flexibility in the reporting then is a desirable thing, provided
there is adequate disclosure so that the investors and the users of the financial
data can make their decision in the light of all the facts.
Analyst: I agree that management should have the right to report as
they wish in terms of their management decisions. As an example, National
Cash Register developed a new Century series of computers. They have
decided to defer certain salesmen’s costs, because they don’t get the revenues
from these rental computers for a period of time, but they pay their salesmen
starting immediately when the order is booked.
I think that it is management’s prerogative to defer certain of these
costs, and not penalize their income statement immediately. National Cash
Register does do this in their quarterly report. They do indicate how much
is being delivered. And as an analyst who follows National Cash closely, I
do take this into account and adjust their earnings in connection with this
particular nonrecurring charge.
So I think management has the right and obligation to manage their
business as they wish, as long as they make full disclosure of how they have
changed reporting practices. This helps us immeasurably.
Analyst: I think some people are confused about the amount of
adjusting that most investors are able to do with the figures that are reported.
Disclosure is helpful, but these problems are so complex, and there are so
many companies, and the whole tempo of our industry moves so fast that I
think relatively few investor organizations are really devoting their time or
energies to making the kind of adjustments you would need to make, pro
vided you had adequate disclosure to put these things on a comparable basis.
And I don’t think this is done nearly as widely as most people in accounting
would assume.
CPA: The example of salesmen’s costs being deferred is an excellent
point for discussion. The question, really, is not whether management should
properly decide to expense, but whether there should be a principle that sets
the guidelines for that accounting under those particular circumstances.
I think that’s what we should be talking about. In the case of deprecia
tion I doubt that anyone who stresses comparability feels that a uniform rate
for all buildings is the answer. Rather, the question is whether a depreciation
method should be specified for a particular set of circumstances whenever
they recur.
Financial Executive: It would still be very difficult to come up with
one method as to whether to defer costs or not because management still has
to determine the likelihood of a benefit from the costs in the future, and this
is still a subjective matter, not something that you can establish as a onephase rule.
Analyst: One of the problems that we get into in this area of com
parability relates to the pressure for performance, which in many ways
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translates itself into pressure on management to get earnings reported at the
soonest possible moment, rather than at a later moment. This leads toward
a Gresham’s law transferred into accounting: As time goes by and no single
generally accepted accounting principle is adopted, one by one by one, and
sometimes industry group by industry group, the accounting method is shifted
by those who have been using the method that tends to defer the reporting
of earnings to the method that tends to get it into earnings quicker.
The investment tax credit, of course, is an example. If you spread the
benefit, it tends to delay the reporting of earnings. If you flow through, the
benefit reaches earnings more quickly.
The same thing happens in the depreciation area. What have we seen
recently? I can think of one company, International Harvester, which has
shifted from straight line to accelerated, and I can think of many companies
that have shifted the other way.
So if you are really seeking economic reality and the best way to report
a given transaction, we don’t have forever to arrive at this decision, because
when we don’t reach some answer, one method gets adopted—usually the one
that gets earnings into the income statement quicker.
CPA: I guess that you would find that various alternatives have sprung
up for good reasons historically, in response to conditions that dictated that
this or that was a more meaningful method. But once having been estab
lished, they become available forever, and we can pick and choose among
them and make changes even if there are no basic reasons to do so. I think
this is too much flexibility.
The Accounting Principles Board has asked that two research studies
be made, one on pricing and one on depreciation methods. These may not
eliminate any of the various alternative accounting methods, but they may
well set up guidelines under which the use of a particular principle might
be limited to those circumstances under which it would apparently make the
most sense.
CPA: We must all recognize that the thrust for comparability is not
meant to exclude management judgment. Management judgment is para
mount in any accounting determination. Whether or not a cost should be
deferred is predicated upon its future potential, and this is a management
judgment decision, and therefore should be dealt with on that basis. The
economic usefulness of a property is a judgment decision which frequently
will be predicated upon policies regarding replacement. The same piece of
equipment could have a longer life with one company than with another,
depending on variations in those policies.
Consequently, we should not inject this element into the discussion con
cerning comparability. The real question is whether or not there is a basis
of permitting two methods of depreciation where the same useful life is
assured, and whether or not there should be a principle which permits defer
ment. If you permit deferment as a principle, there should be a uniform
requirement to defer or not to defer under given circumstances.
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Analyst: We need to realize the increasing public interest in good
financial reporting and the importance of this in maintaining a flow of funds
from the market into corporate treasuries for expansion of business. Given
this public interest, a corporation, no matter how well-meaning and honest
in its own eyes, is probably going to have to conform a little more to certain
standards if they have access to the public marketplace.
As financial analysts we are a kind of intermediary, and as such we are
becoming more aware of our responsibilities in the reporting process and
want to contribute to it in various ways which will facilitate the flow of capital.
We think it is very important in this respect to get some accounting
issues resolved in many of the areas where problems come up. The question
is really not what method of accounting is right or wrong, but rather getting
one method which all companies will follow. In many of these areas the
solution lies not in research but simply in practical and perhaps arbitrary
decisions. You are never going to prove one way or the other exactly right,
but it pays to have everything done the same way.
This is rather like a baseball game. There is no particular reason why
we should have three outs per inning instead of two or four, but this is the
way it has been decided. So everyone plays baseball with three outs per
inning. Given this view, perhaps we could resolve problems more quickly.
Financial Executive: The baseball analogy is not exactly appro
priate, since in that case it is clearly in everyone’s best interests to have a
single set of rules. We must recognize that in financial reporting issues, the
legitimate demands of interested parties are in conflict and in the novelty
of this confrontation we may fail to be aware of the give-and-take which must
occur if conflicting views are to be composed.
In this discussion, Symposium participants have learned of the con
flicting views. I am not so sure, though, that they recognized that the diver
gences and alternatives existing in our present generally accepted accounting
principles have, from a practical viewpoint, served to insure their wide
acceptance. I fear that every step to lessen the divergences or alternatives
found in generally accepted accounting principles will serve to alienate the
affected group. Finally, when we reach the ultimate in comparability, we will
be devoid of support. This process has a direct analogy to the multi-party
political systems of Western European countries. We should recognize then
that complete attainment of any one group’s position is probably impossible
and, were it to be attained, it would be achieved at the expense and loss of
support of other groups.
Professor: Perhaps I am an incurable optimist but I feel that we are
reaching toward a consensus on the issue of comparability versus flexibility.
The user’s plea for comparability consists of asking that in any given set
of circumstances to which a number of alternative accounting practices might
apply, there should be one of those practices which is more appropriate than
any of the others.
I avoid the use of the term “preferred” because preferred seems to attach
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to the practice as if it is always a preferred practice, while appropriateness
relates the practice to the situation. I think the point was clear that a given
practice might be appropriate in one industry and quite a contrary practice
in another. One practice might be appropriate in a given set of circumstances,
but changing the circumstances would make another appropriate. The users,
therefore, seem to think that there ought to be a most appropriate practice
within these kinds of bounds.
Second, they think that the appropriate practice ought to be known
and that any choice of another practice ought to be disclosed. They do not
say that the management does not have the right to use another practice, but
if such is used, there is an obligation to disclose the fact and the reason for
the departure, and the effect of this departure on the financial statements.
Finally, it has come through fairly clearly that users feel that it is
desirable to have as few practices as possible in order to have comparability.
Disclosure is not a complete substitute for comparability, but where it is
necessary to have departures adequate disclosure is a pretty good substitute.
On the other side, the preparers express their need for flexibility. They
feel that they should have freedom to adopt that method, where alternative
methods are available, which in management’s judgment best reveals its
progress and status within the peculiarities of its own condition and situation.
Secondly, management also feels it should have freedom to adopt a different
accounting method when it is necessary in order to meet changed circum
stances or conditions.
When we state the user’s and preparer’s positions in this fashion they
do not seem so far apart. Since the views are not basically inconsistent, they
can be reconciled when adequate communication between the parties exists.

The Role of the
Accounting Principles Board
The feeling that there should be well-known and understood “appro
priate” practices leads immediately to the question of who should define
such practices. At the present time, the Accounting Principles Board plays
this role to the extent that it is performed, and the group seemed to feel that
the Board is the right institution, although increased participation both in
selecting topics and in research is sought.
In the discussion, the interesting question as to the productivity of
research in developing accounting principles was raised. Some view the
Board as a forum in which conflicting interests clash and an essentially polit
ical answer emerges with the compromises inherent in the need for satisfying
various groups. If such is the case, the role of research must be limited to
identifying issues and determining the various views held.
On the other hand, others view the Board as a seeker of truth—namely
the best accounting practice to describe economic reality. This group sees
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in research the source of answers as to the nature of the truth being sought.
This approach to the Board’s function might be labeled as judicial interpreta
tion of its role, while proponents of the political approach view the Board as
a quasi-legislative body.
While there is perhaps surprising agreement in the discussion that follows
that the Board is the appropriate institutional vehicle for the determination
of accounting principles, the more basic issue of how the Board should act
remains unresolved.

Professor: The emphasis in the papers on the authority and participa
tion in the APB proceedings was such that I think we ought to give that subject
some attention. I wonder if we couldn’t start by asking those other than prac
ticing certified public accountants to indicate what kind of participation their
group ought to have in the functioning of the APB.
Banker: It is my view that I certainly don’t know very much about
accounting, and I would hesitate, from what I know about the type of men
who are on the Accounting Principles Board, to attempt to do more than
offer constructive advice where some consideration was being given to an
element which might affect the interpretation of financial statements by a
bank credit analyst or by a bank lending officer.
Banker: The Robert Morris Committee on Co-operation with Public
Accountants does review the exposure drafts, and this has been very inter
esting, and we appreciate that privilege, but we think that these accounting
principles are really the province of the accounting profession and the essen
tial responsibility rests there.
Analyst : My views are similar. What we need on the Accounting Prin
ciples Board is the best brains, not merely representation of a narrow view.
Analyst: I have no disagreement with what has been said. I just think
as analysts we can be much more helpful when we can be brought into the
deliberations of the APB.
Financial Executive: I would like to propose that the development
of acceptable accounting principles should be the responsibility of an inde
pendent research body, not dominated by any one group. Financial analysts,
Robert Morris Associates, financial executives, CPAs, university professors,
and other interested parties should be represented on such a body.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that we have good accountants
not only in the certified public accountant ranks, but also in industry and
the banking profession and financial analysts, and so on. The mere title CPA
is not the final measure of the ability and the capability of people to speak
on subjects in which we are interested. For this reason, it seems to me that
all groups should logically be represented on the APB.
The reason I suggest representation on the Board is that this is really
the only guarantee of being heard. I think the APB has missed an oppor
tunity, if I may suggest it, to draw on the suggestions, the knowledge, the
abilities of other people, particularly within industry. There are a lot of
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practicalities that are involved in some of these accounting principles. The
AICPA has a tremendous amount of knowledge because of its broad contacts
throughout industry. At the same time they are not living with some of the
problems that face accountants within industry day in and day out, and I
think that it behooves them to take advantage of the opportunity to draw
on this knowledge and to draw opinions which reflect the practicality as well
as the academic approach or the theoretical approach to some of the problems
to be faced.
Banker: I don’t see how the accounting profession can profess to a public
trust in their position of being public accountants and at the same time give
up any of the decision-making obligations as well as responsibility for setting
the practices that are acceptable to them. I think this is a public trust, and
while certainly they should seek out the advice of all those who are capable
of giving good advice, I don’t think they can delegate their decision-making
responsibility to others.
I’d like to get to something fundamental. By whom have generally
accepted accounting principles been accepted? By the investing public, the
accounting profession, or the clients? I always thought it was by the account
ing profession.
I think we have to decide who is going to be the promulgator, and
probably the expert, on generally accepted accounting principles.
If the accounting principles to be accepted are those of the AICPA,
then it is their body which is the one to establish them; whereas if it is a
more general grouping, then it probably has to be some other organization.
CPA: It disturbs me a bit to have the concept that public accounting
involves a public trust, which I think it does, coupled with the responsibility
of the CPA to determine accounting principles.
I think that industry management is the really definitive source of the
principle.
The APB, or any other comparable body, has to stand at a somewhat
higher judgmental level, perhaps, in weighing these principles that manage
ment evolves and develops, but I believe that the principles themselves should
be a reflection of managerial judgments. We can try to appraise their appli
cability and relevance, but we should not be the definers of principles in a
basic sense.
Professor: One of the questions that was raised by an accountant was
the extent of participation which the accountants would like to have from
the other groups. I wonder if any of those who have served on the APB or
are now serving would like to comment on the kind of help that they feel
would be most useful from the other groups that are represented here.
CPA: I was the chairman of the APB for three and a half years, and I
have struggled in many, many ways with the question that has been raised.
I am very sympathetic with the point of view that has been expressed by
industry, financial analysts, academicians and others.
You may remember that a few years back the membership of the Board
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was enlarged in order to include members from industry. The result was
that we acquired three very capable men who have been extremely valuable
additions to the Board. However, as it developed, they really did not repre
sent industry either in the sense of being able to speak for industry or in the
sense of carrying the message back to industry. They were simply three
additional good members of the Board.
If the Board is going to continue to be effective and do its job better,
it cannot become too large, and cannot be a symposium like this group. I
think we need a large symposium like this frequently to get the point of view
of all, but I’m sure nobody here would suggest that this group could write
an opinion on accounting principles. It would be totally impossible to func
tion in a committee this large.
I think the same thing would happen if we were to expand the APB in
size, to have representation from all the different groups. Therefore, it seems
to me that the logical alternative to that is to try to break down the responsi
bility in some way.
The APB in order to speed up its work and increase its effectiveness
has been broken down into subcommittees each attacking a single, specific
problem. Each subcommittee will make an effort to discuss the matter with
outsiders, prepare point outlines, find other groups that are interested, and
then come to the Board itself. In this way a highly knowledgeable, highly
articulate group prepares a proposal and defends it in a larger group. This
approach might well be adapted to include the efforts of other groups.
For example, the FEI as a group could examine certain parts of a prob
lem and have their own research and their own committee which would
then meet with a subcommittee of the APB working on the problem. The
Financial Analysts Federation, Robert Morris Associates and the American
Accounting Association could do the same thing, and in this way we could
achieve real participation on a broader scale, rather than just a kind of a
face-saving membership of one or two members on the Board.
Financial Executive: I would like to agree with the comments just
made. I feel that the present relationship and the working arrangement that
has been set up between the APB and the FEI is a solid one.
Many of the problems in the past have been largely related to timing
and the need that the APB felt to do something in a very short time frame,
which did not permit early involvement in the research that some of the FEI
members thought should have been done early in the review of the problem.
The time to get the various groups working together is at the very
conceptual stage of each project; because in that way all the interested groups
can feel as if they have been brought along as the research itself is developed.
Financial Executive: I concur that having a representative on the
APB is not our objective. We would like to get in on the early stages of the
research; and I think at that point we could make capable individuals available
on specific projects and put in the time necessary to accomplish this.
We can criticize ourselves in that we are constantly reacting rather than
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doing the planning, and a reaction is always a defensive mechanism. Our
feeling basically is that we want to be part of the planning aspect. I think
the APB should stay as it is, but broaden its base of participation in all
phases of its decision-making process.
Analyst: What I’m a little unhappy about in the suggestion that each
organization have its own subcommittees is that this kind of research would
represent a particular point of view—the organization that is preparing it.
I would hope that what we could do is enlarge the research effort by financing
studies to be done as objectively as possible, rather than having a study
prepared by one group such as the analysts as representative of their views.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that if we could have some
means of making a research study when a problem comes up that would
include the viewpoint of all groups, and then have a group get together with
the APB that would be representative of all the other groups, so the APB
would hear at one time the comments and thoughts of all of these groups
and get them into context, I think this would be quite useful.
Frequently, the views of bankers, financial analysts, and corporate man
agers are quite close together, but since the APB gets its feel separately from
each group, there isn’t the cohesiveness that there would be to the viewpoints
if it were done as a joint effort, rather than singly.
Professor: I wonder whether we are not losing sight of what the APB
is. At the present time it is still a part-time committee staffed by voluntary
members from the AICPA, and the basic talent of the APB—the members—
is financed by the individual firms who pay them while they spend several
days a year, or in some cases several weeks a year, on this service.
Would it not be desirable to develop an APB which has a number of
full-time members financed in some other way, who are devoting all of their
time to this for a defined period, such as a year or two years? And would
this not be a more important contribution that some of the accounting firms
could make, as opposed to the substantial commitment of time that some of
their partners now put in?
Financial Executive: I am concerned that the caliber of man on the
Accounting Principles Board would go down if this suggestion were carried
out. I just can’t imagine your getting the managing partner of a big firm on
a full-time basis, and I think most of them are on the Board or have repre
sented their firms there. Perhaps it would be sufficient to develop a full-time
professional staff of the highest caliber to serve the Board while still using
the top people on it.
Financial Executive: Personally, I like the idea of people working
full time on some of these very major problems. However, I don’t think the
final decision as to the accounting principles to be adopted necessarily has
to be made by full-time people. I think you need the best talent in the world
to make the final decision, but I think the answer to this thing is really in
getting more full-time people employed in basic research to get the answers.
We have talked about uniformity, comparability, flexibility this morning,
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and we have really come up with no definite conclusions. In my mind this is
a very deep-rooted problem, and we have to have more research. Whether
this is done partially by the FEI, partially by the AICPA, partially by the
FAF, and maybe the National Association of Accountants, and other organi
zations, we have to have it.
Perhaps we should have an Accounting Principles Foundation which
would be a completely independent research arm, and some of our organi
zations and our corporations could contribute to it on a continuing basis to
come up with some sound impartial research and some basic solutions.
I think this is the place where the full-time effort is needed.
CPA: I do think the way things are going we may be forced to gravitate
toward full-time Board membership, with a smaller number of the highest
caliber men on the Board. Such APB members would devote their full time,
divorced from practice during the time that they were serving, and would be
very highly paid for it.
CPA: Someone has to bring up the subject of money! Some years ago
we considered whether or not other organizations should be brought into
the financing of APB research effort. The general feeling was that we should
not have corporations make contributions, because of the possibility that
there might be some linkage which would lead to the thought that the
Opinions are not as objective as they might be.
However, if the groups represented here were to develop a budget for
accounting research, and this money moved through their respective organi
zations without identification of the donor, this might bring in funds that
would enable the Institute to carry on deeper and more extensive studies, and
be more comfortable about it.
Analyst: Didn’t the donation of $120,000 or so by the FEI to the
Mautz study on conglomerates point the way? In such cases, there is no
linkage or taint, and I thought it was an admirable job.
CPA: I have been interested in listening to this discussion to see the
relative emphasis that has been placed on research as opposed to the decision
making process. This indicates a hope that research somehow or other will
indicate the single solution or the couple of solutions which will be applicable
under rather specific sets of circumstances.
I for one have some doubts that research will actually accomplish this,
although it will clarify the issues and will line up a tremendous number of
pluses and minuses on the sides of the various alternatives that are available.
It seems to me if this desire which has been frequently stressed for com
parability under similar circumstances is to be achieved, someone has to
make the difficult choice among principles. This choice can be based in part
on the facts from the research study, but in part it will have to be made on
a somewhat arbitrary basis.
Therefore, I would think that the decision-making point, which at the
present time is the APB, would have been the main topic of discussion, rather
than the ability or the desire to participate in the research itself. And if I
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hear correctly, there does not seem to be any particular clamor on the part
of the other groups to become part of the decision-making process, so much
as it is to become part of the research which goes into that process.
Financial Executive: I agree with you. We are not interested in
sitting on the Board to make the final decision. I think there are competent
people on the Board to make these decisions; but we are interested in the
research. We are interested in making ourselves heard on some of our prob
lems that we feel are relevant to the decision-making process.
We have no quarrel with the APB making the final decision after they
have seen all the facts that we can bring into focus.
Analyst: I think an important background point to keep in mind is
that if the Accounting Principles Board is unable or unwilling to come up
with good, well-researched answers to hard questions, the alternative will be
poorly designed answers without research produced by the SEC. And if I
have a choice of which court I want to go to, I’d rather go to the Accounting
Principles Board.
CPA: It might be worthwhile to review the current procedures of the
Board. We generally start our consideration of a topic with a three-year
research study, which is not generally done by anyone on the Board. This
leads into a two-year deliberation by a subcommittee. The FEI is attuned
now to deliberate to get on board almost immediately by establishing a sub
committee to work with our subcommittee. The machinery has been set up.
It probably has not worked as well this first year as it should, but I know
there have been instances where there has been consultation.
Going back to research, there has been machinery set up so that at
least the research bodies of these different groups (including also the National
Association of Accountants) have lines of communication. Each supposedly
knows what the other is doing.
The FEI is getting into research, which we are very happy about. They
are undertaking a research study now in connection with which one of our
members will sit on their Advisory Board.
In our research studies, we have advisory boards where members repre
senting different skills and different outlooks sit. We would like very much
to have all the help we can. We have probably fumbled. We have probably
made mistakes. But we have developed improved procedures bringing in
outside parties and we would like it very much if the FAF and other groups
could follow the lead of the FEI and give organization to their desire for
participation so that they could be in tune on a timely basis to help us delib
erate. We invite this.
Professor: I wonder if it is necessary to have several different groups
undertaking research. We are all concerned with the same problems of
accounting principles.
One of our great difficulties in developing accounting principles has
been the slowness of research studies, just because there is no one group that
has responsibility for it. It seems to me that the most rapid rate of progress
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that we could get in securing comparability would come about if we had
research studies emerging in a more timely fashion; and we have seen in the
conglomerate study that if we do provide adequate support and permit people
to give their undivided attention to a project, we can get a thorough and
timely research effort.
Many of the AICPA studies are being done on a part-time basis by
partners from accounting firms and accounting professors who are already
more than 100 per cent occupied with other duties, and thus we make little
progress.
This part of our discussion has seemed to call for a united research
activity on the part of all four groups represented here and the NAA and
several others. I don’t see that research done by the Financial Executives
Institute ought to be any different from that which is done by the American
Institute of CPAs.
Financial Executive: I feel strongly that this is the only solution;
that if we have a group research effort that is financed by all the organizations
with a nucleus of a paid research staff supported by a board of directors
representing all organizations on a part-time basis, we are going to accom
plish the most in the shortest time.
Financial Executive: I think we are using the word “research” here
in a little broader sense than we really mean. I think what we are talking
about is complete inputs. Thomas Russell’s Committee on Corporate Report
ing for FEI is not really, in fact, doing a great deal of research. They are
accumulating inputs, so that all of those inputs do get to APB before the
decision process starts.
I think that the relationship that has been now established with FEI could
very well be considered by these other groups in getting all of the input
information into APB before the decision-making process comes about.
Now, where you get into a major subject, like our conglomerate study,
there’s no question about the desirability of independent research, and all
of the groups here were represented on our advisory panel, which is most
desirable.
I question whether you can in fact set up an independent research body
and get the inputs any better than you can by a co-operative working rela
tionship between APB and the organizations represented here.
Financial Executive: There seems to be wide acceptance of the role
of the APB, albeit with early and wider participation by other groups. Implicit
in our discussion, however, is a lack of understanding of how the APB oper
ates. The APB has a choice between being (1) theoretical, (2) pragmatic, or
(3) authoritarian. It was founded ostensibly upon a theoretical approach and
this is supported in its interest in research. But at times it issues Opinions
unsupported by research or departs from the findings of its research. It
appears pragmatic in its calls for opinions with respect to disclosure drafts
and then departs from the weight of evidence. In its departure from either
the theoretical or pragmatic approaches, it appears authoritarian, but if it is,
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it is stymied by the present requirement of a two-to-one vote for approval.
Were the Securities and Exchange Commission to usurp the field, we
undoubtedly would have fewer divergencies and more comparability, if not
outright standardization. In this eventuality, both groups of preparers would
have to be relieved of their present responsibilities and the product would be
unacceptable to most. Management, investors and creditors would all have
to make their desired adjustments to achieve their ends.
Thus, in a political sense, we are precariously balanced between des
potism on one hand and anarchy on the other, with both extremes being unde
sirable to all. But this is freedom. When each group recognizes that progress
cannot be made without a true appreciation of the legitimate demands of
other parties, then and only then can we move ahead.
Professor: In summarizing this discussion, it seems to me that while
there is not unanimity, there is fairly strong consensus that the Accounting
Principles Board as presently constituted is an appropriate body to establish
accounting principles. There is some disagreement as to the degree of partici
pation wanted by non-CPAs in the development of those principles and there
is some feeling that the operation of the Board would be more effective if
full-time Board members of sufficient competence could be recruited, but in
general I think there is satisfaction with the present Board.
Additionally, it is clear that financial executives, analysts, and bank
credit officers are ready to be of assistance to the Board in its work and in so
doing, they want to participate in the development of principles at as early a
stage as possible. They want a genuine opportunity to express their views
early enough in the total process so that they believe that those views are
given fair consideration before any decisions are reached. While it wasn’t
said, I detected a feeling that the APB will disregard this particular desire at
its own peril.
The members of the Accounting Principles Board have indicated that
they will welcome such participation and that steps have already been taken
to facilitate it. In addition, it was also clear that the APB welcomes effective
independent research on significant subjects, however that research is spon
sored.
While some feel that there are advantages in a central research body to
do all accounting research, the preponderance of opinion seems to be that
this would be difficult to achieve and finance due to diverse interests within
the various groups.

Disclosure of Estimates of the Future
The discussions of comparability and the role of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board represent primarily a commentary on the reporting environment
as it exists today. A number of the participants, however, were not content
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with reporting in its present form. The analyst group particularly suggested
that the best remedy for such problems as the current overemphasis on earn
ings per share and the actions of corporate reporters resulting from this fact
was the development of new and innovative reporting forms. Most frequently
mentioned in this respect was the possibility of reporting future expectations
of management. It is clear from the discussion that no consensus exists that
such reporting is desirable or what form it should take if it is to be done. Ideas
seem to range from a published budget and long-range plan to a general man
agement statement about short-range expectations. There are also questions
as to whether the auditor should be involved in future disclosure in any way.
While no answers and agreements emerged from the Symposium on this
topic, the feeling of need on the part of some users was clear. If such a need
in fact exists, the Seaview discussions on the subject may be the forerunner
of continuing exploration by the groups involved of the forms which such
reports might take to meet the need. At the same time, the various risks
associated with such disclosure that are pointed out by the financial executives
must be fully considered.
Professor: One problem that was raised frequently in the papers and
critiques was the need for additional disclosure and, more specifically, dis
closure of future expectations. Is this something corporations and auditors
should be concerned about?
Analyst: I would like to propose that management consider making
public statements as to the future prospects of their company on a periodic
basis, in whatever form they feel is most appropriate. This is not only desirable
from a user’s point of view but from a management viewpoint as well, particu
larly in today’s environment.
In some instances this is already being done. Some companies periodically
give indications as to where they think their company is going in the near
future. And there are varying degrees of precision that are used, and most
appropriately so, because certain industries have the stability to make fore
casts which top management is willing to make public. With others it is
more difficult because of the obvious vicissitudes of the economy and the
industry, which would make it most difficult for a forecast to be meaningful.
When we are considering disclosure today, we must consider more than
just the income statement and the balance sheet. We must consider the overall
aspects of a corporation’s image in the community.
One of the best ways that a corporation can present meaningful infor
mation for the investment community is through forward thinking, rather
than disclosure of the current situation and what the past record was. Stock
prices are primarily influenced by future expectations, and accordingly I think
it is management’s responsibility to make comments as to what this future
prospect may be.
This is not simply another analyst’s request for more information. In
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today’s world, when there are problems of liability arising from inadvertent
disclosure of what may turn out by hindsight to be material information, it
may be very beneficial for management to change the scope of their full dis
closure policy. The best disclosure may be to set the stage on a public basis
of where you think your company is going.
Then you can talk about the detail and the background within that
framework without having the concern of, perhaps, tripping a move in the
stock price by some comment that may have been inadvertently made about
some aspect of the business.
I would like management to consider this prospect. There are many
ways of achieving it, but I think that if we take it from a flexible point of view,
this could be a very meaningful step forward both in reducing the overem
phasis on earnings per share, and in reducing the emphasis on short-term
as opposed to long-term implications for stock prices.
These factors, I think, will give more healthy strength to stock prices
and bring the investor more in line with the attitudes and ambitions and
desires of management in managing a business as a going concern over a
period of time.
Financial Executive: I can’t agree on that one. I think this would
really open up a Pandora’s box. A whole new series of problems relating to
public disclosure of forecasts will be created, but the problem you are trying
to solve will not go away. As soon as the actual facts unfold you are going
to have the same type of market reaction that you would have when you just
focus on the earnings per share.
Financial Executive: It seems to me that the idea is impractical.
For such disclosure to be meaningful, it would have to be put in a context
where it could be fully understood by a reader. But users of financial infor
mation are addicted to brief summary figures; forecasts in these terms would
be more misleading than helpful.
Today the APB is arguing over dozens of different ways of determining
what earnings have been, and there is general agreement that readers don’t
understand what the final figure arrived at really means. Since we do not
have understanding of past data, how can we expect the reader of a report to
understand the implications of projections of the future?
So I think we had better try to solve our problems now without intro
ducing more of them.
Financial Executive: I think the last speaker is right. We have so
many problems of trying to decide where we are and where we have been
that I would hate to see us spend too much time on the question of forecasting.
I think it would be wasted time.
Analyst: I have great respect for the integrity and the sense of responsi
bility of 99 per cent of our companies to do the best job possible in developing
and presenting budget figures. I agree there is the problem of those who will
go overboard, and it should be up to the analysts to filter out these, so that
we do not give weight to irresponsible statements. From time to time com
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panies do get reputations for a credibility gap, but hopefully these are going
to be very few.
CPA: I am told that in England the forecasting of the type that was
just mentioned is actually being done by management, and is even being
reviewed by chartered accountants, although not in the same form as an attes
tation of historical data; and it seems to me it makes eminently good sense.
The earnings per share takes on a disproportionate meaning for people,
because it is the best handle they can think of to make their own forecasts.
We are in the position of giving a do-it-yourself kit to the analyst and telling
him to make his own forecast, while management, who are certainly the bestqualified people to do it, have already done this. They have engineered a
complete budget and are making management decisions on the basis of it.
Why hide this valuable, well-constructed information, and instead let the
public and the financial analysts and others construct their own rather inept
forecasts on the basis of much less information?
I’m naturally not too anxious to take on the liability as a CPA of attesting
to all of this, although if this information is to be useful, it must be reliable,
and to make it more reliable perhaps ultimately CPAs should be attesting
to it or at least reviewing it.
I cannot buy the idea that everyone should go out on his own and guess
the best way he can while there are people on the inside who have worked
hard to develop reasonable budgets and forecasts. Why leave people on their
own?
Financial Executive: I am petrified at what I have heard here about
making public forecasts. This is not going to take the emphasis off earnings
per share; whatever forecast you make would be converted to earnings per
share.
The thing that bothers me after listening to everything that has been
said is that I think we are seeking to get some easy way of appraising a whole
complex company or group of companies. This way does not exist.
I don’t think you are ever going to get comparability or anything else
with a bunch of numbers, be they earnings per share or anything else, that
is going to allow you to compare one company with another. There must be
some information in addition to that. What we must do is to work out what
companies can give those who are interested in their affairs in the way of
information to help them make that evaluation beyond the earnings per share
and third decimal statistics.
CPA: In discussing some of the ways of revealing the results of opera
tions or management accomplishments, it seems to me that we must think
about our financial writers. It seems to me that not only should they be at
symposiums of this sort as an integral part, but, further, that in our dealings
with financial writers we should emphasize the importance of not taking these
figures and considering them the end-all in terms of trying to evaluate the
accomplishments of management. This is the factor that is so often missing
and becomes a great void in all of our communication in this field.
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Professor: We have had testimony that users would like future-oriented
disclosure. Joseph Roth, in his paper, indicated that there might be demand
for auditor’s representations on these published forecasts. Should the auditor
be involved?
Analyst: I don’t think so. Anything involved with prospective aspira
tions or results of corporations is developed by the corporate management,
and it is their best estimate of what the future may hold. At best it is based
on assumptions and probability and a lot of other factors which cannot be
tested in a precise manner.
Banker: The thing that concerns most bankers who are dealing with
smaller companies is the fact that many such companies operate by the seat
of their pants and neither have nor know how to prepare or use budgets and
forecasts. I have recommended many times to borrowing clients that they
develop such tools and I have suggested that they discuss the matter and work
with their CPA to assist them in preparing these statements.
I do not visualize that I would ever look to the CPA for warranty as
to the accuracy of budgets, but I would like to feel that CPA firms would assist
our clients in the preparation of such items.
CPA: The accounting firms do perform such management advisory
services to a very substantial extent without any relationship to attestation.
But one thing which CPAs might do would be to provide an attestation that
sound principles were followed in areas other than the preparation of tradi
tional financial statements.
For example, we might make an examination of a firm’s budgeting
process and attest to the fact that sound budgeting principles have been applied
in preparing a budget that has been presented, without saying anything about
the accuracy of the figures.
Many budgets are weak because management is not fully aware of how
to approach the planning process systematically, and our attestation might
be helpful to outsiders and the management in protecting against this problem.
Financial Executive: I am very much afraid that people would think
that they were getting something that they were not getting. Anybody who
has ever had anything to do with budgets certainly knows that if your pro
cedures are bad, you have less chance of getting a good budget, but even
when they are good there are so many things involved that the fact that your
procedures are good does not make it an accurate prediction of what income
will be. People would interpret an auditor’s certification of procedures to
represent assurance of accuracy, and it can’t be that.
CPA: British accountants are contemplating reports on forecasts. A
recent magazine article there indicated that accountants can, within limits,
properly undertake a critical and objective review of the assumptions on
which profit forecasts are based and can verify that the forecasts have been
properly computed on a basis consistent with the company’s previous account
ing principles in the underlying assumptions and data. In other words, they
can attest that the compilations are based upon the assumptions.
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Banker: While most of us are satisfactorily assured that large corpora
tions do a conscientious job of forecasting, this is not applicable to the largest
number of borrowers. For such smaller companies we do need some sort of
an attestation to the validity of the premises and the assumptions underlying
the budgets and the forecasts that we are working with. It would be helpful,
and we would encourage it.
Financial Executive: I continue to take strong exception to the basic
concept that it is desirable to publish budgeted results.
We have budgets, of course, but we also know that they are variable, and
they are not always attained. To put out figures representing to the public
that a particular result was expected would be a grave mistake.
Professor: In summarizing this discussion, all I can say is that there
is a significant absence of agreement. The analysts’ group feels a need for
various forms of disclosure of future estimates while the corporate executives
present are extremely concerned by the implications of this proposal. It is
certainly an area for additional investigation and communication between the
groups.

Surveillance Over Corporate Reporting
In addition to seeking new forms of reporting, several changes in the
institutional environment of reporting were suggested during the Symposium.
Some of the suggestions regarding the Accounting Principles Board repre
sented institutional innovations, and the expressed desire of all groups to
participate in the selection of APB topics and the research on those topics
make it likely that some new stages in the APB process will be developed.
Beyond this, there was an expressed feeling that lacking in today’s
institutional environment was a means by which corporate reporting could
be systematically reviewed for its adequacy in individual cases. Analysts
seemed to feel that most reporting was good, but that exceptions did exist.
They felt that some way should be found to call attention to these exceptions
with the hope of remedying them and reducing the number of times that they
occur. Ideas varied from the suggestion that there be a joint body which would
be available to receive and comment upon protests by statement users to the
idea that a continuing body should be established to review all public reports.
This is another area where ideas are still largely in an embryonic stage
and there is a need for more research to consider whether a real need exists
and how it should be met if it does. The discussion which follows simply
introduces the problem.

Professor: Both in reading the papers and in hearing the discussions
over the past few days, I have the feeling that there is some dissatisfaction,
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not with all corporate reporting, but with some examples of it. Analysts
particularly have cited examples of situations in which disclosure was felt to
be inadequate or the accounting principle selected inappropriate for the
particular circumstance. The question that seems logically to arise, therefore,
is whether there should be some institutional means of surveillance over
corporate reporting so that these examples, if indeed they are unsatisfactory,
can be brought to public attention.
Analyst: At the present time the Financial Analysts Federation has a
corporate information committee which is increasing its activities in the area
of evaluating the corporate reporting process. We have a group of subcom
mittees which are grading the efforts of management in reporting, and where
we find excellence we are making awards to the companies.
In this connection we have not yet wrestled with the problem of poor
reporting; we certainly do not give enough awards for excellence to brand
all other reporting as poor. Eventually, however, if we continue our process
it may be that we issue hundreds of certificates and ultimately begin to get at
poor reporting by not identifying it as good.
To do this, of course, we have to set standards which we feel are minimum
in this area and we are now thinking seriously about putting criteria on paper.
This is a difficult process and will take some time, but we are now gathering
together the criteria of the various subcommittees in various industries which
we cover. We hope that this will be a document that could be used to identify
and push those who do not meet the qualifications of good reporting.
The question remains as to what we do about abuses. Public accountants
are in a difficult position to push for better accounting principles and disclosure
with their own clients. Analysts are in a stronger position to assert a point of
view, but we have not yet done so.
Perhaps in co-operation with the other groups represented here we could
form a standards committee which would have the necessary strength and
influence to enforce reporting standards in those fringe elements of the report
ing community which presently do not hold to such standards. It must be
recognized that the number of abuses which we are really talking about is
very small in both relative and absolute terms but we do have to be able to
deal with them.
I might also add that analysts have problems to be solved in the area of
policing reports and activities of other analysts as well. Some of our members
do not meet the standards which we believe should be followed by qualified
financial analysts. As yet we have not solved this problem.
CPA: I assume that this discussion refers primarily to deficiencies in pub
lished annual reports of the type that represent insufficient disclosure from an
analyst’s point of view, even though no technical accounting or auditing
violation may have taken place. We have no administrative machinery to
deal with such problems.
On the other hand, we do have a practice review committee, both at the
AICPA and in many of the larger state societies. The AICPA committee
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works mainly with published financial reports. Anyone who feels that there
is an accounting deficiency which relates to the financial statements or the
auditor’s report may send to the AICPA office a copy of the report with their
questions. The report and the questions will then be transmitted on an anony
mous basis to the practice review committee which will take up the questions.
The committee will then raise questions with the particular auditing firm
involved to get additional information in order to be able to form an opinion
as to whether there is a shortcoming in reporting. Since this is an educational
process for the benefit of the member, the committee will render a final opinion
to the public accountant involved. No opinion will be rendered to the man who
sent in the report because we feel our principal objective is to educate our
members. This is not a disciplinary proceeding and, in fact, the practice
review committee cannot turn the report over to the ethics committee for
disciplinary purposes. We would certainly be very happy to have bankers and
analysts submit reports to the committee.
CPA: At the New York State level we have been working on a procedure
in co-operation with bankers which will bring to our practice review committee
private as well as public reports. Bankers are invited to submit reports to a
Robert Morris group which then disguises them so that neither the name of
the auditor nor the client is included and then submits them to our practice
review committee. This committee reviews the report and sends its comments
back to whoever submitted the case, through the Robert Morris representative.
It is then up to the banker to discuss the matter with the accountant and
perform whatever educational processes which he feels desirable. Once again,
this process is entirely educational and not disciplinary.
We have now been at this process for three years, and, if the number of
cases is any criterion, I must say that it represents a tribute to the discipline
of the public accounting profession. In the three years during which we have
existed, we have had a total of 40 cases and the pattern of these cases is highly
repetitive. The most frequent situation is one where the auditor gives an
unqualified opinion in the face of inventory submitted by management or
receivables unconfirmed.
As a result of this experience I have increasingly questioned whether the
output of this committee warranted the time invested in it. We must consider
both whether there is a substantial amount of substandard reporting and
whether bankers and credit grantors are sufficiently concerned to devote effort
to enlisting aid from the accounting profession in dealing with such reports.
Banker: I believe that the practice review program is far from a failure.
The success of a penal system is not judged by the number of people who fill
the jails; it’s judged by the number of empty cells. The mere fact that this
practice review committee exists has been a tremendous help to credit grantors
in obtaining the type of financial report which they would like to see from
their borrowers. On several occasions in the past three years I could have sent
in substandard reports, but I followed the practice originally envisioned when
we set up the committee of first talking with the CPA involved. I have talked
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with him quietly about the report, and on some occasions I have intimated
that I would certainly not want to go to the practice review committee. By
this device I have made many friends and improved reports. I therefore feel
practice review has been very successful, even though I have not sent in a
single report.
CPA: I agree that practice review is useful, but I don’t think that this in
all instances will really satisfy the financial analysts. Even when they use this
system they pass along their comment when they think there is a deficiency,
but that is the last they would ever hear of it. I think that education should
be a two-way street.
In some cases, for example, there may be good and legitimate reasons
why the report is as it is, which may not appear on the surface. In any event,
it might be that any deficiencies are not the responsibility of the reporting
corporation or the public accountant, but rather are a matter for the whole
profession or the Accounting Principles Board. Such facts should be com
municated back to the analyst who submits a report for review.
It might be desirable to set up some kind of special system of communi
cation that would make known to the AICPA all of the various comments and
criticisms on specific reports. This might be supplemented by a system which
would permit financial analysts to talk to some counterpart in the AICPA
and explore the implications of a report together, without necessarily prefer
ring a charge against the accountant that would come before the ethics
committee or even specifically asking the practice review committee to deal
with the matter.
Analyst: I support this idea wholeheartedly. The Financial Analysts
Federation may not have enough strength in its own organization to achieve
what we would like to achieve, and perhaps if all of us are together and in
agreement, we can develop the necessary strength.
Professor: In summary then, I sense the feeling that there is a need for
some surveillance mechanism over corporate financial reporting beyond that
provided by the practice review committee and the ethics committee of the
AICPA. This surveillance activity would have as its principal objective to
educate and inform rather than to discipline, although there might be some
encouraging and deterring force in the publication of its activities where good
and bad examples of corporate report might be publicized.
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Section II

The Problems of
Income Measurement
It is extremely difficult to divide a discussion of financial reporting into
parts, since the interrelationships among all topics are great. In the previous
section, discussions relating to the institutional framework of reporting and
the forms in which reporting should take place were summarized, and included
were many comments on the problems of defining accounting principles.
In this section, the related problems of accounting measurement are more
specifically considered. Robert Sprouse introduces the area with a general
discussion of income measurement objectives and then deals with a number
of specific problems which are currently active subjects of discussion by the
business community and the Accounting Principles Board. The transcript of
the discussions is similarly divided into a section on the objectives of financial
statements and three sections on specific topics: price-level accounting, the
treatment of accounting changes, and accounting for intercorporate investment.

Introductory Remarks
Professor Robert T. Sprouse
I have approached the problem of the measurement of income in two
ways. In the first half of the paper, I have attempted to deal with the general
problem of income measurement on a very broad scale. My academic bias
leads me to favor discussing that area to a considerable extent. I have been
very much concerned with the lack of attention to the general problem of
income measurement on the part of the Accounting Principles Board in its
pronouncements and their almost exclusive preoccupation with specific issues.
I frankly doubt that it’s possible to make substantial progress with specific
issues without some more fundamental groundwork having been laid.
The second half of the paper does deal with some specific accounting
issues that face us today. The area selected for special attention was inter
corporate investments. A research study of this area, sponsored by the Ameri
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can Institute, is now under way. The APB will soon be taking up specific
issues related to intercorporate investments, including the problems of acquisi
tions and mergers; a study in this area has just been published on accounting
for goodwill. But, although the area is increasingly important, with the
exception of the purchase or pooling controversy it has not received a great
deal of discussion.
At the outset of the paper I made the assertion that the purpose of
financial statements is to provide information which is useful in making
rational economic decisions—specifically, rational investment decisions.
In the four critiques it becomes apparent that this is not an accepted
assertion. While David Norr agreed, Thomas Murphy and Harry Long did
not; Robert Trueblood did not deal with it directly.
Thomas Murphy disagrees with this statement of purpose, saying that
“the primary purpose ... is to discharge management’s obligation to report
to its stockholders on its stewardship and to society on the progress of the
business.”
Harry Long’s statements are along the same lines, arguing that the prime
purpose is not to serve investors but to satisfy demands for reporting made by
society. He advocates an extension of accounting measurements to manage
ment, stating: “A primary purpose of financial reports is to measure the
performance of management. . . .” In the course of the critique he suggests
that there ought to be a management audit performed by certified public
accountants as well as merely an attestation to the financial statements.
I think this difference in the objectives of financial statements is the first
issue that must be settled. I don’t know how progress can be made in any
direction whatsoever without agreement on what purpose financial statements
are intended to serve. I hope that we can have considerable discussion on that
most fundamental point. It is an area that has been almost totally neglected,
and perhaps that is the reason why we have alternative methods and disagree
ment within the APB. It may be that the members voting “Yes” and the
members voting “No” on a particular issue are not even thinking about the
same purposes to be served in presenting a set of financial statements.
Given the assertion that I made about the purpose of financial statements,
I tried to raise the question of what concept of income would be most useful
to serve that purpose. There are three suggestions here: first, one based on
invested cost measured in number of dollars, regardless of their purchasing
power (which, to a great extent, represents financial reporting today); second,
one based on invested cost measured in real dollars, reflecting changes in
purchasing power; and third, one based on current values, where determinable.
Robert Trueblood apparently tends to favor the latter two, because he
refers to the “unreality of the profession’s failure to take into account price
level changes,” and he suggests that “perhaps the greatest need by way of
improving financial accounting is to move toward the use of current values.”
Again we have disagreement. Thomas Murphy states that the steward
ship approach, which he advocates as being the primary purpose of financial
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statements, “precludes the necessity of recognizing purchasing power or
price-level changes.”
Harry Long argues that “income determination should move closer to
taxable income,” which is a suggestion that we don’t have to worry about a
concept of income; we can look to the Internal Revenue Code. He does argue
that full disclosure would permit parties to recast the information for their
own purposes and needs, and that overall adjustment for inflation would be
at best guesses and difficult to make. The idea is that if you have full dis
closure, each individual user can adjust to the concept of income which he
favors. The providers of financial information, therefore, would not have to
be committed to one particular concept of income.
This seems to lead us back to the basic question of whether it is possible
to make progress in financial reporting without having some underlying
framework to which reference is repeatedly and consistently made. Is it
possible to develop a meaningful measurement of income by deciding on an
ad hoc basis what should be and what should not be included in its measure
ment, without first resolving the nature of income?
In this regard, Mr. Trueblood makes some specific recommendations
about the entire process. He notes that leadership is needed in designing and
suggesting basic improvements in generally accepted accounting principles
at the higher, broader levels. Then he outlines specific steps that he sees as
being needed in the process of developing a measurement of income: first,
research; second, a statement of general objectives of financial accounting;
third, a series of statements of accounting objectives in specific subject areas;
and fourth, the preparation of a series of practice bulletins codifying currently
acceptable practice. In his advocacy of these steps, he looks to the APB to
carry out the last three.
Most of the Board’s current Opinions have been of the practice bulletin
type and Mr. Trueblood expresses the hope that before it undertakes pro
nouncements about specific accounting issues within particular areas, such
as price-level accounting and business combinations, that it would first issue a
statement of the objectives to be served in accounting in those areas.
I think this is an important distinction. There is a very great difference
between rendering Opinions which offer specific rules for handling accounting
transactions and developing a statement of objectives to be served in determin
ing the rules that are to be implemented.
Turning to the specific problems of measuring income, the answers to
accounting questions depend largely on what the user of the data is looking
for in the income figure. In determining when revenue should be considered
“earned,” for example, is the user looking for cash receipts? Is he looking for
the results of arm’s-length transactions, whether or not cash has been received?
Is he looking for measurable changes in well-being, whether or not cash has
been received and whether or not the business entity itself was a party in an
arm’s-length transaction?
David Norr makes the point that income is whatever ends up at the end
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of the statement, and uses an interesting analogy: “Time is what we measure
with a watch. Income is what we measure with a profit and loss statement.”
I have some doubt about this being a useful approach for the Accounting
Principles Board.
With respect to measurement of expenses, there are several problems.
First, there is the question of whether the measurement of income can be
improved by giving greater recognition to the impact of the time value of
money by using discounted present values, in contrast to the current practice
of equating all dollars, regardless of when the payments or exchanges of
dollars are made. This is relevant in connection with leases, depreciation,
income tax deferral and other areas.
Secondly, would income measurement be improved by taking into
consideration changes in the general price level, or by taking into consideration
changes in the specific prices of assets?
Mr. Murphy agrees with my assertion that the primary constraint on
recognition of revenues is indeed the feasibility of objective measurement,
not these other things. With respect to measurement of expenses, he states
that changes in purchasing power and changes in the specific value of assets
are factors to be considered in fiscal management, but not in management’s
financial statements.
Harry Long urges that inventories, as a specific example relating to this
point, should be conservatively valued in order to perpetuate tax savings. I
think this was consistent with the remarks made earlier that he sees some
advantages in moving toward a taxable income figure rather than some kind
of separate income figure for financial reporting purposes.
In addition to the problems of recognizing revenue and expense, the
treatment of gains and losses in the measurement of income must be considered.
APB Opinion No. 9, which deals with this subject, differentiates between
operating items, extraordinary items, and prior period adjustments. This is
a major step toward greater comparability, but there are still differences of
interpretation. The entire problem has certainly not been solved by this
Opinion.
With respect to the more specific items in the area of intercorporate
investments I think there are three distinguishable problems. The first is how
to account for the income from intercorporate investments involving less than
50 per cent ownership? That is, should the income be based on cash dividends
received? Should it be based on the share of earnings in the particular company
in which investments were held? Should it be based on market values, and
changes in those market values?
Thomas Murphy suggests that fair presentation is the controlling factor.
This is consistent with the notion of flexibility, and allows management to
decide which is appropriate.
The second problem arises in the currently popular joint venture with
some other corporation where the ownership is split 50-50. Should income
measurement in such a case be based on cash dividends received or on the
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share of earnings, either by including a single figure or by consolidating half
of the enterprise? Market value is not an option here, because there is no
market value for such securities.
Finally, there is the case of more than 50 per cent ownership where,
presumably, control exists. Should the income measurement be based on cash
dividends or share of earnings or consolidation? In this case Mr. Murphy
agrees with certain of my assertions that legal segregation is not a basis for
excluding the results of a subsidiary. And Mr. Long would leave this to the
independent judgment of qualified independent CPAs in every instance, not
to management.
A final issue to be considered in this area is the purchase-versus-pooling
controversy. The basic problem to be considered here is whether a business
combination should be accounted for as an acquisition reflecting the market
value of securities exchanged or as a pooling which ignores the market value,
or whether management should be given the choice.
If purchase accounting is to be used, we have the problem of accounting
for goodwill. What do we do with it? Should it be reported unamortized?
Should it be amortized over some necessarily arbitrary period of time? Should
it be written off in a lump sum immediately—the most recent recommenda
tion? Or should it be written off in a lump sum eventually?
In this instance Mr. Murphy agrees with the assertion that the pooling
concept has deteriorated far beyond its original meaning, but he would not
discard this concept entirely. He states that the fault lies within the accounting
profession for agreeing with the shortsighted practices of those who have gotten
out of bounds.
I note that he has argued elsewhere that management’s responsibility is
most significant and is of paramount importance in any consideration of the
adequacy of corporate financial statements, and that management should not
be placed in a straitjacket by accounting rules. Mr. Murphy seems to be
saying that management should take the credit and the accounting profession
the blame!
Mr. Long, I think, is really rather easy to get along with: full disclosure
of the transaction, whether it be purchase or pooling, is the most important
thing, and he is somewhat concerned about possible moves within financial
reporting that might make mergers less attractive.
Finally, I would like to turn to David Norr’s critique which I think is a
most important one, but which did not fit in with the specific questions I have
been discussing and which I have, therefore, not yet treated fully.
Mr. Norr is very impatient with the lack of progress under the current
approach to solving accounting problems. That’s very evident from his paper.
He offers constructive suggestions as to how greater progress might be made,
and his main pitch is on sharing the research burden. I think that in no place
in the paper does he suggest that the Financial Analysts Federation or others
should be involved in the decision-making process; however, he cites examples
of how useful it would be if when the Accounting Principles Board got ready
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to take up a problem there were research results from several sources available
to the Board to assist it in making a better decision. His major recommenda
tion is that there be a massive step-up in accounting research.

Objectives of Financial Statements
A starting point in discussing the problem of accounting measurement is
the determination of why income is being measured in the first place. Pro
fessor Sprouse suggests in his paper that the purpose of financial statements and
income measurement is to supply useful information to an investor, but in the
discussion that follows it is obvious that this point of view is not shared by all of
the participants. The investment orientation for financial statements implies
that the past is reported primarily as a means of forecasting the future. Many of
the participants, and particularly the financial executives attending the Sym
posium, feel that the past is reported primarily in order to account for manage
ment’s past stewardship over assets rather than with any forecasts in mind. In
the discussion which follows, the differences in these philosophies are outlined
and the group considers whether there is a real difference between these points
of view or whether good stewardship accounting is also good investmentoriented accounting.

Analyst: Many of us in the financial community as professionals are,
in effect, fiduciaries. We are involved in managing or guiding people on very
significant sums. So I think we have to have a sense of responsibility, and
broaden the purpose for which financial statements are prepared to embrace
this public concept—usefulness to the investor.
Analyst: I don’t understand what difference there is between your state
ment that the purpose of financial statements is to provide data to make
rational investment decisions, and Mr. Murphy’s idea that their purpose is
reporting on the stewardship of management.
If the management is reporting on its stewardship to stockholders, I think
you said, then they are telling about what they have done, and the stockholders
are going to react to this in one of three ways. They are going to make a deci
sion whether to buy, hold or sell that security in relation to other opportunities
to buy, sell or hold securities.
So it seems to me that the management reporting on its stewardship to the
stockholders is supplying information to investors.
Financial Executive: I think that there’s an enormous difference be
tween these two purposes. A rational investment decision means, to me, essen
tially an assessment of the future. This assessment of the future considers
many things in arriving at an aggregate decision, including investment climate,
outlook for the technology, the political climate, the behavior of the market—
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many other things which in the aggregate are so essential to knowing whether
that investment should be made or not.
Now, it’s true that the past history of the enterprise is also one of the
important ingredients of that decision, but it’s pretty far down the scale of
factors or components that have to be weighed in coming up with that decision.
On the other hand, reporting on stewardship itself is a tremendously im
portant process, one that should be looked upon as an end in its own right.
It would seem to me that many of the accounting concepts that we struggle
with are premised on this very assumption that it is essentially a means of man
agement reporting on its own stewardship. The main purpose of the statements
is to report on past performance, not to make projections into the uncertain
future about all the intangibles and unknowns that can affect the welfare of
the enterprise.
Financial Executive: I think the measurement of income is going to
be different things to different people. I think it depends upon what your
investment is for. Is it a short-term or long-term investment? Is it in the form
of debt or equity?
I think these things are certainly going to have an effect on what you say
your definition of income is, and what your objectives are going to be for the
measurement of that income.
Professor: Let me see if I can illustrate the different approaches by
means of an example. Take the case of earnings per share. If the purpose of
the earnings-per-share computation is to report on management’s stewardship,
I see no reason whatsoever for going any further than the legalistic approach—
the earnings per share this year, based on this year’s shares outstanding. Why
in the world would you take future dilution into consideration if you are
reporting on management’s stewardship?
But if the real reason we want an eamings-per-share figure is so that we
can make a better prediction of the future earnings per share, then the dilution
becomes relevant.
Banker: I am not convinced that your example is a good one. If you
report earnings per share on a purely historical legal basis I think you are mis
leading people on a stewardship basis, because if a corporate management has
gotten earnings today through a series of financial transactions which are going
to lead to future dilution, I think that is a part of their accounting and their
stewardship today. If you report on a proper basis on your stewardship, you
are reporting useful information for investors. If you report useful information
for investors, you are properly reporting for stewardship. That’s the only point
that some of us are trying to make. We do not see there is any difference
between the two.
CPA: It seems to me also that the two are really identical. It’s hard to
see how, if we were to say good stewardship accounting calls for certain prin
ciples, and then good accounting for reaching rational economic decisions calls
for certain principles, would the principles differ? I think not. I can’t think
of a single case where good stewardship accounting would call for something
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different from what you would do if you were reporting in order to enable
people to make rational economic decisions.
CPA: There is a very subtle change taking place that we ought to think
about for a minute. There are really two different concepts of the income
statement involved here, and I think we have a transition and evolution going
on, almost without realizing it.
To me the old-fashioned way of looking at income was what you might
call a stewardship approach, the presentation of a historical record of what has
transpired.
We are now involved in an evolution to what for lack of better termin
ology might be called the earning power concept of an income statement.
When the investment community looks at an income statement, what is being
sought is a measure of the continuing earning power of the entity. The in
vestors are only looking at it to enable them to make decisions with respect to
the future. This earning power concept of an income statement implies that
past history ought to be presented in such a way that it can be used in a most
meaningful and useful manner to make decisions for the future.
This orientation doesn’t mean you are necessarily going to put in fore
casting budgets or other new data, but when you start thinking in those terms
it starts infiltrating your decisions on all accounting problems and you may
come to different conclusions. There’s no doubt in my mind that the earning
power concept of the income statement is the income statement of the future,
and where we are all heading.
This does not mean that earning power statements are not also good for
stewardship purposes and other purposes, but the emphasis is different.
Financial Executive : I would agree that if an income statement serves
both of these purposes, as well as any number of other functions that we could
think of, then ideally it’s the kind of income statement that we want, but I
think we have to put emphasis on the word “primary”.
If the primary purpose is to help us make investment decisions about the
future, then it would seem to me that the accounting profession will have to
reach a little further, perhaps, to give a little more consideration to such things
as value concepts and real dollars.
Let’s take the extractive industries. Is the cost basis proper? Should we
try to measure the accretion of reserves in place from year to year? This type
of thing introduces a real question of objectivity in measurement, and I believe
that if you put your emphasis on stewardship, objectivity goes very high on
the scale of values that you are going to rely on. But in an investment-oriented
measurement system, objectivity is less vital. Therefore, I think that we have a
real problem of identifying the primary purpose; this has been a source of
continuing trouble for the APB in trying to reach some of these accounting
principles.
Professor: To summarize, it seems apparent that analysts are ready to
agree that financial statements are primarily intended to help them make
investment decisions, and therefore past income must be determined in a way
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that makes it useful in forecasting the future. Other groups, however, are not
willing to concede that there is a single primary purpose for financial state
ments. They tend to emphasize the function of measuring past stewardship
while at the same time recognizing investors’ needs.
Equally basic, it seems to me that the fundamental nature of this income
that we are trying to measure is still very nebulous. And while it is not at all
clear what income means to anyone, everyone seems to have very strong feel
ings about what should and should not be included in its measurement. Per
haps we must come back to David Norr’s suggestion that income is what we
measure with a profit and loss statement, even though this seems to me an
inoperable basis on which to seek improvement in measurement.

Price-Level Accounting
One of the subjects which the accounting profession both in the United
States and abroad has been wrestling with for years is the need for financial
statements adjusted on a price-level basis. Accountants have long recognized
that the implied assumption in financial statements that a dollar represents a
constant measuring stick is not a valid one, but at the same time it has seldom
been clear how distorting this error was, and whether its correction would
incur more costs in lack of understanding than it would provide benefits in the
form of improved economic measurement.
At the Symposium, members of an AICPA subcommittee on price-level
accounting indicate that significant differences in net income will be produced
by the application of a price index and that useful information might be given
if such price-level-adjusted data was presented on a supplemental basis. On
the other hand, all recognize that the educational problem is a substantial one
and some major concerns are expressed by analysts and bankers as to what the
resulting financial statements would in fact mean. Specifically, it is obvious
that the distinction between current-value financial statements and statements
based upon price-level-adjusted historical costs must be further explored and
communicated if meaningful results are to be obtained.
Professor: Let us next see if we can get some expression on the part of
the four groups here with respect to your interest in price-level adjustments
and greater concern with current values.
CPA: I think there is a trend already in evidence in a recent AICPA
booklet on audits of personal financial statements. It proposes that personal
financial statements should be presented in parallel columns, the first column
being prepared on traditional cost-based accounting principles, and the second
column with data based on current values where determinable by appraisal
or quoted market, with income tax deferments to bring them to a real current
dollar value. The auditor’s certificate applies specifically to the first column.
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I think this may be a significant development for the future, because it
doesn’t seem to me that any single method satisfies all of our needs. The
method based on cost reflects accomplished facts, something where decisions
have been made which are irreversible; whereas those based upon current
worth reflect values not yet confirmed by a transaction. Current values are
extremely important, particularly for investors, but they are reversible, and
therefore it would be dangerous to try to mix the two.
Analyst: I think that current value is of tremendous use to us in cal
culating true returns on invested capital and things of that sort. That is very
valuable additional information. But we should not eliminate the old cost basis,
because we are still able to manipulate those figures to some good advantage.
As to the fluctuations in the gross national product implicit price deflator
and recalculating statements on that basis, I think the only problem that the
financial analysts have with that is when we get the answer, we have no idea
what to do with it.
We already know what inflation has been doing to us for the last 20 years,
and proving it to ourselves is an interesting exercise, but I don’t know what
we do with the figures when we get them. Perhaps others do.
Analyst: I think, as William Norby wrote in his paper, most of us
analysts are just afraid of all the possible figures and the interpretation of what
could come out of price-level accounting.
As for inflation, I think the statement of funds to some extent offsets this,
because there you have the increasing capital requirements on new equipment.
Analyst: I agree. To me this is a typical academician’s impractical
theory and practitioner’s morass.
I think when a firm invests dollars in a capital project, the primary inter
est at that time is the return on those dollars over the period of years that the
asset is being used. If they begin worrying about how much the price of that
asset is going to go up over the next year, and begin thinking that they should
buy one asset because its price is going to go up 25 per cent in the next ten
years while the price of another one is only going to go up 15 per cent, then
their decision-making process is a terrible morass, and accounting for it is even
worse. I would say that in the discussion we could skip over this very quickly.
Analyst: I think perhaps there is more to this than we analysts realize.
Certainly, comparing a service company with a capital-intensive company in
a period of rapid inflation we do need to make some adjustments so we can be
sure that the capital-intensive company is making adequate provision for
replacement of assets, which, of course, are costed out only over a very long
period of time.
CPA: The APB did make a research study which was published three or
four years ago. They spent a good bit of time on an exposure draft of an
Opinion. Instead of putting it out for exposure, it was used as a research docu
ment, and it was tested by 16 companies with their own actual figures.
The Opinion itself does not prescribe a change in accounting in the United
States. It urges experimentation on a supplementary basis. It says that price
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level accounting on an adjusted historical cost basis is the kind that should be
followed in countries like Brazil.
For those of you who say, “I can judge the effect of inflation on my set
of figures” without doing this—I really don’t think you can. You cannot really
generalize the effect of inflation on a set of financial statements just by saying
the rate of increase has been two per cent or three per cent, because the actual
impact on any particular company differs a great deal depending on the com
position of its assets and their age, its capital structure, debt ratios, and other
things. The differences between reported net income and adjusted net income
for the 16 companies varied from virtually nil up to 233 per cent.
That top figure was an extreme, of course, but of the remaining 15, seven
were affected by ten per cent or less; five were in the range of 11 to 20 per cent;
and three were in the range of 21 to 30 per cent.
Other relationships in the statements changed as well. In one company,
for example, tax rates jumped from an effective income tax rate of 31 per cent
on the historical cost basis to 38 per cent on a price-level basis. Cash dividends
were 72 per cent of income on a historical basis and 90 per cent on a restated
basis. That’s an invasion of capital, possibly.
I should emphasize that what we are urging is not an experimentation in
revaluing assets. All we are trying to do is take the rubber out of the dollar.
We are trying to stay with the same accounting principles based on cost that
we have today, but measuring this cost in terms of a dollar that doesn’t change
its general purchasing power.
CPA: I would like to report on a meeting which was held last week with
the 16 companies who had been kind enough to co-operate with the APB on
the price-level study. Two things came out of that meeting that can probably
be described as general conclusions.
The first thing that was quite clear was that the principal concern of all 16
companies that participated was that there would be confusion and misunder
standing about the data. The questions raised here earlier about the meaning
of price-level-adjusted information and how it should be used bothered every
one at the meeting. This clearly indicates that if these things do have any
usefulness and any real meaning, that there is an educational problem involved.
Interestingly, however, most of the people who have worked with such
price-level-adjusted statements during the course of the study seemed to feel
at the end that they did have some meaning and that they did provide some
information over and beyond the historicals; but these men also seemed to be
concerned about how everybody else would react—and, I think, fairly so.
The second agreement that emerged from the meeting was a decision
made by the subcommittee that the next step will be to invite representatives
of the groups that are represented here for a one- or two-day in-depth discus
sion with the members of the subcommittee. This discussion will take place
in small groups and will be oriented entirely toward the figures, without any
concern about the techniques for making adjustments.
Financial Executive: I don’t think that we can with any degree of
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accuracy or meaningfulness ignore technology when we are trying to get price
level accounting. Every manufacturer has been through tremendous changes
in technology over the last few years. When you try to revalue plant and equip
ment that is 20 or 30 years old, you are not going to get a replacement value on
that particular plant or that particular set of equipment. You have got to take
into consideration the technological changes that have taken place in the indus
try and the improvements in material efficiency, the reduction in labor content.
I think, frankly, that any attempt at this stage to get to price-level account
ing is going to be much more confusing than it will be desirable to anybody in
the whole community that’s going to use it.
Banker: I think there will be a tremendous resistance on the part of
credit grantors generally towards an involvement of price-level accounting.
The historical method is a method on which you can base your calculations
with some certainty, and if there is a floating re-evaluation, with all the uncer
tainties and technological changes that we have spoken about, I think there
would be definite resistance on the part of the credit grantors.
CPA: I think we should be clear about what we are discussing. There are
three possible bases for preparing financial statements: actual historical cost,
historical cost adjusted for changes in the general price level, and current value.
The second of these does not purport to represent replacement values or cur
rent values. There are a lot of people who argue that it would be better to go
to the third level, and others say you ought to stay on the first; but we are
considering the second. Such a general price-level adjustment simply means
that we are expressing a balance sheet in terms of 1968 dollars, which is not
the same as in 1940 dollars. This is like the procedure which we currently
follow when we translate currencies around the world into a common unit—
a dollar.
Financial Executive: But consider that the 1968 balance sheet that
you are trying to revalue would not be there if it hadn’t been for inflation and
technological change. Some of the expenditures made to take advantage of
technological changes would never have been made if labor costs had stayed
at 25 cents an hour. This is the reason that I don’t think you can separate the
effects.
The balance sheet is the result of management actions taken within a
particular set of social and economic conditions. When you try to adjust this
statement to eliminate the effect of certain economic conditions which did exist
and which had a significant impact on management’s decision, you are pre
senting an unreal picture of something which never in fact occurred.
CPA: I should add that the proposal which the APB is considering only
recommends that these price adjustments be made as supplementary informa
tion, and that the presentation of such information would be voluntary.
Analyst: I think most of us would applaud such a proposal. It would
give us a little time to get used to the data and to see what values we derived
from it.
Analyst: Could I suggest that perhaps the APB ask a few of these com
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panies to prepare statements on a current cost basis as well? Because I think
that if you introduce this general price level as supplementary information, you
may be creating an error in the case of companies which have very little to do
with the general price level. You then may be creating a false sense of security
in the minds of people who use it feeling that they are getting better informa
tion, when in actual fact they might very well be getting worse.
Professor: I think that we can all learn a lesson from this discussion on
price-level accounting. This has been a major subject of research and discus
sion in accounting circles for at least 15 to 20 years, but we have never really
sought out users to discover their need for price-level-adjusted statements, nor
have we made any systematic attempt to explain to them what such statements
are attempting to do and the problems of bringing them into being.
Thus when we come to them with research results, it is very natural that
we should get a negative response, since we are presenting them with something
new that they have not fully thought about and do not really understand. We
can clearly see this negative reaction in the comments made here today despite
the fact that I believe there is a consensus in accounting circles that price-level
information would be a good thing.
If we are to hope to get acceptance and use of new forms of accounting
disclosure such as price-level data, we must lay a careful groundwork by com
municating the objectives, benefits and difficulties of implementing price-leveladjusted financial information.

The Treatment of Accounting Changes
Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 9 left undetermined the way
in which changes in accounting should be reflected in financial statements.
Recent practice has varied between treating such changes as prior period
adjustments to retained earnings, as extraordinary items in the year when the
change took place, and by restating all prior years. The reported pattern of
net income over the years can be significantly affected by the alternative chosen.
The discussion indicates varying points of view on the subject with concern
expressed on the one hand for the validity of reported trends and on the other
for the problems of retroactive changes in historically reported data.

Professor: One accounting problem which is currently under discussion
is how a change in accounting procedures should be treated in the income
statement.
Let’s try an example. Suppose a company was capitalizing research and
development, and as a matter of policy without a significant factual change
they have now decided to switch to a policy of writing it off as incurred. What
do they do with the part that has already been capitalized on the balance sheet?
Should they go back and recast past income statements? Should they amortize
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the capitalized R&D in the future? Should they write it off immediately to
income or to retained earnings?
Financial Executive: From the standpoint of corporate management,
I don’t think there could be the situation that you have described, so I think
it’s very difficult to answer. Corporate management would not change its mind
without some reason, and the reason for making the change would seem to me
to have something to do with how it’s treated.
Analyst : I don’t care how they do it, as long as they fully disclose what
they have done. I don’t wish them to go back and recast, as long as they tell
me what they have done and the effect on net income. That’s all I ask.
Analyst: One of the things that the investment analyst does with pershare figures, both currently and on a historic basis, is to relate them to com
mon stock prices. Common stock prices occurred when they occurred, and
the security was valued in the market based on the earnings that were then
either reported or about to be reported or expected to be reported. So if you
make an accounting change ten years later, you can restate the figures if you
want to, and it may be quite interesting to look at them on a restated basis for
some purposes, but if you are trying to see what has been the historical price
earnings ratio pattern of this stock, how high investors have been willing to
value it, how low, and where the midpoint is, then you don’t want these recast
figures, because you would be changing one part of the fraction but not the
other.
There is an example in the steel industry relating to the treatment of the
investment tax credit. The company formerly deferred the credit and then
amortized it. They are now shifting to flow-through. They are not only flowing
through this year for tax credit, but continuing to amortize what they have in
the past. This, I think, is wrong.
CPA: Let us look at this investment credit example and consider the
alternative ways of dealing with the amortized credit that exists at the time of
the change.
Clearly, there are three choices: restate earlier years, make a lump-sum
adjustment as an extraordinary item, or spread it over the remaining years.
I agree that to spread it over the remaining years is going to give you just
an absolutely distorted earnings trend. You are going to compensate for your
earlier understatements of income, according to your current theory, by over
stating income in the later years. This is totally unsatisfactory.
If it is all picked up this year, then you get one big flip in income. It does
appear as an extraordinary item, but you are still reflecting two sides of com
pletely different principles in reported net income.
On the other hand, if you go back and restate, you are going to get an
earnings statement that is stated on the same basis all along.
You do have different reported earnings than investors were acting upon
when they set these prices, but if you do live up to the reporting that is called
for in APB No. 9, you reflect both the earnings as reported in those earlier
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years and the increment year by year as a result of the change. So you can
have the best of all worlds.
It seems to me that the restatement is the only one that’s going to show
the trend of earnings through the years.
CPA: Among accounting circles every time this question of restatement
is discussed, one of the questions that’s always considered to be important is
the extent to which restatement of previously reported earnings tends to con
fuse or shake confidence in the financial community by implying that the
restatement is being made because there was something wrong, or that some
management wants to change a trend line. I would like to hear from analysts
how serious the psychological impact of restatement of earnings really is.
Analyst : In any restatement, the competent analyst ought to try to look
to the facts. What was the reason for restatement? Was it in fact an economic
change that had occurred and the new principle now reflects a more accurate
statement of reality?
I would ask that question of steel companies today. Did they make the
change in depreciation and investment credit accounting because they sud
denly discovered—all of them at the same time—that a better statement of
economic reality comes from their new method of accounting? And if I don’t
find the answer to be “Yes,” then I say: For what other reason did they do it?
In the case of some companies when we see one change this year, followed
by another two years from now, we begin to have a feeling that this is done
simply to improve the reported earnings.
But I think we must attack each one of these changes and find out what
are the facts. If it’s simply to dress up the earnings, then it does shake our
confidence. If it’s changing to reflect economic realities, then we say “Great!”
Analyst: One thing restatement seems to do is to open the door to
abuses. Things that should have gone through the income statement, such as
excess start-up costs, suddenly get buried in prior years with no impact on
current financials.
CPA: The fundamental problem that has to be faced up to is the impro
priety of a free choice of accounting method, and then the right to go flip-flop
on those methods. And until that problem is dealt with we are going to have all
of these varying answers, and in my opinion none of them can be properly
rationalized.

Accounting for
Inter-Corporate Investment
One final specific accounting problem that is considered by the Sympo
sium is accounting for inter-corporate investment. Time does not permit a
very comprehensive discussion of this problem and its various ramifications,
but it does become apparent that the participants feel that when control exists
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the earnings of the subsidiary should be included in the parent company’s
reported income. It is also apparent that changes in market value are not
enthusiastically regarded as a measure of investment performance in a com
pany where a substantial holding is involved.
Some of the more basic issues in this area are not explicitly considered.
For example, the question of pooling of interests accounting is touched upon
briefly in one of the papers but not brought up since it is felt that a large
amount of literature already exists in the area. Similarly, the problems of
reporting associated with conglomerate enterprises are ignored. These issues
were discussed informally as inevitably they must be when interested financial
men get together, but there are no conclusions of significance to report.

Professor: Accounting for inter-corporate investment is one of the
reporting problems receiving considerable attention today. I think we can
discuss this problem in three parts: the less than 50 per cent owned corpora
tion, the joint venture, and the majority-owned subsidiary. In each of these
situations, there are three possible accounting alternatives: (1) reflecting the
investment at equity and reporting the earnings of the corporation in the in
vestor’s income statement, either in a single figure or by means of consolidation,
(2) reflecting the investment at cost and reporting earnings in the investors’
statements only when dividends are received, and (3) reflecting the current
market value of the investment and reporting both dividends and change in
market value in the income statement of the investor. Can we develop any
guidelines here?
Analyst: I think where an integrated sort of operation exists the equity
in earnings should be reported as regular income. When you don’t have that
relationship, and when the majority of the stock or a substantial block of stock
is in public hands, control is not definitely in the hands of this company, and
there is no business relationship between the two companies; then all you can
look at is dividends, because that’s all you can get your hands on.
Analyst: I think part of the key is the permanence of the investment.
If you acquire ten per cent of a company as part of an attempt to merge with
the intention of disposing of your stock if you do not, then you record only
dividend income. But if it is a permanent investment, such as Owens-Illinois
has in Owens-Corning Fiberglas, I feel the investors’ share of the income
should flow through to its income statement.
Financial Executive: Owens-Illinois, I think, suggests an interesting
argument for recognizing in the investor’s income statement each year the
change in the potential liquidation value of that investment.
First of all, they are quite free to dispose of it, as I recall. Second, the
stock after increasing tremendously in value has been quite flat for some time.
If you look at the year-by-year quality of the decisions of the management of
the companies that have held that stock, and you look from the beginning to
the present, it looks as if they made a brilliant investment. If you look for the
last ten years, it probably indicates they made a miserable decision. If they
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had something better to do with the money, they might have been better off
liquidating.
Analyst: I think to have net income affected every year by fluctuations
in the market value wholly distorts the picture.
Analyst: Don’t you distinguish between operating income and gain or
loss on security holdings? I would go along with the idea that you show the
difference in market value from year to year, rather than wait for realizations.
If you show it from year to year, the market gain or loss on the holding is a
separate capital item, as against an operating income item. And then at least
everybody knows what they are talking about, and they can make such com
binations as they wish.
Financial Executive: My answer would be that when you have a
unitary business, you consolidate; and when you don’t, if you have an asset
of which you can estimate the value—the alternative value to you—you recog
nize that value. When you have a pipeline that is an integral part of the oper
ations of the company, it should be consolidated. If you have investment in
something that’s not a part of your business, and you are quite free to go in
and out of it, you should recognize the change on what you can realize.
Financial Executive : I think the key should be control. Whether it’s
one-third or one-sixth or 50 per cent, if you have the ability to leave the money
in the operation for reinvestment or to have it remitted as you choose, then I
think you should go to share of earnings.
On the other hand, if you can only realize through dividends that are
actually paid or through the sale of the asset, then it seems to me that you have
to look to the cost or the market method.
Banker: It seems to me that if the management of the company that you
are looking at is not in a position to exercise its discretionary judgment on the
application of the net income of the company in which it is investing, either
by retaining it in the business, using it to purchase another investment, or pay
dividends, I cannot count it as good income. If it is earned in Brazil, for
example, and the Brazilian government won’t let you bring it out, then to me
it is not good income.
Analyst: I think that when you have a more than 50 per cent owned
subsidiary, you should have a consolidation, and you should also have separate
financial statements available on the finance company subsidiary or the oddball
subsidiary that is totally unrelated to the parent.
In this way, you can look at the separate companies independently. But
I think consolidated statements should still be presented, because in some cases
there are claims against the parent’s assets that are not made clear when you
fail to consolidate.
Professor: To summarize, it seems to me that the two most important
factors that must be considered in deciding how to account for intercorporate
investments are the existence of a business relationship rather than simply a
passive investment relationship between the companies and the presence of
effective control. If these two criteria are met, the consensus seems to be that
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the companies should be consolidated or the parent’s share of the subsidiary’s
net income should be included in the measurement of its own income. In the
absence of these two conditions, the cost method is still favored. The reaction
of the group seems generally unfavorable to recognizing changes in market
value in the financial statements although disclosure of market value is con
sidered to be appropriate in some cases. The main difficulty with market values
is that they fluctuate too much, and there is something undesirable about things
that go up and down.
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Section III

The Role of the Auditor
In addition to the users and preparers of financial statements, a third
party is intimately involved in the reliability and usefulness of financial reports.
This is the public accountant who has the responsibility of attesting to the
fairness of presentation of reported results within the framework of generally
accepted accounting principles.
There has long been a lack of understanding about the nature of the
auditor’s role in financial reporting, in regard to both what it is and what it
should be. Auditors have tended to bask in the tacit acceptance of a public
image of infallibility, even while their professional literature and standards
described a far more limited obligation and responsibility. This inconsistency,
at least in part, has contributed to the disillusionment with the profession that
has been evidenced both by an increasing number of lawsuits against auditors
and by critical literature which has recently appeared.
The profession, therefore, has been faced with the problem of whether
it should attempt to move in the direction of meeting public expectations and
thus expand its role as it has traditionally stated it or whether it should try to
change its public image so as to limit its functions and its liabilities.
These important issues for the future of public accounting pervade the
discussion of the auditor’s role. Professor Herbert Miller introduces the
subject and leads the group through consideration of the current short-form
report and the responsibility of the auditor in financial reporting.

Introductory Remarks
Professor Herbert E. Miller
Joseph Roth has identified the function of the independent audit as that
of adding credibility to the financial statements. This definition of the auditor’s
role might at first hand strike one as modest, but it is probably realistic, and I
think it is very important.
Perhaps the thing that disturbs us is that this role of adding credibility does
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not square with the role expected by statement users, and Mr. Roth acknowl
edges this. Hence we have a misunderstanding that is of serious proportions.
Arthur Nash in his critique suggests that users believe the auditor has
prepared the financial statement, and that the figures shown on the financial
statements are the auditor’s figures. If this is true, it would indicate a most
significant misunderstanding.
How much if any of this misunderstanding is attributable to the short
form opinion? Our authorities differ. Robert Pfenning is doubtful that this
is a source of misunderstanding. Mr. Nash agrees with Mr. Roth that this
may be a source of serious misunderstanding.
In my view, anything that hasn’t changed in 34 years, such as the present
short-form opinion, probably needs overhauling. At the least, it certainly
warrants a very serious reconsideration by preparers and users.
There is evidence in the critiques associated with the role of the auditor
that the authors are concerned about the existence of a choice of accounting
alternatives. Mr. Roth states that the auditor must be satisfied that the financial
statements constitute a fair presentation. For an impractical accountant like
me, this raises an interesting question. Can the CPA assume that reliance on
generally accepted accounting principles will always result in financial state
ments that achieve a fair presentation? I doubt it.
We may have semantic difficulties here. If fair presentation is defined in
terms of the total impression you get from financial statements, then it seems
to imply an added responsibility for the auditor. I believe that there might
be misunderstanding on this point on the part of statement users.
Mr. Roth raises the interesting question whether the auditor should
undertake to evaluate management’s performance. He doubts whether the
auditor is capable of doing this, and indicates that such a development is
remote, and I am relieved.
If evaluating management’s performance ever becomes part of the
objective or the role of the auditor, then probably we will have to take a
fresh look at financial statements, because they will come to be viewed as the
vehicle by which managerial performance is communicated and reported.
If they are being used for such a single purpose, then I believe we must
reconsider the propriety, or sense, of continuing to prepare financial statements
which are general purpose in character and presumably suitable for a wide
variety of uses.
If they are going to be used for a single purpose, might that not change
the relevance of some of the concepts, rules and conventions that we have used
for many years?
If we do get into evaluation of management more directly, then it seems
to me that we face the problem of setting criteria. I would have no objection
to giving management initially considerable voice in the selection of criteria
by which their performance is to be evaluated, but I have some doubts as to
whether management should be given any voice in the application of such
criteria.
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Mr. Roth’s paper also indicates an awareness of the desire to improve
the predictive quality of financial statements. This issue is raised in connec
tion with the possibility of auditing budgeting results. As Mr. Pfenning
indicates, he’s petrified. He feels that attesting to the validity of budgeted
results or forecasts would be one of the better ways of destroying the auditor’s
credibility. Albert J. Bows opposes auditing such budgeted results, because
that kind of auditing would amount to a mere technical performance, a
performance without substance.
Also of interest to this group would be the question of auditing quarterly
financial statements, which would represent a very significant expansion of
the role of the auditor. Whether such specific expansion of the audit function
will occur is uncertain, but it is certain that the auditor’s role is in a constant
state of evolution and expansion.
It is somewhat surprising that in commenting on the evolution and
expansion of the role of the auditor, Mr. Roth attaches only slight influence
to the client and the accounting profession. The real forces for change are
the statement users, the regulatory authorities, and the courts. With existing
lines of communication, such rate of change will be slow, and perhaps happen
in a zigzag pattern. For some, such as Louis Warlick, the pace of change
will be much too slow. He makes an appealing case for a greatly expanded
role for the auditor, including an interpretative role. This, I think, has opened
the door for many interesting possibilities for discussion. But if we do expand
the role, there is the serious question of legal liability to be faced which all of
our groups must be concerned with. And perhaps this question of legal
liability, if it is raised, will raise the question of incorporation of accounting
practices.
It is apparent from the thoughts and ideas expressed by our authors—
Roth, Nash, Pfenning, Bows, Warlick-—that we have many more challenges,
it seems to me, than we have conflicts in this area, but there are many ideas
and differences of opinion worthy of discussion.

The Short-Form Report
Professor: Perhaps a logical starting point for this discussion of the
role of the auditor is the auditor’s ending point—the short-form report. Does
this form of report do its job? Should it be changed?
Analyst: I think the short-form opinion is misleading. The wording
does not indicate clearly what responsibility the auditor is taking. The key is
in the words “present fairly.” I think there is a lack of pointing out that it is
management who supplies figures and chooses the accounting principles, and
that the auditor has merely applied certain sampling techniques and other
requirements to be reasonably sure that the books are being kept properly.
I think back to the “fairness through the eye of the beholder” concept.
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The auditor would be much better off if he didn’t say he thought the statements
were fair or unfair. He should find more appropriate wording.
Financial Executive : I think the short-form report serves its purpose
very well for those technicians who are familiar with its background. Our
problem arises from the fact that the user group is expanding and includes
many without technical expertise. We are therefore attempting to force a
technical document into the hands of laymen, and expecting them to use it.
Banker: I feel that there is a tendency to regard the short-form certificate
as a form of Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval. Users are supposed to
assume that the auditors have done everything necessary and that the state
ments tell the full story. But as a credit grantor, I deal with many CPAs of
different capability, and I like additional details from them as to what they
have done and what the various numbers represent so that I can use my
judgment and form my own impressions of them and their client. This means
I like long-form reports.
I am not sure that a revised short-form report would solve my problem,
but I am interested in hearing what changes in it, if any, are being contem
plated.
CPA: The AICPA’s committee on auditing procedure, which is the body
charged with responsibility for auditing and reporting, has had this matter
on its agenda. Several versions of a revised report have been prepared by
individuals and each of the individuals likes his version, but they don’t like
one another’s.
The committee has been trying to determine in what ways it should be
changed. We might just change a few words, but this will not solve our major
problems; and additionally we find that every change creates problems in
other parts of the report.
We have considered expanding the report enough to try to explain more
about the nature of the examination that is made, and possibly the nature of
the financial statements themselves. The committee at this point is a little
reluctant to agree that we have a responsibility to tell others what financial
statements are, but it may be that this is the most efficient way of doing it.
Unfortunately, many other more urgent matters have come onto the
agenda of the committee, so this subject is no longer on the top of our list
of priorities.
CPA: I’d like to inquire of the financial executives here whether you feel
there would be any particular degree of resistance on the part of management
if the standard short-form report included near the beginning some sort of
categorical statement to the effect that these statements were prepared by the
management. This seems to be one major point of misunderstanding.
Financial Executive: Personally, I would welcome the change.
Financial Executive: The only problem I see with including such a
statement in the auditor’s report is that it might imply that if the auditor had
prepared the financial statements he would not have done it in the same way,
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when actually we have had a meeting of the minds with our auditors.
Financial Executive : I think you are completely right in putting such
a statement in the report as part of the process of educating users.
Analyst: It seems to me that fundamentally the auditor’s responsibility
and management’s responsibility for the financial statements that appear in
the annual report are inseparable. Presumably the auditor would not have
put a certificate on any statement that he did not approve of. So when he
lets a statement of management reach the light of day with his certificate on
it, he has as much responsibility for it as management has. He is saying that
it is prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles,
and this is where the user runs into problems, because for many purposes the
range of accounting principles is pretty wide. If the range is going to be
narrowed by the work of the Accounting Principles Board, then it seems to
me the auditor’s report would have more meaning.
Banker: I don’t really understand why the accountants are so anxious
to attribute the statements to management, since they have certified them. If
they have certified them, what difference does it make whether they prepared
them or not? I really don’t understand why this is so important to them.
CPA: The word “seal” was used earlier in reference to the certificate.
This is indicative of the general impression held by many that the certificate
represents an insurance policy or a guarantee of the statements presented.
This is a sore point with CPAs. We have to educate the business layman as
to what the significance is of our report.
We are not guarantors. We are not issuing an insurance policy. The
short-form report, if it is read properly and if the reader understands the
terminology, cites exactly what we have done and what we report on. But
the public doesn’t understand the meaning of “generally accepted accounting
principles” or “generally accepted auditing standards,” and so they misunder
stand our report. What is needed is education of the business public but I
am not sure this can be done simply by changing the certificate.
CPA: If we do revise the short-form report, we can move in several
directions. One alternative is to make the report a page or two long and to
say in it that the statements are management’s, and they are estimates, and
the use of judgment is involved, and describe accounting principles and fair
presentation and consistency. Then we would have a nice educational docu
ment in that certificate. Of course, one would have to look carefully to find
any qualifications to distinguish it from the so-called clean opinion.
At the other extreme, we might follow a procedure similar to one used
in South America where documents are stamped “fisco bueno.” That means
“approved.” There is no qualification or mention of consistency or auditing
standards. When it says “approved” it means all of those things.
The question therefore is whether we should make the short-form report
an educational document or try to educate the public in other ways and
perhaps go to the other extreme in our report.
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The Responsibility of the Auditor
Professor: One of the important questions which we have been discuss
ing by implication we might now turn to explicitly: What should the auditor’s
role be in financial reporting? Should the CPA assume a larger and more
responsible role?
As I read the papers by Charles McGarraugh and William Norby, I
sensed a plea that the auditor assume the role of professional reporter rather
than acting purely as auditor. On the other hand, I have heard management
express very clearly the feeling that financial statements must be their
responsibility.
How do users in general feel about this? Should the professional account
ing expertise of the auditor be used by making him an independent professional
reporter who selects accounting principles which he feels are appropriate and
tells the story as he sees it in the manner of a newspaper reporter?
Analyst: I think that this relates to the discussion about flexibility and
comparability. On the one side we say we have to have flexibility to report
true economic facts, and on the other we would like to have more compara
bility. But as we look at the real world, it seems as if there is a lot of evidence
of companies shifting from one accounting procedure to another not in fact
to reflect economic reality but for some other purpose. This leads us to the
question: Who is responsible? I have the feeling that management seems to be
using the accounting profession in this respect.
Professor: Recently I heard a learned member of the public accounting
profession say that within the purview of generally accepted accounting
principles there were good principles, adequate principles, and obnoxious
principles—all generally accepted. He said that in giving his opinion on
financial statements he was indicating that the accounting principles used were
generally accepted and he would sign an unqualified opinion on a set of
financial statements that he did not feel represented the best reporting merely
because the principles used fell within the framework of generally accepted
accounting principles.
Banker: I would think that this should not be done.
CPA: If we are going to be responsible for our opinion, I think our
approach must be like a doctor. The doctor doesn’t care whether the client
accepts his findings or not—they are the doctor’s findings.
I think our standard must not be what is generally accepted but rather
what in the accountant’s opinion is the most appropriate to the particular case.
I am in favor of changing the wording of our certificate so that it is expressed
in that way.
Financial Executive: I think the certificate should describe the deci
sion-making process which actually went on. In most large companies the
financial statements are prepared by management and the accounting principles
are selected by management. In many smaller companies the statements are

70

prepared by the public accountant who selects the principles that are to be
used. I think the certificate ought to reflect what actually happened.
Analyst: To me as a user the certificate means that the records have
been checked and there is no fraud. The range of acceptable accounting
principles is so broad, however, that they cannot be used as a measurement
of the quality of the earnings report. The quality of earnings is the responsi
bility of management, and management must disclose the various elements
that go into the numbers so that the quality of earnings can be discerned by
a reader.
CPA: I should emphasize that our examination is not made for the
purpose of discovering fraud but rather for the purpose of expressing an
opinion on the fairness of the financial statements as a whole. In a sense we
are really just rendering an opinion on the quality of the earnings of the
corporation.
Analyst: As a user I would have to say that a true determination of
quality is not being achieved by the CPA.
Banker: I would like to think that the certificate, when it says that
financial statements have been prepared in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, means that the statements have been prepared by
management and that the auditor in reviewing the presentation has exercised
his professional influence to have these presented in the best way possible—
not that he has searched through accounting literature to find some means of
supporting the way that management may have elected to present something
that he doesn’t really agree with himself.
Perhaps the certificate should be worded in such a way that the reader
can know whether the auditor feels that management has used accounting
principles which are acceptable, although he does not feel they are completely
right in the circumstances, or whether the principles are those which he feels
are the best.
Financial Executive: I still have not heard anything that won’t be
cured by the Accounting Principles Board limiting the areas where there is
more than one acceptable method of accounting. The accountants themselves
must resolve these questions because there is no one else to sit in judgment.
The accountants are the best we have in this area and if they do not define
principles some government agency will.
Analyst: When we talk about expanding the auditor’s role perhaps we
should also consider whether there is a need or an advantage of having the
auditor review and be responsible for various aspects of the annual report
other than the financial statements. This can be done either by an explicit
statement confirming the accuracy of the particular data or by a report indicat
ing that the auditor had surveyed the balance of the annual report and felt
that all figures were consistent with the fully audited financial statements. I
know that the Securities and Exchange Commission is very much interested
in this problem, and has given consideration to this very point. How would
auditors feel about making such a statement?
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CPA: I don’t think that the CPAs would object to assuming such responsi
bility but I think that management and users would have to recognize that if
such a statement is being made our responsibility is being broadened and this
must be paid for. If we are to attest to conglomerate reporting, backlogs and
other quantitative data in the annual report, we would have the difficult task
of obtaining objective evidence as to the validity of such information. But I
do believe we could express an opinion on many more things if we were paid
to do so.
Analyst: I believe that underlying this question is the practice which
we have noticed of reporting selected highlights from the financial statements
in the remainder of the report without disclosing facts which would make the
data misleading. Recently we have found a company that reported 39 cents a
share of ordinary income and 19 cents of extraordinary income in its financial
statements. But in the president’s letter income was said to be 58 cents per
share without any indication of what was extraordinary. It is things like this
which disturb us and which blunt the efforts of the Accounting Principles
Board.
CPA: Many accounting firms do today insist upon looking over the
president’s statement, and other material that will go to stockholders; in so
doing they pay particular attention to those figures which tend to interpret
what’s presented in the financial statements that have been attested to by the
accounting firm.
Even though this is done, we generally do not accept any responsibility
for it.
CPA: I think if any auditing firm found a gross error in the representa
tions of the president or the chairman of the board or the financial highlights
or review, the accounting firm would take some exception to it, either in his
report or by refusing to issue a report.
CPA: One way in which this has been done is to force the inclusion of
additional information such as earnings per share in the financial statements.
Then the auditor must be responsible.
CPA: Before we leave this discussion today I would like to suggest that
we raise our sights a notch or two.
It seems to me that what is at stake is really the free enterprise system,
and what is involved is the public interest. All of us are involved with the
public interest. The reason for having public accountants is the public interest.
Managements have greater and greater responsibility to the public as evidenced
by court cases and other public actions. I think it has become evident that
their responsibility runs far beyond stockholders today to the general public.
Financial analysts have a great public interest in helping and protecting
investors, and they are going to have more legal and ethical responsibilities in
this area. Banks are involved because they are lending money to the public on
the basis of financial statements.
I think we have to realize that the regulatory agencies that we are all
subject to in one way or another are representatives of the public. Courts are
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representatives of the public. Court decisions, regulatory decisions, and every
thing else are going to be in the direction of greater and greater public interest.
I think that is evident, and it is something that we should all think about,
because we are going to be subject to it.
If we ever hit a point—and we’re all involved in this—where the public
feels that corporate financial reporting is not sufficiently reliable and has
insufficient integrity, then the whole free enterprise system is going to suffer.
And if that happens, we are all going to suffer with it.
I think at times we worry too much about legal liability and the wording
of the short-form certificate and all these other things, which all have their
place, but are not the main problem. The main problem is that each of us
do a better job at what we are trying to do.
Auditors right now are worrying too much about legal liability. I think
that if we worried more about improving the standards of our profession and
doing a better job, we wouldn’t have to worry about legal liability so much.
And so the problem is for each of us to do a better job at what we are
trying to do. I think the accounting profession needs better auditing standards
and accounting principles. We need to do a better quality of work as a
profession. The public feels that when we certify statements we are giving
our general approval to those statements, and I think the courts will so hold
when these cases come up. I don’t think the wording we use in our certificate
is going to be a defense if we haven’t done a good quality job.
So I think we had better sit back occasionally and look at the overall
thing, the total picture, and recognize that the public interest is going to prevail,
and the public interest is going to be determined by what the public thinks,
regardless of what we think.

Practice of Public Accounting
In Corporate Form
CPA: I would like to explore with this group a problem with which the
accounting profession is currently grappling—the possibility of the corporate
practice of public accounting.
As CPAs we are subject to a code of ethics which says that we shall not
practice in corporate form. Many of the state societies and state boards have
similar rules. There is no prohibition against practice before the Treasury
Department in corporate form. In this day of liberty we are subject to a good
many pressures from members around the United States who are seriously
questioning why they should not be able to practice accounting in corporate
form. Our immediate past president, Marvin Stone, has spoken widely and
written several articles on this subject, as a matter of fact. We have had a
study committee in the Institute examine this question. It’s still in process
under the chairmanship of Matthew Blake.
I think if we started from scratch we would reach the conclusion that
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there is no reason why it should be appropriate to practice accounting in
partnership form and inappropriate to practice accounting in corporate form.
This is quite aside from whether we are discriminated against by practicing
in partnership form for tax purposes.
It does also touch on the question of liability that you mentioned. We do
seriously feel that the legal responsibilities that the profession has with respect
to the Securities Act of 1933 are totally unreasonable, and too harsh, and
should be amended.
The facts of life are that if you have a $50 million registration statement,
the limit of the liability for the CPA is $50 million, the gross offering price.
This has brought up the question of practicing in corporate form in the
minds of many of the members of the Institute. They don’t see, realistically,
why they should work all their lives and then possibly late in life have some
lawsuit hit them and put them in personal bankruptcy. Many people feel this
is an unreasonable thing to impose on a professional man.
We are considering permissive incorporation for other reasons such as
continuity of the firm. Some of the large accounting firms are the largest type
of partnership operation in the world.
We are a little concerned as to whether the business community, whose
opinion of us we respect, would feel we were running for cover on liability
if we sought to limit our liability to typical corporate liability.
Those are the questions that we are really struggling with in our study
group. It would be very helpful to the study group if we could get some type
of informal expression of opinion among this group as to whether they think
it would be appropriate or totally inappropriate for accounting firms to
practice in corporate form.
It will be a long, hard struggle just to achieve the right to practice in
corporate form, particularly for the large firms that practice in most of the
states. It requires changing the state laws to permit the practice of accounting
or any other profession, for that matter, in corporate form. It requires going
to the government agencies. This might take five to ten years, $2 or $3 million,
and a tremendous amount of time. We don’t want to take that if the end result
isn’t worthwhile.
Analyst: I see no more reason why accountants shouldn’t operate in
corporate form than, say, a large New York Stock Exchange firm.
Banker: In July 1967 we conducted within our bank a survey of 20
senior credit officers as to this very question. Almost unanimously the opinion
was that it wouldn’t matter.
Financial Executive: Having been a public accountant at one time,
and knowing the relationship with public accountants through the years, I
see no reason why they should be subject to any greater liability because of a
partnership form of organization than any other firms that we have in the
United States. I definitely think they should incorporate.
Financial Executive : As a financial manager of a business I am very
much concerned over the liability that has been imposed upon the accountants.
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I think in the final analysis we are going to have to pay whatever the cost is.
The real problem, I think, is broader than just the corporate form. It
gets into the field of risk management; we are very careful about the risks that
business accepts, and if we can’t diminish them we go out and find, if we can,
insurance against them.
I think we have to look at the character of the risk that has been imposed
upon the profession. We have to see whether it can be adequately insured and
minimized through the corporate form, if need be.
Banker: I have no objection to the CPA practicing in corporate form.
However, practically speaking, you act as individuals when you act. I am not
sure that you will get the insulation as a corporation that you are seeking by
practicing in this form.
Financial Executive : I don’t think it would make any difference to the
firms that are here as to whether they are incorporated or not. I think the
code of ethics under which they operate is much more important than the form
in which they are organized. I don’t think that makes a bit of difference.
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Section IV
A View of the Future
Throughout the Symposium, many views are expressed which imply
varying forecasts of the future. Explicit forecasting is deferred, however, until
the last afternoon when the four discussion leaders are allowed to present their
“blue sky” forecasts of the reporting firmament in ten to 25 years. Professors
Miller, Burton and Sprouse all predict major changes, while Professor Mautz
expects only gradual evolution.

Professor Herbert E. Miller
Joseph Roth has defined the role of the auditor as adding credibility.
Even within this constraint, we will see the scope of auditing expand into per
formance audits. Furthermore, we will not, in spite of the resistance expressed
this morning, beat down the desire for forecast information in some form or
another, and auditors won’t be able to rely on Institute pronouncements to
limit their responsibility to traditional areas.
These changes will be accommodated somehow within the role of adding
credibility, but I don’t think that this is going to be the extent of the auditor’s
role in the long run.
More and more coming into focus is going to be the question: Whose
financial statements are they? Whatever the answer, this kind of questioning
is going to raise some real issues as to who sets and applies the measurement
criteria. I believe that those with an interest in our free enterprise system, not
necessarily just management or the groups represented here, are going to feel
that they need some voice in setting the kind of measurement criteria to be
applied, so that they can obtain the kind of readings and measurement desired.
Then there will be the question of who applies the criteria. In the kind
of society toward which we are moving, it is fundamental that the party being
evaluated by the financial reporting process should not have the jurisdictional
right to participate in the measurement of his own performance. Given this
trend, I doubt if the public accountant’s role will be limited to adding credi
bility to management’s financial statements.
In the area of accounting principles, I anticipate a growing awareness
that agreement on broad principles is not the key, nor is it the best or the
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practical route to the elimination of dissatisfaction with financial statements.
Hence I predict that there will be a noticeable lessening of effort devoted to
working at the broad conceptual level in the Accounting Principles Board
and similar groups.
The suggestion now controlling that we first settle broad conceptual
principles and then get down to details is an enticing one, but I think it is
inappropriate for accounting. While many of our disagreements are based
on differing basic premises, I doubt that we can solve problems at that level,
because it is at that level that agreement is most difficult to obtain and there is
no empirically determinable truth that can be discovered to help settle such
basic arguments.
Largely for this reason, I also anticipate a gradual disenchantment about
the amount of help believed to be forthcoming from research. Our failure
to find solutions to many problems cannot be attributed to insufficient hours
in the library reading books or at the computer manipulating and simulating.
I see the possibility that after great efforts in research we may conclude that
it really does not help us as much as we thought it would.
Accordingly, I would anticipate a return to the view that the avenue
offering the greatest potential for a lessening of dissatisfaction with financial
reporting lies in the direction of resolution of specific issues. If we could
resolve one specific controversy and then another and then another, we would
be accomplishing quite a lot.
I also believe that the role of accountants in establishing measurement
rules is going to diminish in the distant future, because accounting principles,
procedures and policies are very much like public policy issues. These things
belong to the public, and it is only going to be a matter of years before the
public becomes aware that they have as much at stake in accounting policies
and principles as they have in other public policy issues. And when this
happens, I believe the public will want and expect some kind of representation
through a much more broadly based vehicle than the boards and committees
we presently entrust with establishing positions on accounting principles and
procedures.

Professor John C. Burton
I too see both an expanded role for the auditor in the future and a major
change in the manner in which he performs his function. Increasingly, public
accountants will be viewed as professional reporters and hence will be playing
a greater role in determining what information is available to the public.
Related to this, the auditor’s approach to the audit will change. The work
he does will be directed increasingly toward the evaluation of the total infor
mation system of the firm. He will be determining whether it satisfactorily
meets all the demands placed upon it by management, labor, government
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agencies, analysts and others. A standard set of financial statements for public
reporting purposes will be only one of the outputs required from the system,
and the auditor will therefore have to be prepared to offer reports on his exami
nation which go far beyond today’s short-form report.
An early step in this direction will be an auditor’s opinion on the adequacy
of internal control. I believe that this will become a standard part of the
auditor’s reporting function in the near future; indeed, such opinions are now
being given in the case of a few banks and in the questionnaire prepared by
auditors in connection with brokerage firm audits.
Further in the future, it is possible that the auditor’s opinion will be
sought and published on the adequacy of various management procedures,
although I doubt that a complete management audit report to the public will
be standard within the time dimension we are discussing.
Certainly one of the implications of this view of the auditor’s role is the
need for increasing closeness between the consulting and auditing functions
in public accounting firms. I believe that this will occur, and that the current
concern that consulting affects independence will gradually disappear.
As an aside, I also expect that public accountants are going to have to
publish their own financial statements. As the significant public role of the
auditor expands, there will be increasing demand for information about the
economic characteristics of firms shouldering this responsibility, and the
demand will have to be met. It may be that such disclosure will be one of
the prices paid for moving into the corporate form.
On the disclosure side, I think I agree with Herbert Miller that the pleas
of the analysts for future-oriented disclosure will be met, and it would be my
guess that various forms of budget and planning disclosure will exist in the
10- to 20-year time span.
One factor which has not been discussed very much here but which will
have a significant role in financial information is the growth of the computer
orientation of information. Only the very largest companies in the future
will have their own computer systems; others will be operating through
computer utilities of one sort or another. This will lead to substantial econo
mies in information processing, and also to considerably more standardization
of information among companies than you currently have.
This development, when coupled with increasing demands for up-to-date
information by analysts and the increasing regulatory pressure to limit the
selective disclosure of information to some people and not to others, may lead
to a system of on-line access to corporate information systems by users. Under
such a system sensitive data which would aid competitors would be blocked out.
This would represent a reversal of our philosophy today under which selective
data is given to users. In the future, we will be arguing about which data may
be blocked under generally accepted principles of disclosure rather than what
should be made available.
By way of giving management some solace, it seems very likely that users
would have to pay for information under such a scheme. In addition, major
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problems of liability for all parties would have to be solved before implementa
tion.
In summary, if a symposium is held 25 years from today, its participants
will discuss the problems of corporate reporting within an institutional setting
significantly changed from that we have considered in the past two days.

Professor Robert T. Sprouse
It takes a lot of guts to be so presumptuous as to tell you what we think
is going to happen during the next 10 or 20 years. But it’s nice to have the
opportunity, anyhow.
My predictions are directed primarily to the future development of
accounting principles. The Accounting Principles Board was established just
about ten years ago to replace a group called the committee on accounting
procedure. The reason that this change took place was dissatisfaction with the
way in which accounting practices were being promulgated by the committee,
primarily the lack of any relationship from the study of one problem to
another problem. In the charter of the Accounting Principles Board it was
specified that the first thing the Board should concern itself with would be a
set of basic postulates of accounting and broad accounting principles which
could then serve as the fundamental framework by which other specific
accounting issues could be analyzed. Each new pronouncement would be
related back to those fundamental principles.
Ten years have now elapsed, and that initial charge specified in the
charter of the Board has not begun to be taken up. This would lead me to
predict that it is not going to be taken up, and ultimately that the activities
of the Accounting Principles Board will be deemed to be unsatisfactory.
There are several reasons for this. One thing that the charter called for
at the outset was for research studies of the issues to be taken up. Quite a
large number of research studies have indeed been commissioned, but there
has been an unexpectedly long time involved in the completion of such studies.
I think the goodwill study took four to five years. It, in turn, arose out of a
study that had been completed earlier by Arthur Wyatt dealing with business
combinations, so that whole subject has been under research for the full tenyear period of the Board.
There is a study on extractive industries which has been under way for
several years; I have no idea when it is due for completion. There is one on
intercorporate investments, and since a subcommittee of the Board has now
been appointed, I assume that the Board has given up on that one being
completed in time to be used. Somewhere there is one floating around on
foreign operations, which surely is one of the most crucial issues that might
be discussed currently. Finally, somewhere in the background, somebody
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suggested that materiality deserved some consideration; I understand such a
study has not even been commissioned, although it has been talked about for
a couple of years.
This is past history, but it is the basis for my prediction that the current
procedure for establishing accounting principles will not succeed. At the
present time the Accounting Principles Board members are, in effect, doing
their own research. This is an extraordinarily inefficient method for such a
group to use. I suppose, indeed, in some cases there isn’t any research being
done at all.
My prediction, therefore, is that the Securities and Exchange Commission
will play an increased role. We already have evidence of an increasing activity
on the part of the SEC, and I certainly foresee a continuation of this trend.
This trend will be accelerated if the Accounting Principles Board continues
on its current path of doing what could be done more easily and more quickly
and more economically by a group of one or two or three people in the office
of the SEC. I guess I must confess that it is not at all clear to me that the
results would not be at least as satisfactory, or perhaps more satisfactory.
A couple of possibilities have been suggested here at Seaview for changes
in the future that might divert this trend. Specifically, it has been suggested
that the Accounting Principles Board concern itself with broad objectives, and
leave all the rule-making to some other group, which certainly would not need
to be a group of the high caliber that the Accounting Principles Board repre
sents. I think this is a possibility, but I am not optimistic, in view of past
performance, that this particular route will be taken.
With respect to the subject matter itself, ever-increasing attention will be
given to the needs of the user. I think it is evident that some are uncomfortable
with this trend at the present time, but surely we are going to become increas
ingly sensitive to the needs of users. I think that today’s rather high-sounding
phrases about management obligations to the public and to society will become
much more specific in respect to information needs.
I predict that there will be increasing awareness of the inadequacy of
historical information, and I think this will come about particularly with new
generations that are already upon us. These generations are oriented toward
a questioning attitude toward those things which we elders hold dear and
sacred—things like realization and conservatism and the matching principle.
Herbert Miller made the prediction that research was not the answer,
and that, indeed, there would be less research. How there could be less research
is not quite clear to me, but his prediction is probably right. The consequence
that I think is inevitable is the demise of accounting, as it is known today, as a
legitimate subject of study in the universities, even in business schools. This
is already upon us. You would not recognize as accounting courses many of
the things that are now being taught in the universities under that title; many
of the things that you might recognize as accounting are no longer being
taught. The kind of research that is now taking place is entirely different from
the kind of research that we have been talking about. That sort of thing is
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just not being done; it is no longer considered acceptable in many of the
universities.
This does not necessarily mean fewer CPAs or fewer students interested
in accounting. Indeed, there might be a side benefit. If we stop teaching
technical accounting in the universities, there might be a lot more people
interested in it as a career!
It does mean that a great educational burden will be shifted to the
accounting firms. The technical training will be left to a far greater extent
in your hands, but you will need some way to appeal to these young people
whose ideas are at a different level.

Professor Robert K. Mautz
After these fellows get through, there is really nothing left for me to
predict except total atomic disaster!
I remember an advertisement of one of the leading airlines several months
ago describing the way it will feel to take a flight on one of these wonderful
new jumbo jets. And the pitch was something like this: If you really want to
know how it’s going to be, take a ride on one of our present jets, and it will
be just like that, only more so.
That is how financial reporting is going to be in 20 years. It is going to
be just like now, only more so. If we were to have done this kind of predicting
in 1948, 20 years ago, we would have described 1968 pretty well if we had
forecast in these terms, and I don’t see any evidence that leads me to believe
that I should change my technique.
We had a committee on accounting procedure that was functioning then
at a slightly different pace, but was just as confused as the subcommittee chair
men of the present Accounting Principles Board. There was the same kind of
disagreement. They were searching very hard for principles. People were
unhappy with the state of accounting practices, but somehow we were getting
along.
I really don’t think there is going to be any great change. We are going
to be facing the same kinds of problems in much the same kinds of ways.
There is likely to be one difference. Business management is going to find
a way to express its views and its case. I think it has a case, a very important
case to all of us. Unfortunately, somehow managers are not as articulate as
they should be.
Frequently we have heard expressed the idea that the dissemination of
information is a very good thing. It’s like motherhood; you have to be for it.
But just as undisciplined or illegitimate motherhood destroys the family, too
much information may sacrifice a company’s competitive edge. If everybody
knows everything, no one has any competitive advantage. We don’t have any
reason to work very hard.
True, the suggestion has been made that we will block out certain kinds
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of information that will damage the firm. What kinds of information? How
does anybody define innovations, for example? We are not going to have any
innovations unless we have rewards for them. We are not going to get rewarded
for an innovation that everybody else knows about.
I think we have to have confidences. They are essential to innovation. I
think we have to have freedom to develop judgment, or we aren’t going to have
anybody with judgment. If there is only one way to do something, we don’t
have any choices. We will have leaders that have never had any experience in
making judgments, and their judgments aren’t going to be any good.
So my expectation is that we will have just more of the same. It’s going
to be harder; it’s going to get more difficult, but you will get paid more for it,
and it’s not going to be too bad a situation.
I am not at all despondent about the possibilities for improvement in
financial reporting. In fact, I think financial reporting is going to continue to
improve, as it has, but at a faster rate, and the improvement will come from
the most logical source. I am just naive enough to believe in a great profession,
and I think that public accountants as a group are just about ready to reclaim
the responsibility that they have abdicated to the SEC. I think they are just
about ready to see the futility of substituting rule-making for judgment.
Ultimately, events will force them to do this, but in any case I think they
are ready to begin to exercise their own professional judgment, plus the
necessary amount of courage to whip wayward management into position.
If they do this they will have the support of responsible management. That is
where the improvement in public reporting is going to come from.
I disagree with Bob Sprouse completely about accounting not being an
intellectual discipline or being abandoned in the universities. I think it is just
coming into its own.
We have depended upon economics for years and years to be the funda
mental discipline upon which business is based, and of course it has made
great contributions, but economics is going off in all directions these days.
It is becoming much more concerned with social welfare, with macro-economic
measurements, and such, and is giving relatively little attention to the theories
of the firm and to decision-making within the firm.
Now at the same time accounting is becoming less procedural and much
more conceptual. We have borrowed a great many concepts from other fields,
such as law and economics, and now we are beginning to develop our own.
There isn’t a concept like realization in any other field. There isn’t a concept
like matching.
We cannot borrow the economic definition of income, which really starts
with the income of a human being, and convert that right over to an enterprise,
because an enterprise is not really the same sort of thing as an individual.
We have talked about well-being, for example. You can’t talk about the
well-being of an enterprise in the same terms as you talk about the well-being
of an individual.
We are just beginning to develop these concepts. They are just emerging;
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but I would say that within the next 15 or 20 years we will see accounting
developing as the basic economic discipline for analysis of the firm. I stay
away from the word “measurement.” The word “measurement” bothers me.
It is used by too many people in too many different ways, and I don’t know
what it means. I think of accounting as a method of analysis that is peculiarly
adapted to the progress and status of the enterprise. We are going to see more
and more and more of this, and it is going to come into its right as an intel
lectual subject as well as a field of special activity.
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Symposium Papers and Critiques

Where Do We Stand?
By Ralph S. Saul
President, American Stock Exchange

The pace and number of developments in corporate financial reporting
complicate the task of summing up where we stand today. In fulfilling that
assignment, I hope not to be guilty of Winston Churchill’s comment on a
political adversary, “He had the gift of compressing the largest amount of
words into the smallest amount of thoughts.”
In my discussion, I intend to cover two points. First, I will describe some
of the important changes in the environment which appear to affect corporate
financial reporting and then relate each of these changes to current develop
ments. Finally, I want to offer some tentative thoughts about possible future
directions and objectives.
Corporate financial reporting is now caught up in the type of controversy
which seems to permeate our society. In a sense, it is anomalous that while
financial reporting and accounting standards in the United States are emulated
elsewhere in the world, we are now engaged in an intense debate on the form
and content of full disclosure.
How did we arrive at this state of affairs? What is the reason for the
dialogue on corporate reporting—for this meeting—at this point in time? It
seems to me that underlying changes in three areas—the business, investor,
and legal environment—are largely responsible.

Changes in the Business Structure
The most significant factor affecting corporate financial reporting is the
far-reaching change now taking place in the structure of American business
through merger.
The current merger trend is unique in a number of ways. It has lasted
longer than any such trend in American economic history—for nearly the last
two decades, with a burst of activity during the past two years. It is also sub
stantially larger than any prior merger movement. In 1967, and again this
year, the number and size of mergers in manufacturing exceeded by wide
margins the previous peaks of merger activity in the 1890’s and 1920’s.
This merger trend is also unique because of the types of mergers being
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consummated. In prior periods of merger activity vertical and horizontal
mergers dominated the scene—now conglomerate mergers are dominant.
Conglomerates will probably account in 1968 for almost 90 per cent of total
acquired assets in large mergers
*
—horizontal mergers accounting for only 3.7
per cent and verticals for 6.4 per cent.
We are also witnessing significant changes in the types of conglomerate
mergers. In prior years most conglomerate mergers involved a market or
product extension by the acquiring firm. A market extension merger is one in
which two firms selling the same product, but in different geographic markets,
merge. In a product extension merger, the acquiring firm brings together a
number of related products which may be distributed through the same mar
keting channels. However, during the past several years there has been a sub
stantial increase in conglomerate mergers in which there is little discernible
relationship between the activities of the acquiring and the acquired firm. In
1968, it is expected that almost 60 per cent of all conglomerate mergers will
involve the acquisition of companies engaged in businesses unrelated to those
of the acquiring companies. It is also significant that there has been a substan
tial increase in the size of firms acquired.
When we consider that the structure of American business is undergoing
a fundamental change and that this change appears to be accelerating, we can
place some of our financial reporting problems into better perspective.
The conglomerate merger movement has forced us to focus on three
immediate questions in financial reporting. How is an acquisition to be treated
—as a purchase or as a pooling of interests? How can we assure that the
resultant earnings per share figure is stated as accurately and as consistently
as possible? Finally, how do we disclose the financial data which will show
the relative contribution to earnings per share of the various lines of business
of a conglomerate?
The common factor running through all of these questions is the impact
of a business combination upon earnings per share.
For the corporate manager, earnings per share is the ultimate measure of
his stewardship. One way to improve earnings per share is through the appli
cation of accounting rules which permit the addition of the earnings of one
company to another as though both companies had in fact been divisions of
one company all along. Many informed accountants and the SEC agree that
accounting rules which permit companies to choose between pooling and pur
chasing on the basis of which makes earnings look better, are unsatisfactory
and need to be changed.
Accounting problems are further complicated when an acquisition in
volves an injection into the capital structure of complex securities. An analysis
of the balance sheets of several of the better known conglomerates shows a full
spectrum of securities—convertible notes, convertible debentures, convertible
preferred, non-convertible preferred and common stock. Since investors rely
* Defined by the Federal Trade Commission as mergers involving $10 million or more in assets.
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primarily on the per share earnings figure in their evaluation of a company’s
record, the dilution factor is of prime importance. Investors also want to know
the effect of an acquisition upon earnings per share and to be able to compare
earnings through acquisitions with earnings through internal growth.
When a company diversifies into unrelated activities, the investor may no
longer receive information from the financial statements of the acquired com
panies. The prospects of the conglomerate are then measured by a figure which
reports the total profitability of the enterprise and which tells him little about
the risk, profitability or growth of each segment.
Significant progress is being made to resolve each of those problems. The
Accounting Principles Board has recently published a research study on
accounting for business combinations which may provide the basis for new
standards in this area. In Opinion No. 9, the Board has prescribed ground
rules for the reporting of earnings per share and is about to expose a further
draft to clarify this area. Finally, to improve financial reporting by diversified
companies, the Financial Executives Institute sponsored a comprehensive study
by Professor Mautz which recommended reporting guidelines for diversified
companies. Many companies are now publishing reports in line with these
guidelines.
Any discussion of accounting problems relating to conglomerates should
take note of the studies now under way by the Federal Trade Commission and
other government agencies of the implications of the current merger movement.
We must assume that difficult questions will be asked in the months ahead
centering on whether the current trend of events is in the public interest and
consistent with antitrust policies. Certainly we cannot assume that a basic
restructuring of American industry can occur without a critical analysis of its
implications for the economy.
Another change in the business environment that may have an important
impact on public reporting of financial data is the improvement in internal
reporting systems of corporations.
With the formidable assistance of the computer, the financial manager
has developed systems for providing, almost on a real time basis, information
about revenues and costs, both for the corporate entity and for product lines
or segments within the entity. Internal reports are usually an integral part of
the profit plan for the corporation and for measuring the performance of
managers responsible for the control of costs.
The financial executive regards internal reports as a management tool
and feels that publication of these reports might both mislead investors and
help competitors. He rightfully points to problems of common cost allocation,
pricing of intra-company transactions and consistency from one period to the
next. Also, the company has a legal responsibility for the reliability of pub
lished financial data. However, as internal reporting systems become more
sophisticated, more timely and more reliable, I would foresee increasing de
mands for more disclosure of material information derived from these reports.
Financial managers, particularly conglomerate financial managers, may
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be faced with a dilemma. Internal reporting systems are providing more and
better information about segments of the total enterprise. At the same time,
published overall operating results tell less about the different degrees of risk,
profitability and opportunities for growth of the individual segments. If a
development within the enterprise is material to the whole enterprise, man
agement may be under an obligation to make timely disclosure of that
development.
Finally, corporate reporting is complicated by accelerating technological
changes in the business environment. These changes have created new indus
tries, such as computer leasing, where the accountant must apply accounting
principles to novel business transactions and arrangements.

Changes in the Investor Environment
The overriding change in the investor environment has been the emphasis
upon the concept of growth in investment analysis and portfolio management.
It is this emphasis which has created the “earnings per share syndrome.”
I think that the preface to the most recent edition of Graham and Dodd’s
classic work on “Security Analysis” illustrates the change that has taken place
in analytical concepts. Older criteria for the valuation of common stocks took
into account wide fluctuations in former markets and average earnings for a
number of past years and then established upper limits for “a permissible price
in relation to such earnings.” Under these older criteria, said the authors:
. . . favorable possibilities of future growth were to be looked for
and taken advantage of when feasible: but the investor—as disting
uished from the speculator—was to keep the premium paid for such
prospects within a modest maximum.

Continuing inflation, a rising stock market, and the growth in the econ
omy provided the background for acceptance of new criteria. The new edition
now gives more weight to measuring investment values in terms of expectations
of future earnings.
To sum up, securities analysis is firmly bottomed upon an analysis of
growth and earnings per share is an essential part of that analysis.
Additionally, corporations must now reckon with a new investor—the
institutional portfolio manager. This constituency is informed, active and
skeptical. Several interrelated factors are responsible for the needs of these
managers for more financial data.
Institutions are placing more equities into their portfolios and it would
appear that the demand for equities continues to grow. Even where the
institution is a creditor, the portfolio manager is seeking some form of equity
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participation. As the institutional investor becomes increasingly equity-ori
ented, he tends to be more interested in corporate developments which may
have an impact on earnings.
Competitive pressures on portfolio managers for performance have in
creased. Because of the liquidity of the securities markets, information can
be used quickly; that is, investment decisions can be immediately translated
into an execution at a price reasonably close to the last sale. Under these
circumstances, portfolio managers want to know all corporate developments
which may affect earnings per share, even over the short term.
These factors—growing equity orientation of institutional portfolios,
competitive pressures upon portfolio managers and increasing liquidity of our
securities markets—tend to explain, in part, the needs of institutional investors
for more and better financial data.
Of overriding importance in the investor environment is the growth in
the number of investors—both institutional and individual. These investors
want greater comparability of data between companies, more accurate and
comprehensive earnings data and more adequate disclosure of accounting
principles employed.

Changes in the Legal Environment
As we are all well aware, changes in the legal environment have had an
impact upon financial reporting.
The growth of the institutional investor, his greater sophistication and
access to companies, has raised questions about fairness in the distribution and
timing of the release of material corporate information. The near instant
liquidity of our securities markets which makes it possible to act upon infor
mation quickly, explains regulatory preoccupation with questions of fairness.
It might appear that recent legal developments in the disclosure area
represent a new departure. Actually, the SEC and the exchanges have been
concerned for many years with insuring fair dealing in the markets.
The securities markets are now public markets both in fact and contem
plation of law. The markets of the twenties were professional markets which
represented themselves as public markets. Now the markets have become truly
public markets which must be shared with professionals, including institutions.
If the individual investor is to continue to have confidence in the markets, he
must be assured that these markets do, in fact, serve individual investors.
It seems to me that emphasis on two facts in recent cases—Cady Roberts
and Texas Gulf Sulphur—in the disclosure area will help to provide some
perspective. First, these cases involved information which had a sharp and
immediate market impact—a cut in dividends, a major mineral discovery.
Second, insiders, or those with a special relationship to the company, allegedly
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traded on the basis of inside information. If these facts had been kept in mind,
perhaps there would have been less overreaction to recent legal developments.
The basic disclosure questions are not easy to answer in specific situations.
What is material information? When should a company make disclosure?
And how should that disclosure be made?
At the Exchange, we have to answer these questions every day in the
administration of our timely disclosure policy. We therefore bring some work
ing experience to these questions. Hopefully, we also bring flexibility. We
find a tendency to talk about many disclosure problems in the abstract and in
legalistic terms without getting into the more difficult operational problems.
I think that the exchanges have an opportunity through their timely dis
closure policies to provide operational guidelines to companies. The difficulty
with Commission Rule 10b-5 is that it does not provide a precise guide in
making decisions about disclosure. Continuing extension by the courts of the
reach of Rule 1 Ob-5—a rule based upon fraud concepts—has only served to
increase corporate anxieties in the disclosure area.
At the Exchange we are now reviewing our timely disclosure policy to
see if we can provide better guidelines for listed companies, for analysts and
for member firms. For example, we are exploring whether we can devise a
better system for publication, perhaps through the filing of a release with the
Exchange. Another area would be to provide rules of thumb on the timing
of insider purchases and sales.
Direct government regulation of corporate publicity has inherent limi
tations. The volume of corporate publicity, the paramount aim of full and
prompt disclosure, the difficulty of making judgments concerning specific items
of publicity and the proximity of this field to the constitutionally protected
right of freedom of expression—all combine to make legal control an imperfect
instrument.
Under a vigorous chairman, the SEC has taken a more aggressive role in
corporate financial reporting. Although it has urged voluntary action by the
accounting profession and financial managers, it has not hesitated to use its
own powers where it felt that voluntary action did not go far enough. There
have been two recent examples of this attitude.
In its release on accounting for pooling of interests and convertible secu
rities, the SEC departed from the Accounting Principles Board’s Opinion No.
10 and stated that potential future dilution, by itself, determines whether a
security is a residual and that companies having only common stock and other
residual securities outstanding should present earnings per share figures solely
on the basis of equivalent outstanding common shares. Then came another
release in which the SEC made its own proposals for reporting by diversified
companies on the ground that voluntary disclosure recommended by the
Financial Executives Institute had achieved only “mixed results.”
I think we must assume that there is a third item on the SEC’s agenda
which will be dealt with through government action unless there is a satis
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factory solution in the near future—the criteria to be used in determining the
applicability of a purchase or pooling accounting in a combination. If we are
to forestall government action, this matter should be high on the agenda for
self-regulatory action.
There is another matter on the SEC’s agenda—its disclosure study which
is reviewing the rules and policies of the Commission relative to disclosure
under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act. As Commissioner Wheat has
stated, the study is not attempting a statutory integration of the two acts but
rather to concentrate on what can be accomplished now through use of the
Commission’s rule-making authority.
From this study we can hopefully expect expansion of the use of the short
form registration to certain specialized types of offerings, guidelines on cor
porate publicity and broker-dealer recommendations when a company is “in
registration” and clarification of the private offering exemption and Rule 154.
It would also appear that the study will make recommendations for a more
timely and useful Form 10-K and for extension of quarterly reporting require
ments to unlisted companies.
The SEC disclosure study is already bringing tangible results by imple
menting arrangements for the dissemination of filed information through the
use of a new reproducing technique.
The most controversial development during the past year has been a
widening of accountants’ legal responsibilities as a result of judge-made law.
Accountants must work under the federal securities laws which impose
liability even for non-negligent mistakes. And if, for example, a company goes
bankrupt, they inevitably find themselves in the middle of controversies be
tween creditors, stockholders, and others.
Traditionally, suits against accountants by other than clients were unsuc
cessful. The landmark decision, the Ultramares case, seemed until recently
to foreclose successful investor actions against accountants for false and mis
leading financial statements. This has been slowly changing over the years
and decisions such as that in Yale Express indicate that the courts are not
reluctant to extend accountants’ liability.
At the time of adoption of the federal securities laws, the decision was
made that an independent accounting profession rather than government
auditors should be the means for assuring the public of full and fair corporate
financial reporting. The responsibilities of auditors to shareholders and in
vestors were not precisely delineated. The results of present litigation may
hopefully bring a better definition of these responsibilities consistent with both
the practicalities of accounting and the policies of the federal securities laws.
Perhaps the profession itself could assist in that definition by adopting addi
tional guidelines for the practitioner.
For the accounting profession, the “litigation explosion” is a fact that
must be lived with. I think we must assume that in the event of an economic
decline the number of suits against auditors will increase. Eventually, however,
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the present “time of troubles” for accountants will pass and I am sure we will
all survive.

Where Are We Going?
This review of where we stand in corporate financial reporting will con
clude with some tentative thoughts about future directions and objectives.
I do not believe that the current interest in financial reporting is a tran
sient or passing phenomenon. Financial reporting is in the limelight and the
environment within which reporting must operate is generating continuing
pressures for change. The government, the academic community, the financial
press and the investing public are constantly asking difficult questions and
pressing for answers. We all face what someone has termed “consumerism”—
a state of affairs in which the consumer expects higher standards of responsi
bility from the private sector. Increasingly, he will want to be told things as
they are rather than as we might want them to be.
If we start from this premise, our objective should be to develop new
principles and practices through responsible self-regulatory action rather than
through direct government regulation. More aggressive and vigorous use of
self-regulatory power would avoid the need for government action.
A second objective should be to continue to provide vehicles similar to
this Symposium to anticipate reporting and accounting problems and to devise
solutions more promptly. It would seem to me that any vehicles devised should
attempt to bring together all interested parties—accountants, analysts, creditors
and financial executives—to assure that these parties can contribute their
expertise to help achieve workable solutions.
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Users and Preparers:

Needs and Responsibilities

The Needs and Responsibilities
Of the Investor in Equities
By William C. Norby
Senior Vice President, Harris Trust & Savings Bank, Past President, Financial
Analysts Federation, representing the Financial Analysts Federation

There are many types of investors in public companies. Individual stock
holders are by and large inarticulate on matters of financial reporting but
skilled and sophisticated financial intermediaries represent them in increasing
degree. The financial analysts employed by these intermediaries thus stand in
the place of the equity investor and have become one of the most important
users of financial data reported by corporate managements and certified by
CPAs. This paper will be concerned with the needs and responsibilities of
financial analysts in relation to corporate financial reporting.

The Use of Financial Information
In Equity Investment
The financial analyst endeavors to determine relative values among
alternative investment opportunities. In the long run, the return on an invest
ment is measured by the income received plus capital appreciation arising from
growth of the enterprise through retained earnings. In addition, securities
traded in public markets demonstrate wide fluctuations in the valuations placed
on expected returns, both over time and between companies. The most
attractive investments are those which are expected to show the greatest total
return on the investment, allowing for the degree of risk, relative to other
alternatives.
The keynotes of this selection process are “expected,” “risk,” and “rela
tive.” The financial analyst must deal with the uncertain future, using the
past as a guide, in contrast to the accountant who deals largely with the
hardened facts of today and yesterday. The analyst tries to estimate expected
future returns for periods of one to five years for many companies because he
seeks the best relative return on current price. There are no absolute values
in investment but only an ebb and flow of values as between companies and
as between types of securities. Thus, the relative value approach requires
constant comparison over time and between enterprises. Risk is the poten
tiality of loss. Obviously, risks are great when many future variables must be
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forecast. There are risks in erroneous economic forecasts, in reversals in
investor psychology and in incorrect appraisals of company expectations. The
latter risk can be reduced through more accurate analysis of past performance
and present position of the enterprise.
Selection of equity investment begins with an analysis of present and pros
pective earning power of individual companies. The financial analyst employs
a wide variety of techniques to make this analysis but the starting point is the
financial data reported in the annual and quarterly reports. From these data
he analyzes the comparative historical trend of earnings—their growth and
variability; the capital requirements; profitability in relation to sales and
capital. Financial data alone are useful but they must be related to general
and industry economic factors, to product development, to past capital invest
ment decisions, and to company organization in order to assess their full
meaning. Net earnings remain the final measure of financial power and
management stewardship. They are the common denominator of all corporate
enterprise.
A projection of future earning power is necessary to calculate future
returns and begins with the foregoing analysis of historical and present earning
power. An estimate of the future involves a wide range of variables including
economy and industry forecasts, product marketing projections, management
capabilities, and competitive developments. Financial analysis has not yet
developed any rigorous method of correlating all of this information, and
indeed the nature of the problem may preclude it. Financial data will be used
in different ways, and perhaps inconsistent ways, by different analysts. Mathe
matical techniques have been applied to give an appearance of rigor but are
as likely as not to prove quite misleading in the long run. A wide variation in
forecasts is to be anticipated under these circumstances.
Financial information is the heart of an analysis of a company’s cur
rent position and of a projection of future earning power. While financial
analysts may use these data in different ways, they all start on the presumption
that the financial reports are accurate and consistent. To the extent that finan
cial reports fall short of this standard, there can be no question that improved
financial data can provide a better base for appraisal and projection of a
company’s earning power which in the long run should narrow the range of
forecasts and hence of investment values.

Data Requirements
Given the extreme range of industries and companies in the U.S. econ
omy, it is not possible to delineate all comprehensive and specific requirements
for financial data in this paper. Perhaps some general principles can be
outlined.
The financial analyst gives primary accent to the earnings statement
because he bases investment value primarily on earning power. Generally
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there should be sufficient financial data on sales and revenues and the signifi
cant elements of costs and expenses to make possible an understanding of the
economic and financial dynamics of the enterprise. For example, the analyst
needs to know how costs such as labor, materials, selling, etc., vary in relation
to volume changes; how revenues relate to investment in plant and working
capital; and how all of these factors relate to economic data for the company
and the industry. The latter, while outside the scope of the certified financial
statements, are essential to an adequate understanding of the enterprise.
The balance sheet is necessary to provide an integrated understanding
of the business but normally the analyst gives it secondary consideration
because the market value of the business is not directly related to the fair
value or book value of the assets. This is not to say that assets and capitaliza
tion are unimportant, for the earnings return on capital in most companies
tends to fluctuate within a moderate range. But the emphasis of the analyst
differs from that of other users of financial statements and his concern with
accounting problems is mostly directed to the earnings account.
Each industry group of companies must have its own list of specific
requirements for financial data. Through the Financial Analysts Federation
Corporate Information Committee, analysts are making known their data
requirements, industry by industry. The great diversity of American enterprise
makes the industry approach necessary; broad statements applicable to all
companies have little value. The general standard should be adequate earn
ings, asset, liability and supplementary data to provide an understanding of
the economic and financial dynamics of the enterprise.
In the light of this standard, the need for more detailed information about
widely diversified or conglomerate companies is readily apparent. When a
company has major segments of its business in home building, hotels, elec
tronics manufacture, bread baking and telephone utilities—just to mention
one of many weird business combinations now in existence—consolidated
financial information does not provide an understanding of the economic and
financial dynamics of a company. The analyst must understand the dynamics
in each distinct segment and therefore requires segmented sales and profit
information which can be related to economic variables. This is a thorny
accounting and reporting problem but the recent rapid expansion in the num
ber and size of conglomerate companies is now making more data essential
for adequate financial analysis. Progress has been made in the recent study
commissioned by the Financial Executives Research Foundation. Further
development of concepts is desirable and new accounting rules or conventions
may be necessary.

The Role of Earnings Per Share
Financially, the final measure of the success of a company and the ulti
mate objective of investors is net earnings available for dividends on the
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common stock. Hence great stress is placed on net earnings in all investment
analyses. The amount, trend and variability of earnings relative to capital
investment are the final expression of the results of all of a company’s en
deavors.
For the investor, of course, net earnings per share is the significant figure
since his participation is proportionate. It is a small number which is more
easily remembered and it permits a more ready comparison between companies
of different size. It can be related to market price of the stock. The number
of stock issues in the security markets is large and growing. It is beyond any
individual’s or organization’s competence to follow all of them. The financial
press cannot provide complete data on them. Hence earnings per share is the
quick shorthand for capsuling the financial progress of companies.
This emphasis sometimes leads non-investment people to think that all
investment analysis is structured on this one number—a shallow approach
indeed. However, the wide range of capitalization ratios applied to earnings
per share demonstrates that investors recognize variations in quality based on
analysis. Nevertheless, reported changes in earnings per share can have a
great impact on stock prices; and therefore every effort must be made to have
the earnings per share figure as accurate and consistent as possible; to insure
that it rests on the application of fair and correct accounting principles to
aggregate net earnings.
The problem with the earnings per share figure is really an information
reporting problem. It is the figure which gets the headlines in the press and
therefore makes an impact without any qualifications from explanatory foot
notes or other background. But it is fair to say here that if the range of
generally accepted accounting principles can be narrowed and greater con
sistency and comparability achieved in the reporting of net earnings, some
of the reporting problems concerned with earnings per share will evaporate.

Comparability and Other Accounting Matters
The investment process is the comparison of relative values. Comparison
requires comparability of financial statements—over time and between com
panies. To achieve comparability we must have strict, practical accounting
rules which do not permit deviation, and uniform application by the accounting
profession. Granted that much is being done by the American Institute’s Ac
counting Principles Board to give “general accounting principles” more pre
cision, much remains to be done—perhaps beyond the boundaries of present
thought in the profession.
A plea for stricter definition and application of accounting principles is
always countered by arguments for flexibility and judgment in the preparation
of financial statements, by protests against the stultifying effects of hard and
fast rules on the development of accounting principles, and by statements that
forced comparability will merely make unlike situations appear alike.
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Obviously a practical balance must be struck between the needs of
investors and sound accounting in the quest for comparability. First, many
of the unlike situations that are said to require different accounting treatment
are really reasonably alike from a practical viewpoint. Different accounting
treatment is not likely to yield more useful information. Second, while methods
of allocating some revenues and related costs between periods can be debated
theoretically, the investor will find a practical rule enforced in all similar
situations preferable to a more precise interperiod allocation which varies
between companies. In the long run aggregate revenues and costs over a life
cycle will be the same for all companies and in the short run comparability is
more important to the investor. Hence it is desirable to eliminate variations in
accounting treatment not clearly justified by the circumstances.
A case in point is the by now tiresome subject of the investment tax credit.
In the interests of comparability it would be better to have a flat rule on this
subject than variable treatment and continuing debate regarding the account
ing theories involved.
There are many comparability questions more difficult than the invest
ment tax credit. Consider depreciation policies applied to computers, by now
a fairly standard piece of hardware, as between the various manufacturers.

First-Year Depreciation on Computers

IBM
NCR
Burroughs
Control Data
Honeywell
Leasing companies

40%
33%
25%
25%
16%
10% (mostly IBM equipment)

There ought to be some practical judgment on the appropriate first year
write-off of a computer which is applicable to all manufacturers and would
make their earnings statements more nearly comparable. Granted this would
require a degree of agreement between accounting firms, managements and
the APB that would be called utopian, consider also the tremendous market
value of the securities of these companies. If for example, 25 per cent write-off
is a representative rate, then IBM’s earnings are understated and stockholders
misled as to the true earning power of the company. Honeywell’s are over
stated as are those of the leasing companies to an even greater degree. A
current phenomenon in the market is the rapid promotion of new computer
leasing companies and their success is importantly dependent on more liberal
depreciation policies; in fact these securities probably could not be marketed
if they followed the depreciation policies of the manufacturers.
In the airframe industry, Boeing charges off development costs of new
programs as incurred; Lockheed inventories these costs and charges out as
deliveries are made and revenues received (with provision for current charge
off of cost overruns). While both methods no doubt have validity, analysts
are noting currently that Lockheed may show a better earnings record in the
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next several years, partly because it will not have heavy charge-offs for devel
opment costs as Boeing will have, entirely because of different accounting
policies. This tends to make Lockheed appear the more attractive investment
(other factors are at work also). Perhaps the analyst should not play on this
difference in accounting policies as a market factor, but then how can he make
the statements comparable for his analysis?
Another aspect of comparability is materiality. The degree of materiality
applied in statement preparation probably varies from company to company,
accounting firm to accounting firm, and perhaps from year to year. But the
small differences can have an investment significance beyond that suspected
by accountants. Even items of 1 per cent to 2 per cent of total earnings can
have an important effect on market prices, if accounting decisions are all
applied in the same direction. In recent years investors have considered con
sistent earnings growth from year to year as a primary factor in appraising
common stocks. For example, growth of 8 per cent to 10 per cent may be
capitalized at over 20 times. In this context an extra 2 per cent to 5 per cent
of reported earnings in a year from favorable treatment of “immaterial” items
may appear to indicate an acceleration of the growth rate, which may tend to
boost the price earnings ratio of the stock.
In summary, comparability of financial statements is essential to deter
mination of relative investment values—not the only factor but the starting
point. Investors would prefer consistent application of a practical rule to all
similar situations, even at the expense of some elegance of accounting theory.
The various arguments against comparability do not appear substantial when
weighed against the potential effects of non-comparability on market values
of securities. The real source of resistance to comparability comes from a
desire for individual expression by accountants and by managements. Admit
tedly these statements in support of comparability are more extreme than the
practicalities of the real world will support, but comparability needs more
attention than it has been getting from accountants and management.

Accounting for Business Combinations
Another accounting subject of current importance, in which investors
have an important stake, is mergers, acquisitions and poolings of interests.
There is a great deal of discussion and controversy over accounting theory in
this field, none of which can be resolved here. A cursory analysis may be
useful in highlighting the analyst-investor point of view on the matter.
The primary financial interest of investors in mergers and acquisitions
is the impact on the earnings per share and the capital structure. No matter
what theory may be used in accounting for the merger, there will be a new
amount of aggregate earnings, a new number of shares outstanding and a
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resulting new earnings per share. Investors are interested in knowing over a
period of years what the impact of mergers and acquisitions has been on
earnings per share as contrasted with internal growth. This requires retro
active adjustment of per share earnings with each new acquisition. In the
final analysis, however, it is the actual earnings per share reported each year
which is the final measure of the performance of the company, whether these
earnings arise from internal growth or from ability to make acquisitions on a
basis favorable to shareholders. There is a need to standardize the presentation
of aggregate earnings and earnings per share for acquisitive companies, prob
ably one which would show both actual and earnings adjusted for acquisitions
over the last five years. In fact, there does not seem to be much controversy
about this approach to accounting for mergers and acquisitions, and most,
but not all, companies now show some form of retroactive adjustment for
acquisitions.
Most of the accounting controversies on accounting for mergers and
acquisitions center around the method of recording the acquisitions on the
balance sheet. Should the assets of the acquired company be shown at original
book value or at the acquisition value as determined by the bundle of cash
and/or securities issued in exchange? Should securities issued be credited
at market value or at stated book value? Fundamentally, it would seem that
accounting for mergers and acquisitions should be the same regardless of the
method of payment and should show real cost. In the last three years or so
the merger and acquisition movement has proceeded so rapidly in the Ameri
can economy that the price of many available companies has been bid up to
high levels. Perhaps many acquisitions would be hard to justify if managements
had to show in their accounting the real cost of the companies acquired. The
objection to the pooling of interests method of accounting is largely based on
the fact that it conceals such costs from the balance sheet. On the other hand,
the pooling of interests method does not credit capital accounts with the excess
of market value over book value of shares traded. It is the “Chinese money”
created by inflated stock prices which enables conglomerates to buy other
companies at inflated prices; under pooling of interests, the inflation is elimi
nated from both sides of the balance sheet.
In some cases promoters of conglomerate companies have been able to
create income out of capital when under the pooling of interests method,
acquired property is later sold at a profit. This capital gain would not exist
if the property had been recorded on the books at an amount equivalent to
the market value of the shares exchanged for it. Needless to say, extra earnings
from any source are welcome to promoters.
In the fast-moving world of conglomerate high finance many new and
difficult accounting problems have been created and abuses in financial report
ing have been obscured by accounting complexities. We see here then a need
for a rigorous accounting theory for mergers and acquisitions which will
standardize the approach and preclude the use of accounting technicalities to
obscure the real costs and the real results of these developments.
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Disclosure Problems
There are a number of problems associated with disclosure of corporate
financial information which affects its interpretation and use. First is the
question whether disclosure of differences is sufficient to meet the needs of
users. Many analysts have taken a position over the years that full disclosure
of accounting methods was of greater importance to them than actual com
parability of data because the analyst could make his own adjustments to
produce comparisons which were meaningful to him. This approach does not
any longer seem practical because of the rapidly increasing number of public
companies to be followed and the difficulty of maintaining desired adjustments
up to date. Investment inquiries are more costly to handle if time must be
spent on each inquiry to ascertain the accounting method and make the neces
sary adjustments in the figures to achieve comparability. Not every review of
a security can be an exhaustive treatise with a careful review of accounting
details. The whole apparatus of the financial press and financial services
makes it too cumbersome to try to adjust in myriad ways individual company
financial data to make them comparable with similar companies. The absence
of such adjustments when presenting summary financial data might easily
lead to incorrect conclusions. Therefore disclosure in itself is not a satisfactory
substitute for comparability in accounting methods.
Comparability is not a complete substitute for disclosure, however. In to
day’s complex economic environment almost every company encounters excep
tions to standard which require explanation. The annual report continues to
be the place where these qualifications and judgments on financial statements
can best be expressed, and specifically in notes to the financial statements. It
would seem desirable to make the financial notes more comprehensive, more
literate, and less technical in an effort to entice the user to read them. If the
analyst has the annual report available, it is reasonably likely that he will go
over its supporting notes to the financial statements, but too frequently it has
been difficult to discern their importance. The effects of accounting decisions
should be spelled out in dollar terms.
These explanations and qualifications can easily be lost in the publication
of company statements in manuals and financial news media. In the interests
of brevity, such publications may drop footnotes so that the user is handi
capped in making a complete analysis unless he has the annual report itself.
Emphasis in some way on the two or three most significant footnotes, plus an
educational effort with the press might resolve some of this problem, but there
will remain with the investor the responsibility of reading with care the annual
and quarterly reports to be fully informed.
The disclosure of quarterly financial information in the press or in
quarterly reports to shareholders is normally not subject to the scrutiny of
the accounting profession. Quarterly data have almost as much significance
as annual data in today’s investment markets, for stock prices frequently
respond promptly to the ups and downs of quarterly earnings. This may or
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may not be a sensible approach by investors, but it exists and must be dealt
with as a fact of life. Should the accountant review these quarterly statements
before they are released to insure that they conform to accounting principles
and are not misleading? It is probable that some companies consult their
accountants before preparing quarterly statements. Perhaps some opinion
short of certification might accompany these statements.
What should be the role of the accountant in the disclosure of information
through the text of annual or quarterly reports? We sometimes see the careful
work of accountants in preparing an accurate measure of changes in the
company’s financial status overridden by the management comments in the
text of the report, or in the press releases derived therefrom, which try to put
the best foot forward and are sometimes misleading. For example, recently
we have seen conglomerate companies which emphasize in letters to share
holders that sales and net earnings were up by some large percentage, but
closer examination reveals that these figures refer to aggregate dollars which
have been enlarged by mergers in the current year (i.e., not retroactively
adjusted) and that earnings per share may have decreased for the period. This
is an attempt to maintain the euphoria which has been surrounding conglomer
ate companies through misleading disclosure. In order to control this sort of
thing, which of course involves only a minority of companies, would it be
desirable for accountants to state in their opinion that they have read manage
ment’s letter to the shareholders and find the financial references therein
consistent with the financial statements?
As in most any other aspect of life, it is not enough to have the right idea
or the right information; it must be successfully communicated to be meaning
ful. Therefore effective disclosure and communication of financial data are
equally important with the careful preparation of such statements in accord
ance with established accounting practice. To bring this about may require
some leadership from the American Institute of CPAs as the independent
group closest to the company management which prepares the statements, and
from users as well.

Conflicts Among the Parties at Interest
The presentation of financial statements is the responsibility of corporate
management. The professional accountant attests as to their correctness. The
user and interpreter of these statements is the investor, or the financial analyst
acting for the investor. In theory these parties have a common interest in
accurate financial statements. In fact, however, their immediate interests tend
to diverge. The resulting conflicts are at the root of some of the accounting
and reporting problems plaguing investors today. Perhaps if the conflicts are
laid bare, they can be more readily resolved.
Corporate management has the primary responsibility for the preparation
and issuance of financial statements through annual and quarterly reports,
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press statements, and other media. Management has broad latitude in its
accounting policies so long as they fall within the framework of “generally
accepted accounting principles,” or regulatory requirements in some instances.
Corporate managements wish to prepare fair and accurate reports for
shareholders, and American investors are favored with the most comprehensive
financial data of shareholders anywhere. There are a minority of companies
which fall short of the general standard, however, and almost all managements
are affected by subtle motivations in the preparation of reports. An executive
is by nature optimistic if he is to be successful and, since the financial results
contained in the report are the measurement of his personal success as a
manager, there may be tendencies to put the best foot forward and cover up
adversity. Stock options and trading activity in the company’s stock may
tempt a few to overdo the optimistic accent. By contrast, some managements
have a predilection to understatement in the interests of conservatism. Man
agement is only human in its distaste for public retreat and if internal reserves
are available, unexpected reversals can be absorbed without affecting reported
earnings.
“Managed earnings” combine these tendencies. Sufficient flexibility exists
in most companies to allocate some revenues and costs between periods, in
such a way as to show a steady (hopefully rising) trend of earnings, a quality
highly valued in the market place. This may not be entirely misleading,
however, since the earning power of a company is really a continuum which
cannot be precisely allocated between time periods, particularly quarterly
periods. Frequently, the high points are not really as favorable as the “unman
aged” figures indicate, nor are the low points as bad.
Any and all of these reporting tendencies by management are in conflict
with the interests of investors. The investor may be led to overvalue or under
value his stock, or perhaps acquire a false sense of security regarding the
steady progress of his company. However, the investor may be able to develop
from these tendencies an independent measure of management which could
be useful in appraising the quality of his investment.

Responsibility of the Financial Analyst
The financial analyst’s responsibility is to study all available information
about a company and its industry in order to form an objective conclusion
about its investment attractiveness. Dealing with many uncertainties, the
analyst’s natural tendency is to seek all possible details about a company and
always more than management wishes to release. A conflict arises between
disclosure of adequate data for analytical purposes and protection of data
which might compromise a company’s competitive position or which is useful
primarily for management control purposes. Analysts do not need to act like
news reporters looking for a “beat” on some financial detail. Nor do analysts
need to be in management’s chair to make a fair appraisal. They are better
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advised to retain a broader perspective. Most large companies today provide
reasonably adequate data for analytical purposes, but there remain some
laggards.
The financial analyst has not always used accounting data properly, nor
has he fully understood the nature of some of the accounting problems inherent
in his criticisms regarding comparability and disclosure. As a matter of fact,
analysts by and large are not well versed in accounting theory. Only a very
small percentage of analysts have degrees in accounting and their knowledge
is largely in statement analysis.
The analyst also has hidden motivations which affect his objectivity.
Sometimes he is anxious to “sell” an investment idea. Sometimes he is swept
along in stock market fads. Occasionally he may succumb to the flattery of
management.
Hence, carefully prepared financial statements may sometimes suffer in
the hands of the analyst who incorrectly interprets them from an accounting
standpoint, and it is his report that intervenes between the company and the
ultimate investor rather than the company’s own annual report. Clearly the
financial analyst has a responsibility to both the company and the reader of
his analyses to exercise care in the interpretation of financial statements. His
analytical report and investment recommendation may have a more direct
impact on security prices than the corporate report. This responsibility is not
easily monitored; only through education and leadership can it be enhanced.
This role falls largely to the Financial Analysts Federation as the professional
body of analysts, but has not yet been actively assumed. The FAF should, in
due course, establish better guidelines for use of financial data and for analyti
cal procedures.

Role of the Public Accountant
The public accountant is the man in the middle of this conflict. Thought
by analysts and other users to be the final arbiter of accounting questions
arising in a corporate financial statement, he is in fact responsive to the wishes
of management so long as they are within accepted accounting principles,
which are very broad. The accountant is retained by management, not by
investors (despite occasional formalities of stockholder approval). His attes
tation to a financial statement is thought by users to reflect a fiduciary
responsibility, but in fact, it is a limited certificate. This misunderstanding
of the extent of liability of accountants in their attest function seems to be
reflected in the growing number of suits filed against accounting firms on
grounds that certified statements were misleading. It is not easy for profes
sional accountants to balance these conflicting views when on the one hand
the management which hires them has its own fixed ideas about what it will
report, while on the other hand the users of financial statements tend to criticize
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accountants for failure to perform a quasi-fiduciary function which they do
not quite have.
Standing in the wings is the Securities and Exchange Commission which
has the power to prescribe accounting principles for statements submitted to
it under various requirements of law. The SEC has eschewed this role, prefer
ring to rely on the accounting profession, but in one or two instances it has
in fact acted on its own and in a manner considered arbitrary by some. There
is always the fear that if the accounting profession does not move more rapidly
to satisfy the needs of investors, the SEC will act for it and accounting rules
and principles will tend to become inflexible under government aegis.
Other government regulatory agencies have a strong voice in financial
reporting in some industries—e.g., utilities, transportation, banking. They
sometimes establish accounting rules to serve their own ends which conflict
with generally accepted accounting principles or do not serve the needs of
investors. These actions compound the problem of comparability and are
hard to get reversed.
The expansion of the economy, the proliferation in types of enterprises,
and the explosion of stock market activity and investment all require a resolu
tion of these conflicts and an improvement in the understanding and co-opera
tion of all parties at interest in the preparation and use of financial reports.
Managements sometimes resist outside dictation by accountants, financial
analysts or anyone else in the preparation of financial statements, making it
difficult to obtain agreement on a uniform approach to a particular accounting
treatment among all companies. (The American Bankers Association demon
strates unseemly inconsistency when, as a user, it asks for improvement in
accounting principles and in their application, while as an issuer it protests
newly developed principles applicable to banks and recommends that members
ignore them and accept limited certificates on annual reports.) However, most
managements today demonstrate concern for investors and so it is reason
able to expect that their responsiveness to accounting changes and new
requirements of investors can best be brought about through persuasion and
example rather than by edict. The Financial Analysts Federation through its
Corporate Information Committee is in a good position to present investors’
requirements and should redouble its efforts to develop more systematically
statements of analysts’ requirements and mobilize a greater consensus for them
among analysts. It must be willing to criticize as well as praise corporate
reporting standards in an effort to upgrade the laggards.
The accounting profession can resolve its conflicting middle position by
fully assuming the fiduciary role that is being thrust on it anyway. Its certificate
on a financial statement is valuable to the issuer and therefore the accountant
has a point of leverage to secure adherence to new and stricter accounting
principles by his clients. The scope of the certificate might well be enlarged
to include financial data in the texts accompanying the statements and possibly,
on some basis, interim reports.
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Before these developments can take place, the accounting profession
needs to resolve more quickly some of the debates over accounting theory. It
is admitted that the Accounting Principles Board already has a herculean task
in this field. Perhaps, however, it needs to level its attention to the more
practical issues confronting investors, particularly those concerning compara
bility. Some matters which have been undertaken are too theoretical to have
much impact in the practical investment world. APB Opinion No. 10 on
accounting for convertible securities is a case in point. While the proposal
here might have brought about a more precise allocation of costs of this kind
of financing, such accounting adds nothing to measurement of year-to-year
earning power development which is the concern of investors. Another peren
nial problem of theoretical interest but little practical importance to earning
power determination is price-level adjustment of carrying value of assets.
Practicality should be the lodestar in development of accounting prin
ciples. Where several alternatives may be equally acceptable on theoretical
grounds, one should be established as the rule for all to follow. Such principles
and rules must be backed with greater force by the entire profession so that
an individual accounting firm is in a better position to insist on conformance
by its corporate clients. Persuasion and example by the analyst, coupled with
greater power by the professional accountant to assume a fiduciary position
between corporate management and the investor should accelerate the adoption
of improved reporting practices.

Communication Between Parties at Interest
Someday it may well appear in retrospect that development of improved
corporate reporting practices and more rigorous definition of accounting
principles progressed very rapidly in the 1960’s. During these years, however,
it has sometimes seemed very slow, particularly in relation to the dynamic
changes in investment markets and in corporate financial practices. While
more effort is being made today to bring about change, the present mechanism
does not appear sufficiently responsive to the need.
For example, merger and acquisition activity and the development of
so-called conglomerate enterprises has come very swiftly. During this period
of time there has been criticism of some of the practices used in accounting
for mergers and acquisitions. We may well be near the crest of this movement
in the current decade, yet we will not have settled the accounting problems.
To protect the investor, it would have been desirable to have developed the
necessary accounting changes much more rapidly. The investment tax credit
is a similar example. While this credit has now been available for six or seven
years, we still do not have an accounting principle that will produce compara
bility of reporting. By now, however, the practices of individual companies
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have become so firmly imbedded in their accounting that any single standard
would be most difficult to achieve.
Some form of structured communication between the principal organi
zations involved, beyond the present interorganization liaison committees,
might give sharper and more current focus on accounting and reporting
problems and bring a quicker resolution of them. Perhaps this Symposium
group could evolve into a continuing organization to provide a forum for prac
tical dialogue and interaction regarding current accounting problems while
they are still current. If such a conference concentrated on developing an
understanding of the requirements of each party at interest, and these require
ments could be brought into greater harmony, possibly debates on accounting
could be resolved more quickly.
Key leaders from the Financial Executives Institute, representing cor
porate management, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
representing the accounting profession, the financial Analysts Federation rep
resenting investor users, and the Robert Morris Associates representing credit
users, would form the basic group. Participation by Securities and Exchange
Commission representatives would be desirable. Other regulatory agencies
could be invited when required by the topic. Government agencies should
help resolve accounting and reporting problems rather than become a part of
the problems.
This annual Symposium would require some continuing effort by repre
sentatives of each of the participating organizations, who would have to offer
studied opinions if it were to be effective. In turn they would have to take
responsibility for communicating the consensus of the Symposium within their
own organizations and work toward acceptance. There is much work to be
done.

Summary and Conclusion
1. The needs of stockholders in public companies should have great
weight in the development of corporate financial reporting standards, including
accounting principles, because of the constant expansion of investor interest
and ascending market values.
2. The financial analyst, as intermediary for the investor, endeavors to
determine relative values among alternative investment opportunities. This
determination is heavily based on expected future earning power. The finan
cial analyst, therefore, requires accurate and comprehensive earnings and
other financial data prepared by accountants as one basis for his projections.
3. Since he is interested in relative values, these financial data must be
comparable over time and between companies. A more rigorous definition of
accounting principles and a reduction of alternatives by the accounting pro
fession is desirable in order to achieve greater comparability of data between
companies.
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4. Adequate disclosure should be made of accounting principles em
ployed and exceptions thereto. But the whole apparatus of financial reporting
places a premium on comparability of data. Practical rules to achieve this
objective have greater importance to investor users of financial data than
application of elegant accounting theory to achieve small gains in precision.
5. More rapid determination and development of accounting principles
is needed in today’s rapid pace of change in the corporate sector of the
economy. New rules should be established when change is beginning, not
when it is over. Accounting for mergers and acquisitions and reporting by
conglomerate companies are current examples of lag in development of ade
quate accounting principles.
6. Management has the responsibility of preparing its financial state
ments and has broad latitude within the framework of generally accepted
accounting principles. While most companies wish to present their data fairly
there is a minority of situations that could be improved. The connection
between financial data and stock market prices is a powerful one. Greater
support of accounting changes by managements and possible extension of the
role of the accountant to review quarterly statements and the financial data
appearing in texts accompanying statements might resolve some of these
reporting problems.
7. The financial analyst stands between the company and the investor
in a position of great responsibility. He must exercise care in his analysis and
interpretation of financial data. Analysts need to expand their knowledge of
accounting theory and practice to understand the limitations of financial data.
Through their professional organization, the Financial Analysts Federation,
analysts can articulate their requirements for financial data to management
and the accounting profession.
8. There is need for some better means for the resolution of conflicts
between management as issuers of financial data, investors and other users
of financial data, and accountants who develop accounting principles and
attest as to their application. There is the aforementioned need to focus more
promptly on new accounting problems. An annual symposium of the key
leaders of the professional associations representing the various groups plus
government might well achieve these objectives. Each organization must also
work for greater consensus among its own members regarding financial report
ing requirements.
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The Viewpoint of the
Credit Grantor
By Charles T. McGarraugh
Senior Vice President, Northwestern National Bank of Minneapolis, repre
senting Robert Morris Associates

The years following World War II have clearly demonstrated that the
corporate financial report is one of the essential tools for the credit grantor.
Although he may use other techniques and information, the increasing com
plexities of the conglomerates and the multi-product corporations have created
barriers to the effective personal communication once possible. Corporations
located throughout the United States, businesses with credit needs involving
many sources of funds, time limitations of both the corporate executive and
the executives of the lending organizations—all of these factors make it
imperative that the corporate financial report assume this role of the primary
medium of communication.
Credit grantors are not in agreement as to the information they need,
for there seems to be no uniform opinion, even among bankers, as to just what
procedures are to be followed in arriving at a credit decision. However, one
fact should be self-evident: that, although it is clearly the responsibility of the
credit grantor to make the assumptions necessary to arrive at his credit deci
sion, he must have confidence in the underlying data, the corporate financial
report. His judgment must be an informed judgment.
Decision making as practiced by all lenders is predicated on an evaluation
of the factors which affect the two ordinary ways of getting a loan paid. First,
the earning power of the organization—the continuing ability to service debt,
and, second, the quality of the assets or the margin of safety for that loan. The
methods of presentation of the data necessary to understand these two factors
ought to be re-examined with the knowledge of the heavy reliance given by the
credit grantor to the corporate financial report. Should the credit grantor get
a special report? Consider some of the varying needs.
The short-term lender (12-18 months maturity) may look first to the
liquidity and turnover of current assets. He needs to be well informed about
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the principal assets, inventories and accounts receivable and the timing of
their conversion to cash. Along with the examination of the current assets,
the overall working capital position must be related to the aspirations of the
company. There must be a review of the cash flow represented by this conver
sion and the contribution to that flow represented by an evaluation of future
possible profits.
The long-term lenders, and this can include maturities from 18 months
to 20 or more years, may place their primary emphasis on a comparison of a
projection of historic cash flows with the planned debt maturities. Although
the traditional source of long-term loans in the past came from non-bank
sources, there in recent years has been a significant lengthening of maturities in
the average bank loan portfolio, so the banker, too, has need for enough
information to develop his assumptions to project cash flows to match with the
expected projected financial requirements.
Essential to the development of cash flows is the necessity to distinguish
between earnings reported on an accrual basis and cash earnings. Disclosure
of the measurement standards used in arriving at accrual earnings is an obvious
necessity to all who have reviewed statements of computer leasing companies,
the construction industry or industries with significant deferred developmental
expenses.
However, the essential distinction between the needs of the short-term
lender and the long-term lender remains a difference only in emphasis, with
the short-term grantor relying more on the orderly conversion of current assets
and the long-term grantor more on debt-servicing ability through cash flow.
The equity investor, in theory at least, should be the best informed of all
suppliers of funds as his is the ultimate risk. The primary objective of the
average equity investor is a maximum return in the long run from a combina
tion of dividends and capital appreciation. In order to attain that objective,
the analyst must review a number of factors: the quality of the management,
the potential for growth, and the projection of future profits. Although it
appears that oftentimes the small investor substitutes marketability of the
security for comprehensive financial information, the needs of the able equity
investor for comprehensive fair financial reporting are similar to those of the
credit grantors.
The problem appears to be a serious gap between the needs of the various
groups for complete financial reporting and the type of financial reports we
are now receiving. The items which appear to create that gap should be
examined with the objective of attaining a bridge built on co-operative under
standing.

Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
“Generally accepted accounting principles” includes a multiplicity of
alternative acceptable accounting principles. More information is needed to
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identify the particular principles used to understand the statement under
review. For instance, there seems to be a number of different ways of evaluat
ing assets and liabilities under the umbrella of “generally accepted accounting
principles.”
Even though there are real problems involved in attempting to arrive at
conformity or uniformity in any area of reporting, some confusion seems to
have been created by the number of different ways of acceptable asset valua
tion. A historical study of the motivation for some of the various methods no
doubt would be most interesting. One might suspect that too often the method
was dictated by somewhat extraneous reasons, i.e., tax regulations, specific
industry regulations, etc. Serious study should be given to a simplified proper
accounting method for stating asset valuation.
Consider, first, inventory costing as now practiced and the effects such
pricing methods can have on operating results for any given period. The
most generally accepted inventory valuation is cost or market, whichever is
lower. But this has been varied by the use of Fifo (first in—first out), Lifo (last
in—first out), or a moving average cost method. Again, the pricing of inven
tories in a manufacturing concern tends to have variations as shown by the
diverse ways of capitalizing overhead and, more particularly, by the capitali
zation of research and development expense. The inventory issue may be
further confused by differing treatment of inventory obsolescence or in the
method of recording an inventory with a disproportionately high market value
in relation to cost value.
Most financial reports seem to accept “the cost or market, whichever is
lower” concept in the valuation of securities and investments. However, in
most cases the reporter realizes that market valuation and comparative cost
figures are an essential part of the report, and generally both values are given.
For many valid complex reasons, accountants have not yet been willing to
advocate a price-level accounting system. However, an enlightened approach
to the valuation of fixed assets other than original cost ought to be considered.
Perhaps the comparison of original cost and current market values ought to
be shown.
The problems the credit grantor has in properly evaluating statements
of the manufacturers of computers, particularly those that both sell and lease
their manufactured product, vividly portray the necessity of some disclosure
of judgmental decisions in both the evaluation of the inventory and of the
fixed assets held for leasing purposes. Without a knowledge of these measure
ment standards it is not possible to analyze the statement with any degree of
proficiency. The use of the various accepted methods of depreciation and/or
amortization can have a markedly differing result in asset values.
The financial reporter is reluctant to give much credence to other than
cost value until the applicable asset has been sold and the profit or loss has
been realized. For this reason frequent misstatements of fair financial condi
tion occur because of the generally accepted principle of original cost
presentation of fixed assets.
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It may be unnecessarily complicating to record the tax consequences of
constantly varying values for assets with the resulting effects on the operating
statements. This should not, however, preclude some sort of presentation of
an asset value where the market value is materially higher or lower than as
presented in the financial statement. Fixed assets can have a real obsolescence
factor just as do inventories, and the recognition of that factor is important in
any considered financial analysis of a corporate situation. For instance, the
reports of the meat-packing industry ought to show some important examples
of this principle. Conversely, in some older, well-established companies, it is
not at all uncommon to find recorded real estate values that have very little
resemblance to current market or appraisal values. The materiality of these
discrepancies and the extent to which they are known to a potential credit
grantor or an investor cannot help but influence his ultimate decision.
The recording of deferred research and development expenses also can
be done by several acceptable accounting methods. Although the method is
properly selected by the financial reporter, the credit grantor needs to know
what standard was used.
One becomes more aware of the whole problem of proper asset evalua
tion and the resultant effects on profit and loss accounting when the “pooling
of interests” accounting treatment is studied. The extensive acquisition pro
grams of many corporations during the past few years have created some very
complicated company structures. Many of the new combinations have had an
insatiable demand for credit from all sources. The investor or the credit grantor
has often found that there is not enough information in the corporate financial
report to disclose all of the standards of measurement that were judged desir
able, necessary and accurate by the statement preparer. If there were only one
acceptable standard, then the user, perhaps, could be deemed as knowledge
able. But this is not often the case.
The analysis of the financial reports of conglomerate corporations by
credit grantors usually indicates three areas of concern: the method of origi
nally recording the asset values (again, that important problem of proper asset
evaluation) and the resultant effect on current operating earnings; second, the
inability of the user to get proper segmented information related to the
important product or subsidiary divisions of the company; and third, the
enormous problem of getting properly comparable operating statistics.
If it is proper to consider that one of the goals of financial reporting ought
to be the presentation of fair asset value on the balance sheet, a concept readily
understandable by the average credit grantor, then it is hard to justify the
use of the “pooling of interests” concept if, by its use, the assets are stated at
a value substantially different from their fair value. The mere fact that the
assets had previously been carried at that value on the previous company’s
books does not seem to be sufficient justification for continuing that value. It
seems obvious that at the time of an acquisition there are value decisions made
in arriving at the price, and usually these values are related to the asset
acquired, including a valuation for goodwill, if there is determined to be one.
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Again the real problem for the credit grantor is not to determine how the
acquisition is to be recorded but to have access to the facts necessary for him
to arrive at an understanding of the fair values involved.
Receiving sufficient detailed operating statistics for the various divisions
or subsidiaries of the company presents a somewhat different problem. The
confrontation is not so much with the accounting principles involved as it is
with management’s reluctance to give out specific details on relative operating
profitabilities. Audits that include consolidating balance sheets and consoli
dating profit and loss statements are a most desirable form of financial reporting
if the conglomerate organization has retained the various separate corporate
structures as operating entities. In other cases, perhaps, financial reporting
by profit or product centers might accomplish the desired end which is simply
to determine as accurately as possible the contributions made to the overall
results by the various divisions involved. Anything less than this detailed
reporting makes credit decisions less effective.
The third problem—comparability of financial data over a period of time
for a company involved in an active acquisition program—is a particularly
troublesome one. Even in those few cases where the financial reporter has
endeavored to restate the operating statements of the past, results have not
been too satisfactory. The hard fact remains that the combination is really
a new set of operating conditions that may or may not represent a reasonable
continuation of past operations. It is suggested that profitability and progress
of the conglomerate might be shown more precisely by other standards of
measurement than those of comparison with the past or even with other
conglomerate corporations.
Proper financial reporting for the conglomerate corporation is one that
deserves continued study by the public accounting profession. Accounting
Research Study No. 5, A Critical Study of Accounting for Business Combina
tions, completed in 1963 by Arthur R. Wyatt, Ph.D., CPA, for the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, helps to clarify the various complex
ities of this accounting problem. As with so many of the other areas of
financial reporting, the important consideration should always be to so present
the data and the judgmental decisions made that the user understands the
makeup of the data shown.
The liability section of the balance sheet does not present quite the
magnitude of problems inherent on the asset side. Nevertheless, the increasing
tendency for companies to enter into long-term leases for a variety of reasons
presents special problems in showing the impact of that very real liability.
Although the accounting profession has ruled that such liabilities are not
properly a balance sheet item, the increasing use of leased assets in material
quantities suggests further review of this decision. Certainly, an analytical
review of financial reports loses valid comparability if this factor is not directly
reported.
The balance of the emphasis on the reporting of liabilities can be centered
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on the necessity for full disclosure of material contingent liabilities, special
covenants, disputed tax claims and like items.

Income Reporting
The judgmental decisions made in the presentation of the asset and lia
bility sections of the balance sheet almost invariably affect the income accounts
of the company. In considering this section of the financial report, it is well to
keep in mind the objectives of fair income and expense reporting. Those
objectives should be to prepare the report so that it can be compared fairly,
not only with previous reports of the same company, but also with the reports
of other companies engaged in similar operations. A more important objective
is to report fairly the results of the operations attributable to the period under
review. In examining the possibility of attaining these objectives, it is well
to recognize, once again, that “generally accepted accounting principles” do
provide some alternative methods of presentation which can change materially
the results of operations reported. Financial reports simply are not comparable
unless the standards of measurement are known to, and understood by, the
user of those reports.
It is necessary to know not only the decisions that have been made in
valuing the various assets and the resultant effect on the charges to operations,
but, also the methods of apportioning those charges. In addition, income report
ing tends to become confused because of the apparent differences in approved
accounting principles used in recording income tax expense. The permitted
alternate methods of recording income tax accruals, although clarified by the
Accounting Principles Board’s recent ruling, is still somewhat confusing.
There also is some confusion in the way the investment credit tax benefit and
some special allocations of income are recorded for differing reporting periods.
Companies in the construction industry, whose work is principally in
volved in producing contract work with a fixed future selling price, create
some particularly difficult judgmental decisions for the financial reporter. It
is not uncommon in the heavy construction field for one contract to require
several years to complete. If the contract is one which carries a predetermined
lump sum price, the problem of reporting the affected company’s financial
position at intervals during this particular time is difficult. Yet, if the reporter
has not made a careful review of the estimated cost to complete the contract,
both the balance sheet and profit and loss statements may present an inaccurate
statement of the facts. There seems to be a general acceptance of the principle
that a loss should be recognized as soon as it is known, which, in these situa
tions, implies that a review of future events has to be made. Therefore, it
seems clear that in order to convey a fair presentation of the financial position
of any company whose volume of work includes a material amount of fixed
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contract work, the financial reporter should ascertain the estimated cost to
complete.
At this point, it is obvious that there are, indeed, alternative “generally
accepted accounting principles” whose use may produce alternative balance
sheets and differing income accounts. It is clear that comparability of financial
data, within a company at differing points of time, and between companies, is
a highly desirable characteristic for financial data and of great importance to
all users of financial reports. It follows that comparability can be attained to
the extent that sufficient disclosures are made as to the judgmental decisions
made in selecting the accounting procedure. How should those disclosures be
made, and is there a possibility that some of the alternative procedures might
be eliminated?

Supplemental Reports
Most of those who review financial reports for the purpose of arriving
at sound credit decisions would prefer to have as few alternative choices to
identify and understand as is feasible yet still have a fair presentation of
comparable data. In addition, most would prefer to have the significant data
recorded as a part of the statement itself to the greatest extent possible, in
order to minimize the amount of collateral information needed to arrive at
sufficient understanding of the data shown in the balance sheet and income
accounts. Ideally, a perfect financial report would be one wherein the particu
lar user in question could have full comprehension and a fair presentation of
data shown, without any footnotes or other disclosures required to give that
degree of comprehension.
The ideal objective of an understandable comparable financial report,
uncluttered with footnotes and other types of disclosures, is probably not
attainable. However, there does appear to be an important potential for
simplification, and it is encouraging to note that the Accounting Principles
Board is currently devoting considerable study to that end. As the professional
financial reporters work toward simplification, there are some criteria that
appear pertinent to the use of disclosure.
Disclosures ought to be specific enough so that meaningful comparisons
can be made between companies in similar lines of business. Judgmental
decisions directly affecting the valuation of the published items on the balance
sheet and profit and loss statement ought to be included as a part of that
statement. Other material information, such as the valuation of fixed assets
not yet converted, forecasting the estimated costs to complete, or scheduling
cash budgets, more properly would be shown in supplemental exhibits or text.
All of the data that is needed to provide sufficient information to give a
reasonably well-trained credit grantor a proper base for decision making
should be a part of the financial report presented to him for that purpose.
A financial report, to be of the greatest value to the credit grantor, not
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only needs to include comparative balance sheets and profit and loss state
ments, but also requires supplemental data to inform the lender. In a general
way, these data can be classified into two categories. The first type presents
data that would be helpful in almost all corporate reports reviewed, and the
second, unique data related either to specialized industries or to a specific
condition applicable only to the corporation under review.
An example of the first type of supplemental report desired would be a
statement by the firm’s independent auditor regarding the quality of the internal
control system maintained by the company. Generally accepted auditing
standards require a careful review of the system of internal control established
by the corporation and also the extent to which the system is implemented.
Presently, there is no effective way of transmitting the results of that review
to the credit grantor. There seems to be a policy among the financial reporters
that if the condition is not directly “figure” oriented, it does not belong in the
financial report. Certainly, the results of a review of a system of internal
control by individuals trained for that purpose could have a great impact on the
quality of the final credit decision. The complexities of the modern corporate
structure, with the tendency toward increasing mechanization of data record
ing, further demonstrate the need for careful system study. Although it appears
that all competent financial reporters do carry out such a study, virtually none
report the results to those who have a right to that knowledge. For example,
the letter report which is often made to the board of directors is usually not
available to the credit grantor or the investor.
Other useful tools for those analyzing financial conditions are statements
depicting the cash flow of the company, what was experienced in the past,
the present condition and estimates of future probabilities of cash generation.
These cash generation data reports are becoming more and more valuable
since they provide the lender a summary of the sources and amounts of the
cash which will be available to service debt maturities and other fixed charges.
There do not appear to be any unusual problems for the reporter in the com
pilation of the past and present statistics. However, the estimating of the
future is, of course, subject to many errors. Still, a short-term projection
prepared by professionals based on the announced plans of management can
attain a high degree of validity and be of great value, not only to the lender
but also to the management of the company. Most competent managements
already have prepared such corporate budgets. All that remains to be done
is to have the estimates and the judgmental premises reviewed objectively by
an independent professional reporter. The addition of at least the shorter
term projections in the financial report would be of great value to all those
using it.
The general class of additional financial information required certainly
should include a report of the compliance with the provisions of special
contracts and agreements that may be in effect at the time of reporting. As
mentioned previously, a disclosure of any other information that might be
material to a fair appraisal of the company’s condition should be made.
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Some industries have unique characteristics that provide opportunities
for the presentation of supplemental financial data that can be utilized both
for comparing with similar industry performances and for providing addi
tional detail most useful to the lender. As an example, most financial reporters
use similar additional reports for presenting specialized information relating
to those corporations engaged in the finance business. These special purpose
statements have been accepted both by those that find the detail helpful and
by those preparing the detail. The value to the lender of these reports has
been well demonstrated.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has published a
bulletin, Audits of Construction Contractors, which explains a number of
recommended special-type schedules to be included in each financial report.
In many cases, these suggestions have been followed and the additional data
have been of significant value to the lender. Finally, there are a number of
specialized summaries of financial statistics that are commonly used for many
of those industries under some degree of control by civil authorities. Public
utilities and segments of the transportation industry are examples of this type
of industry.
For the most part, special-purpose reports can be prepared from data
already accumulated by the corporate financial staff. These data nearly always
contribute to better understanding by the user. The data may often be essential
to provide the user with a base for an evaluation decision.

Responsibilities
Persons preparing financial reports should recognize that their obliga
tion is not only to corporate management but also to those who are making
financial decisions based on the report. Once this principle is accepted, then
the extent of the disclosures needed for reasonable comprehension should not
present a serious problem.
Generally, corporate management is reluctant to disseminate financial
information that might conceivably be of value to the competition and,
thereby, harm the corporate competitive position. Indeed, the publishing of
any detailed financial information at all is a comparatively recent develop
ment. However, because of various governmental regulations and the multi
plicity of investors interested in corporations, more detailed information has
had to be made available to attract the capital base required to support the
desired volume of operations.
In order to reconcile management’s desire for competitive secrecy with
the lenders’ wish for complete financial information, certain rights of privileged
information need to be respected. Robert Morris Associates, a national asso
ciation of bank loan officers and credit men, recognized this problem and as
long ago as 1916 devised a code of credit ethics for the exchange of credit
information. The code has been amended several times over the years, but
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still is used and provides a measure of responsibility in the use of privileged
financial information. At the same time this code provides a degree of flexi
bility for the responsible administration of credit information.
There is a serious responsibility for the proper use of financial data
placed on everyone who receives this information. The responsibility goes
beyond that of only protecting the information in line with the methods sug
gested by the Robert Morris code of ethics. Those who are permitted access
to the financial data have the obligation for the requisite knowledge, back
ground and training to properly interpret the given information.
In order to keep abreast of recent developments in financial practices,
the banking profession has a number of formal programs for the continuing
education of those engaged in lending activity. There are many graduate
banking schools and specialized seminars dedicated to this task. Presently,
there are at least two new exciting programs to be implemented within the
next 12 months. One is sponsored by the American Bankers Association,
directed toward furthering the education of those newly assigned to credit
responsibilities and the other, sponsored by the Robert Morris Associates, is
for those members who have had senior credit responsibilities for some time.
These and similar efforts should continue to improve the capabilities of the
members of the banking fraternity.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants also has formal
training programs and fosters continuing education for its members. The
profession should continue to inform the various users of their reports of
the changes in accepted principles of accounting and the implications of these
changes. It is well known that the quality of financial reports varies and that
some audits are substandard to the point that they convey erroneous informa
tion, even to the most sophisticated analyst. This problem, which is a result
of the great demand for auditing services (resulting in the increased use of
less experienced help) is recognized by the accounting profession. Some of
the substandard audit reports are immediately identifiable as such, by the
better trained lending officers, while some are so labeled only after subsequent
events have painfully pinpointed the errors. The problem can assume a terri
fying collision course when the substandard audit report is analyzed by the
inadequately trained lending officer.
Both the accounting profession and the lenders have indicated a desire
to eliminate such inadequate work and have jointly devised a means to accom
plish this end. Several chapters of the Robert Morris Associates have set
up means for the systematic referral of substandard work to a practice review
committee of the auditing profession. Although proper safeguards have
usually been provided to assure that no liability for libel can accrue to either
the lender or the practice review committee, the system has not been particu
larly effective. Some of its failure can be attributed to the lack of under
standing on the part of the lenders as to the extent of the liability exposure.
A significant part of the ineffectiveness of the system seems to result from
the feeling, on the part of the bankers, that no real corrective action will
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be undertaken by the accountants. This is a continuing serious problem for
financial report comprehension which is difficult enough without contend
ing with inadequate audits.
For the purposes of this paper, the term financial reporter has been used
to identify the one who is responsible for the financial report. It is necessary
to designate that individual more accurately and to determine the scope of
his responsibility. The criteria for delineation are threefold. Actions taken
that create the financial data are distinctly the responsibility of management.
Accurate accumulation and compilation of the data created is the task of
the corporate accounting staff which is responsible to management and
accountable to the certified public accountant. Review of the accuracy of
that compilation and the principles utilized in its presentation to the ultimate
user must be delegated to the professionally trained, qualified certified public
accountant. Only the certified public accountant can be deemed objective
and well-enough trained to present fairly the data to the user. The concerned
auditor should willingly accept this responsibility.
Contrasting with this viewpoint, consider the position of the certified
public accountant’s responsibility as set forth in the bulletin, “The Auditor’s
Report—Its Meaning and Significance,” published in July 1967 by the certi
fied public accountant members of the National Conference of Bankers and
Certified Public Accountants. The introduction to this publication states in
part as follows:
While the auditor has the sole responsibility for his opinion as
expressed in his report, the primary responsibility for a company’s
financial statements, including any accompanying footnotes, rests
with management, and this responsibility cannot be relieved by the
engagement of an independent auditor. . . . At the same time, the
auditor recognizes that the significance of the opinion expressed in
his report enables him to exert considerable influence on the financial
statements and to make recommendations that will assure a fair
presentation of information contained therein.

The posture the accountants assume of placing the responsibility of
statement presentation on management, instead of recognizing the real value
of their influence, is again emphasized by the statement on page 4:
This emphasizes the fact that the financial statements are repre
sentations of the company.

A slight inconsistency is suggested, however, when the qualifications
of the professionally trained auditor are set out on page 6 of that report as
follows:
It recognizes that however capable an individual may be in other
fields, including finance and business, he cannot meet the require-
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merits of the auditing standards without proper education and experi
ence in the field of auditing. The attainment of proficiency in
accounting practice and auditing procedure begins with the auditor’s
education and extends into his subsequent experience.

The bulletin further stresses the importance of the independence and
the training of the auditor. Little disagreement is likely with the theory that
the independent certified public accountant ought to be objective and bet
ter informed on current accounting principles than the accounting staff in
the average corporate accounting office. As a practical matter, he will also
be the individual who will suggest the proper form of statement presenta
tion and, no doubt, usually will prepare the statement footnotes. Indeed,
although the auditor cannot be expected to control the events that give rise
to the financial data that are to be presented, he must have the responsibility to
control the form that the statement takes. It is the public accountant who is
expected to be well versed on the applicable “generally accepted accounting
principles” required in any particular situation. An auditor’s responsibility
is to provide the professional skills required to get the financial report in
the proper form so that the user may understand and depend upon its con
tent. Anything less than the acceptance of this responsibility tends to weaken
the importance of the auditor’s contribution.
Part of the preface of “The Auditor’s Report” deserves to be reread:
This is public accounting as it is, not necessarily as bankers might
hope it to be. This is public accounting as it must be understood by
all who look to audit reports for assurance and guidance in the mak
ing of credit judgments on the strength of financial statements.

If one is to infer from that statement, and others previously mentioned,
that the auditor is unwilling to accept the responsibility for the fair and
accurate presentation of the statements that he certifies, the whole status of
corporate financial reports must be re-examined. Most business enterprises
today are finding the proper recording of financial data an increasingly diffi
cult task. The responsibility for transmitting the data in an understandable
form to those who are entitled to its use frequently requires training and
abilities not available within the corporate staff. Furthermore, the require
ments imposed by the user of the financial report for independent objectivity
in its preparation precludes use of the company’s own accounting staff. These
criteria are valid and directly emphasize the need for the certified public
accountant’s service.
The certified public accountant is already eminently qualified to satisfy
the needs of both management and the user. He is already performing that
function, even though he may wish to avoid the responsibility for the finan
cial report that is prepared. But there are indications that the responsibility
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is so inherent in the function of certification that it attaches, regardless of any
disclaiming statements. Numerous legal actions (the latest of which is the
BarChris case) indicate that the responsibility cannot be abrogated. In any
event, the economic function of objective reporting is an increasingly im
portant one and hopefully the accounting profession will willingly accept the
responsibility they are or should be so eminently well qualified to handle.

Needs of the Credit Grantor
The credit grantor and the commercial banking officer have a variety
of criteria that are reviewed and judged in order to arrive at a credit deci
sion. Certainly, one of the most important of these criteria that he must
rely on is an understandable and accurate financial report. As banking has
become more and more impersonal, the reliance on the objective financial
report has increased.
The credit grantor’s reliance on the financial report has increased as has
his need for more detailed information. No longer is it always possible to
interview corporate management of the company and accumulate all of the
data that may be pertinent to its financial position. In addition, it is getting
more difficult for both management and the credit grantor to find time for
sufficient dialogue to provide the desired objectivity of financial review.
Often the only practical effective way of presentation of this all-important
data is to have it accumulated, reviewed and properly presented by a trained
objective professional. As far as the credit grantor is concerned, this presenta
tion ideally should include more detailed information than is now usually
available. Adequate disclosure of the judgmental decisions is essential for
an intelligent analysis of operating results and comparative positions. An
outside evaluation of the internal control system is most helpful in evaluating
management compliance and interim reports.
There must be a common language used in the financial reports so
that the banker can translate the data shown into the conditions that are exist
ing and intended to be shown by the auditor. Such a common understanding
will become more prevalent as the competence of both the auditor and the
lending officer is improved through a continuing process dedicated to that end.
Both modern corporate management and lending officers expect that
the financial report, independently certified, must provide the means of data
communication, and, since significant financial decisions are largely based on
its reliability, there ought to be assurance of responsibility exercised in its
preparation.
Methods of communication and new communication media have pro
vided some of the most exciting new techniques in our business world. It is
unfortunate that the corporate financial report has not kept up with this
dynamic trend and its failure to do so seems to be because few have recog
nized the very vital expanding role that it must perform to keep business
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dynamic. The most efficient and progressive corporation should recognize
that progress is best achieved when all concerned—management, credit gran
tors and owners—work together for the common objective. The unified
effort is attained only when each party has sufficient comprehensible financial
information to understand its proper role and responsibilities. An expanded
and revitalized corporate financial report, independently and objectively pre
sented, appears to be the best medium to accomplish that end.
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A Financial Executive Views
Accounting Developments
By Robert O. Whitman
Vice President and Treasurer, American Electric Power Service Corporation,
representing the Financial Executives Institute

Accounting developments are a subject of great importance to corporate
executives because they can influence the content of published reports and
thus affect communications with the financial community. They affect the
interests of present and potential investors, the ability of the company to
raise additional capital, the governmental regulation and taxation to which
it is subjected, and relations with its employees and the public. Directly or
indirectly, accounting developments can affect a corporation’s pricing policies,
dividend declarations, wage and benefit structure, and investment decisions.
The cumulative impact of these effects on the national economy is a matter
of concern to the company as well as to society.
The focus of these influences is in the annual report to shareholders.
Their importance is reflected in the very considerable effort and expense
devoted by the great majority of the larger corporations to the achievement
of excellence in the presentation of not only the basic certified financial
statements but also supplementary statistics and reports on corporate per
formance, plans, products and prospects. It is generally recognized that the
users of American corporate reports receive more and better information
than their counterparts in other countries. Since this has been the result of
a continuing evolutionary process, it is a matter of particular concern that
there are to be heard in some quarters allegations of a “crisis” in financial
reporting and agitation for abandonment of proven principles and methods
of development in favor of an enforced uniformity imposed by some form
of centralized authority. Since confidence and acceptance are indispensable
to effective reporting, charges of crisis tend to be self-fulfilling, and in such
an atmosphere hasty action may be taken without regard for its immediate
practical effects and long-run economic consequences. Therefore, it is
vitally important to the financial executive that responsibility and authority
for financial reporting be properly defined and that the most effective means
for true improvement be established.
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Primary Role of Management
The primary responsibility for the reporting of financial information
must remain with management under existing authority-accountability inter
relationships. Few have argued otherwise and the principle is long estab
lished, procedurally operative, fully codified and, indeed, the only realistic
alternative.
Underlying all committee opinions is the fact that the accounts of
a company are primarily the responsibility of management. [Intro
duction to AICPA Accounting Research Bulletin No. 43]
The fundamental and primary responsibility for the accuracy of
information filed with the Commission and disseminated among
investors rests with management. Management does not discharge
its responsibility in this respect by the employment of independent
public accountants, however reputable. Accountants’ certificates are
required not as a substitute for management’s accounting of its
stewardship, but as a check upon that accounting. [In the Matter of
Interstate Hosiery Mills, Inc., 4 SEC 721 (1939)]

Management is assigned the responsibility for conducting the affairs
of the corporation and is accountable for that stewardship subject to the
attestation of independent accountants. Various groups such as shareholders,
creditors, employees, tax authorities, customers and suppliers have continuing
and sometimes conflicting relations with a company and depend upon its
reports to disclose matters affecting their respective interests. Management
must see that the single set of financial figures that is released is the fairest
possible presentation of performance and current position, or impairment
of relationships with one or more interested parties can be created.
Management has the intimate knowledge of past transactions and future
plans necessary properly to match revenues and expenses and portray present
conditions in terms that are significant in relation to the long-run trend of
operations. Certainly, if financial reporting is to continue to be meaningful,
management must agree with the adequacy of the principles and concepts on
which the statements are prepared or it can no longer be held fully account
able for the results.

Roles of Other Parties
Asserting management’s primary role is not to deny the importance of
the requirements and contributions of others in the development of account
ing principles. In our pluralistic, government-regulated free enterprise system,
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conflicting demands must be balanced and compromised in a manner which
satisfies as nearly as possible the legitimate requirements of all groups.

1. Security analysts, credit grantors, and other users should express indi
vidually and collectively, in general and to specific companies, their
special informational requirements. At the same time, they must recog
nize the inherent limitations of the accounting process and accept the
fact that financial reporting serves varied purposes simultaneously. In
formation can not always be presented in the exact form most desired
and statements require study and analysis. Nevertheless, management
can often accommodate requests for information which are reasonable
and relevant, and suggestions for improvements and modifications in
reporting from investor groups always receive serious consideration.
2. Certain governmental agencies, as a special class of users, are empowered
to specify various accounting treatments necessary to the performance of
their regulatory or tax functions. However, they should recognize that
reporting for other purposes may call for different presentations and
should not require that it conform in all respects with reporting to the
agencies. This is especially true where the interests of investors are
adequately safeguarded by the Securities and Exchange Commission.
3. Independent accountants have an obligation to provide management
with advice and technical assistance regarding the best financial reporting
practices. The accounting profession has the responsibility for assisting
in developing a body of generally accepted accounting principles to serve
as the standard for reporting. This work must be done with full recogni
tion of the problems and needs of those who report financial information
and those who use it and must avoid conflict of accounting theory with
the realities of the business world by allowing sufficient flexibility to
permit adaptation to circumstances.
4. The Securities and Exchange Commission and the stock exchanges have
a duty of protecting the public interest by promoting good reporting
practice, which is best accomplished by continuing emphasis on full
disclosure as the cornerstone of security regulation. Occasionally, it
may be necessary to require a recalcitrant minority to adhere to pro
cedures for which a true consensus exists or to caution an overzealous
few from attempting to compel a conformity of unproven merits.

Since so many groups properly should play parts in the development
of accounting principles, full recognition should be given to the contributions
of each, and the basis for generally accepted accounting principles should
be sought in SEC releases, stock exchange requirements, court and regulatory
commission decisions, the literature of the accounting profession, and espe
cially the established practices of the business community.
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Conflicts in the development and acceptance of accounting principles
very commonly revolve around the question of comparability. The contro
versy over comparability is not new. But an overemphasis on this objective
over the years has probably become the greatest impediment to agreement
on the principles that serve the proper objectives of accounting. This is
because the unsophisticated insistence by some on uniformity as the con
trolling standard can only be satisfied by sacrificing other important criteria
of sound accounting, such as the relevancy, consistency and matching
concepts.
The problem of comparability is that different things are not in fact
easily comparable and that attempts to make them so lead inevitably to a
devotion to form rather than substance. It is like insisting that the proper
way to compare an oak with a pine is to strip off the leaves and cut off
the branches in order to clearly demonstrate differences in height and girth.
Unfortunately what is left after removal of the foliage is not an oak nor a
pine—nor even a tree. If we forget what we were looking for in the first
place, it may seem that lopping and trimming is the answer until one dis
covers that some of the characteristics removed are more important than the
measurements of denuded poles.
Similarly, some accommodating accounting nurserymen stand ready to
lop off real tax reductions, twist leases into the shape of freehold property, and
tell us that through uniformity they have created comparability. Actually,
they would not only distort or obliterate some very significant differences but,
by creating the illusion of easy comparability, they encourage us to base our
judgments on those factors alone and to disregard important fundamental
distinctions.
To reject indiscriminate uniformity is not to advocate unbridled diversity
but to recognize that some degree of flexibility is necessary to provide for
the changing conditions and varying circumstances existing in the real busi
ness world. The desirable goal of narrowing differences can best be achieved
by endeavoring to define the situations in which various methods are most
suitable rather than arbitrarily proscribing alternative procedures which may
provide the most realistic and informative financial presentation in particular
applications, especially where a reasonable dichotomy of opinion exists. This
approach has been advocated by many discerning authorities.
The aim should be to satisfy the investors’ need for knowledge
rather than the accountants’ sense of form and respect for tradition
and make very clear the basis on which accounts are prepared. [From
the pamphlet, “Audit of Corporate Accounts”]
This evolution has also led to a demand for a larger degree of
uniformity in accounting. Uniformity has usually connoted similar
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treatment of the same item occurring in many cases, in which sense
it runs the risk of concealing important differences among cases.
Another sense of the word would require that different authorities
working independently on the same case should reach the same con
clusions. Although uniformity is a worthwhile goal, it should not be
pursued to the exclusion of other benefits. Changes of emphasis
and objective . . . have led, and doubtless will continue to lead, to
the adoption of new accounting procedures. . . . [Introduction to
ARB No. 43]

It would be convenient if some automatic comparability among financial
statements could be attained via simple arithmetical computations. However,
few of our analyst acquaintances seem to be alarmed about the possibility of
being replaced by clerks or computers. They appreciate that the operations of
a modern corporation can be highly complex. Enterprises operate across in
ternational frontiers, produce myriad goods and services, have millions of
transactions of many varying types, face a multiplicity of different and some
times unique financial, regulatory and tax conditions and undertake projects
lasting decades, subject to every conceivable combination of economic, polit
ical, technological and other environmental risks.
Considering the foregoing complications, it is no small accomplishment
that the affairs of a corporation, summarized periodically on a few sheets of
paper and even expressed as a single statistic of earnings per share, have
received such wide acceptance. It may reasonably be argued that this is
because a degree of flexibility in generally accepted accounting principles
has permitted the application of professional and managerial judgment to
differing conditions in accomplishing the paramount objective of meaningful
financial reporting.

The Lessons of the APB
Any consideration of the means by which changes in generally accepted
accounting principles should be brought about requires review of the method
of operation and the results of the work of the Accounting Principles Board
of the American Institute of CPAs. This organization has contributed to an
increased awareness of the importance of accounting and has played a leading
role in recent years. But, while recognizing its contributions and accomplish
ments, many financial executives feel that exception must be taken to some
aspects of both its methods and the results.
The general criticism centers on what appears to be undue reliance on
prescriptive authority, misdirected emphasis on uniformity, insufficient atten
tion to good research, and inadequate consideration of the comments of the
business community regarding the practical implications of proposals. It is
recognized that there has been an increasing internal awareness of these de
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ficiencies and that changes are being made to correct them; therefore, the
comments that follow are not intended to pillory the past but to help formulate
agreement as to the proper goals and methods to be followed in the future.
Attention should be directed to the quality and general acceptability of
Opinions rather than to their early and frequent release. Pronouncements are
accorded the influence they deserve based on their inherent and intrinsic
merits. No attempt should be made to impose them on the public or pro
fession by substituting the bludgeon of compulsion for the power of persua
sion. Reliance on fiat is likely not only to encourage superficial consideration
but to become increasingly ineffective. Two outstanding instances are APB
Opinion No. 2, “Accounting for the ‘Investment Credit’ ” and APB Opinion
No. 10, “Omnibus Opinion-1966,” relating to accounting for convertible
securities. The first was so widely disregarded that it was necessary effectively
to rescind it, and the second received even less acceptance and has been sus
pended, at least temporarily, as impractical.
Some Opinions have displayed an appearance of persuasion in that a sub
stantial portion of the text has been devoted to presenting the pros and cons,
but in the end the Board has simply stated its conclusions without rebuttal of
the contrary arguments, some of which are considered by many to be quite
convincing. This tends to impair the position and persuasive tone of the
Board, especially when it is well known that the conflicting opinions are
widely held by many persons of recognized standing.
When the Board presents persuasive reasons for more than one method
and ends by adopting only one, there must be a strong inference that con
siderations of uniformity materially influenced the conclusion. It has been
stated that it is the Board’s policy to narrow differences rather than to im
pose rigid uniformity, but we find that in the case of APB Opinion No. 11,
“Accounting for Income Taxes,” comprehensive income tax allocation is re
quired irrespective of when, if ever, a net “reversal” is expected to occur.
This treats alike those companies and those transactions in which fluctuations
in income may be expected within a relatively short period of time and those
in which the interval between the origin of the tax effect and the reversal is
so long as to make them for all practical purposes completely unrelated
events. The continuing pressure to force deferral of the investment credit—
against the vehement opposition of management and others—and indications
that the accounting for leases by lessees is to be reviewed, without any clear
demonstration that present accounting is unsatisfactory, are symptomatic of
emphasis on uniformity for its own sake.
Operating under comprehensive rules obviously provides some protec
tion by obviating the need for the exercise of those judgments which in border
line situations can create the opportunity for litigation. However, it can also
eliminate useful information and be contrary to full disclosure. A surface
uniformity may—by obscuring the economic facts in particular circum
stances—conceal more than it reveals and be affirmatively misleading. The
proper objective is the elimination of unjustifiable differences in accounting
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combined with the preservation of adequate flexibility to handle real differ
ences in cases.
A good illustration of the latter approach is APB Opinion No. 8, “Ac
counting for the Cost of Pension Plans.” An improvement was attained in
spite of the failure of this statement to satisfy extremists of all persuasions.
Essentially, it accomplished three things:
1. Elimination of practices having minimum justification and open to great
est potential abuse

2. Expression of a preference for the guidance of those requiring a general
ized recommendation

3. Recognition of practices which were generally accepted and have strong
theoretical and pragmatic support.
Overemphasis on uniformity is especially apparent and detrimental to
accounting progress when it is the sole criterion for action without judgment
being passed on the relative merits of alternative practices. A recent example
involves the area of discounting deferred income tax adjustments. Several
informed individuals, including the author of the Institute’s own research
study, discern distinct possibilities in this proposition and believe it should
be explored. Discounting theory is employed in several other situations and
is implicit in the Board’s initial proposals for treating convertible securities.
Nevertheless, the APB enjoined any extensions in the tax area in 1966 pend
ing further consideration. The prohibition was reaffirmed in 1967 without
any indication of when the subject may again be included on the agenda.
Another danger associated with an obsession with uniformity is that it
encourages an emphasis on the avoidance of any immediate expansion of
alternative procedures at the expense of endangering future progress by sti
fling present initiative and innovations in reporting practices. We have not
achieved the present level of financial reporting by waiting for change to
spring full-grown from the forehead of Theory or requiring modifications to
be centrally sanctioned. Rather, progress has occurred through evolution
based on many companies adopting and improving the presentations first
pioneered by an imaginative few which were well received by users.
One example of this is the large number of historical summaries now
included in annual reports in order to provide a basis for making significant
comparisons of current conditions with the long-run trend of operations.
Annual reports are only a chapter in the continuing history of the company
and, as had been said, if these interim installments were not absolutely
indispensable, they would be completely indefensible. These summaries range
in coverage from repetition of a few key financial statistics to comprehensive
presentations of income statement and balance sheet detail. These disclosures
represent voluntary actions by management—based on suggestions of its in
ternal and independent accounting advisers—going far beyond any externally
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imposed requirements such as furnishing two-year comparative figures, or even
five-year summaries of earnings as required for certain SEC filings. This
evolution towards more and better long-term financial reporting is one of the
most important recent accounting developments.
Other illustrations of upstream development include use of the equity
method of accounting for unconsolidated subsidiaries, inclusion of funds state
ments, and reporting in round thousands. In varying degrees after the value
of these and other new methods have been demonstrated through use, they
have been accorded formal recognition in Institute releases.

Responsibility for Adequate Research
It is a truism that financial events should be reported as they actually
occur, absent compelling reasons to the contrary. Those who would depart
from reflecting actual transactions have the burden of showing that the modi
fications will increase the usefulness of reports to management, investors and
other users. When accountants adopting or approving practices differing from
Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board are assigned the obligation of
justifying their actions, it would seem equally appropriate to require that the
pronouncements given such presumptive authority should represent something
more than the unsupported personal preferences of a two-thirds majority of
present Board members. The Board has, however, at times chosen to act with
out conducting what many consider to be adequate prior research. This is
not to suggest that as a general practice the Board reaches its conclusions on
the basis of snap votes, that preliminary studies are not made, or that many
members of the Board do not conscientiously consult their broad knowledge
of the thinking of others on the subject. However, in many cases there is not
any published evidence of the adequacy or even the fact of preliminary study
or research, and, in at least one case, the research as published appears to
have been directed toward implementation rather than toward foundation.
The consequence has been in some cases an unsatisfactory pronouncement
occasioning widespread noncompliances and a weakening of confidence in
the authority of the Board.
Faulty research employed in the formulation of Opinions without the
benefit of factual analysis of actual business is evident in the history of inter
period allocation of income taxes. There have been numerous conflicting
statements released in the literature of the profession and pronouncements
by organs of the AICPA without the benefit of comprehensive first-class
research as to the proven propriety, practical implications, and economic
consequences of particular approaches. One need only cite official AICPA
Opinions in order to document the indecision which surrounds this issue.
Accounting Research Bulletin No. 44, “Declining-balance Depreciation,”
was released in 1954 after adoption of major modifications to the Internal
Revenue Code and then revised four years later. The original pronounce
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ment accepted the basic arguments for partial allocation but the restatement
clearly called for comprehensive allocation with respect to book/tax timing
differences relating to depreciation. Little or no justification of the change in
position was presented. The year 1962 introduced another tax consideration
in the form of the investment credit which resulted in an APB promulgation
requiring deferral. In 1964 the Board rescinded this rigid requirement and
announced the acceptability of the flow-through treatment which, in spite of
the original pronouncement, had become the prevailing practice.
Finally in 1966 the AICPA published Accounting Research Study No.
9, Interperiod Allocation of Corporate Income Taxes by Homer A. Black.
Although this document defined and differentiated alternative methods of
allocation in a competent manner, the report was largely devoted to matters
of computational mechanics and classification. Unfortunately, this study did
not provide a balanced presentation of pertinent information regarding prac
tical aspects of accounting for income taxes from a business perspective.
Neither was there any attempt to provide an objective review of the basic
issue of whether comprehensive, partial, or some other income allocation
policy was most appropriate from the standpoint of reporting to shareholders.
This limitation of scope was explicitly stated:
The study begins with two accounting assumptions which have
long been accepted by the majority of the profession: (1) income
taxes are expenses rather than distributions of income, and (2)
income taxes are to be allocated to applicable periods (corollary—
disclosure of tax timing differences in a note is not an acceptable
substitute).

These very issues were not completely decided at that time and are,
indeed, still being debated today. Thus, the author actually “assumed away”
the problem that he or someone else should have been investigating. Indeed,
he justified his assumptions by quoting from an Accounting Research Bul
letin, which is a classic case of circular reasoning. This shortcoming was
pointed out in the introductory comments by the AICPA’s director of ac
counting research, Reed Storey:
The study does not answer fundamental questions about the nature
of the income tax and the validity of the concept of interperiod income
tax allocation. Whether income taxes are conceptually expenses
or distributions of income has not really been resolved by the pro
fession. Similarly, whether taxes should be allocated or whether the
taxes currently payable should be the income tax expense for a period
has never been adequately studied. ... I sincerely hope that these
fundamental questions will be studied by others.

The aforementioned research study was one of the main items considered
by the Board in issuing APB Opinion No. 11 on this subject. Although
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paragraphs regarding deferral of the investment credit were eliminated from
the final Opinion because of the extensive criticism received concerning the
reactivation of this proposal, which, significantly, was not covered by the
research study, the provision prescribing comprehensive allocation of income
taxes was retained. The Opinion recited the basic arguments for partial and
comprehensive allocation and reviewed the deferred and liability procedures
for calculating desired adjustments. Although the evidence was seemingly
balanced in many respects, the majority simply stated in paragraph 34, with
out supplying its reasoning, that:
The Board has considered the various concepts of accounting for
income taxes and has concluded that comprehensive interperiod tax
allocation is an integral part of the determination of income tax
expense. Therefore, income tax expense should include the tax
effects of revenue and expense transactions included in the determina
tion of pretax accounting income. . . .

To many, this Opinion represents a disappointment because of their
belief that income taxes are a real expense which, depending on available
alternatives and elections, produce real and varying results. They believe
that the income statement should reflect these realities. Many also think that
accounting should reflect the economic probabilities that additional tax pay
ments will actually be required in the foreseeable future. However, all must
experience some regret that again the nature of the income tax itself was not
explored and that no answer was given to those who argued the importance
of practical consequences, including the impact upon the national economy.
Argument by assertion is inadequate substantiation for pronouncements which
are intended to affect reporting by thousands of corporations to millions of
individuals for billions of dollars of investments.
The inadequacies of research relating to tax allocation are exceeded only
by the complete absence of any published study in the case of convertible
securities, where, as in the case of the investment credit, it was necessary for
the APB to retract its previously untenable position. Thus, the problems which
have been encountered with these particular topics underscore the need for a
firm foundation for any Opinions.
It would be appropriate to summarize this subject, which is critical to
future progress in financial reporting, with the observation that many cor
porate executives have considerable experience with large and complex
research projects and are able to evaluate these endeavors without becoming
expert or immersed in details. Many are prepared to provide advice and
assistance since there can be no disagreement with the fundamental objectives
of the accounting profession. However, if progress is to be accelerated and
mistakes avoided, it is imperative that there be a firm resolution that really
adequate financial research must first establish a firm foundation for all future
accounting Opinions.
135

An example of the need for and the proper approach to financial
research is to be found in the area of segment reporting for diversified
companies which has been receiving increasing attention in recent years.
Difficult problems are involved in the question of the amount of disclosure
that is appropriate in financial reporting. Present investors are entitled to
the information necessary to pass judgment on management’s performance
and to appraise the true value of their holding. Potential investors are en
titled to similar information. Neither should be at a disadvantage in relation
to “insiders,” which include not only management and principal stockholders
but others who by means of special efforts and sources may obtain information
that might reasonably have been provided to all. On the other hand, few
would advocate that financial reporting should unnecessarily injure the com
petitive position of the enterprise.
Beyond the question of relative rights to information are the issues of
the practicality and best means of publishing results on some basis more
detailed than total company operations. An initial reaction might be to
require the furnishing of information on profit and revenues by standard in
dustrial classifications, existing organizational units, or major product lines.
Closer study reveals that this could require some companies to functionalize
themselves into unnatural components. There are also many difficult prob
lems of joint cost allocations and varying interdepartmental transfer pricing
practices which must be considered. Indeed, in some situations the added
disclosure could be more misleading than meaningful to those not intimately
acquainted with the affairs of the corporation.
There is little question that disclosure will be greater in the future than
has been common in the past. This reflects a greater public need resulting
from generally expanding diversification of corporate operations, culminating
in the advent of the conglomerate enterprise, combined with an increasing
appetite for additional information by all classes of governmental and private
users.
Because of the many practical as well as theoretical problems involved,
it is important that business participate actively in the development of means to
satisfy these requirements. The recently completed research study, Financial
Reporting by Diversified Companies, released by the Financial Executives
Research Foundation represents an initial response in this area. All available
evidence indicates that this comprehensive and balanced report has been well
received. It represents a noteworthy example of the contribution that may
be made by business through research conducted in a thorough and objective
manner and with representation of all interested parties.
This report recommends guidelines for greater component reporting
but does not attempt to codify rules. It recognizes that the application of
judgment to existing circumstances is essential to meaningful results. This
freedom may result in an inconvenient variety of presentations but is preferable
to a meaningless artificial uniformity.
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Commitment to Communication and Full Participation
The number of persons interested in improving financial reporting is
constantly increasing. The fisting would include large numbers of accountants
in public practice, their thousands of corporate colleagues and a considerable
assemblage in other occupations. It is axiomatic that each of these groups
has a contribution to offer which cannot be ignored. There is an issue,
however, as to whether present operating practices are optimum to assure
that industry and other views are actively solicited and given serious con
sideration well before final conclusions are reached.
One of the most constructive aspects of this Symposium is that it brings
together members of the accounting profession, academic world, and business
community to discuss accounting developments. Similar joint conferences
on specific subjects should be equally beneficial. There are other areas in
which communications might be improved contributing to an acceleration
of progress.
First, industry and user representatives should actively participate from
an early stage of project development. These groups have a detailed experi
ence with practical problems and an intimate awareness of informational
utilization that can offer much-needed guidance to the Accounting Principles
Board and the accounting research division of the AICPA. On any particular
subject, there are many real experts whose assistance could be invaluable in
increasing the soundness of statements and improving the reception they
receive. Indeed there ought to be much greater representation of industry
and user interests on the APB than presently exists.
Any Opinion which is going to be successful must have the support not
only of independent accountants but also of financial executives and invest
ment advisors and analysts. To attain this confluence might necessitate a
major modification in organization of the APB with greater use of task forces
assigned to specific projects and less emphasis on an omniscient superstructure.
Subcommittees of the full Board are a partial reflection of this approach but
represent at best a compromise. The full task force approach, not restricted
to members of the Board, offers the following advantages:
1. Services of individuals with special competence and experience in partic
ular areas can be solicited.

2. Scope of assignment can be made more commensurate with the extent of
participation which can be assumed by most persons with other full-time
responsibilities.
3. The study would tend to be more comprehensive and the group would
not be confronted with the present need to issue some statement before
annual membership turnover occurs.
4. Simultaneous progress on several fronts would be possible because total
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resources would exceed those available to committees formed from a
limited body.
5. Representation of, and liaison with, other interested organizations would
be improved.

Secondly, an adequate interval between the issuance of a research study
or exposure draft and subsequent action should be provided to afford oppor
tunity for careful examination and orderly consideration of the many points
involved. This is required not only to provide the accounting equivalent of
legal due process, but to protect against the issuance of Opinions which will
require revision and against the impairment of the reputation and influence
of the APB.
In establishing schedules and target dates, the profession should not be
stampeded by critics who foretell financial collapse if long-standing practices
are not changed forthwith. Consistency and stability are important to sound
reporting. Appropriate recognition should be given to the high priority of
many other matters competing for the attention of the parties who are entitled
to contribute to decisions. The simulation of results and the full review of
economic implications can be major undertakings. Incidentally, the magni
tude of this task varies inversely with the adequacy of accompanying research.
Equally time-consuming is the preparation of those consolidated comments
outlining supporting reasoning which the APB prefers. Many trade associa
tions have more elaborate clearance arrangements than are in existence in the
American Institute to ensure that a true consensus of views exists before
official statements are released.
Finally, the commitment to communications is not a collection of pro
cedures or a public relations campaign politicizing particular pronouncements.
It is an attitude which fosters both dissemination and receipt of ideas with
the aim of improving the reporting process.

Conclusion
The pace of accounting developments has quickened in recent years
in response to the growing demand for more complete and exact financial
information from an expanding body of investors. It is most important that
corporate executives participate actively in these developments supporting
those offering significant and needed improvement, but also resisting those
representing unsophisticated oversimplifications in the name of uniformity
or comparability which are not in conformity with the realities of the business
world.
Consistency in reporting economic facts and effects is of the utmost
importance if comparisons of results are to be meaningful and public con
fidence maintained in the integrity of financial statements. If we are to achieve
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continued progress by evolution rather than risk regression via revolution it
is absolutely essential that there be a firm commitment to better and broader
research as the prerequisite to any future recommendations for implementa
tion of proposed accounting reforms.
Symposiums such as this serve a useful purpose by bringing together
representatives of the major groups most interested in improving financial
reporting, and afford an opportunity to review the serious implications of
accounting developments which attempt to travel too far down the road of
purely theoretical reasoning without the solid backing of practical experience.
Through combined co-operative efforts we will most expeditiously achieve
our common goal.
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Corporate Reporting and
Accounting Principles:
The Viewpoint of an
Independent Accountant
By Thomas D. Flynn
Partner, Arthur Young & Company, Past President of the American Institute
of CPAs, representing the American Institute of CPAs

Corporate reporting in the United States has come a long way in the
last twenty-five years in revealing information about the financial and eco
nomic facts which bear upon the life and growth of American businesses.
We often overlook this healthy development in our concentration on the
things in corporate reporting which require improvement or correction. A
number of influences have affected this development. Corporate manage
ment, the accounting profession, the SEC, the various user groups and the
financial press can all claim some part of the credit.
Another factor which is also overlooked in our focus on the deficiencies
in corporate reporting and on the development of accounting principles is
the immense complexity of the publicly owned enterprises with which we are
primarily concerned. The solutions to the reporting and accounting prob
lems of these companies become much more difficult as the emphasis in
corporate reporting is shifted from the historical performance to the future
performance of companies. The historical record is useful now only to the
extent it can contribute to predictions of future performance.
Still another factor which complicates our search for better accounting
principles is the unhealthy emphasis by our financial community on the figure
of net income per share as a yardstick to measure performance. It is under
standable that the investor would like to have one single measuring device or
unit on which he can rely to tell him what he needs to know about the past
and future performance of a corporate enterprise. But the financial and
economic factors involved in corporate life and growth are so complex that
there is no reasonable hope that such reliance can ever be placed solely on
“net income per share” no matter what progress we make in agreeing on
better accounting principles. The recent Opinions of the Accounting Prin
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ciples Board dealing with earnings per share should be useful in developing
a better perspective by the financial community on this useful financial
measurement.

Role of Accounting Principles
Perhaps at this point it is appropriate to ask what we should expect
accounting principles to do for us. In my opinion, accounting principles
should help us to describe, in financial terms and with reasonable accuracy,
economic events and transactions affecting business enterprises. As we all
know, business transactions exhibit tremendous range and variety. Account
ing principles are a kind of financial grammar which is indispensable in
helping to describe these transactions in financial terms with reasonable
accuracy. In our quest to reduce the number and variety of accounting
principles, we must not let our efforts carry us too far. We need to have
enough accepted ways of accounting for transactions so that we can tell the
reader of a financial statement what he needs to know about the significant
business facts which can be expressed in monetary terms. We should not
require all business enterprises to use a kind of accounting Esperanto in the
preparation of their financial statements. To be unable to express adequately
the variety in business transactions would be as unsatisfactory as to have too
many alternative accounting principles.
Good accounting principles are an essential element in organizing
intelligently the financial facts of a business so that the management of the
business can understand what is actually taking place. Management needs
for information are, indeed, much greater than those of investors. In spite of
these greater needs, there are relatively few situations where management
requires different accounting principles for internal reporting purposes than
those required for reporting to stockholders. After all, the same set of facts
and transactions is being reported upon in both cases. Accounting principles
should help make like things look alike, and unlike things look different. This
thought was expressed by the special committee on the Opinions of the
Accounting Principles Board. The committee concluded that one of the
objectives of the Board should be “that variations in accounting items gener
ally should be confined to those justified by substantial differences in factual
circumstances.”
Part of our difficulty in agreeing on accounting principles is the present
inability of existing accounting principles in many cases to describe economic
and business events as they really are. For example, you are all familiar with
the pooling-purchase concept in accounting and its inability to deal with the
tremendous variety of real-life situations involving corporate mergers and
acquisitions. At one end of this merger spectrum is the classical purchase of
a company for “cash on the barrel head,” and at the other end is the pooling
of two large public companies of equal size through an exchange of common
stock with no gimmicks of any kind. In actual fact, however, there is a wide
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range between these two extremes, and most mergers can be located at some
point in between. However, until quite recently we could classify mergers
for accounting purposes in only two ways—either as a pooling or as a pur
chase. It is as if we were required to describe a vivid modern painting—a
Jackson Pollock, perhaps—in terms of either white or black, but not both,
much less other colors.
Recently, accounting has recognized that there are gradations of color
in between simple white and black. We now account for some mergers on
the basis of a “part pooling—part purchase.” This may be a step in the
right direction, but we have a considerable distance to go. As it is now, there
are many cases of mergers in which it is difficult to determine how the trans
action should be accounted for, the transaction being balanced on a “knife
blade” between a pooling and a purchase. Yet, the accounting consequences
of treating the transaction as a pooling may be vastly different from those of
treating it as a purchase.
There are other examples of the inadequacy of existing accounting
principles to express fully the economic realities of business transactions. The
present accounting for leases is a good example of the kind of inadequacy
which I have in mind. There are a tremendous variety of leases, ranging in
almost imperceptible steps from the rental of equipment for a few hours to
leases which are scarcely distinguishable from purchases with all the rights
of ownership. Our accounting principles at present can handle such trans
actions only as a lease or as a purchase.
Another important example has to do with the effects of the changing
value of our monetary unit of measurement—the dollar. We account for the
dollar as if it were stable, yet we all are well aware of the erosion in its value
which has taken place over the last 25 years. Users of financial statements
should insist that the statements be adjusted to the changing value of the
dollar. It is feasible to prepare such statements.
The failure to consider the present (discounted) value of assets and
liabilities is another area of accounting which should be explored more
vigorously. Application of present value measurements would, in many
instances, present the facts more realistically. The present value of an invest
ment credit to be spread over a future period should probably take into
account the effect of interest on the balance deferred to future periods. For
example, assume that a credit is to be deferred over a period of 20 years
with a 6 per cent interest factor. At the end of the first year only 56 per cent
of the investment credit would be deferred to the remaining 19 years as
compared with 95 per cent if discounting to present value were not used.

Changing Attitudes of Users
At this point, it might be useful to consider briefly the changing attitudes
of investors and credit grantors as they have evolved over the last 30 or 40
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years. These attitudes constitute an important part of the environment in
which independent auditors operate, and will become even more important as
more and more people exhibit a greater interest in corporate securities. Buy,
hold and sell are decisions which now face not only the affluent investor of
former years, but also the man with relatively few dollars to invest. As
communication becomes increasingly instantaneous through telephone and
television, greater publicity will be given to management decisions—to build
new plants or develop new products and to engage in other projects affecting
future operations. Such information helps to excite the interest of the investor
in the future events which determine the market value of the securities which
he owns or wishes to buy. Increasingly, the investor is interested in the past
only as a guide to the future.
Historically, financial statements have been regarded as a report of
stewardship to the stockholders by management for the assets, capital and
business entrusted to its care. Not so many years ago the balance sheet was
viewed as having more significance than the income statement. With this
attitude, emphasis was placed on conservatism and periodic dividends. Con
sequently, assets and liabilities were viewed more in terms of their liquidation
values than in terms of their effects on income in future periods.
In recent years, the income statement has assumed the dominant position
in the financial statement sweepstakes. Users have become more concerned
with the growth potential of a company than with the ability or need to pay
a cash dividend. The periodic changes in economic resources of a business
entity now assume a primary importance as an indication of the likelihood
of future dividend prospects or capital gains, on which a choice among a
number of alternative investment opportunities may turn.
The measurement of this periodic change might appropriately be re
ferred to as the “earnings-per-share syndrome.” The symptoms of this malady
can be found most frequently in the practice of measuring the value of a
security in a particular industry at a particular point in the business cycle
in terms of a price/earnings multiple. Investors have now realized that
multiplying a figure of earnings per share by some multiple only magnifies
any purported defect in the earnings per share figure. The defect most often
mentioned is the lack of comparability of the resultant values between two
companies because of variations in the application of generally accepted
accounting principles.
It is in this environment that users have come to feel that an independent
auditor’s responsibility goes beyond more conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles, and also comprehends “fairness” which, as with its
physical counterpart, is found only in the eye of the beholder. To be fair is
to be useful. To be useful, however, depends upon who the reader is. This
leaves unanswered the variety of demands placed on the corporate financial
executive and the independent auditors to tell the financial story in such a
way as to satisfy those demands.
How do we public accountants fit into this environment? What is our
143

role in the search for better accounting principles? We are usually grouped
with the preparers, as distinguished from the users, of financial statements.
Independent auditors, however, resist the implications that the word “pre
parers” connotes. Their association with financial statements is not as a
preparer. The distinction between the responsibilities of auditors and those
of corporate financial executives is spelled out in the accounting profession’s
literature. Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33, “Auditing Standards
and Procedures,” issued by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac
countants discusses this distinction as follows:
Management has the responsibility for adopting sound accounting
policies, for maintaining an adequate and effective system of accounts,
for the safeguarding of assets, and for devising a system of internal
control that will, among other things, help assure the production of
proper financial statements. The transactions which should be re
flected in the accounts and in the financial statements are matters
within the direct knowledge and control of management. The audi
tor’s knowledge of such transactions is limited to that acquired
through his examination. Accordingly, the fairness of the represen
tations made through financial statements is an implicit and integral
part of management’s responsibility. The independent auditor may
make suggestions as to the form or content of financial statements
or he may draft them in whole or in part, based on the manage
ment’s accounts and records. However, his responsibility for the
statements he has examined is confined to the expression of his opin
ion on them. The financial statements remain the representations
of the management.

This statement was issued in 1963, repeating a similar statement made
in 1960. In the last two or three years, however, there has been pressure to
involve the CPA to a greater extent in the preparation of a company’s finan
cial statements and to increase his responsibilities for those statements. This
pressure has been coming from the changing attitudes of investors, credit
grantors, financial analysts, and other users of financial statements.
While independent public accountants are not preparers, we have a
primary interest in the development of the very best accounting principles—
those which will be most useful to investors and management and to their
advisers.

The Role of the Accounting Principles Board
It was this challenge which prompted the AICPA to review its role in
the development of accounting principles, and to create the Accounting
Principles Board in September 1959. This Board superseded the committee
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on accounting procedure, which had been created in 1938 to deal with
accounting matters and which functioned until August 1959. The APB’s
activities are supported by a greatly expanded accounting research program
of the Institute. As you know, it is the duty of the APB, “to issue in its own
name pronouncements on accounting principles. It may also, in its discretion,
revise or revoke, in whole or in part, or issue interpretative statements as
to any pronouncements previously issued.” The APB is designated “the sole
group within the Institute having authority to make or authorize public
pronouncements on accounting principles,” and its pronouncements are
expected to be regarded as authoritative written expressions of generally
accepted accounting principles. Pronouncements of the Board on accounting
principles are not required to be presented to the Council or to the member
ship of the Institute for approval.
To give added status to APB Opinions, the Institute’s Council, in
October 1964, unanimously adopted a Special Bulletin entitled “Disclosure
of Departures from Opinions of Accounting Principles Board.” While recog
nizing that general rules may be subject to exception, it provides that the
burden of justifying departures from Board Opinions must be assumed by
those who adopt other practices, and that such departures must be disclosed
in footnotes to the financial statements or in independent auditors’ reports
when the effect of a departure on the financial statements is material.

Procedures of the Accounting Principles Board
A description of the procedures followed in developing opinions might
be helpful in answering questions regarding the modus operandi of the APB.
A prospectus outlining accounting issues to be investigated is prepared for
discussion and approval of the full Board. The chairman of the Board and
the director of accounting research select the research project to be under
taken. The director assigns the project to a project advisory committee
(usually five to seven members) which is appointed by the director with the
approval of the APB chairman. The committee ordinarily is selected partly
from the Board, with a member of the Board acting as chairman, and partly
from the general membership of the Institute, but individuals from industry
and other sources outside the Institute may be invited to be members. Drafts
of the study are exposed to the project advisory committee and, frequently,
to others interested in the project. Comments and opinions are sought.
Upon completion of a study, the director and a majority of the advisory
committee decide whether to publish it. Any committee member not agreeing
with the conclusions of a study may express his disagreement. His remarks
are included in an appendix to the study. Each study as published bears a
clear statement to the effect that it has not been approved or disapproved by
the Board or by the Institute, and does not necessarily reflect their views.
The full study, upon publication, is widely exposed in the accounting profes
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sion and in business and financial circles. A summary is published in The
Journal of Accountancy. Comments are solicited. APB members review the
study and the comments received and decide whether an Opinion is advisable.
If advisable, a draft Opinion is developed by a subcommittee for review by
the full Board.
After review by the Board, an exposure draft of the proposed Opinion
is prepared and widely exposed for comment to give interested persons oppor
tunity to present, for consideration by the Board, memoranda in addition
to those previously presented on the subject. The proposed Opinion is also
published in The Journal of Accountancy. The APB studies the comments,
discusses any proposed changes, and, after a reasonable period, prepares a
final draft for balloting by the Board. Each Board member must assent,
dissent, or assent with qualification. In the latter two cases, a statement of
the member’s position is published with the Opinion. The final Opinion must
represent the considered opinion of at least two-thirds of the members of the
Board. The Opinions are not intended to be retroactive unless otherwise
stated and are not intended to be applicable to immaterial items.

The Activities of the Board
As mentioned earlier, the Board has the responsibility to issue, in its
own name, pronouncements on accounting principles in accordance with the
overall objective. The Council of the AICPA, its governing body, expressed
this objective as follows:
The general purpose of the Institute in the field of financial account
ing should be to advance the written expression of what constitutes
generally accepted accounting principles, for the guidance of its mem
bers and of others. This means something more than a survey of
existing practice. It means continuing effort to determine appropriate
practice and to narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in
practice. In accomplishing this, reliance should be placed on persua
sion rather than on compulsion. The Institute, however, can, and it
should, take definite steps to lead in the thinking on unsettled and
controversial issues. [Report to Council of the Special Committee
on Research Program, September 1958}

Is the APB meeting the challenge which the accounting profession has
accepted to improve accounting principles, and to eliminate alternative
accounting principles which cannot be justified by variations and differences
in circumstances? I believe that the Board is meeting this challenge in
magnificent fashion. It has worked exceedingly hard, and it has moved as
fast and has accomplished as much as can rightfully be expected. If anything,
in their zeal to make progress, the members may have moved too fast in some of
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the complicated problem areas in which they have issued Opinions. Within
the last two years, the APB has issued five Opinions. These Opinions, among
other things, have improved:
• The accounting for and reporting of the cost of pension plans
• The reporting of the results of operations, particularly the treatment
of extraordinary items, and the computation of earnings per share
• The recording and reporting of investments in unconsolidated domes
tic subsidiaries
• The allocation of income taxes among periods and to related trans
actions
• The disclosure of depreciation methods for major classes of depre
ciable assets.

In addition, the Board has under study a number of other projects, the
majority of which will probably lead to Opinions by the Board. Included in
these efforts are projects on the following subjects:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Principles underlying financial statements of business enterprises
Financial statements adjusted for price-level changes
Accounting in regulated industries
Accounting for components of an entity
Reporting (and accounting) by diversified companies
Business combinations and goodwill.

The scope of these projects suggests that the tempo of the Board’s work
load is increasing rather than slowing down. But is this necessarily in the
best interests of the profession or the financial community? If the mounting
pressure for change invites too hasty a response which later proves to be
unacceptable, are not all parties hurt?
This has, in fact, happened on two recent occasions. The first was with
regard to the accounting for the investment tax credit. Many agree that only
one method of accounting should be used—either a method of deferring the
credit over the useful life of the related asset, or a method whereby the benefit
is permitted to “flow through” to income. The difficulty is that agreement
cannot be reached as to which method should be required. The APB moved
to require the deferral method, and later had to revise its position.
The second revision to a Board position occurred in connection with
its earlier requirement, now temporarily suspended, to require an attribution
of a portion of the proceeds of the sale of convertible debt or debt issued
with stock warrants to the conversion feature or the warrants.
I submit that, in responding to the challenge of change, the Board may
have tried to move too fast. Like the extensive tests required of an airplane
before certification, the draft Opinions of the Board should be extensively
tested by business and industry by application to real conditions with all of
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their complexities. This will require management, especially the financial
executives, to take a much more active interest in the activities of the APB
before Opinions are issued in final form. It is not enough for business to
review the draft Opinions and submit comments based upon their general
knowledge. They should carefully apply the draft Opinions to the operations
of their own companies for a sufficient period of time to ensure that all
relevant real life situations have been appropriately dealt with, and that there
are no surprises or ambiguities hidden in the language of the Opinions. Cer
tainly the financial community and management were both caught by surprise
as to the meaning and significance of the Board’s Opinion on the accounting
for residual securities and for convertible debt. This element of surprise
could have been avoided if both groups had tested the proposed Opinion
against actual business situations. In this testing phase, the implementation
of the draft Opinions will not infrequently suggest areas which require better
definition or revision.
This means, however, an even longer period of gestation for Opinions,
particularly in the final stages. Adequate time must be given management
and user groups to explore the implications of the draft Opinions of the APB.
Those of you who have read the Opinion on income taxes and have attempted
to apply it to various business situations undoubtedly realize how compli
cated such a subject can get. Often the complications do not become
apparent until real-life situations are studied in depth.
I should point out that my views on the present pace of the APB are
not endorsed or shared by all of my colleagues. The executive vice president
of the AICPA, Leonard M. Savoie, believes that the pace must be stepped
up. Addressing the Council meeting of the AICPA in the spring of 1968,
he said:
The accounting profession has earned the right to set accounting
principles by giving constant and careful attention to the elevation
and maintenance of accounting standards. But if the profession is
to continue to enjoy this privilege, it will have to redouble its efforts
to meet rising expectations of a better-informed public.

*

*

*

The predominant view of all but the management groups is that
the accounting profession should accelerate its efforts to improve
financial accounting principles and to narrow areas of differences
in accounting practices.

We probably are not as far apart in our thinking as these statements by
Mr. Savoie might imply. I do not want the APB or the accounting profession
to rest on their laurels or to slacken their efforts. I am against meeting self
imposed deadlines without the necessary study and testing of draft Opinions
by groups in our society who have a vital interest in them. If the APB or the
profession can increase its present efforts and pace, so much the better.
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The Means of Developing Accounting Principles
What should be the role of the various groups in our society who have
a stake in the development of better accounting principles and improved
financial reporting?
It seems to me that the present arrangement is basically sound. This
places the accounting profession, through the APB, in a position of leader
ship with other groups such as the SEC, the FEI, the FAF, the national
associations of investment and commercial bankers, the stock exchanges and
the professors of accounting occupying influential and co-ordinating positions.
Legally, of course, the SEC has had the authority since its inception in
the thirties to prescribe the form and content of financial statements, and the
underlying accounting principles for companies coming under their control.
They have wisely left this task primarily to the managements of the companies
and to the accounting profession. A few years ago, the SEC gave indication
that it was becoming restive under this policy and might exercise to a much
greater extent the authority conferred upon it by law. In the last two years,
however, the SEC has expressed its satisfaction with the work of the APB.
I am confident that as long as the APB and the other groups having an
interest in accounting principles and financial reporting address themselves
with vigor and in an orderly manner to the various important problems, the
SEC will co-operate with understanding as it has in the past.
While I fully concur in the proposition that the accounting profession
should exercise leadership in the search for improved accounting principles,
I believe it cannot and should not try to accomplish the job without close and
active co-operation with the other groups represented at this Symposium. I
have been pleased with the increased efforts by these groups within the last
two or three years, particularly those of the Financial Executives Institute.
Their study of conglomerate reporting represents a real contribution to this
difficult subject. I am hopeful that all of these groups will step up their
efforts even more over the next few years. This means more organized com
mittee work, more permanent full-time and competent staff assistants and
directors, and much more financial support than has been devoted, even in
the recent past, to the development of accounting principles and to improve
ments in financial reporting.
Some people, particularly users of financial statements, regard this
arrangement as too loose, too lacking in definition of the precise areas of
responsibility assumed by each of the groups, including the accounting pro
fession. They want to make very much faster progress. Their impatience
may cause them to look elsewhere for a solution. This could be unfortunate.
Not a small part of the problem, in my opinion, is that many users of
financial statements are not sufficiently aware of the difficulties inherent in
the effort to improve accounting principles. There are not too many easy
problems left, since the easier problems have been solved. Greater awareness
of the factors involved in the current problems should enable the user groups
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to contribute more effectively to the solutions. It is not enough for them to
stand on the sidelines shouting encouragement or hurling abuse at the
accounting profession and others working to improve accounting principles
and financial reporting. These groups must be active participants. They
should work through their own organizations by financial support and by
personal effort.
While the present arrangement which I have described for moving
forward in the area of accounting principles and financial reporting is not
working perfectly, the alternatives are much less attractive. Some people
would turn to the government for the resolution of accounting problems and
for the enforcement of the decisions reached. A prominent public accountant
has advocated the establishment of an accounting court—a Supreme Court
of accounting consisting of members appointed for life by the President of
the United States and confirmed by the Senate. The court would make its
decisions on the basis of briefs submitted by interested parties and would
thus “eradicate the contradictions now existing” with respect to accounting
principles and auditing standards.
Proposals along these lines may have superficial appeal to the unin
formed. It is obviously possible to point to many alternative accounting
principles in use today and to wide variations in the methods of disclosure
in published financial statements. To some people this is evidence of an
unhealthy condition which requires immediate and drastic action as a means
of bringing order out of what they regard as chaos.
In the long run, I am convinced that such proposed solutions would be
disastrous, would tend to impose a straitjacket on American business and
finance, and would make these institutions far less responsive to change than
under our present economic system. This is particularly relevant when we
consider that we are in the initial stages of the greatest scientific and tech
nological revolution known to man. Change is the order of the day. Cer
tainly we should not now adopt a system of accounting determination which
would make us less responsive to change. Of course, it is understandable for
people to seek for uniformity and certainty and to try to set down precise and
elaborate rules for achieving these objectives. In his book, Self-Renewal,
John W. Gardner made an exceedingly astute comment about the growth,
development and decay of an organization which has some relevance to this
objective in our dynamic economy:
The new organization is loose in procedure, unclear in organiza
tion lines, variable in policies. It is willing to experiment with a
variety of ways to solve its problems. It is not bound by the weight
of tradition. It rushes in where angels fear to tread. As it matures,
it develops settled ways of doing things and becomes more orderly,
more efficient, more systematic. But it also becomes less flexible,
less innovative, less willing to look freshly at each day’s experience.
Its increasingly fixed routines are congealed in an elaborate body of
written rules. In the final stages of organizational senility there is a
rule or precedent for everything. . . .
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Those who wish to impose a rigid system of accounting determination
by an arm of the federal government might well take heed of the wisdom of
Mr. Gardner’s observations.
I do not want to leave the impression that I am opposed to the present
effort of the accounting profession and by the groups to improve accounting
principles and financial reporting. On the contrary, I am in enthusiastic
support. We need, however, to have a good understanding of the difficulties
involved so that we can realistically judge our rate of progress and can decide
objectively and through careful analysis what changes, if any, we should make
in the structure and in the methods we are using to reach our objectives.
I have been stressing the role of the accounting profession in the im
provement of accounting principles much more than I have its role in
improving financial reporting. I have done this not because accounting
principles are more important than financial reporting, but because they are
the cornerstone—the foundation—on which good financial reporting must
rest. Accounting principles, in this context, are often difficult to consider or
to discuss independent of financial reporting. For example, at the present
stage of pension accounting, it is all but impossible to deal with this subject
without consideration of the extent of disclosure necessary or desirable in
financial statements.

Role of Other Groups
However, taking a broad view of financial reporting, it is clear that other
groups in our society should have relatively more important roles in this area
than they have in the determination of accounting principles. Quite rightly,
in my opinion, the Financial Executives Institute undertook the study of
financial reporting by conglomerates. Similarly, I believe that the various
user groups should undertake serious studies of their specific needs in finan
cial reporting within the practical limits of our system to produce such
information, and with due regard to competitive, legal, and other factors which
might restrict their right to have access to such information.
As might be suspected in the light of my views on the need for close
co-operation between the various groups in our society who have a stake in
accounting principles and financial reporting, I strongly endorse the holding
of conferences such as this one to identify needs and problems. These con
ferences should be held annually, and perhaps more often. While the subject
matter of the present conference is excellent for a first meeting, at some
future conference I would like to see an important problem area of much less
scope tackled in depth. A few years ago the Harvard Business School held
an “accounting round table” which inquired into “the measurement of
property, plant, and equipment in financial statements.” Other subjects of
comparable importance should provide future conferences with the oppor
tunity to gain new insights and to advance the development of accounting
principles and to improve financial reporting.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers

By Clifford V. Heimbucher, Farquhar and Heimbucher, Member of Exec
utive Committee and Past President of the American Institute of CPAs, Former
Chairman of the AICPA Accounting Principles Board, representing the Amer
ican Institute of CPAs

It has been said that if one cannot be famous then it is better to be
infamous than to be ignored. Surely the Accounting Principles Board has
escaped the fate of being ignored or neglected. It has accomplished this feat
by becoming both famous and infamous and is at the same time the frequent
target of bouquets and brickbats, often from the same source.
Therefore it is no surprise that the APB is the principal subject of all
four papers prepared under the title “Users and Preparers: Needs and Re
sponsibilities.” All four contain both praise, in varying degrees, and dissatis
faction ranging from impatience to outright condemnation. More important,
however, is that all four accept the Board as a potent force and all offer
constructive ideas, suggestions, and programs for future improvement.
Rather than review or criticize each paper individually or as a whole I
should like to direct attention to the suggestions for future development.
That is the basic purpose of this entire meeting. If we are to lay a ground
work for future joint progress then we should explore and discuss the different
philosophical approaches that are evident in these papers and attempt to
ascertain if they are really as irreconcilable as they at first appear and what
steps may be needed to bring about a higher level of harmony and co-operation.
To approach this subject I shall compare the points of view expressed
on three subjects covered by all of them and thus try to distill questions for
further discussion. The questions relate not so much to conclusions as to
attitudes.

Whose Statements?
Mr. Whitman starts his paper by stressing the primary role of manage
ment in the reporting of financial information. He states: “Few have argued
otherwise and the principle is long established, procedurally operative, fully
codified, and indeed the only realistic alternative.”
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In discussing this same subject, Mr. Flynn reaches the same conclusion
but states it quite differently as follows: “We are usually grouped with the
preparers, as distinguished from the users of financial statements . . . there
has been pressure to involve the CPA to a greater extent in the preparation
of a company’s financial statements and to increase his responsibilities for
those statements. . . . while independent public accountants are not preparers,
we have a primary interest in the development of the very best accounting
principles . . . .”
Now hear Mr. Norby, again on the same topic: “The presentation of
financial statements is the responsibility of corporate management .... It
is not easy for professional accountants . . . when . . . the management
which hires them has its own fixed ideas about what it will report, while . . .
the users . . . tend to criticize accountants .... The accounting profession
can resolve its conflicting middle position by fully assuming the fiduciary
role that is being thrust on it anyway. . . . the accountant has a point of
leverage to secure adherence to new and stricter accounting principles . . . .”
The author of the fourth paper, Mr. McGarraugh, reaches this con
clusion: “Accurate accumulation and compilation of the data created is
the task of the corporate accounting staff which is responsible to manage
ment and accountable to the certified public accountant. Review of the
accuracy . . . and the principles utilized . . . must be delegated to the . . .
CPA.”
Are these different conclusions of four thoughtful leaders in the field in
agreement or in conflict? They appear to be essentially in agreement as related
to present responsibilities and authority in the preparation of financial infor
mation. It is clear, however, that they have reached these conclusions by
different philosophical routes and different degrees of emphasis. From this
we may also assume that they may have different directions of departure for
future evolution.

Comparability
In reviewing what these authors have to say about the subject of com
parability we again observe that the differences appear to be primarily in
degree and emphasis rather than in kind.
Mr. Flynn says: “Accounting principles should help make like things
look alike and unlike things look different.” He also quotes from a committee
report that: “variations in accounting items generally should be confined to
those justified by substantial differences in factual circumstances.”
I do not find any directly contrary view expressed in any of the other
papers. Nevertheless, the language used is so different that diverse frames of
reference can be inferred.
In discussing comparability Mr. Whitman uses such phrases as “. . .
overemphasis on this objective . . . has probably become the greatest impedi153

ment to agreement on the principles . . .
“. . . unsophisticated insistence
.. . .” “. . . different things are not in fact easily comparable and . . . attempts
to make them so lead inevitably to a devotion to form . . . .”
On the other hand, Mr. Norby states: “. . . we must have strict, practical
accounting rules which do not permit deviation, and uniform application by
the accounting profession.” “. . . much remains to be done—perhaps beyond
the boundaries of present thought.” “. . . many of the unlike situations that
are said to require different accounting treatment are really reasonably alike
from a practical viewpoint.” “Practicality should be the lodestar . . . where
several alternatives may be equally acceptable on theoretical grounds, one
should be established . . . .”

Roles of Interested Parties
The most important task that this Symposium could accomplish would
be to build a framework for a mutually acceptable system of developing,
enunciating, and applying accounting principles. I am sure that everyone
here would agree that we do not yet have such a system, that we should have
one and that it should include significant roles for all of the groups represented
here and others as well.
If we are to succeed in this task we must examine the premises from
which we start. We should do so critically, but in a spirit of mutual respect
and co-operation and in the light of the long-term public interest. We must
each ask ourselves what changes may be necessary in our own established
attitudes in order to accommodate them to a mutually acceptable set of
relationships.
So far I have quoted selectively and without comment from the papers
submitted in order to point up the different attitudes which prevail in our
several disciplines.
Now I should like to examine what the authors appear to be saying about
the appropriate roles of the interested parties and add some comments of my
own for the purpose of raising questions which deserve full discussion.
Mr. Whitman clearly feels that management should have the final say
in the determination of accounting principles. He recognizes that the SEC
and other governmental agencies have certain legal authority which he implies
should be exercised only on a minimum basis. All other interested parties he
relegates to an advisory role.
A few quotes: “Security analysts, credit grantors, and other users should
express individually and collectively, in general and to specific companies,
their special informational requirements.” “Independent accountants have an
obligation to provide management with advice and technical assistance regard
ing the best financial reporting practices.” His key statement, however, is:
“Certainly, if financial reporting is to continue to be meaningful, management
must agree with the adequacy of the principles and concepts on which the
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statements are prepared or it can no longer be held fully accountable for the
results.”
In actual operation it would appear that what is being advocated is a
system under which the APB and others would propose accounting principles
and each individual company management would pick and choose among
them and adapt them to its own requirements. I suggest that this is a clear
case of separating responsibility and authority. Presumably, reliance for
improvement in financial reporting generally would rest on the public acclaim
accorded to those enlightened managements who adopted the best principles.
There can be no disagreement with Mr. Whitman’s statement that: “. . .
progress has occurred through evolution based on many companies adopting
and improving presentations first pioneered by an imaginative few which were
well received by users.” What I suggest is that the present dissatisfaction with
the rate of progress shows that this has not been enough and, with the rapid
expansion and increasing complexity of the capital market, cannot suffice for
the future.
From this we can discern at least one element needed to improve our
present structure—greater collective responsibility of management.
Mr. Norby notes that: “Managements sometimes resist outside dictation
by accountants, financial analysts or anyone else in the preparation of financial
statements . . .” and “The American Bankers Association demonstrates
unseemly inconsistency when as a user, it asks for improvement in accounting
principles and their application; while as an issuer it protests newly developed
principles applicable to banks and recommends that members ignore them
Another element that is needed to improve our present structure is
greater participation and responsibility by industry groups.
Commenting on the swift development of merger and acquisition activity
of recent years Mr. Norby notes: “. . . it would have been desirable to have
developed the necessary accounting changes much more rapidly.” On the
investment credit he says: “By now, however, the practices of individual com
panies have become so firmly imbedded in their accounting that any single
standard would be most difficult to achieve.” These views support the conten
tion that we should accelerate our efforts to improve financial accounting
principles and to narrow areas of differences in accounting practices.
On the other hand, Mr. Flynn states: “I submit that . . . the Board may
have tried to move too fast.” In support of this position he cites the experience
with the convertible debt issue. This was a case where the APB moved to close
the barn door in time in order to forestall the imbedding of undesirable prac
tices in financial reporting. The Board did not take this step without a sincere
and intensive effort to enlist the aid and co-operation of the investment banking
community. The result was an almost complete wall of stone raised up against
any infringement of individual management’s right to choose its own principles.
The issuance of the Opinion raised an immediate howl of protest, accompanied,
at last, by an offer to collaborate on a collective basis.
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Conclusions
Despite the divergent views expressed by the four authors all of them
agree that the improvement of financial reporting is a collective responsibility
and that all of us must play important roles.
I submit that the most fruitful area of discussion for this group is the
problem of the appropriate division of authority and responsibility in the
improvement of financial reporting and how the two can be interwoven so as
to achieve a system that is responsive to the public need but is not dictatorial
or inflexible.
A good place to start is to ask how management collectively can provide
money, ability, and interindustry communication to cope constructively with
the developing need. Numerous leaders of industry have made notable con
tributions by service on the APB, service on industry committees, public
speeches, and by individual example. These are individual actions, however,
and these men cannot speak for management as such. The notable exception
to this is the recent action of the Financial Executives Institute in implementing
a research program and providing capable leadership which can command the
respect of management. Further activity by the FEI along these lines can
provide the nucleus to furnish the collective responsibility that has been lacking.
Similar programs by industry groups and by professional groups like
those represented at this Symposium can also contribute importantly.
Such efforts must be matched by the APB through changes in its methods
of operation so as to provide early interchanges with management, industry,
and professional representatives; mutually acceptable divisions of labor in
research and publication; and suitable forums for constructive criticism in
both directions.
In my view increased representation by industry or other professional
groups on the APB is not an answer. Such representatives are individuals who
may provide constructive ideas and valuable assistance but they cannot speak
for anyone else and there is therefore no flow-back of responsibility and
collective acceptance of the results.
We have managed to avoid being saddled with control by fiat. Our sys
tem is flexible. It relies upon self-regulation, co-operation, communication,
and mutual respect between industry, government, and profession. It offers
maximum opportunity for innovation and adaptability to change. To maintain
this healthy atmosphere we must make use of our communication and adapta
bility to see to it that our processes and procedures keep pace with the public
need in this modem age of rapid expansion and change.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers

By Charles N. Berents, Vice President—Investments and Director, Hillman
Land Company, representing the Financial Analysts Federation
Norby
In representing the common stock investor, Mr. Norby presents a plea
for more information of an indirect financial nature. One might question
whether the sophisticated investment analyst uses the financials as the starting
point. He is more likely to assemble and analyze data as to economic and
industry settings, trends, concepts, stock price habits, and so forth, in under
taking original investigations. Financial analysis becomes more of a discipline
around the time a commitment has been made.
There is no doubt that many companies are endeavoring to provide
better information about the industry or industries within which they operate;
all will eventually have to recognize this need. It has a considerable bearing on
qualitative analysis as a highly important factor inextricably tied into the
financial results.
I would question whether financial data really lend themselves to “projec
tion of a company’s earning power,” as stated. They more usually tend to
establish parameters for future expectations.
A reference that is surprising (as a parenthetical observation) is that
return on an investment includes “capital appreciation arising from growth
of the enterprise through retained earnings.” More familiar is that investment
return is measured by the combination of income and capital appreciation;
the latter is not necessarily related to the plowback.
While on the subject of investment return, one of the problems is that a
majority of investors do not take a patient view of their holdings these days.
One result is that supplemental information, which often has more influence
on the short-range market fortunes of a stock, is of greater importance than
accountants and financial officers may realize.
Implicit throughout this discussion is the intangible of confidence. It is
clear that the serious analyst is more interested in qualitative analysis than the
quantitative approach. Financial statements which are inadequate or poorly
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presented do not usually find as high regard in the market place in terms of
earnings multiples and dividend yields.
A telling point is the detailing of supplemental information required by
the investment analyst outside the scope of certified financial statements.
(Note: Financial analyst and investment analyst are here regarded as synony
mous.) Footnotes developed for financial statements should be given more
prominence and they most certainly should be stated more intelligibly.
When assets include unamortized R&D, patent development, etc., there
is a real question as to whether accountants always understand the entry or
presentation which has been approved. The user hopes that sound judgment
supports the form of reporting. Comparability is not a substitute for disclosure
and where new, or high, technology is present, it would be beneficial (and
refreshing) to find that certifying accountants have independently sought
expert consultation prior to rendering statements.
Depending on the treatment, too, in charging off special costs as incurred,
or deferring all or part of the expenses, major swings in reported earnings can
occur. There are at least one-half dozen other important categories, not to
mention investment tax credit accounting, which can have great impact on
earnings results.
“Managed earnings,” as described by Mr. Norby, seem to be the order
of the day. Since this might also be described as “management earnings,” some
better standard for the treatment of stock options probably should be generally
adopted. One must inquire about the logic in treating them as deferrals
through capital accounts rather than as current expense. They are incomerelated costs and should pass through the P&L account. A flat rule in these
matters is, in Mr. Norby’s view, far better than continuing debate about vari
able treatment, an observation with which I concur.
Reviews of the depreciation practices in the computer manufacturing
industry and methods for charging off certain overhead expenses by Boeing
and Lockheed provide examples as to a key area for the Symposium to examine.
Another, which surely will be covered at length, is the method for recording
acquisitions on the balance sheet. It might be pertinent to observe that includ
ing negative goodwill amortization in current earnings is a gross distortion for
practical purposes.
Even well-trained, experienced users handling financial reports encounter
problems, but they are nowhere near the degree of those confronting the
average investor. Large investors can afford to employ experts to analyze and
interpret data. The author joins others, therefore, in recommending that the
range of generally accepted accounting principles be narrowed.
Review of computer depreciation methods for reporting purposes under
scores the need for clear statements by accountants as to the difference between
tax and stockholder reports. This can be particularly important as regards
interim earnings releases.
A very interesting proposal by Mr. Norby is that certified public account
ants should work closely with clients in preparing interim reports. The value
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would be obvious in the case of holding companies or conglomerates, many of
which refuse to release pro-forma comparative statements.
Mr. Norby makes a clear call for the accounting profession to accept
gracefully the fiduciary role that is being thrust on it. This certainly is justified
despite the profession’s policy of avoiding involvement with others’ problems.
As a step in the right direction, the addition of representatives from regu
latory agencies to the Symposium, if continued, makes sense. It would also be
helpful to invite participants from the listing departments of national ex
changes. The latter could be most helpful in meeting the needs of today’s
rapid pace of change.

McGarraugh
The author opens his paper by getting at the heart of the matter—confi
dence in the corporate financial report. Uniformity is not necessary to insure
this, but comparability of statements and adequate supplemental information
are essentials.
The credit grantor, due to legally enforceable rights, has a preferred
position which could be more clearly brought out. For example, frequent
interim reports and interview intelligence (including discussions with the CPA
firm handling the audit, if desired), often of an “insider” nature, are supplied
to creditors as a general practice. While the desire to hold judgmental decisions
to the minimum is understandable, as discussed in the mid-section of the paper,
the objective is admittedly beyond attainment. It is important, therefore, that
the creditor combine supplemental information for interpretive evaluation of
financial statements just as is the case with others who have capital at stake
in a business.
As the needs of creditors emphasize cash flow more than others, there
would seem to be little reason for this to be unavailable to stockholders. So
long as the detailed information has already been prepared, there should be
no problem. This, regrettably, is rarely the case. The statement that “the
equity investor . . . should be the best informed of all suppliers of funds as
his is the ultimate risk” is a significant observation.
The banker or short-term lender often has a further recourse to payout
which was not mentioned. This, in the case of publicly owned corporations,
would be the “bail out” through issue of longer-term capital. Indeed, this is
necessary for the feeding and care of conglomerates since they engage so
extensively in interim financing. In this respect, alerting others to improper
or questionable use of a credit line is perhaps a duty that the banker owes to
mutually interested parties.
The complexities of conglomerate and rapidly growing multiline com
panies doubtless present obvious problems vis-a-vis personal communication.
It is stated that it is “no longer . . . possible to interview corporate management
of the company and accumulate all of the data that may be pertinent to its
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financial position.” One might reasonably inquire, however, whether the
deficiency lies equally with credit grantors not sufficiently staffed with the
“trained objective professional” rather than identifying the problem primarily
as a shortcoming of the corporate borrower.
Nonetheless, there is no disputing the view that the financial statements
are basic to communicating and that they will continue in the primary role.
Insofar as substandard reports are concerned, Mr. McGarraugh raises the very
practical question of who bells the cat. Procedure followed by some of the
Robert Morris Associates’ chapters is ineffective, and for good reasons as
described.
The banker, however, has less risk than the longer-term investor if only
for the reason that his payout period is considerably shorter. Thus, differences
in evaluating financial statements variously prepared under the umbrella of
generally accepted accounting principles probably are more tolerable. If the
short-term creditor can secure statements of subsidiaries and/or divisional
information, obscure accounting can largely be cleared away. Conglomerate
accounting, primarily made available as consolidated reporting, seems to find
attention focusing more on earnings than balance sheet data. As observed in
another paper, accounts should come out identically in the long run regardless
of treatment accorded during the interim. Tax advantages must be grasped,
a fact recognized by Mr. McGarraugh. Reported earnings become managed
earnings so readily, however, that general acceptance by the equity investor
is surprising. Quantitative, rather than qualitative, reporting seems to be the
vogue in certain areas.
Forcefully detailed by the author is the problem involving companies
which customarily operate with contingent liabilities of major extent. Apart
from possible sizable losses that should be quickly determined for the balance
sheet, there also is the problem of non-comparability of earnings with an
example given as the construction business, depending on completed contract
or accrual accounting. The magnitude of contingent liabilities covering other
recurrent items such as purchase contracts, orders in process, leases, pension
requirements, etc., also deserve full disclosure. Stockholders do not usually
enjoy a truly co-operative reporting effort in these respects.
Mr. McGarraugh is a protagonist of presenting dual asset values; cost
and current market. A very real problem arises, however, in establishing com
petence and fairness of appraisers. Although market valuations need not be
certified and they could be presented as illuminating (hopefully) statements of
presumed factuality, opposition of CPAs to accept and incorporate adjustments
of this type is understandably formidable.
The tax consequences of restating capital assets must remain theoretical
as this would have to await IRS concurrence and legislation. It might also
prove an exercise in futility by proliferating problems such as are evident in
foreign corporate reporting. I rather lean toward the implication in this paper
that the difference in acquisition cost versus predecessor’s original value should
be by way of goodwill rather than restatement.
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Inventory costing could be given supplemental treatment. Yet, the author
seems to be critical of supplemental reports and states that an ideal financial
report would be one that does not rely on footnotes or other disclosures for
comprehensiveness. Simplification cannot exist in fact, however, as the busi
ness to which this might apply would be so simple that the whole question of
financial communication would probably be redundant.
It is entirely proper for management to retain competitive advantage or
to avoid misleading or needlessly disturbing investors, among others, by decid
ing what constitutes privileged information. This is the only paper reviewed
which clearly brought out this point and described the ethical responsibility.
One can appreciate the complications in disclosing special studies of products,
facilities planning, contemplated new ventures, management personnel evalua
tions, and so forth, and especially if prepared by outside experts.
Review of the handling of corporate budgets, internal financial and
operating controls are among the responsibilities of the board of directors
which should question an incumbent management’s capability if grievous
errors continue. They are not a part of the independent accountant’s juris
diction. He can only examine and advise as regards internal procedures.
The Symposium, hopefully, will bring forth specifics apropos of the
author’s concluding general statement that “an expanded and revitalized cor
porate financial report, independently and objectively presented, appears to
be the best medium to accomplish that end.”

Whitman
The ideal role of corporate management in financial reporting, as repre
sented by Mr. Whitman, would seem to embrace that of public prosecutor and
defender. The impression created, unwittingly, I am sure, is that management
insists on being final arbiter with sole responsibility. And accounting is placed
at center stage for virtually everything on the economic scene which, of course,
is an exaggeration.
The fact that users of American corporate reports receive more and better
information than anywhere else in the world does not exempt preparers from
endeavoring to do even more. As an example, attention is focused on the
annual report. Little comment is directed by the author to the need for
detailed interim reporting for the benefit of all parties concerned.
It is not conclusively proved that management has a clear mandate for
the authority-accountability interrelationships as described. Indeed, must
financial management be privileged to establish the rules as a condition for
participation? This question will have to be examined by the Symposium.
Distinction of stewardship is not made clear as between operating man
agement and directors. Passive “window dressing” boards have need, so far
as their responsibilities to creditors and stockholders are concerned, for their
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protection by independent accountants. If financial reporting is to become
increasingly meaningful, public accountants should make every effort to
assist directors and strongly support disclosure of important business facts
which go beyond the accounting phases.
It is not enough for management to agree with adequacy of principles
and concepts governing preparation of statements. Management and account
ants should also co-operatively cultivate straight-forwardness. Both remain
subordinate to other interests, especially those of stockholder-owners who, as
described in another paper, have the ultimate risk.
Apropos of this is the author’s belief that “the interests of investors are
adequately safeguarded by the Securities and Exchange Commission.” This,
to say the least, is a debatable statement. If the SEC should eventually strait
jacket accounting, as is the practice on the part of certain other regulatory
agencies, the average investor quite probably would find the results helpful
but also misleading. The uninitiated will continue to have difficulty in properly
understanding financial statements. No one would be aided by having the
preparers sheltered by conformity with statutory requirements.
If, on the other hand, publicly available reports were already suffering
from excessive uniformity, that would be one thing; but the premise is not
proved. This also applies to the question as to whether uniformity necessarily
is in conflict with “important criteria of sound accounting such as the rele
vancy, consistency and matching concepts.” That some problems do exist
should be recognized, however, unless dissatisfaction at the grass-roots level
should simply be dismissed in cavalier fashion.
Considerable space is devoted to discussing taxes and the philosophy of
taxation. It seems self-evident that all corporations should do everything
possible to minimize taxes as an expense borne by stockholders. In a few
special instances, such as in the public utility industry, there may be some
reason to regard tax savings as income which should be shared with the local
consumers. The principal concern, however, should be with how taxes are
detailed in reports prepared for general use. Misinterpretations need not
occur so long as there is adequate disclosure.
Conglomerate accounting is a hydra-headed phenomenon which, to a
greater extent than any other financial reporting in recent history, has grown
to be a matter of dissatisfaction with many. Since so much of the conglomerate
is tied in with financial management, the effort always to put the best foot
forward can have adverse repercussions. Comparability and uniformity are
not synonymous. Uniformity probably is impractical, but comparability as to
format has more validity than seems generally to be acknowledged, especially
as can be applied in specific industry classifications.
The extensive attack launched against the Accounting Principles Board
by Mr. Whitman is certain to provoke lively discussion. Clear differentiation
is not made as to whether his displeasure is with the jurisdictional power of
the APB or its personnel and procedures. If there is suppression of outside
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views, if not information, by the APB as indicated, the practice most certainly
should be rectified.
There is no need to comment at greater length on Mr. Whitman’s paper
other than to say that his desire to have representation in APB proceedings
by industry, users and other interests is to be applauded. Circulating of study
drafts prior to adoption of Opinions should be encouraged, but it has been my
impression that this was established procedure.
In conclusion, the need for rational informed analysis by properly experi
enced users will always be a sine qua non. Mr. Whitman enunciates this as
his position.

Flynn
The theme of this paper is strong endorsement of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board. Efforts to improve standards through the APB must continue
in the absence of any comparable body providing ground rules and guidelines
for CPAs. The Board’s procedure is outlined in considerable detail. (It should
be noted that there evidently is conflict of understanding between Messrs.
Flynn and Whitman as regards preparation and exposure of draft Opinions
promulgated by the APB.)
Mr. Flynn summarizes projects now on the APB agenda, several of
which are extremely important to outside users of the reports. In meeting
change, the author feels that challenges should not result in over-reacting.
Although making haste slowly may be appropriate, the possible disadvantages
also are obvious. While comforting to some accountants and financial man
agements, it does nothing to ameliorate problems of those who have to deal
with financial reports.
Mr. Flynn emphasizes that corporate financial reporting has been, and
will continue to undergo evolutionary changes through concerted efforts on
the part of interested groups. Care must be observed in placing any restrictions
affecting the work of independent accountants and financial executives. Exces
sive refinements must be avoided just as inclination to ignore need for change
must be overcome.
That “accounting principles are a kind of financial grammar which is
indispensable” is a truism accepted by the financially sophisticated. But gram
mar does not always promote proper communication with the uninformed.
At issue here is “fairness” in accommodating all classes of users.
Mr. Flynn states that “. . . there are relatively few situations where man
agement requires different accounting principles for internal reporting purposes
than those required for reporting to stockholders. After all, the same set of
facts and transactions is being reported upon in both cases.” Withal, it is
appropriate to inquire whether outsiders’ needs are being properly met if there
is a preoccupation with the format for internal reporting and the stockholder
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report becomes a secondary, or by-product effort. Difficulties arise in recon
ciling disclosures to the satisfaction of all concerned.
As corporations become more complex and public ownership broadens,
the financial community increasingly desires to have the advantage of expedi
tious yardsticks for judging performance. The author’s view is that proper
recording of transactions and analytical interpretations of historical perform
ance will increasingly have to satisfy practical use in predicting the future. It
follows, therefore, that comparability in reporting will be receiving increasing
emphasis.
References to investors’ preoccupation with earnings per share are in a
critical vein. What the author deplores as the “earnings per share syndrome”
is not symptomatic of the serious investor; and it certainly does not apply to
the institutional type.
So far as earnings multiples are concerned, determination of this signifi
cant valuation element is empirical. It generally has a less radical stock market
influence than surprises in reported earnings, especially for interim periods.
It is unfortunate that qualitative reporting is subordinated to the quantitative
in view of the fact that stockholders have to rely for such long intervals on
incomplete data. Herein lies real need for greater concern on the part of CPAs.
It is interesting that Mr. Flynn argues for financial statements adjusted
for changing value of the dollar. Indexing would have an inverse effect on
reported earnings by expressing results in real dollars. During an inflationary
period, the corollary effect is that there is increasing pressure on earnings for
larger reserve provisions for asset renewals and additions. But, if prices and
costs cause upward asset revaluation and inhibit earnings as they would be
reported, it follows that the treatment should be reversed during a cycle of
deflation. It is perhaps gratuitous to observe that debate about both sides of
the equation will not soon be settled.
The present worth concept in discounting futures is introduced without
convincing presentation as to usefulness for creditors, investors and other
classes of users. Question arises as to whether this would introduce excessive
refinement bordering on the esoteric with perhaps limited internal benefit.
As a professional accountant, it is regrettable that Mr. Flynn did not
develop in greater detail the problems and treatment of acquisition and merger
accounting. It ties in with what he describes as “the financial statement sweep
stakes” (and presumed growth potential). Absorbingly controversial, con
glomerate reporting will doubtless be receiving prime attention over the next
several years.
As giant corporations of comparatively recent creation proliferate and
expand, their influence on our country’s economic stability cannot be mini
mized. The sacrifice of current benefits for future promise necessitates very
careful handling of accounting in order to deflate “pie in the sky” expectations
on the part of the uninformed. Highly important is adequate disclosure of the
dedication of cash earnings for debt repayment and presumed growth plowback instead of dividends.
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The accounting profession ought to accept the position of leadership
among the groups “occupying influential and co-ordinating positions.” A
problem is whether the CPA seeks to share responsibility with others to too
great an extent so as to avoid frictions. There is the impression that change
of itself finds professional accountants and managements reluctant dragons, so
to speak. If preoccupation with the status quo will have unfortunate conse
quences, it follows, of course, that too dynamic an approach is undesirable.
Thus, moderation, as in all things, is the ideal.
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Critique
Of the McGarraugh and Norby papers

By Dudley E. Browne, Group Vice President—Finance and Administra
tion, Director and Member of Executive Committee and Finance Committee,
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, representing the Financial Executives Insti
tute

This critique covers two primary papers. The first, by Charles T.
McGarraugh, is entitled “Conflicts and Challenges.” Mr. McGarraugh sets
forth the views of the credit grantor. The second, by William C. Norby, is
entitled “The Needs and Responsibilities of the Investor in Equities.” As the
title suggests, Mr. Norby sets forth the views of the financial analyst concerned
with investments in equities.
The critique writer’s role is twofold. First, he is to evaluate the ideas
and proposals of the writer of the principal paper from his professional view
point. Second, he is to identify and discuss any relevant and important issues
that he feels have been omitted or not treated in sufficient depth. A tacit
assumption of the format of this Symposium is that the participants will have
read the papers beforehand.
My approach as a critique writer will be: (a) to cite the common points
of the two principal papers; (b) to discuss the divergent views of the two
authors; and (c) to offer my own views on the relevant points omitted by
Messrs. McGarraugh and Norby.
Before turning to the task at hand, I would like to set forth some sugges
tions as to how we might better profit from our attendance at this Symposium.
In so doing, I shall take considerable liberty in paraphrasing, in part, an article
by Chris Argyris, “Students and Businessmen: The Bristling Dialogue,” which
appeared in the July-August 1968 issue of THINK.
Mistrust, rejection, downright hostility—these are the prevailing attitudes
of the members of four groups concerned with the preparation and use of
financial reports. Financial executives, independent public accountants, secur
ity analysts, and credit grantors are involved in unplanned, uncoordinated
attacks on each other that hide the underlying problems that each group faces.
The flaw in this dialogue is that none of the groups is listening to the
others. Each is more interested in defending itself and discrediting the others
than looking at the total picture. The result is, as John Gardner said at last
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June’s Cornell commencement, that 20th century organizations are caught in
a savage crossfire between uncritical lovers and unloving critics.
Why do we have this polarization between over-hate and over-love? One
reason is that when one group attacks the other, each is threatened by the fact
that its own weakness is a strength of the other group. The irony is that all
four have had research conducted in their own organizations and have sup
ported experimental studies that were, when conducted, the most daring ever
done. But the fear that is the basis of over-love won out.
It is time that the polarization caused by over-haters and over-lovers,
dispassionately observed by each organization, should be seriously examined
and greatly reduced. We who are gathered in this unique Symposium on
financial reporting have a special responsibility to bring about this change.
If we do not, we could someday wake up to a world that has destroyed us in
the name of freedom and democracy.
You may well dispute what I have just stated. But, if the four papers I
have read beforehand are representative of the others, then again, we are in
grave danger of talking and not listening, of seeking not to give, but only to
take. Let us resolve for once to seek to understand views advanced by others
that are at variance with our own. Only in so doing are we likely to go away
from this Symposium with a sense of accomplishment.
In any event, my approach as a critique writer will not be solely that of
a financial executive. As one who has had more than a brief passing experience
in the function of each of the four groups, I shall try to be a catalyst in seeking
to bring about a meaningful and fruitful discussion.

Agreement Among Papers
Turning now to the task at hand, I note certain commonality in the two
papers under consideration. Both are written by bankers, and both authors
are senior vice presidents of their respective banks. The initials of their last
names are at the middle of the alphabet.
Both authors zero in on financial statements. I suppose this was dictated
by the subject matter of this Symposium. But, in so doing, each leaves for
possible inference the view that his only task is to deal with financial statements
—an inference that I am sure both authors would hasten to deny.
Mr. McGarraugh, for example, does not mention such matters as cus
tomer status, reciprocal balances, credit standing, nor priority vis-a-vis other
creditors. Nor does Mr. Norby associate himself with the fundamentalist’s
approach, or the subgroup thereof that supports the current fad of relative
earnings growth, as opposed to the Dow-Jones theorists, the random walkers,
and the new school of dart throwers. This observation is not intended in any
way to downgrade the importance they have attributed to the financial report.
Rather it is an attempt to place its importance in context with the total picture.
Both authors readily admit to the dynamics of their fields of interest and
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the consequent lack of unanimity of approach by practitioners therein. Mr.
McGarraugh, for example, says, “Credit grantors are not in agreement as to
the information they need.” However, the credit grantor “must have confi
dence in the underlying data.”
Mr. Norby says, “Financial analysis, in estimating the future, involves the
use of a wide range of variables, but has not yet developed any rigorous method
of correlating all of this information, and indeed the nature of the problem
may preclude it.” And as for confidence, Mr. Norby notes, “Financial analysts
start on the presumption that the financial reports are accurate and consistent.”
Perhaps if we can keep these confessionals in mind and match them with
the analogous ones of the other organizations represented, we can all start
from a common ground.
The absence of any identified concern over downside risks occasioned by
restatements of assets or liabilities surprised me. In prior confrontations with
the subject at hand, I have always found both credit grantors and financial
analysts to be quite vocal about the losses they suffer when such revaluations
occur, almost to the complete exclusion of any willingness to talk about the
broader aspects of financial reports.
Perhaps this would have been better left as a dead issue, but I think
concern does exist and to the extent it does it undermines confidence in finan
cial reporting. I am constantly asked how we can avoid this. And, usually,
I am frank enough to admit I do not know. Despite every care in measurement,
all approaches to minimizing revaluations seemingly involve ultra-conservatism
in undervaluation of assets or overvaluation of liabilities.
Both papers evidence considerable concern over the accounting for
mergers and acquisitions. Neither mentions taxable acquisitions, but instead
evidences concern with pooling of interest concepts associated with the record
ing of tax-free mergers and acquisitions. Mr. McGarraugh notes: “Pooling
of interest conglomerates are complex and have insatiable demands for credit.
There is not enough information to disclose all of the standards of measure
ment that were judged desirable, necessary, and accurate. If there were one
method, the user could be deemed knowledgeable.” Mr. Norby observes:
Most of the accounting controversies on accounting for mergers and
acquisitions center around the method of recording acquisitions upon
the balance sheet. Fundamentally, it would seem that accounting for
mergers and acquisitions should be the same regardless of the method
of payment and should show real cost. Perhaps many acquisitions
would be hard to justify if management had to show in their account
ing the real cost of the company acquired. Pooling of interests con
ceals the acquisition cost but does not credit capital accounts with the
excess of market value over book value of shares traded. Many new
and difficult accounting problems have been created and abuses in fi
nancial reporting have been obscured by accounting complexities. We
see here the need for a rigorous accounting theory of mergers and
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acquisitions which will standardize the approach and preclude the use
of accounting technicalities to obscure the real costs and real results
of these developments.

Obviously, both authors are disenchanted with the results to date. Each
wants one method, with one asking for disclosure and the other for recording
real cost. Neither evidences any understanding of the alternatives involved.
Lacking this, I find no suggestions as to how they feel the excess of the
price paid over the value of the assets acquired should be treated. And, of
course, some others have doubt as to the price paid when the securities issued
in payment have price earnings ratios carried out to infinity. In the trouble
some cases, the excess of price over net asset value involves goodwill and all
of the historic concern as to what it is and whether and how it should be written
off.
I suspect that there is no one method upon which wholehearted acceptance
could be found. Asking for one method of recording is tantamount to asking
that only one method of merger or acquisition be allowed. Whatever the
merits of the latter are from the recording standpoint, it is not likely to occur.
Sitting in the wings, as it were, and observing the whole controversy, I
would attribute much of our difficulty to that of putting procedures before
principles. Lacking tangible knowledge of what we seek to reflect, we get
involved in trying to fit transactions to procedures that did not contemplate
the instant form of transaction. And, in too many cases, the form of the
transaction was dictated by the very existence of this hiatus. Even when one
starts with a rigorous logic, variations caused by differences in the relative
price earnings ratios of acquiring and acquired companies, and the existence
of companies restricted to cost based pricing, seemingly create infinite possi
bilities.
I have only glossed over the problem, but, hopefully, I have identified
some of the issues involved.
Messrs. McGarraugh and Norby both stress the need for comparability,
with their desire for such being expressed loud and clear. The former avers:
“The objective of fair income and expense reporting should be to attain
comparison with previous reports of the same company and reports of other
companies in the same business.” The latter states: “The investment process
is the comparison of relative values; that comparison requires comparability
of financial statements over time and between companies; and that to achieve
comparability we must have strict, practical accounting rules, which do not
permit deviation, and uniform application by the accounting profession.”
I have heard this from so many quarters (the term can be used advisedly
because we have proponents of comparability in each of our four represented
organizations), that I am beginning to get the message! However, if I am to
be included among the proponents, I would suggest rephrasing this objective
to that of attaining the maximum comparability. While I will have more to
say about this in citing my own views, I do want to observe how odd this goal
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appears when every effort is being made in each of our groups, as we seek to
persevere over our competitors, to maximize the differences and to undermine
any meaningful comparison.
In both papers, strong pleas are mounted for better segmented reporting
by conglomerates. Mr. McGarraugh notes that two of the problems relating
to conglomerates are “the inability of users to get segmented information
relating to important product or subsidiary divisions and getting properly
comparable operating statistics.” Mr. Norby observes that the need for more
detailed information about widely diversified or conglomerate companies is
readily apparent, that the analyst must understand the dynamics in each
distinct segment, and, therefore, requires segmented sales and profit informa
tion which can be related to economic variables.
Mr. Norby, apparently unheeding the admonishments relative to the
problem of segmented reporting which were set forth in the Financial Execu
tives Research Foundation’s study in this area, notes that progress has been
made but “an even more vigorous approach seems necessary to accomplish
the desired objective.” I have expressed at length on previous occasions my
views on segmented reporting. They will have to be encapsulated here. I
believe that it would be to the advantage of most companies to improve their
reporting in this area, where possible. In some companies, despite a wholesome
desire to display segmented reporting, integrated operations and joint costs
create such problems that I doubt if meaningful and not misleading segmented
reporting can be made. And if there is one message to be gotten out of the
FERF study, it is that uniformity in this area is probably not achievable. Some
have advocated marshalling assets along segmented reporting lines; I do not
think our current state of the art is sufficiently advanced to permit this.
Both Mr. McGarraugh and Mr. Norby want the independent accountant’s
responsibility enlarged. Their views as to how this is to be brought about are
at variance, so I shall cover this point in my discussions of the individual papers.
And finally, both authors express frustration over the degree or lack of
progress by the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA. Mr. McGarraugh’s discontent has to be inferred from his statements with respect to the
various issues. Mr. Norby states: “Much remains to be done, beyond the
efforts of the APB to date—perhaps beyond the boundaries of the present
thought of the profession.”

Viewpoint of McGarraugh
So much for the common approaches of the two papers. I will now turn
to a discussion of the individual viewpoints expressed in the two papers. In
so doing, I shall deal with them in alphabetical order; first, Mr. McGarraugh’s
and then Mr. Norby’s.
Mr. McGarraugh, throughout his paper, uses various terms for objectives
to be attained in financial reporting. For example: “simplified, proper, fair
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financial condition, desirable, necessary, accurate, and fair value.” These,
like “truth” to the philosopher, are relative and can be the source of endless
debate. In any event, they are relative terms and meaningless out of context
with varying degrees of achievement offered by alternate choices. According
to Mr. McGarraugh:
The credit grantors’ needs include information relative to cash flows,
asset values, and lease liabilities. The financial statement should per
mit distinguishing between earnings reported on an accrual and cash
basis. The reluctance of the report preparer to depart from cost until
realization causes frequent misstatements of fair financial condition.
The credit grantor needs access to the information required to arrive
at an understanding of the fair values involved. The increasing use of
long-term leases presents special problems in showing the impact of
that very real liability. This is a material item and the absence causes
a financial report to lose valid comparability. The decision not to
reflect should be reviewed.

The foregoing statements from Mr. McGarraugh’s paper indicate the
credit grantors’ dissatisfaction with the existing cost-based and realization
concepts of today’s accounting. Areas of particular concern are high market
and low cost inventory and the lack of market values for fixed assets. These
are not likely to be furnished in the annual reports unless there are wholesale
revisions to current accounting concepts.
Some among the profession, like Chambers, Ross, and Sprouse, to men
tion but a few, have proposed concepts that would move us in the direction of
asset valuation. Such concepts, however, have the disadvantage of requiring
more subjectivity—less objectivity—in determining values. Such an approach
seems doubly dangerous, for on one hand it would make it more difficult for
an injured party to claim misrepresentation, yet on the other hand it would
subject both management and independent accountants to an ever increasing
number of suits. Apparently, what the credit grantor really needs is a Realiza
tion and Liquidation Statement—and if so, such is at variance with the “going
concern” convention.
It delights me to note Mr. McGarraugh’s complaint that alternate
methods of recording income tax accruals, although clarified by APB Opinion
No. 11, are still somewhat confusing and that there is also some confusion
in the way the investment tax credit benefit and special allocations of income
are reported. I say this, because, like Mr. McGarraugh, I feel that the APB’s
current predilection for achieving comparability of the income statement is
creating additional problems for those, such as credit grantors, who would use
the balance sheet to determine cash flow.
The adoption of the deferred method of recording comprehensive tax
allocation removed any payment concept related to the deferred credit. And
I would note similarly that APB Opinion No. 8, which deals with pension costs,
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has created liabilities that similarly are unrelated in some instances to cash
payments. In fact, this course of action has created a whole new need for
supplemental analyses to identify both when and what proportion of the credit
will be paid, if ever.
All of the immediate foregoing material suggests the use of supplemental
data submissions. This, however, is not the preferable answer, for Mr.
McGarraugh states that the credit grantor would prefer to have the significant
data recorded in the statement itself in order to minimize the amount of
collateral information necessary to arrive at a sufficient understanding of the
data shown in the balance sheet and income statements.
Further, the ideally perfect financial report is described as having full
comprehension and fair presentation of the data shown, without any footnotes
or other disclosures required to provide such information, though he notes
that this is probably unattainable. I am unable to conceive of any likelihood
that such a goal might be achieved. I suspect that Mr. McGarraugh has similar
views, because he then calls for increased disclosure in the following manner:
“All of the data that are needed to provide sufficient information to a reason
ably well trained credit grantor should be included in the report.”
Mr. McGarraugh also asks for future estimates of cash flow, described
as: “short-term projections prepared by professionals on the announced plans
of management. Competent managements have already prepared such cor
porate budgets; all that remains to be done is to have the estimates of the
judgmental premises reviewed objectively by an independent professional
reporter.”
Whatever the merits may be of this requirement, we seem to be moving
away from any prospects of its achievement. Legal advisers to management
are taking an ever increasing dislike to any and all forecasts, and the AICPA
rules do not presently permit the attestation of any forecasts.
But what seems to me to be more important is whether such information
and the information with respect to values, if furnished to the credit grantor,
might be construed as “insiders’ information.” I think it is, and while it is
necessary to the credit grantor, the submission of such sets up a veritable chain
reaction. It certainly imposes constraints on the use thereof by the credit
grantor, a point which Mr. McGarraugh notes. It imposes similar constraints
on every individual in the credit granting organization who becomes privy to
such information. Obviously, such information must be kept sacrosanct from
the investment division of the trust department.
Having of necessity given such “insiders’ information” in support of a
loan request, what obligations are imposed upon management with respect to
policing its use? And what obligations does management have if it obtains
knowledge that the information has been put to uses beyond those intended?
The answer becomes doubly difficult when one realizes that such information
would never have been released except for the specific purpose, and should in
most instances never be the subject of a general release.
Mr. McGarraugh suggests that the independent accountant be responsi
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ble for the financial reports. While the courts seemingly are displaying a
willingness to attach increasing responsibility upon the independent public
accountant, management has and should retain the basic responsibility for the
financial statements. Under the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, primary
responsibility for financial statements is placed upon management as the
“registrant” or the “issuer or obligor.”
Indeed, the whole arrangement would fall like a row of dominoes were
the public accountants to have to face submissions from management for
which the latter had no responsibility. Nor can there be joint responsibility,
for what is everybody’s responsibility soon becomes nobody’s responsibility.
One thing seems certain: management should and must do everything in its
power to minimize the exposure to liability of the independent public account
ant, for in the final analysis the client is going to have to pay for the costs of
the profession’s product liability exposure.
Any reading of recent proceedings involving SEC Rule 10b-5 cases is
sure to cause concern as to what can be done and what cannot be done. The
problems are difficult enough if we were to simply follow existing guidelines.
But, as in the field of civil rights, the courts have seen fit to legislate new
concepts and to apply them upon an ex post facto basis to the parties con
cerned. Such an environment is certainly not conducive to encouraging the
expansion of the amount of information presently available in financial reports.
Before concluding my critique of Mr. McGarraugh’s paper, I want to
note his further observation:
Modern communication methods and media have provided some of
the most exciting techniques in our business world; it is unfortunate
that the modern financial report has not kept up with this dynamic
trend—and its failure to do so is attributable to the fact that we have
not recognized its vital role.

All of this is true insofar as transmission of data per se is concerned. Our
problem is not in this area. Our problem is with information needed for
decision-making purposes; and when we consider this we must recognize that,
despite all of our advancement in communication transmission, we have
equally increased our capacity to transmit biased, slanted, half-truthful mate
rial. In my opinion, we shall find no ready answers to this problem.

Viewpoint of Norby
Mr. Norby’s paper presents the view of the financial analyst. He is a
Chartered Financial Analyst, a past president of the Financial Analysts
Federation, and is eminently qualified to set forth such views.
Before embarking on my critique of Mr. Norby’s paper, I want to lift
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out of context one valuable observation he has made. Speaking of the activities
of the APB, he states:
Some matters which have been undertaken are too theoretical to
have much impact in the practical investment world, e.g., accounting
for convertible securities and price-level adjustments of carrying value
of assets—neither of which adds anything to the measurement of earn
ing power.

From this, it seems to me, one can draw the inference that this Symposium
might be able to develop a list of action items and their relative priority for
the assistance of the APB. At least it is a thought worthy of some considera
tion.
Mr. Norby, like Mr. McGarraugh, uses some relative terms to describe
his goals of financial reporting. These include “accurate, consistent, sufficient,
fair, comparable, sound and practical.” My comments concerning Mr. McGarraugh’s use of such terms are equally applicable here.
Mr. Norby stresses the analysts’ concern over estimates of future returns
for periods of one to five years. He notes that a projection of earning power
is necessary to calculate future returns and that it begins with an analysis of
historical and present earning power. This need seems patently obvious. It is
interesting to observe, however, that while we all have been attempting to
concentrate upon improving the presentation of both historical and current
financial information, modern managements have developed entirely new
capabilities of forecasting future financial information through their concen
tration on, and development of, long-range plans.
Surely, such information would be of inestimable assistance to both the
financial analysts and the credit grantors. But, instead of recognizing this,
we have continued the travesty of attaching so much liability upon manage
ment for the disclosure of such information as to seemingly guarantee that
it will never see the light of day beyond the halls of the corporation. And our
independent public accountants have joined in the charade by prohibiting
any attestation thereof. Just how reasonable is this?
The view is taken in Mr. Norby’s paper that each industry group of
companies must have its own list of specific requirements for financial data.
The great diversity of American enterprise makes the industry approach
necessary; broad statements applicable to all companies have little value.
I can say a hearty “amen” to this for non-conglomerate companies. I am
at a loss, however, to apply this concept to our conglomerates on any whole
hearted basis. This guideline is possible of fulfillment in the non-integrated
conglomerate, but I would think that the integrated conglomerate would have
to come up with a single set of rules to be applied universally across the
whole enterprise.
Mr. Norby has some interesting comments about comparability in two
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cited areas. He states: “Other comparability questions are more difficult,
e.g., depreciation policies applied to computers. There ought to be some
practical judgment on the appropriate first year write-off of a computer
which is applicable to all manufacturers and would make their earnings state
ments more nearly comparable.” In a recent panel I was on with David Norr
and LeRoy Layton in Fresno, California, the former defied anyone to find
justification for the present spread of first-year depreciation rates which
range from 10 to 50 per cent!
Admittedly, this seems on first blush to be incomprehensible and cer
tainly destructive to comparability. To state the obvious, it does demonstrate
a varying capability to withstand obsolescence. We might choose to brush
this aside, but what do we say if, in respect to IBM, it reflects a management
plan to gain a larger or protect an existing share of the market by introducing
a new line of computers that will justify the use of the 50 per cent first-year
depreciation rate?
This whole area is one over which we ever so lightly tread. As we move
from the developing company with capitalization of start-up costs in order
to match them with revenues, we move to the mature company that typically
seeks utmost conservatism and has a penchant against carrying any unneces
sary costs as assets. Certainly, such a course is good economics and it is good
management, but we are all in doubt as to whether such constitutes good
accounting.
Mr. Norby read my mind by citing the variations in practice of the aero
space companies engaged in the production of commercial transports with
respect to their handling of development costs. He notes that Boeing charges
off development costs of new programs as incurred and that Lockheed inven
tories these costs and charges out as deliveries are made and revenues received,
with provision for current charge-off of overruns. Lockheed will report more
current earnings than Boeing because of different accounting.
He could have added that McDonnell Douglas capitalizes both inventory
and development costs and spreads such over the life of the program. The
question as to how comparable this treatment is really begs the fundamental
question. With respect to Boeing, the question must be: What is the amount
of the hidden asset, or how much of the development costs that have been
charged off have really been sold through the orders on hand? With respect
to McDonnell Douglas, the question is: What is the amount of unrecovered
costs, or how much of the capitalized costs have not been sold? For such
represents the exposure to a possible restatement of asset value. In either case,
the desired answer is unattainable short of a supplementary analysis.
In the case of Lockheed, we have sought to distinguish between sold
and unsold costs. We have undertaken to capitalize those costs which we
anticipate will be recovered by the orders on hand and to write off those costs
which are not. In our case, we have attempted to provide the analyst with
the information we have been led to believe is desirable. This, hopefully,
sounds very nice; but in truth, by the selection of this method, as in the pre
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ceding example, we have written off as much as we believe we can afford.
Mr. Norby suggests that the independent accountant’s involvement with
quarterly reports and the text of annual reports be expanded. I am in sym
pathy with his position. Lockheed involves its auditors in the latter, and I
suspect that for most of the companies represented at this Symposium this
is common practice. However, we have not chosen to show the auditor’s
involvement with such in the certificate.
How to deal with the problem of quarterly report coverage short of a
full audit is not clear. Perhaps I should rephrase this for the benefit of the
professional accountants here with us. In the Yale Express System case, the
shareholders contended that the independent auditors, though they had not
been responsible for auditing the nine months’ figures, did have enough
information to know the figures were incorrect. My concern, therefore, is
how to protect the auditor by minimizing his exposure to liabilities he con
ceivably could have with respect to quarterly figures.
As noted in my coverage at the outset of items of commonality, Mr.
Norby seeks to expand the role of the independent public accountant. He
states: “The accounting profession can resolve its conflicting middle position
by fully assuming the fiduciary role that is thrust upon it anyway.” I am
not sure I understand Mr. Norby’s point here. A fiduciary role brings to
mind concepts of care and conservation of assets and application of the pru
dent man rule with respect to the investment and safekeeping thereof. I find
this role for the profession hard to accept. And, if, like Mr. McGarraugh, he
seeks to expand the independent accountant’s role to one of primary respon
sibility for the financial statements, I find this impossible to accept. In any
event, the latter is not the role existing SEC statutes and rules imply.
Nr. Norby has an interesting and challenging section in his paper, under
the heading of “Conflicts Among the Parties at Interest” (see page 105). If
you do not readily recall this section, I urge you to reread it. He notes that
management has broad latitude in its accounting policies so long as they fall
within the framework of generally accepted accounting principles. Manage
ments wish to prepare fair and accurate reports for shareholders (a minority
fall short), yet almost all are affected by subtle motivations: optimism, because
of a desire for success as a manager; opportunity to exercise stock options; a
predilection for extreme conservatism; a desire to create internal reserves
or manage earnings.
Any and all of these reporting tendencies by management are in conflict
with the interests of investors as they lead to possible over- or under-evaluation
of their stock or perhaps engender a false sense of security. This is a chal
lenging area. Even for managements of highest motivation and intent, great
objectivity is needed to arrive at reasonable answers. The matter has not been
helped by the current push for performance, wherein the time horizon of the
investor has been moved to a point entirely out of step with that of a manage
ment seeking to achieve long-term growth as opposed to maximization of
current earnings.
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And the subtle motivations of which Mr. Norby speaks are surely there,
for they must be in an environment which permits one in government to say
that every government has a right to lie in order to maintain its position in
office. What frightens me most is the very real possibility that in our quest for
comparability and simplicity we may seek to impose upon management a
system of accounting which is unacceptable and by this fact alone, as com
parable events in Russia and China have disclosed, motivate management
to manipulate the figures. It seems to me that one of our principal strengths
today is the latitude management has in presenting its figures, for in so doing
much is disclosed that otherwise might be concealed.

Comments on Financial Reporting
So much for the individual papers. I turn now to my own additive com
ments that could not be placed into juxtaposition with the views of the pre
parers of these two principal papers.
I must admit that I have a rapidly growing concern as to how and where
our financial reporting concepts fit into our total environment. In this con
text, I mean for environment to include our form of government, a republic
of limited democracy and protection of minorities, and our economic system,
capitalistic free enterprise. I have assumed that our deliberations upon
accounting matters would be viewed against this backdrop and that our actions
would be in harmony therewith and serve to at least protect, if not to better,
our political and economic heritage.
In this time of turmoil, reflecting as it does a passionate concern over
individual liberty and civil rights, which has been aided and abetted by legis
lative excursions of our courts with respect to the First and Fifth Amendments
to our Constitution, I am appalled by the contrast between this concern over
the liberty of individuals on the one hand and the constraints we seek to place
on management, independent accountants, underwriters, and analysts (to
mention but a few) on the other hand. And these constraints are justified
by a desire to protect the investor.
In the individual area we have gone to great lengths to reaffirm our
faith in the individual, the right of free speech, the right to be represented by
counsel, and protection against duress and self-incrimination. In the field
of business, however, we seemingly have forgotten all of these principles and
pile rules upon rules, regulations upon regulations, statutes upon statutes, and
judicial decisions upon judicial decisions that are based on the malfeasance
of a few but are applicable to all. I wonder why the A.C.L.U. has so ignored us.
Felix Morley, in his Power in the People, wrote: “Indeed it is impossible
to read even the bare text of the Constitution at all carefully without realizing
that the American Republic was specifically designed to safeguard individual
enterprise against the State.” In our quest for more disclosure, more informa
tion, comparability, and segmented reporting, we move constantly toward
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the socialization of business decisions. As in our government, our decisions
will become more delayed and more ineffective as we seek beforehand to
insure their acceptability. In moving ever in this direction, we erode the
guiding spirit of our free enterprise system.
I have mentioned the foregoing because we seemingly have a host of
conflicting objectives derived from many different disciplines that we must
compose if we are ever going to make progress in the field of financial report
ing. The nature of our problem suggests that the application of some concepts
of system analysis might be fruitful. But, to do so requires some effective
norm whereby system effectiveness might be measured. Certainly we are
going to have to weigh and balance our conflicting viewpoints and make
trade-offs between our alternate choices. Lacking any clear and unified state
ment having a semblance of acceptability, we are lost. Somehow we are going
to have to get down to the nitty-gritty and define the purpose or objective
we seek to accommodate in our financial reporting. And when we do, we
must also exercise care to assure the preservation of our concepts of govern
ment and of economics.
I am concerned that our present mode of operation through voluntary
organizations has no clear source of power. We have conflicting views. Do
we solve them solely by vote, with the group having the largest membership
prevailing? Or do we restrict the expression of views to those having an
interest in the subject at hand? Certainly, one of the problems facing the
APB today is whether to interpret acquiescence born of lack of interest as
acceptance of a proposed bulletin. I would hazard the view that the section
of APB Opinion No. 10 dealing with the accounting for the issuance of
convertible equity slipped through because of the lack of consideration of
the need for an informed electorate. Also involved, I believe, is the degree
of concern we exercise over minority views. Are these forever to be brushed
aside by the will of the majority, or must we seek some accommodation
thereof?
I am, of course, as always, concerned about our ability to accommodate
change and to encourage innovation and experimentation. It is unlikely that
we will find permanent answers to any of our dilemmas. What we do today
will surely have to be changed tomorrow. We seem, however, to be hell bent
with a desire to cast all decisions in concrete as a monument to our failures.
In its present form, I would say that the APB will in all probability be the
last to adopt the new and the last to discard the old. If we are going to keep
accounting progressive, we must encourage experimentation and permit the
testing of new ideas in the market place. The market accorded to a company’s
securities in some measure reflects that company’s management’s concern
and care with respect to its financial reporting. We should be most cautious
before we rule out this role of competition under the guise of seeking com
parability.
Our current investment binge for “performance” also causes me concern.
It suggests a transitory shareholder devoid of any lasting and abiding interest
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in the corporation. How is management going to cope with this emphasis on
immediate values? How is management going to find support for those long
term projects that are necessary for the survival of the company, but come at
the expense of current earnings? I wonder, too, about the sale of stock by an
existing shareholder to a new shareholder. Where did he get the impetus for
his sale? Was it a research report of relatively narrow circulation that
recommended disposition of the security? If so, does this constitute a new
form of “insiders’ information” that would place upon the seller the obligation
of disclosure? And what overtones of obligations for policing research reports
by management does this suggest?
Before concluding, I want to make a few observations with respect to
our desire for comparability. It is a most understandable desire and certainly
all of us make comparisons, day in and day out. Sometimes we are knowl
edgeable about the limitations inherent to the process; sometimes we are not.
I think we must recognize that a driving force of business, whether it be
banking, financial analysis, public accounting, or industrial enterprise, is to
identify and maximize a series of differences from our competitors that be
comes our stock in trade. Not only is this necessary to persevere against our
competitors, it also provides us with a defense against superficial comparisons
with them.
I am inclined to give a hearty laugh when my friends in the investment
field lay great stress on the necessity for comparability. Did you ever try to
seek agreement upon the basis of measuring performance of a portfolio
manager? If I recall, there are some 28 alternative measurements avail
able for the process. Lockheed has nine bank trustees managing its retire
ment plan and savings plan investments. They each use a different basis of
measurement and are disdainful of any effort on our part to judge them by
one standard. None of our consumer products are standard; none of our
concepts of organization, manpower utilization, or use of capital assets are
standard. Can we really get meaningful comparisons? Neither our credit
grantors nor our independent public accountants need feel smug about their
omission from my examples, because I have witnessed the same distress on
their part when one seeks to compare their performance.
You may wonder at this point why I have gone into the matters of en
vironment, systems analysis, constituencies, change, transitory shareholders,
and comparability. I have done so because I feel that our efforts to date have
been hindered by our accounting blinders that force us to forever deal with
the smaller issues and not the large. I suspect that if we had the vision to stand
back and take a good look at the overall issues facing our society today, we
would discover that our issues are of a much different nature than what we
had thought. And I think this would make us much better prepared to deal
with them successfully.
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Critique
Of the Whitman and Flynn papers

By Thomas F. Russell, Vice President and Group Manager, Federal-Mogul
Corporation, Chairman of the Corporate Reporting Committee of the Finan
cial Executives Institute

Introduction
An essential goal of management, the accounting profession, and other
interested parties is to eliminate undesirable or misleading practices and
methods of reporting. In addition, it is important to narrow differences in the
method of reporting where there is no justification based on factual circum
stances. Recognize, however, that there are differences in the methods of
reporting where there are conflicting principles of accounting or logical
alternate methods for reporting the same set of facts. Inventory valuation
methods, for example, imply certain cost flow assumptions (i.e., Lifo, Fifo,
specific identification) which are reasonable but differences in the timing of
expense recognition make inter-firm comparisons difficult, if not impossible.
While the various acceptable methods of inventory valuation may prevent
inter-firm comparisons, adequate disclosure and consistency in reporting
allows proper inter-period comparisons of the operation of a single firm. Thus
the idea of comparability in financial statements breaks down into two cate
gories. One category encompasses the problems of inter-firm comparability.
Adequate disclosure and consistency will not necessarily allow a meaningful
comparison of two firms. The other category is interperiod comparisons of a
single firm whether the period is one year as for annual reports or for quarterly
or other interim reports. Each category has specific problems which require
analysis.
Any attempts at eliminating or reducing the use of certain methods of
accounting would in effect bring about a greater degree of uniformity, but
uniformity is not necessarily a desired goal. Strict uniformity in accounting
methods will not ensure comparability. The regulatory accounting methods
prescribed by the Federal Power Commission for utilities is a case in point.
The FPC has prescribed a set of accounts and descriptions of their use, but
meaningfulness in reporting is lost because a proper theory of accounting is
lacking. The utilities are forced to use a concept of “aboriginal cost” where
asset accounts are kept at the cost to the original owner who first put the
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assets to use in a public utility. The difference in cost when an asset is pur
chased or otherwise acquired by another utility is carried in a separate account
and very often the utility is permitted quick amortization not in line with the
value or useful life of the asset. It is important to recognize that accounting
for rate-making purposes or specific government reporting requirements is
not necessarily good accounting for reports to shareholders or other interested
parties. More importantly it should be apparent that any uniformity in report
ing which ignores basic accounting principles sacrifices the usefulness of the
report.
In order to narrow differences in accounting methods which are not
justified by variations in factual circumstances, it is necessary to establish the
criteria for appropriate use. Attempts at establishing criteria for accounting
methods has been tried with limited success by the APB. The criteria for the
pooling of interest treatment of business combinations is one example. An
article in the August 1968 issue of The Journal of Accountancy by Jack Fisch
and Martin Mellman outlines how the criteria established in 1957 in Account
ing Research Bulletin No. 48 have been subjected to varied interpretations in
current practice. There have been attempts by the accounting profession to
establish criteria for the capitalization of leases but this has not been widely
accepted by accountants or management. If the criteria for alternative
methods of reporting cannot be established and be generally accepted there
will be little progress in narrowing accounting methods for handling a given
set of circumstances. Certain situations may have a clearly preferable treat
ment but there will always be many situations where there is no clear preference
on the choice of methods. Accounting methods cannot be forced upon man
agement without extreme and undesirable consequences.
In order to approach the problems of corporate financial reporting there
must be a clear understanding of the roles of various persons in the process
of reporting. This is where the paper by Mr. Whitman begins.

Recent Developments Affecting Public Opinion
On Financial Reporting
The accounting profession is again faced with an impending crisis as a
result of four important court decisions. The Westec, Texas Gulf Sulphur,
Continental Vending Machine Company, and the BarChris cases will have
far reaching effects. The full impact of these decisions has not yet been felt.
Part of this conflict centers in the role of various individuals in financial
reporting. Other important issues center on the methods of accounting for
certain factual circumstances. These cases point out the need for clarifying
the roles of those who prepare or assist in the preparation of financial reports,
and the need for a narrowing of alternate accounting methods which are not
based on variations in circumstances. As Mr. Whitman points out, confidence
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and acceptance are indispensable to effective reporting. Clearly, the publicity
of these cases adversely affects the public’s confidence in financial reporting.

The Role of Management
The influence of corporate executives on reporting is felt because man
agement has the primary responsibility for the methods of accounting used
in the published financial statements. Management must be responsive to the
needs of users but they must weigh the cost of providing information and the
effect of releasing information. Certain information may jeopardize the firm’s
competitive position and the value of the shareholders’ investment. The
criterion for additional disclosure should be the usefulness of the additional
information. The costs of preparation, and the possible detrimental effect of
the information release on the competitive position of the firm and thereby on
the investor’s capital must be compared to the need for and/or the use of the
information.
At one extreme there are certain security analysts who seem to want full
and complete disclosure of any and all financial information without specifying
what they need for financial analysis. Management must be selective in the
information that is presented in financial statements, for too much information
may be as misleading to the user as inadequate disclosure. While management
must be concerned with adequate disclosure, it is inherently wary of new
reporting practices and additional information requirements because of the
aforementioned competitive risks.
We do not mean to imply that management should have a secretive or
negative attitude toward disclosure. As Mr. Whitman points out, management
has voluntarily provided additional information where such information was
considered useful to interested parties, such as the printing of prior years’
earnings summaries and financial ratio analyses. In the area of segment
reporting by conglomerates, management has voluntarily supplied such infor
mation in many cases.
We believe that managements are committed to the idea of keeping the
investors and others fully informed. However, the answer to financial reporting
problems is not to simply supply more detailed facts but to present relevant
facts which carry the assumptions implied in a sound theory of accounting.

Varied Uses of Accounting Data
There are many users and many uses for accounting data and the assump
tion that there are generally accepted accounting principles begs the questions
of acceptable to whom and for what purpose. Can a single set of figures be
reported for all users without impairing the usefulness of the reporting? Mr.
Whitman states that financial statements must fairly present the financial
position of the firm. Most would agree with this statement but the concept of
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fairness must be evaluated. If there is no single set of financial statements
which is fair to all users then perhaps there cannot be a single set of accounting
principles or postulates. Many of the problems of comparability stem from
conflicting accounting principles. Mr. Whitman states that the proper match
ing concept will go far to insure fairness to all concerned. But consider the
position of the Chock Full-O-Nuts restaurants in 1962 where the security
analysts were disturbed by the method of reporting research and development
costs. The costs of research and development were deferred to match with
the benefits to accrue hopefully from the incurred expenditure. The matching
concept states that costs and revenues are to be matched at the point when
revenue is realized. Deferring of research and development costs to the periods
where the benefits are realized would seem to be a preferable treatment but
it is not extensively used in financial reporting. This fact prevented the com
parison of the operations of Chock Full-O-Nuts with other restaurants.
Until the logic and base of acceptance of accounting principles and
methods is broadened and clarified it is not appropriate to singularly attack
management for the accounting methods used. As Mr. Whitman points out,
uniformity by fiat and not persuasion is not acceptable to management.

The Role of Independent Accountants
While we agree with Mr. Whitman that the primary responsibility for
financial reporting rests with management, we do not feel that the development
of accounting principles is the primary responsibility of management. Man
agement has a stake in accounting principles as they affect the basis for
reporting, but management has a secondary responsibility in the development
of accounting principles. The accounting profession, in our opinion, is pri
marily responsible for the development of accounting principles. However,
the profession must not operate in a vacuum but must seek the co-ordination
of its research and pronouncements of authoritative opinions with the research
and opinions of management and other interested parties. A greater degree
of participation and interaction is required of the various professional groups.
This will provide the only clear path toward a cohesive set of generally accepted
accounting principles.
Too often the concept of generally accepted accounting principles is
taken to mean general acceptance by the Accounting Principles Board or the
accounting profession. It should be apparent that due to the roles of other
interested parties that a broad base of acceptance is required to narrow differ
ences in accounting methods. If the logic of a preferred treatment can be
established by persuasion and the criteria for the use of alternate methods can
be established then financial reporting will be improved. It will be improved
because of the reasonableness of the assumptions underlying the treatment of
financial data, not simply because it would create a greater degree of com
parability.
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While management has primary responsibility for the preparation of
financial statements the auditor’s role is interrelated with management’s. A
part of the CPA’s role is to advise management on the presentation of infor
mation and the methods of reporting which fairly present the financial position
of the firm. His responsibility is not simply to condone present practice but
rather to advocate practices on sound principles and assumptions so that the
logic of a preferred treatment is apparent.
About 80 per cent of all companies filing with the SEC employ one of
eight large accounting firms and yet there is a lack of agreement among the
large firms on accounting methods and accounting principles. The work of
these eight large firms has a major influence on management practices. Unfor
tunately, however, the lack of unity on accounting methods and principles is
the cornerstone of the problems we are discussing here.
Attempts have been made by the accounting profession to narrow differ
ences in methods not justified by differences in factual circumstances but in
many areas of conflict there are several logical methods for reporting the same
facts. In these areas the profession has attempted to establish preferred prac
tice by rulings of the APB. As Mr. Whitman points out, this has been less
than completely successful.

The Role of Security Analysts
Mr. Whitman looks at the security analyst as an important user of finan
cial information. He states that analysts must make their informational
requirements known. The analysts have a responsibility to determine if any
additional information is useful and justifies the additional costs. The role of
the financial analyst is considered in depth in the study on Financial Reporting
by Diversified Companies conducted by R. K. Mautz for the Financial Execu
tives Institute. Professor Mautz was disappointed by the fact that out of 1,000
questionnaires mailed to analysts only 220 useful responses were received.
It was the investment analysts who first indicated that a more detailed
reporting of conglomerates was required. Those individuals who require
additional information from management must clarify what type of informa
tion is needed.
The recent Texas Gulf Sulphur decision in the courts will have an impact
on the role of security analysts in financial reporting. The full impact of the
decision has not been felt. A great deal of interest in the decision is evidenced
by the fact that a reprint of the circuit court decision is currently a best seller
for the publisher. An important point in this court opinion is that a person
who gives out inside information but doesn’t use it for personal profit is as
guilty as the person who uses it. There is some question as to what is material
information. The courts have taken a very broad definition of materiality.
This decision if upheld on appeal to the Supreme Court may place more
emphasis on disclosure in financial reporting and the types of formal informa
tion required by analysts. In any case it appears that managements will be
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more guarded in their disclosure of information to outsiders. Analysts are
entitled to all information that is furnished to groups outside of the corporate
structure, but do not have an exclusive license to receive other data.

The Role of the SEC
Ralph A. Martin, vice president of Standard Oil of Ohio, has stated that
the SEC is part of “business’ conscience, and morality.” This might also be
said of auditors but the auditor’s role has a much broader scope in this respect.
Mr. Whitman states that the role of the SEC is to protect the public interest
by promoting good reporting practices. He also states that full disclosure is a
cornerstone of security regulation. Perhaps what is meant by full disclosure
should be explained.
The SEC should be chiefly interested in seeing that investors get all the
relevant facts and figures for their decision-making analysis. There are limits
to the amount of protection which the SEC can give the public, for a portion
of the public will make errors in judgment based on erroneous interpretation
of published data. The prospectus of the Go Publishing Company is an
interesting example. An article in The Wall Street Journal stated that the
prospectus sounded more like a petition for bankruptcy than a prospectus.
The company has not earned a profit since it started in 1966 and it appears
future prospects are very dim. The firm was extremely frank in its presentation.
The stock offering has been cleared by the SEC and the stock enjoyed a brisk
sale.
The SEC and other governmental agencies should consistently review
reporting requirements for their usefulness. The costs of financial reporting
can be reduced where regulatory requirements can be derived from the under
lying accounting structure of the firm. Unnecessary or useless reporting
requirements should be eliminated and, if possible, reporting should be consoli
dated to avoid the duplication of effort by management to comply.

Comparability of Financial Reports
Mr. Whitman points out that a major problem in financial reporting is
the unjustified insistence on the comparability of the financial statements of
different firms. A major topic in most discussions of comparability is the idea
of uniformity versus nonuniformity for comparisons can only be made by the
uniform treatment of similar facts. Noncomparability is caused by several
factors:

• Inadequate disclosure
• A lack of consistency in the application of accounting methods

• Logical methods of accounting supported by conflicting accounting
principles
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• Divergent authoritative support for various methods
• Differences in the interpretation of facts
• Variations in factual circumstances

• Differences from management’s choice of methods
In the inter-period comparison of a single firm a uniform or consistent
treatment along with disclosure of the methods used allows a comparison of
the financial reports of several periods of time. In many cases an alternate
accounting method if consistently followed will produce the same result over
time. However, because of the public’s tendency to use a single figure of the
earnings per share in the analysis of a firm, the problem of nonrecurring or
extraordinary charges should be discussed. Paul Grady states in Accounting
Research Study No. 7 that only recurring items may be meaningfully compared.
Therefore, nonrecurring gains and losses should be shown separately from
ordinary operations. Mr. Grady further states that, “There is a strong pre
sumption that all gains and losses will be included in periodic income state
ments unless they are of such magnitude in relation to revenues and ex
penses from regular operations as to cause the statements to be misleading.”
Because of the possibility of overlooking nonrecurring items which are
charged to retained earnings it is useful to disclose the effect of extraordi
nary items on earnings per share. Perhaps more extended use of combined
statements of income and retained earnings would provide more adequate
disclosure for interperiod comparisons and highlight extraordinary items not
reflected in the income statement.
There are many problems to be resolved in the comparability of quarterly
or interim reports. Should interim reports be examined by auditors? How
can interim reports be compared to the annual reports? Comparability of
interim reports is complicated by seasonal variations in business enterprises.
In particular the problem of allocating annual period costs may lead to a
distortion in an attempt to relate the quarterly earnings to expected annual
earnings. Proportioning or assigning period costs in interim reports should be
given further consideration. The ideal interim report will be both accurate
and predictive.
Inter-firm comparisons create further problems which Mr. Whitman has
analyzed. Mr. Whitman points out that there have been attempts to gain a
useless comparability by advocating strict uniformity in accounting methods,
but that some degree of flexibility is necessary to account for changing condi
tions in the business world and differences in factual circumstances. It is a
fact that uniformity eliminates flexibility but on the other hand flexibility
should not be used as an excuse to prevent improvement in accounting methods
and the elimination of undesirable accounting practices.
Mr. Whitman stated that a degree of flexibility in the application of
generally accepted accounting principles has accomplished the objective of
meaningful financial reporting. The reporting methods for variations in factual
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circumstances should be flexible, but basic principles should be uniformly
established for authoritative support of methods based on logical assumptions
and reasoning.

Narrowing Differences in Accounting Methods
We suggest that the first step is to effectively establish the basic accounting
principles. Then an attempt must be made to narrow differences in accounting
methods which are not based on sound principles of accounting or which are
not justified by variations in factual circumstances. To justify alternate
methods the criteria for alternate methods must be established. Emphasis must
be placed on persuasion not compulsion. There are several ways of moving
toward these goals. Mr. Whitman has considered the progress of the APB and
the voluntary actions of managements as one way.
Because of managements’ unique position in determining which account
ing methods will be used in the preparation of financial statements, it is
important to eliminate undesirable or unjustified methods within an industry.
The nature of the industry itself is important in justifying the particular treat
ment of accounting information. Various industries can encourage discussion
of accounting methods to establish criteria for the methods used. These discus
sions might be sponsored by the FEI with the participation of other interested
parties. In any attempt to state preferred accounting treatment it is important
to achieve a broad base of acceptance. The work of the American Petroleum
Institute, which has studied the accounting methods used in that industry,
represents the type of research that is needed.
In addition to the actions of management, there is a need for further
action by the accounting profession and the SEC. The SEC should set mini
mum requirements for necessary information which justifies the costs of
preparation by its usefulness. The accounting profession is faced with the
greatest task and must have the full co-operation of all interested parties.
Discussions prior to the issuance of rulings or pronouncements of the account
ing profession would place the interested parties in the position of contributing
to the research and encouraging consideration of divergent views. Unfortu
nately, in too many instances, interested parties can only react to the rulings
of the APB because they have not been privileged to participate fully in the
deliberations of that body.

Flynn
Mr. Flynn presents an interesting look at the problems facing the accounting
profession in the development of accounting principles. The increasing com
plexity of business operations is a fact of business life. There has been a
considerable trend towards the expansion of the economic activity of a firm
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through the many mergers and acquisitions which have taken place. The idea
of a conglomerate company operating in diverse and unrelated industries has
led to the demand for a breakdown of earnings on a basis more detailed than
overall earnings for the firm. It would seem that the problems of the past
diminish by comparison to the problems and challenges of the future.
Sound accounting principles should be the basis for justifying accounting
methods. An improved definition of generally accepted accounting principles
would result in a more authoritative and more meaningful audit opinion. The
APB has been established to provide authoritative support for accounting
methods and practices which are consistent with sound accounting theory.
Often the authority and significance of the APB rulings have been undermined
by the refusal of accounting firms to qualify their opinion where they felt there
was substantial authoritative support for an alternate method of accounting.
This led to the opinion that departures from the rulings of the APB must be
disclosed in footnotes or in the auditor’s opinion. The importance of sound
reasoning and general practicality in the accounting methods is essential in
the preparation of APB rulings and pronouncements. The co-operation,
understanding, and acceptance by other interested parties is essential to
effective implementation of sound accounting techniques. Perhaps the most
important contribution of this Symposium to resolving the problems under
discussion would be reaffirmation of the thesis expressed in the preceding
sentence.
Fundamentally, nothing has changed since the now defunct committee
on accounting procedures stated that “the authority of opinions reached by
the committee rests upon their general acceptability.” In spite of the authority
granted to the APB by its parent body, that authority has no substance if the
Board’s pronouncements fall upon deaf ears in the financial community.
Therefore, Mr. Flynn’s suggestion that the Board has tried to move too fast is
particularly noteworthy when coming from one who has been a close observer.
While the APB may have been too quick in issuing its research findings
and Opinions, it may be said that others, including management, perhaps have
been too slow to react to pronouncements of the APB. The Omnibus Opinion
No. 10 is an example of the failure of interested parties to adequately consider
the implications of an Opinion prior to the APB adoption.
The suggestion that adequate time be given to test the practical applica
tion of the draft Opinions is a step toward more authoritative Opinions with a
broader base of acceptance. However, Mr. Flynn’s recognition of the need for
greater participation in the formulation of Opinions by user groups outside the
AICPA is of even greater significance. This is in contrast to the recent action
of the APB in reducing the number of industry members on the Board. It is
not enough to pay lip service to participation; continuing tangible evidence of
agreement by the APB that participation is desirable is an essential ingredient
for progress in clarifying accounting principles. An encouraging sign of
greater participation is indicated by distribution of early drafts of recently
proposed APB pronouncements to concerned FEI Committees, and others.
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However, the desire for haste on the part of the APB has resulted in only scant
time for consideration of these drafts by parties outside the Board.
Mr. Flynn suggests that there are few situations where management
requires different principles for internal reporting than those for external
reporting. One situation where this is not true is in component reporting.
Most companies prepare reports of the profitability of components, but the
accounting methods and assumptions in cost allocation and intercompany
transfers are not suitable for external reporting. Accounting principles for
component reporting must be established if such reports are necessary. The
matching of costs and revenues between components differs from the matching
of costs between periods in financial reporting. A basic principle of accounting
is the going concern concept. The integrated operation of a firm as a whole
has some value over the value of the separate assets. Where the amount of
unassignable common costs is significant for a diversified firm there is con
siderable justification for a defined profit concept, which is inconsistent with
present accounting principles, in measuring the earnings of a segment of a
business.
Another example of a situation where internal reporting principles are
not accepted for external reporting is in the direct costing method of valuing
inventories. External reporting requires full costing, limited by market values
or net realizable value, in the valuation of inventories in the balance sheet.
Another example relates to the realization of income at the point of sale or
exchange in an arm’s-length transaction. Most individuals agree that income
is earned in the manufacturing process but it is not realized until the point of
sale. Management is concerned with responsibility accounting and therefore
income may be recognized by management in its internal reporting upon
transfer, but prior to its realization by sale. Methods and purposes vary
between internal and external reporting and it seems to us that present
accounting principles are not entirely applicable in both areas.
In discussing accounting methods which do not reflect the economic
realities of business transactions, Mr. Flynn states that financial statements
should be adjusted for the changing value of the dollar. The problems involved
in providing supplemental statements based on the changing purchasing power
of the dollar have yet to be resolved. There are, it seems to us, sound reasons
to adhere to historical cost. What is the purchasing power of the dollar in the
hands of a particular firm? The uniform application of the gross national
product deflator as an index of purchasing power is an arbitrary attempt at
uniformity. The use of an index number implies a base year for comparisons.
What is a satisfactory base year?
The transaction concept is important to the objectivity of accounting
data. Price-level changes are realized only at the point of sale or exchange.
Adjustments of earnings for price-level changes would reflect anticipatory
profits. These supplemental statements could be misleading and costly to
prepare, and are of doubtful value in most instances.
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Critique
Of the Norby, McGarraugh, Whitman and Flynn papers

By Harry S. Meily, Executive Vice President, Security Pacific National Bank,
representing the Robert Morris Associates

Norby
From Mr. Norby’s presentation, several essential arguments are raised:
(1) the uses of financial reports; (2) information requirements; (3) interests of
preparers and users; and (4) how reporting should be accomplished.
While the paper is carefully developed, some additional comments seem
in order. These comments fall into two major classes: leadership for change
and the quality of reporting.
It is of great importance that Mr. Norby considers the investment analysts
to be weak in accounting training and theory. This points to a major flaw in
much current financial reporting—it is difficult to interpret without extensive
training, which is not normally expected of an investment-analyst. Since one
of the primary reasons for publishing the “Annual Report” or other reports to
stockholders is to inform them on the affairs of their company, it appears as
a failure of responsibility to provide reports which will mislead the investor
or analyst, either due to the complexity of reporting devices, or deliberate
manipulation of the results to provide an attractive appearance.
The investor and the financial analyst who represents him look for relative
values principally in terms of earnings, such as prior earnings ratios, return
on invested capital, growth rate of earnings, and cost ratios involving labor,
materials, and selling expense. Because of the myriad corporations and the
astronomical amounts involved in the securities markets, it is imperative that
comparability provide like bench marks from the beginning.
Earnings per share represents a stockholder’s proportionate interest and
this is the figure that makes the headlines. The general public doesn’t hear
about the explanatory footnotes. Today the quality of these earnings is masked
because the range of generally accepted accounting principles is too wide.
What is needed then is a narrowing of this range.
For the very reason that investment analysts are not trained to perform
extensive analysis of the financial information to obtain the most accurate
possible insight available from the information provided, the group of invest
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ment analysts cannot reasonably be expected to provide leadership in the
formulation of specific rules to govern reporting. On the contrary, they are
seldom as interested in the specific rules of accounting for financial results as
in the more general view that reporting should provide certain kinds of things.
In this view, reporting should be comparable: by time periods; by companies;
and by industries. This raises many specific issues which are not being reported
in a meaningful way, such as pooling-of-interests mergers, depreciation report
ing, cash flow, non-recurring gains, internal growth versus growth by acqui
sition, etc. How these specific issues should be handled and other specific
issues which have arisen and will arise is not as important to this group of
users as when and how well. The timing and quality are important, due to the
large absolute size of the number of companies and the dollar investments
involved. These analysts, in order to properly evaluate alternate investment
opportunities, need reasonably uniform measures of earnings, quality of earn
ings, and potential earning power. Without uniform yardsticks, the analyst
will be unable to arrive at a practical method of assessing the progress of a
company or group of companies. The obvious consequence is very serious,
in that the analyst will tend to undervalue the underlying securities if he is
unable to satisfy himself with respect to the earnings of the company.
While it is generally recognized that changes are needed in reporting, the
speed of the changes is underemphasized. The longer uniform accounting
principles lag behind the rapid pace of changes in corporate reporting needs
which stem from rapid change in the character of corporate business activity,
the greater the problems of comparability of results. Thus, as Mr. Norby
emphasizes, accounting principles, or rules, should be established when change
is beginning, not when it is over. To illustrate this point, it is only necessary
to think of any poor rule which is generally understood, as opposed to no rule
and many solutions which are generally not understood. The results in the
former would be easily followed, but in the latter case, they would be subject
to varying opinions of what was being reported.
This entire paper seems to point toward several solutions to the basic
problems of adequate reporting and the responsibility for adequacy of the
reports.
Mr. Norby suggests that a simple solution would involve the accounting
profession using the influence inherent in the value of the certification to the
corporation to enforce adequate accounting principles. While this would offer
the most simple solution, it avoids the problem of establishing the rules, or
principles, to be enforced. Development of the rules is probably a more diffi
cult problem than enforcement.
Another solution seems to lie with the leadership of lenders, such as
banks, working within the committee form, such as this Symposium, or inde
pendent of it on an individual or group basis. This would not seem reliable,
due to the varied thinking of bankers on their own reporting, and the diverse
requirements for information on credit in general or in a specific case. Even
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if banks were able to agree on reporting rules, it would not seem likely that
their requirements would correspond with those of the investor.
An unpleasant solution, which is also obvious, could involve a public
agency such as the SEC which could both establish the rules and enforce
compliance. A more pleasant use of this idea could involve the recommenda
tion to the SEC or other agency of the rules desired by the accounting pro
fession and the other interested groups.
While it is clear that these or similar solutions are not desirable, as
recognized by the need for this Symposium, a worthwhile solution is not clear.
It does seem, however, that the accountants have, and admit that they have,
a quasi-fiduciary responsibility which revolves around the goodness of the
certification. It also appears that a practical approach by the accounting
profession should center on this goodness or lack of goodness of the certifica
tion, and the responsibility or lack of it that is implicit.

McGarraugh
Mr. McGarraugh presents his argument regarding the respective roles
of users and preparers of reports on three major premises:

1. The audited and certified corporate financial report has become the primary
source of information for credit grantors and other users, but does not
adequately meet these needs.
2. In order for it to accomplish this task, the report must be reliable and
sufficient in disclosure of material facts.

3. The burden for fair presentation of these facts has fallen to the profes
sional accountants due to their expertise and independence.
While each premise is well supported, the latter two require some com
ment. As Mr. McGarraugh points out, the information requirements of the
individual user may differ from other similar users. However, this would not
seem to imply a comprehensive annual report, as he suggests, but special or
supplemental reports to fulfill these special requirements. Although he
acknowledges the value of these special reports in several places, the emphasis
is on maximum disclosure in a single multi-purpose report. Even though he
does not seem to establish their compatibility, these two points may be recon
ciled by supplementing special materials to a reliable audit report to provide
full disclosure of all material facts, and also information of possible value to
the analyst. The issue here is not entirely disclosure, but rather, there are two
main issues: how disclosure is best accomplished, and where the impetus for
change should lie.
The simple, uncluttered, comprehensible, multi-purpose report, which
Mr. McGarraugh regards as an “ideal” report, is not only probably unattain
able, but also cannot meet all of the criteria which he has established for good
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reporting. If a report could be written which had a uniform meaning to all
trained users then it would also be too revealing of company operations, and
not acceptable to corporate management. An even greater weakness of his
“ideal” report would be that the real financial analysis would have been per
formed by the preparer, who is not trained as an analyst, but as a reporter.
By looking beyond this artificial ideal, we may consider the more basic
question of how disclosure is best accomplished. This would seem to involve
either full disclosure of material facts, or adequate disclosure of material facts,
based upon a particular user’s need to know. Clearly, some of this valuable
information seems to be beyond adequate disclosure, and involves many judg
mental factors normally reserved to the credit grantor or investor. Particularly,
this would include some of the asset valuations, the cash flow schedules and
projections and the letter on internal controls that are mentioned.
Full disclosure would appear to be impractical for two reasons: the vast
amount of information required for such disclosure; and corporate reluctance
to disclose information of possible value to competitors. The amount of infor
mation would be prohibitively expensive and cumbersome to distribute and
would represent a burden to most recipients. At the same time, regardless of
precautions, such information made available to lenders and investors would
eventually become available to competitors.
At the present time, this disclosure requirement is ordinarily accomplished
on an acceptable basis between corporate management and the qualified user.
Management will disclose adequate information if the user is able to demon
strate a need for such information. This places the burden of evaluation on
the user, where it properly belongs. It is no more reasonable that a manufac
turing corporation be required to disclose all facts to each of its many sources
of credit than it would be for a bank to justify its solvency to each of its many
depositors.
It is also clear, however, that many additional disclosures would enhance
the audit report. These disclosures could include a listing of the material judg
mental decisions, which “generally accepted accounting principles” were
employed, cost and market prices where relevant, capitalization of expenses,
special measurement standards, acquisition accounting, compliance with
agreements, and non-balance-sheet liabilities and assets. In short, this would
involve disclosure of the standards employed in the preparation of the financial
report and the audit. With this information, the qualified user would be able
to essentially reconstruct the major accounts and satisfy himself as to the
fairness of the presentation.
While the inclusion of these standards would make the report difficult to
interpret without thorough analysis, the recent changes in general accounting
standards through the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA have simpli
fied some of the alternate choices of principles and hold promise to further
reduce the multiplicity of principles which may be applied in a particular
circumstance.
The last of the three premises involves the reliance on the independent
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accountants’ report by the report users. While the accounting profession has
disclaimed the reliance on the audit report by users, especially in the bulletin
“The Auditor’s Report—Its Meaning and Significance,” for a fair and accurate
presentation, and instead, attributes deficiencies to corporate management,
there is considerable user and corporate management reliance on the certified
statement as a fair and accurate presentation of the financial condition of the
company.
Credit grantors, however, are probably less inclined to regard the auditor’s
certification as the only test of the financial condition of the company than
some other user groups. The certification is viewed as additional assurance
that the financial affairs of the company are as represented. In addition to
other information—from corporate management, through credit channels and
from contact with the company—the lender should have the analytic skills to
evaluate the company’s financial condition.
In view of these premises, it is rather apparent that both users and pre
parers should work toward better disclosure and that the accounting profession
should undertake the responsibility which has been pressed upon it. Failure
to accept this responsibility could eventually weaken the accounting profession,
as the audit report loses its value compared to other forms of information
which have become commonplace. That is, if the audit report is not reliable,
users will demand increasing quantities of information directly from corporate
management from which they may judge the financial condition of the
company.
Many of the concepts discussed by Mr. McGarraugh point up the growing
sophistication of bankers and other lenders in their credit roles. No longer is
the banker able to rely on historical statement information and personal
contact with corporate principals as the basis of credit judgments. Lender
contact with corporate management has become more impersonal and less
frequent and lenders are seeking other means to aid in credit evaluations. At
the same time, the pace of business activity has increased and the corporate
structure has become more complex. This has led to discussions of new
methods of evaluating comparability of operating results and financial posture.
Bankers are alert to new methods and media of communication and will
increasingly look to new technology to assist in the complex credit decisions
they are facing.

Whitman
Mr. Whitman holds that management is responsible for reporting of
financial information and should therefore have a greater voice and authority
in its preparation. At the same time he contends that both user and preparer
groups should play major roles in influencing the principles and practices to
be employed. In this regard, also, he is critical of the Accounting Principles
Board, especially the emphasis on uniformity, inadequate research and the
compulsion to adhere to the Opinions. Instead of fiat, he argues, the Board
should use persuasion.
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Mr. Whitman believes that all would be better served if all contributed
to development of APB Opinions, perhaps by having representatives of pre
parer and user groups on the APB. Although not recommending any particular
form of achieving better accounting principles, he mentions several possible
methods of increasing the value of the APB as the vehicle for that improvement.
The proposal with the greatest merit relates to representing other interest
groups on the APB. This could reduce problems of acceptance and communi
cation and also improve the Board’s insight into the practical implications of
a draft Opinion.
In our opinion, two important weaknesses mar an otherwise very wellreasoned paper. First, the general observation that the speed of changes in
principles was overemphasized. From the standpoint of the accounting pro
fession, speed is important if the independent accountants expect to maintain
their influence over accounting principles and practice by leading in responding
to changed conditions. The longer diverse practices are in use, the more
difficult it will be to adopt reasonably uniform principles to deal with account
ing problems. If public confidence in the “audit and opinion” of independent
accountants were seriously shaken, every interested group would lose.
The second major weakness is the attempt to find a consensus of inter
ested parties prior to change. This implies a strongly pragmatic approach,
evident in other portions of the paper. Even if it seemed possible to obtain this
consensus, the effect of such an approach could damage the theoretical frame
work of accounting by introducing more exceptions to existing theory and
identifying them as principles. From both standpoints, this would probably
not serve our interests in better accounting.

Flynn
Central to Mr. Flynn’s paper is his general conception that the accounting
profession has been recently subjected to rapid changes, both by users and
the AICPA through the Accounting Principles Board. While standing in favor
of change, and agreeing with most of the Opinions of the APB, he believes that
the “user” impetus for the change and the pace of the change will result in
impractical and inflexible rules which will damage everyone’s interests. This
conflict of where the responsibility for change should lie and by implication,
where the responsibility for accounting principles should lie, runs throughout
the paper. The suggestion is always present that authority for “good account
ing principles” should rest with the accountant-practitioner, but everyone
should share the responsibility for those principles. This suggestion is especially
clear in his treatment of the APB where he indicates that the Board has been
too responsive to pressure for change and that this kind of pressure and
response could seriously damage accounting and reporting practices.
This seems to be a somewhat narrow view both of the role of the inde
pendent accountant and the role of users, despite indications that Mr. Flynn is
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in favor of changes which have been taking place. Perhaps it was this view of
accounting principles as being primarily in the independent accountant’s
domain which led to the many outside pressures for changes in principles, and
influenced the creation of the APB.
We as users have come to believe that this narrow view is not the prevalent
view of independent accountants. It appears that many accountants would
welcome even more rapid change, in order to make accounting principles more
responsive to current needs.
As a user of published financial reports, it is not entirely clear to me
where authority should reside, but responsibility and authority should be
together. It is clear that if the accounting profession does not lead in principles,
others will. As Mr. Flynn admits, the SEC was on the verge of requiring
changes in “generally accepted accounting principles” for their purposes, but
is now willing to wait for the APB. The IRS has also, over many years, altered
accounting practices. These single-purpose changes are undesirable, primarily
because financial statements are put to many uses, and it is far more attractive
to employ a single set of statements for all purposes, than many special purpose
reports. However, contrary to Mr. Flynn’s comment that one report should
serve all users, this is not currently true in practice. Most businesses have at
least two reports: the IRS tax report, and the stockholders’ report. In addition,
some firms may need additional reports (e.g., special management information
reports; reports to regulatory agencies, as the ICC; special information reports
or supplements for lenders; etc.). The worst feature of the proliferation of
reports is that it necessitates additional material (normally not provided) to
fully understand the facts being reported.
The largest question may be: If the independent accountants, and the
management of the businesses they audit, do not respond to the needs of the
users within a reasonable period of time, won’t this reduce the value of the
“audit and opinion” to such an extent as to threaten its future? If, due to
complexities of business organization, lenders need a special report, a separate
tax report is prepared for the IRS, management uses a special program to
audit its computers for internal control, other special reports are prepared for
institutional investors, regulatory agencies and securities analysts—who will
want the “audit and opinion” of the independent accountant?
On the need for periodic conferences, such as this one, Mr. Flynn agrees
that they are desirable, but would prefer to treat specific accounting problems
in greater depth. This evades the central issue of the roles of the interested
groups.

Synthesis
The papers discussed above represent essentially divergent views of the
common problem that is the basis for this Symposium.
Although each paper attempts to recognize the needs of the other
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interested groups, those needs are defined differently by each group for the
other groups. Thus, the papers as a whole seem to suggest little common
grounds for agreement.
The most common area would lie with the simplification of accounting
principles, primarily by reducing the latitude of preparers in the selection of
principles to fit a specific case. This solution is considered attractive by the
users, but less so by the preparers, especially the financial executive.
None are anxious to lead in solving this disagreement, and the AICPA
and the APB have placed the accounting profession in between corporate
management and the interested users. Obviously, this is a highly untenable
position and has resulted in adopting the inconsistent posture of -claiming to
be the authority on accounting, while denying the general validity of their
certification.
The easy solution is to apply more pressure on the accounting profession
to formulate and enforce the requisite changes in accounting practices. This,
however, does not seem to be a healthy solution. The accounting profession
would probably lose, rather than gain, influence due to the conflict which
would develop between that group and the corporate finance group, abetted
by the pressure from users.
A more reasonable solution could lie in a permanent group, such as the
APB, composed of representatives of all interested groups, including the
relevant government regulatory agencies. While this would seem to be a
cumbersome solution, it might be able to devise rules which would have a
higher degree of acceptance by the interested parties.
Another possible solution, which might place excessive burdens on the
corporate management, could involve a split certification. This approach
could develop a highly simplified, rigid rule reporting system for stockholders
or investors with a strong certification of goodness and few or no explanatory
notes. The report for lenders could involve a more detailed presentation with
a very limited certificate and an exposition of principles employed. This
approach would relieve the existing pressure for quick solutions to special
reporting problems, permit corporations to ration information on a “need”
basis, and provide investors with understandable information. This should
permit the accounting practices to evolve rapidly enough to satisfy the require
ment of Mr. Norby for “more rapid determination and development of
accounting principles [that] is needed in today’s rapid pace of change in the
corporate sector of the economy. New rules should be established when
change is beginning, not when it is over,” without pushing the accounting
profession into positions that are unacceptable to itself or the other parties.
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The Measurement of Income

The Measurement of Income
By Robert T. Sprouse
Professor, Stanford University

The primary purpose of this paper is to raise questions, not to provide
answers. It is intended to serve as a basis for the discussion of the problems
of income measurement at two levels: First at the general level—the purpose
for which the measurement is intended, the concept of income to be measured,
the components whose net result provides the measurement, and some of the
problems involved in the recognition and measurement of those components.
Second, at the specific level—a set of specific related accounting issues that
arise in the measurement of income from intercorporate investments. This
particular set of problems was chosen because of their increasing significance,
their currently unresolved status, and their imminent consideration by the
Accounting Principles Board.

The General Problem of Income Measurement
The purpose of financial statements is to provide information which is
useful in making rational economic decisions. Because different kinds of
information are needed for different kinds of decisions, the nature of the
information that should be provided and the form in which it should be
presented are dependent upon the decision to be made. For example, the
Internal Revenue Service has the responsibility for determining the amount
of federal corporate income tax to be paid by each corporation under the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. In making that determination,
certain financial statements containing certain kinds of information presented
in a certain degree of detail have been found to be useful and have been
prescribed. The purpose of the financial statements prepared for corporate
income tax purposes is specific; taxable income is defined in great detail in
the Internal Revenue Code and the Federal Income Tax Regulations.
In sharp contrast, the information contained in the financial statements
published in corporate annual reports is used for varied and unspecified pur
poses and the final figure appearing in the income statement is not well defined.
Items included in the measurement of the income of one corporation may be
excluded from the measurement of the income of another; measurements of
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similar items may be made on one basis by one corporation and made on an
entirely different basis by another.1 Sometimes these differences reflect the
different environmental circumstances in which corporations operate, but
often these differences merely reflect different accounting policies more or less
arbitrarily chosen among alternatives that are considered to be equally
acceptable for financial reporting purposes. A corporation might well account
differently for its foreign operations in a country having rigid governmental
restrictions and experiencing rampant inflation and for its foreign operations
in a country with a tradition of free enterprise and a history of stable currency.
On the other hand, environmental circumstances are not likely to explain
different accounting treatments of the tobacco inventories of two domestic
tobacco companies12 or different accounting treatments of the investment
credits associated with the acquisitions of identical aircrafts by two com
peting airlines.3
To provide measurements of income that are most useful—or, more gen
erally, to provide financial information that is most useful—it seems necessary,
therefore, to start with the objectives to be served or the uses for which that
information is intended. With objectives or uses established, the concepts
with which those uses are concerned can be formulated and relevant measure
ments can be undertaken.

Uses of Measurements
There seems to be general agreement that although the financial state
ments published in corporate annual reports may serve a variety of purposes
they are primarily intended to provide information that is helpful in making
rational investment decisions—decisions on the part of current and prospective
investors to buy, to hold, and to sell debt and equity securities. Income
measurements are particularly relevant for investment decisions made with
respect to a continuing enterprise—a perpetuity. The enterprise can continue
to survive and prosper only if its resources are maintained; the income figure
is determined after providing for a recovery of all the resources expired in the
income earning activity.
In contrast, measurements of flows of working capital or measurements
of cash flows may be more useful for decisions involving limited periods of
time. The economic wisdom of an investment in a new machine may be deter
mined by the cash flows that result from the machine’s operation during its
1

2
3

To the extent that different accounting procedures are specifically provided for, differences
may also exist in the measurement of “taxable income” reported to the Internal Revenue
Service. The obvious incentive for taking the largest possible deductions as early as possible,
however, tends to dictate such elections.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company reports substantially all of its inventories on the basis of
last-in, first-out cost; P. Lorillard Company and others report their inventories on the basis
of average cost.
For example, American Airlines, Inc. and United Air Lines, Inc. reflect the investment tax
credit in income in the year the credit is utilized; Northwest Airlines, Inc. and Delta Air
Lines, Inc. amortize utilized investment tax credits over a period of years.
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limited life. When that life expires, the cash flows cease, and the machine is
no longer of any consequence. The ability to settle an obligation that will
mature on a specific date may depend on the cash flows that will take place
before that date. Whether the enterprise will be able to maintain its current
level of operations after the cash has been used and the debt has been settled
need not be of any concern to the creditor. His interest in the enterprise is
essentially terminated when the debt is paid.
Investors in common stocks, however, typically base their decisions on
the assumption that the business enterprise will have a perpetual existence.
They are likely to be interested in the measurement of income either as an
indication of the amount of dividends that may be distributed without reducing
the future earning capacity of the business enterprise or as an indication of
the amount of growth that can be expected, if income is retained and reinvested
in the enterprise. Some combination of dividends and growth may be the
objective. If the amount of dividends is less than the amount of income, one
would tend to assume that the underlying earning power of the enterprise is
not only being maintained, but being strengthened.
Measurements of income, therefore, provide a basis for predicting future
earnings. Such predictions have obvious relevance to all investors—to current
and prospective preferred stockholders, noteholders, and bondholders, as well
as to current and prospective common stockholders. The profitability of
operations, as indicated in measurements of income, provide a basis for assess
ing the long run “safety” of future dividends on preferred stock and interest
on debt as well as a basis for predicting the amount of future dividends to
common stockholders and/or for increased underlying earning power and,
hence, growth in the value of common shares.
Concept of Income

Probably the most widely quoted, and most appealing, concept of income
is that of the noted economist, J. R. Hicks:
The purpose of income calculations in practical affairs is to give
people an indication of the amount which they can consume without
impoverishing themselves. Following out this idea, it would seem that
we ought to define a man’s income as the maximum value which he
can consume during a week, and still expect to be as well off at the
end of the week as he was at the beginning. Thus when a person saves,
he plans to be better off in the future; when he lives beyond his in
come, he plans to be worse off.4

Conceptually, the measurement of how “well off” an individual or busi
ness unit is at any point of time implies the determination in real terms of the

4

J. R. Hicks, Value and Capital, 2d ed. (London, Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 172.
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capitalized value of prospective net cash receipts. However, the uncertainty
with respect to the amounts and timing of prospective net cash receipts and
the uncertainty with respect to future price levels and appropriate rates of
discount prevent measurements of income in that sense. To a great extent,
accountants have ignored changing price levels, the time value of money, and
future cash flows and have accepted invested cost, measured in terms of
numbers of dollars, as an appropriate basis for valuation. Usually, at the date
of acquisition, invested cost can be said to be the equivalent of market value;
market value is presumed to represent the best estimate of the capitalized
value of prospective receipts of cash or valuable services. Subsequent changes
in outlook, changes in the purchasing power of the dollars invested, and
changes in the revelant rate of interest are ignored for accounting purposes.
With this in mind, Hicks’ concept of income might be modified to describe
corporate income as we know it in practical affairs today:
The income of a business enterprise during any given period of time
is that number of dollars which, if there were no additional invest
ments or disinvestments (i.e., dividends and purchases of treasury
stock) by the stockholders during the period, could be distributed by
the enterprise to its stockholders without impairing the number of
dollars of stockholders’ equity in the enterprise at the beginning of
the period.

Although the current practice in the U.S. is to measure all amounts in
terms of numbers of dollars regardless of the purchasing power those dollars
represent, this version of Hicks’ concept of income could easily be modified
to focus on purchasing power:
The income of a business enterprise during any given period of time
is that amount of purchasing power which, if there were no additional
investments or disinvestments by the stockholders during the period,
could be distributed by the enterprise to its stockholders without im
pairing the purchasing power of the stockholders’ equity in the enter
prise at the beginning of the period.

Furthermore, although current practice in the U.S. relies largely on
invested cost—which could be measured either in terms of numbers of dollars
or in terms of purchasing power—as the basis for accounting measurements,
the same concept might easily be adapted to the use of “current values” as
the basis for accounting measurements.
In any case, it is to be noted that the measurement of this concept of
income is dependent upon the measurement of stockholders’ equity. The
measurement of stockholders’ equity, in turn, is necessarily dependent upon
the measurement of assets and liabilities. This suggests that the concept of
assets and the concept of liabilities are more fundamental than the concept of
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income. Indeed, to my knowledge, no one has ever managed to formulate
a concept of income that is not directly or indirectly dependent upon the
concepts of assets and liabilities. There is good reason to expect, therefore,
that any attempts to improve the measurement of income that ignore the
measurement of financial position and the concepts of assets and liabilities
embodied therein, are doomed to failure.
Furthermore, because the nature of income is obviously more funda
mental than the rules and procedures adopted to implement its measurement,
a meaningful concept of income is fundamental to the establishment of sound
rules and procedures. Some erratic results are almost certain to be produced
by a process of deciding on an ad hoc basis what should be and what should
not be included in the measurement of income without first resolving the
nature of income.
Measurement Rules and Procedures

Those who make use of the income figure are also frequently interested in
the nature and magnitude of various transactions from which income is the net
result—for example, the amount of sales made during the period, the amount
of depreciation estimated to be applicable to the period, the amount of wages
earned during the period, the amount of taxes attributable to the period and
so forth. Typically, therefore, the measurement of income is accomplished
by separately recognizing and measuring significant classes of revenues and
gains and separately recognizing and measuring significant classes of expenses
and losses. When these are summarized, the algebraic sum represents the
net change in stockholders’ equity resulting from operating transactions,
financial transactions, and other economic events, exclusive of stockholders’
investments and disinvestments. The income statement, therefore, is a sum
mary of the non-stockholder transactions that affected stockholders’ equity;
net income is the net effect.
A large portion of the problems encountered in the measurement of
income are the result of the artificial segmentation of the life of an enterprise
into calendar periods—e.g., months, quarters, and years. Such divisions are
necessarily arbitrary; measurements of income during these arbitrary periods
are necessarily tentative. It is a rare business indeed that does not have some
incomplete transactions at the end of a fiscal period—receivables that have
not yet been collected, inventories that have not yet been disposed of, equip
ment that will continue to be useful next period, or debts that have not yet
been paid. Investors and other decision makers, however, cannot wait for
information until the business enterprise ceases to exist and an accurate
accounting can be made. Accordingly, in order to supply income information
periodically, rules must be adopted, estimates must be made, and costs must
be allocated among fiscal periods. This is the unique responsibility of the
financial accountant, but the tentative nature of his rules, estimates, and allo
cations must not be overlooked.
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Revenues
Although it is generally acknowledged that income is attributable to the
entire process of business activity—not just to the moment of sale or the
delivery to a customer—it is also generally acknowledged that, as a practical
matter, the amount of income attributable to the entire process of business
activity is frequently not determinable until the income earning process is
terminated by a sale or delivery.
Indeed, it is often stated as a general rule that revenues should be recog
nized at the time of sale—that is, the entire change in stockholders’ equity
resulting from the production and delivery of a product should be identified
with the period during which the sale is made. The support for this rule lies
primarily with the objectivity of measurement which is possible at that point.
The selling price (revenue) has been determined; the most significant costs
of earning the revenue (expenses) have been incurred. Furthermore, at the
time of sale, revenues have been realized—that is, there has been a conversion
by means of an arm’s-length transaction into new liquid assets (cash or
receivables).5
It must be acknowledged, however, that in practice there are a wide
variety of acceptable, and desirable, exceptions to “time of sale” and “realiza
tion” which tend to negate the validity of both as basic criteria for revenue
recognition. On the other hand, there is no set of circumstances in which
the recognition of revenues before they have been earned is acceptable. For
example, revenues are sometimes realized in advance—as in the case of
magazine publishers and insurance companies. Such advance collections do
not become recognized in the measurement of income, however, until they
have been earned—by publishing and distributing the magazines and by
bearing the risk of unforeseen insured losses. In other cases, it is common
practice to recognize earned revenues before “time of sale” and/or before
“realization.” Consider the following examples.
1. United States Leasing Corporation’s income from lease underwriting
includes participations in the residual proceeds of the leased equipment at
lease termination. These “participations in residuals are recorded as income
at their discounted value on the lease commencement date.” The company’s
auditors render an unqualified opinion.
2. The Superior Oil Company, a producer of crude oil, natural gas, and
natural gas liquids, values its inventories of products “at market price” thereby
recognizing earnings at time of production, rather than at time of sale. This
practice is quite common among crude oil producers.6 Superior’s auditors
render an unqualified opinion.
3. South Puerto Rico Sugar Company (a New Jersey corporation) values
5 W. A. Paton and A. C. Littleton, An Introduction to Corporate Accounting Standards (Amer
ican Accounting Association, 1940), p. 49.
6 Report of Certain Petroleum Industry Accounting Practices (New York, American Petroleum
Institute, 1965) pp. 55-62. See also “Resurvey as of December 31, 1966,” pp. 22-26.

206

its inventories that have been sold, but not shipped, “at estimated net contract
sales prices” and its inventories that have not been sold “at estimated sales
prices.” The effect is to base its measurement of income on production rather
than sales. The company’s auditors render an unqualified opinion.
4. Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company “records profits
on its long-term shipbuilding contracts through estimates on the percentageof-completion basis and on its other long-term contracts as billings are made
thereon. Estimated major losses on such contracts are recorded in the year
first recognized. The performance of such contracts may extend over periods
as long as several years.” The auditor’s opinion is unqualified.
5. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., recognizes its “equity in earnings of
50 per cent owned companies” in its measurement of income. Recognition
of this equity in earnings “is included whether or not there has been any
realization of those earnings in the form of cash dividends.” The company’s
auditors render an unqualified opinion.
These few examples are by no means an exhaustive list of recognitions of
revenue that ignore “time of sale” and/or “realization.” These examples are
representative, however, of practices that are widely used and which are
desirable and properly acceptable for the purpose for which published financial
statements are intended—that is, for appraising past performance as a basis
for predicting future performance. Income should not be equated with cash
and receivables; income encompasses increases in well-being, whatever the
form.
In practice, the crucial constraint on the recognition of revenues as they
are earned is not realization or sale; it is the feasibility of objective measure
ment. Revenues should be—and usually are—identified with the period
during which the major economic activities necessary to the creation and
disposition of goods and services have been accomplished, whenever objective
measurements of the results of those activities are available. These two
conditions—accomplishment of major economic activity and objectivity of
measurement—are fulfilled at different stages of activity in different cases—
probably most frequently as late as time of delivery of a product or perform
ance of a service, but sometimes at an earlier point of time.
Revenue recognition which is useful and meaningful and which, happily,
is overwhelmingly manifested in accounting practice as it exists today, rests
on those two conditions. Revenues are identified with the period during which
the major economic activities are accomplished, provided objective measure
ments of the results are available. This is what accountants do and why they
are doing it. Assertions related to realization and time of sale are misleading;
they are too narrow to encompass a significant portion of accounting practice.
Expenses

Expenses arise as the resources of a business enterprise are utilized in
the creation of revenues. Basically, however, all expenses are related to cash
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expenditures, or their equivalent. There are no exceptions. Cost of goods
sold, depreciation, wages, advertising, research and development, income
taxes (deferred as well as currently payable), interest (including amortization
of any bond discount), and every other expense either is the result of a past
cash outlay (or its equivalent) or will require a future cash outlay (or its
equivalent). Accordingly, when people refer to “non-cash expenses,” they
can only mean expenses that did not require cash outlays this period. All
expenses reduce the cash balance at some time or other, and all expenses which
continue to be incurred will continue to require cash. The qualification “or
its equivalent” is necessary only to recognize the acquisition of assets and
services and the settlement of debt in exchange for shares of stock. For various
reasons, often involving tax advantages, shares of stock may be used instead
of cash payments; presumably the same shares of stock could have been
issued for cash. For purposes of this discussion, therefore, the substitute of
shares of stock for cash can be ignored.
As in the case of revenues, accounting for expenses involves two major
problems—timing and measurement. Most expenses can be identified either
with specific revenues or with specific periods of time. The recognition of
revenues, therefore, dictates that certain expenses closely associated with those
revenues be recognized at the same time—e.g., cost of goods used. Other
expenses have no direct relationship to revenues but do have a direct relation
ship to the period during which revenues are recognized—e.g., the salaries of
the corporate officers.
Measurement of expenses becomes increasingly complex (1) the greater
the number of periods that receive valuable services as a result of a single cash
outlay and (2) the longer the interval between the cash disbursement and the
expiration of those acquired services.
When more than one period receives economic services from a single
cash outlay—past or future—expense measurement requires some allocation
of the cost of the economic services among the periods benefited. Often this
allocation is necessarily arbitrary.
The time interval between cash disbursement and expiration of services
introduces three other complications: (1) changes in the purchasing power of
the monetary unit, (2) changes in the value of individual assets due to tech
nological changes or shifts in demand, and (3) the time value of money.
The major problems of expense measurement are exemplified in the
estimate of depreciation—the expiration of service potential owing to use,
deterioration, and obsolescence. The time interval between cash disbursement
and the expiration of acquired services tends to be longest for these kinds of
assets; the number of accounting periods during which valuable services are
received from a single cash outlay tends to be greatest for these kinds of assets.
Accordingly, in addition to the necessity of arbitrary allocation of the initial
cost among periods benefited, changes in the general price level, changes in the
specific prices of the individual assets themselves, and the time preference for
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cash are factors which affect the validity of the measurement of depreciation.
Surely no aspect of the measurement of income has created more mis
understanding, more fallacious analysis, and more wild interpretation than
that of depreciation. Like all expenses, however, depreciation is the result
of a cash outlay. If an enterprise is to continue operations indefinitely, it must
continue to pay cash for labor, continue to pay cash for materials, and continue
to pay cash for the replacement of capital equipment. Among these productive
factors, the relative importance of cash expenditures for property, plant, and
equipment has become increasingly great with the acceleration of substituting
machinery for labor.
Depreciation is no less an expense merely because it must be estimated.
Most accounting measurements involve estimates of one kind or another. In
terms of wealth and income, the exhaustion of service potential of plant and
equipment is no different from the expenditure of cash and the use of inven
tories. All are economic goods and all are necessary to the continuing
operations of a business enterprise. There must be a continuous cash flow
(receipts and disbursements), a continuous flow of inventories (sale and
replenishment), and a continuous flow of plant and equipment (use and replace
ment) if the enterprise is to operate indefinitely.
The most serious defect in the conventional measurement of depreciation
expense is not that it is an estimate—that can never change. It is the failure
to recognize the time preference for cash, the impact of changes in the general
price level, and changes in the specific prices of assets. Basing the depreciation
estimate on the number of dollars of some unspecified purchasing power
invested some time in the past does not provide an income measurement as
useful for predicting future incomes as accountants are capable of providing.
With the current state of the art and the experience of accountants in other
countries, accountants have the capability of significantly improving the
measurement of income.

Gains and Losses
Ranking high among the most significant actions of the Accounting
Principles Board is Opinion No. 9, issued in December 1966, entitled “Report
ing the Results of Operations.” Without any explicit reference to an income
concept, the measurement of which was the subject of discussion, the Board
concluded “that net income should reflect all items of profit and loss recognized
during the period except for prior period adjustments.”7 It would be interesting
to know whether the Hicksian concept of income with which the Board’s
conclusion is completely consistent—or any other explicit concept of income,
for that matter—played a role in the Board’s deliberations. This was not the
first time that an Opinion had been published specifying what should and/or
7

APB Opinion No. 9, “Reporting the Results of Operations” (New York, American Institute
of CPAs, December, 1966), p. 107.
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what should not be included in income with no explicit clue as to the concept
of income the measurement of which the Board was attempting to improve.8
A major variation in reporting income measurements had always been
the decision to include or to exclude extraordinary items—that is, the gains
and losses resulting from non-recurring transactions that are generally unre
lated to the corporation’s typical business activities. Due to the permissiveness
of earlier recommendations,9 it had been left largely to management to decide
whether or not to include extraordinary items in measuring income. Many of
us have had a strong suspicion that managements, being human like the rest
of us, tended to include in income extraordinary gains and to exclude from
income extraordinary losses.
Basically, APB Opinion No. 9 calls for the inclusion of all extraordinary
gains and losses in the measurement of net income, but requires that they be
specifically identifiable as extraordinary items and be deducted separately from
a subtotal labeled “income before extraordinary items.” Accountants refer to
this as the “clean surplus” rule or the “all-inclusive” measurement of net
income. Under the new Opinion, only items that are clearly identifiable as
corrections of prior period’s measurements of net income may be excluded;
such corrections are treated as direct adjustments to retained earnings. The
criteria for classifying an item as a prior period adjustment are quite severe;
presumably such corrections will be rare, the most likely candidates being
settlements of prior years’ income taxes following litigation or negotiation with
the Internal Revenue Service.
The effect of the Opinion may be illustrated with an example. In its 1966
annual report, General Mills, Inc., adjusted its retained earnings to reflect costs
from closing its Refrigerated Foods Division facilities and a reduction in some
reserves provided in prior years for liquidation of certain operations. The net
adjustment to retained earnings was a deduction of $1,381,000. In its 1967
annual report, published subsequent to the recommendation of the Accounting
Principles Board, General Mills reclassified the $1,381,000 adjustment and
reported it as an extraordinary item deducted in arriving at net earnings for
1966. In the reported comparison of 1967 and 1966 earnings, the effect was
to reduce 1966 earnings per share by $.18.
This part of APB Opinion No. 9 is a great step forward in creating some
For example, in APB Opinion No. 2, “Accounting for the ‘Investment Credit’ ” (New York,
American Institute of CPAs, December, 1962), the Board stated: “There is no significant dis
agreement with the view that the investment credit is a factor which influences the determi
nation of net income. The basic accounting issue before us therefore is not whether the
investment credit increases net income but, rather, the accounting period(s) during which it
should be reflected in the operating statement. Resolution of the accounting issue, in large
part, rests upon the accounting principles relative to the realization of income.” (p. 5) The
Board then proceeded to eliminate the alternative of considering the investment credit a
“subsidy by way of a contribution of capital,” stating that “this concept, in our opinion, is
the least rational because it runs counter to the conclusion that the investment credit in
creases net income of some accounting period(s).” (p. 6)
9 Prior to the issuance of APB Opinion No. 9, this matter was covered in ARB No. 43, “Re
statement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins” (New York, American Institute
of CPAs, 1953), chapter 8.
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semblance of comparability among companies and, perhaps more important,
among a series of fiscal periods for one particular company. It does not solve
all the problems, however; controversy and variation will still surround the
classification of items as “typical or customary business activities” that affect
the results of ordinary operations without need for separate disclosure versus
classification as nonrecurring extraordinary items that must be reported sepa
rately as adjustments to operating income in arriving at the final net income
figure.
Earlier this year, United Fruit Company issued a press release reporting
1967 net earnings of $4 per common share as compared to $3.06 for 1966.
In the text of the news release, the inclusion of an after-tax gain of $1,037,000
or $.13 per share from the sale of the company’s interest in stock of Gorton
Corporation was mentioned. Accordingly, in its “Earnings Digest” of Feb
ruary 9, The Wall Street Journal deducted the $1,037,000 from United Fruit
Company’s net income and reported its earnings per share at $3.87 as com
pared to $3.06 for the previous year. This matter was particularly distressing
to United Fruit Company “in view of the market decline in the price of the
stock.” It seems that in January the chairman of the board of United Fruit
Company made a prediction before the Rhode Island Society of Security
Analysts that United’s earnings for 1967 would be about $4 per share. The
company argued that the readers of The Wall Street Journal must have con
cluded that the earnings were less than estimated. Accordingly, the company
charged that The Journal’s publication of the $3.87 figure was misleading and
“a disservice to the investing public and the financial community.”
In the financial statements in United Fruit’s annual report, the gain is
apparently included with “sales of products and services,” no separate mention
whatsoever being made of any gain on sale of stock. The auditors rendered
a clean opinion on these statements.
In some respects, therefore, the problem of accounting for extraordinary
items has simply been moved, not solved. These items will now be included
in net income but whether they affect the results of operations or are separately
identified as nonrecurring and nonoperating may continue to vary to some
extent from company to company.

The Measurement of Income From Intercorporate Investments
During the past decade a rapidly increasing number of corporations have
been engaging in intercorporate investments in one form or another.10 This

10 “Accounting Trends and Techniques” (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 1967) re
ported 646 affiliated companies (less than 50 per cent ownership), unconsolidated subsidiaries
(more than 50 per cent ownership) and associated companies (50 per cent jointly owned)
among the 600 1966 annual reports examined. For 1956, the total for the 600 annual re
ports was 396.
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increased activity has accentuated the need for a re-examination and a con
sistent resolution of a whole set of related problems involved in measuring the
results of such investments. This group of related problems is presented here
as a possible test for the application of any set of objectives, concepts, and
recognition and measurement principles that might be proposed as a general
framework for analyzing the problems of income measurement—the approach
advocated at the outset of this paper.
Intercorporate investments may create at least three distinguishable kinds
of problems: (1) investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership, where
control is necessarily questionable, (2) investments involving exactly 50 per
cent ownership, where control is usually shared with one other corporation
that owns exactly 50 per cent, and (3) investments involving more than 50
per cent ownership, thereby establishing prima facie control.
Investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership. Currently, ac
counting for investments involving less than 50 per cent ownership seems to
depend, at least in part, on the industry in which the investing corporation is
considered to be primarily involved. Investment trusts—both closed-end and
open-end—typically account for such investments at market value, recogniz
ing increases and decreases in such market values as well as any dividends
received; most industrial companies account for such investments at cost,
recognizing only cash dividends received. For example, in its 1967 annual
report Owens-Illinois reported its 29.3 per cent ownership of Owens-Corning
Fiberglas and its less than 5 per cent ownership of Pennsylvania Glass Sand
and some shares of Container Corporation of America stock at cost. That
cost was incurred in the 1930’s, and amounted to about $2.7 million. The
1967 year-end market value of the investment in Owens-Corning Fiberglas
alone was about $130 million and the underlying book value of its equity
in Owens-Corning Fiberglas at that date was about $62.5 million. Further
more, about three-fourths of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas investment and all
the Pennsylvania Glass Sand and Container Corporation investments were
classified as current assets and thereby included in working capital. If market
values were used, as they are by investment trusts, Owens-Illinois December
31, 1967 working capital would have been nearly doubled. Under such cir
cumstances, the significance of reporting these investments in 1967 financial
statements at their cost in the 1930’s is not at all clear.
Du Pont accounted for its investment in General Motors at underlying
net equity for about 40 years prior to the required divestiture of that invest
ment, although the annual increases were not reported as income. For its 1967
financial statements, Northern Pacific Railway Company switched from report
ing its 48.59 per cent ownership in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
at cost, recognizing only cash dividends as income, to reporting that investment
at underlying net equity, recognizing as income its share of undistributed
earnings as well as cash dividends received. The change added nearly $8
million to its 1966 earnings, or almost 90 cents per share to the $5.08 earnings
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per share previously reported for 1966. The change also added over $260
million to the investment account and to Northern Pacific’s retained earnings.
Which of these three alternatives should be used for investments involving
less than 50 per cent ownership—at market value as reported by investment
trusts, at cost as reported by Owens-Illinois, or at equity as reported by
Northern Pacific? Differences in practice cannot be explained by differing
degrees of “objectivity” or the presence and absence of “realization,” because
the situations are identical in those respects.
Investments involving exactly 50 per cent ownership. Jointly owned 50
per cent investments present a much less complicated problem but one which
has, nevertheless, not been resolved. Typically, these investments are not held
as temporary investments and there is no quoted market value that might be
used in reporting. The choices therefore are only two: report at cost recogniz
ing as income only cash dividends received or report at equity recognizing as
income 50 per cent of the earnings or losses of the joint venture. Currently
both methods are widely used. Standard Oil Company of Ohio and Atlas
Chemical Industries jointly own Solar Nitrogen Chemicals on a 50-50 basis.
Standard Oil reports its half ownership using the cost method; Atlas Chemical
Industries reports its half ownership using the equity method. During the last
three years Solar has declared no cash dividends, reinvesting its earnings in
expansion. Accordingly, Standard Oil has included no income from its invest
ment in Solar during those three years. At the same time Atlas Chemical has
been recognizing 50 per cent of Solar’s earnings each year—an amount repre
senting as much as a quarter of Atlas’ earnings—$.35 of the $1.41 earnings
per share reported by Atlas during 1965.
In one of its 1966 actions, the Accounting Principles Board took the
position that, in consolidated statements, unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries
should be accounted for using the equity method. Expressly unaffected by this
opinion were foreign subsidiaries and “jointly owned (50 per cent or less)
companies.” Skeptics have suggested that companies have a tendency to use
the cost method for joint ventures during the early years of getting established
while losses are likely to be incurred and to switch to the equity method once
the joint venture is on its feet and showing earnings.
Reporting income and financial position on the basis of the historical
cost of investments that have been held for any significant period of time is
wholly inconsistent with the acknowledged function of accounting to provide
useful information. Under what circumstances would any creditor or investor
consider Owens-Illinois’ investment of $2.7 million in the 1930’s to be the
most useful information about those investments that accountants are capable
of providing in 1968? If income measurement is viewed as a process of report
ing the effects of past events as a basis for making predictions of the effects of
future events, strong support can be mustered in favor of the equity method
for investments in uncontrolled affiliates, 50 per cent owned and less than 50
per cent owned, foreign and domestic, and in favor of the use of market value

213

for temporary investments in marketable securities held by industrial corpora
tions as well as those held by mutual investment trusts.
Investments involving more than 50 per cent ownership. One might
expect that accounting for investments involving more than 50 per cent owner
ship, and therefore control, would have been resolved long ago. This is not
the case. The final set of recommendations issued in 1959 by the AICPA
committee on accounting procedure, the predecessor of the Accounting Prin
ciples Board, dealt with consolidated financial statements. The committee
stated that “there is a presumption that consolidated statements for a parent
company and its subsidiaries . . . are more meaningful than separate statements
and that they are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one of the
companies in the group directly or indirectly has a controlling financial interest
in the other companies.”11 The committee also stated that, as a general rule,
ownership by one company, directly or indirectly, of over 50 per cent of the
outstanding voting shares of another company is a condition pointing toward
consolidation.11
12
In 1962, a couple of years after this recommendation was issued, the
SEC halted trading in the common stock of Atlantic Research Corporation on
the American Stock Exchange. Looming large among the factors contributing
to this action was the 1961 annual report to stockholders of Atlantic Research
Corporation which reported net income of $1,473,000 while the report filed
with the SEC reported a loss of $1,066,000 for the same year.13 The financial
statements in the annual report included investments in certain wholly-owned
unconsolidated subsidiaries carried at cost. In the statements filed with the
SEC, these subsidiaries were consolidated, their losses more than offsetting the
earnings of other segments of the enterprise. Both the unconsolidated state
ments in the annual report and the consolidated statements filed with the SEC
were accompanied by the unqualified opinion of the company’s auditors.
This incident gave rise subsequently to a change in the SEC rules govern
ing information to be furnished to security holders in connection with the
solicitation of proxies—that is, in annual reports.14 The amended rule requires
that “any differences, reflected in the financial statements in the report to
security holders, from the principles of consolidation or other accounting
principles or practices, or methods of applying accounting principles or prac
tices, applicable to the financial statements of the issuer filed or proposed to
be filed with the Commission, which have a material effect on the financial
position or results of operations of the issuer, shall be noted and the effect
thereof reconciled or explained in such report.”15 The impact of this require
11 ARB No. 51, “Consolidated Financial Statements” (New York, American Institute of CPAs,
1959), p. 41.
12 Ibid.
13 The Wall Street Journal (October 11, 1962), p. 24.
14 The Wall Street Journal (November 19, 1963), p. 8.
15 Securities and Exchange Commission, “Adoption of Amendments to Rule 14a-3,” Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 7324 (May 1964).
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ment, now several years old, is difficult to assess; probably only those who are
corporate managers and auditors really know the extent to which this new
SEC requirement has influenced financial reports to stockholders.
In March 1968, Value Line called attention to Newmont Mining’s ac
counting which had an effect not unlike that of Atlantic Research Corporation.
Newmont reported an increase in earnings per share—$5.33 for 1967 as
compared to $5.15 for 1966. These earnings were based on unconsolidated
financial statements, however, that included the cash dividends received from
about ten, more than 50 per cent owned, subsidiaries rather than Newmont’s
equity in the earnings of those subsidiaries. Whereas dividends received were
about $2.4 million greater in 1967 than in 1966, equity in net earnings of
subsidiaries declined nearly $17 million. Value Line suggested, therefore,
that a more meaningful comparison might be consolidated earnings of $5.10
for 1967 as compared to consolidated earnings of $6.57 for 1966.16 A different
picture, to be sure.
With Accounting Research Bulletin No. 51 stating that consolidated
statements are usually necessary for a fair presentation when one company has
a controlling financial interest in other companies and the 1966 Accounting
Principles Board Opinion No. 10 stating that in consolidated financial state
ments the equity method should be used for any unconsolidated domestic
subsidiaries, one might have expected that Newmont’s accounting policies
would not be acceptable. Apparently, however, some ambiguity about proper
reporting remains; the auditors’ opinion about the Newmont financial state
ments was unqualified.
The 1959 recommendations about consolidated financial statements
expressly suggest that consolidation of certain kinds of subsidiaries might be
inappropriate. Specifically, the recommendations suggest that separate state
ments may be required for a subsidiary which is a bank or an insurance
company and may be preferable for a finance company where the parent and
the other subsidiaries are engaged in manufacturing operations. For example,
Swift & Company, which is usually viewed as a meat-packing company, does
not consolidate its insurance company subsidiaries such as its wholly owned
Globe Life Insurance Company. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company
does not consolidate its wholly owned Allis-Chalmers Credit Corporation,
Allis-Chalmers Leasing Corporation, and Allis-Chalmers International Finance
Corporation.
There are those who feel strongly that these so-called “captive finance
companies” should be consolidated.17 Presumably the 1966 recommendations

16 The Value Line Investment Survey (March 8, 1968) p. 980. See also, Robert Metz, “Market
Place: How Newmont Lists Earnings,” New York Times (April 18, 1968), p. 68. The above
estimated consolidated earnings were based on the consolidation of those subsidiaries 80 per
cent or more owned by Newmont. Value Line estimated $4.96 for 1967 and $6.93 for 1966
if 50 per cent or more owned subsidiaries were consolidated.
17 Victor L. Andrews, “Should Parent and Captive Finance Companies Be Consolidated?” The
Journal of Accountancy (August 1966), pp. 48-56.
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of the APB requiring a parent’s recognition of its share of the earnings (or
losses) of unconsolidated domestic subsidiaries was expected to insure that the
measurement of income would not be affected by the frequently adopted
accounting policy of not consolidating captive finance companies, but there
are still a few of us diehards, who continue to believe that the balance sheet
has the potential to provide useful information—information about resources
employed, debt paying ability, capital structure and certain other elements
related to risk. Captive finance companies seem inevitably to be financed with
a very high portion of debt relative to equity; their consolidation would often
change the consolidated capital structure significantly.18 The unresolved
accounting issue here then is whether separate financial statements for captive
finance companies are “more informative to shareholders and creditors of the
parent company than would be the inclusion of such subsidiaries in the con
solidation.”19

Business Combinations
A closely related unresolved accounting problem is the accounting for
business combinations, where two or more corporations are brought together,
by one means or another, for the purpose of carrying on their previously
separately conducted businesses. In most cases, this is a matter of one corpo
ration acquiring another corporation.
When the combination is the result of a cash acquisition—directly or by
means of a cash tender offer—the transaction is necessarily accounted for as
a purchase. Where the cost is different from the book value of the equity
acquired, the perplexing problem of accounting for this difference—often
referred to as goodwill or negative goodwill—is necessarily encountered. Once
established, goodwill may be reported undisturbed among the assets for an
indefinite period of time, goodwill may be amortized over some, usually
arbitrary, period of time, or goodwill may be written off in lump-sum fashion.
The lump-sum write-off of goodwill immediately after acquisition is not con
sidered acceptable accounting practice although only a brief delay may suffice.20
For example, in September 1965, Alsco, Inc., purchased all the stock of Selectile Company, Inc., for cash in an amount about $1,079,000 in excess of the
book equity of Selectile. At that time Alsco announced that “it is not the intent
of the company to amortize the excess cost.” During the immediately following
fiscal year, the $ 1,079,000 goodwill was written off. A footnote explained that
18 For empirical evidence, see Victor L. Andrews, “Captive Finance Companies,” Harvard Busi
ness Review (July-August 1964), pp. 80-92.
19 ARB No. 51, “Consolidated Financial Statements,” p. 42.
20 “Lump-sum write-offs of intangibles should not be made to earned surplus immediately after
acquisition, nor should intangibles be charged against capital surplus” but “intangibles should
be written off when it becomes reasonably evident that they have become worthless.” ARB
No. 43, “Restatement and Revision of Accounting Research Bulletins,” chapter 5.
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“developments since acquisition have demonstrated that no value can be
attributed to goodwill.”
When one corporation acquires another by issuing some of its shares in
exchange for the outstanding shares of the acquired corporation, management
may elect to account for the transaction as a pooling of interests rather than as
a purchase, thereby avoiding the goodwill problem. If such a transaction is
treated as a purchase, the market value of the stock issued is considered the
purchase price and is accounted for like a cash purchase. In such a case, if
this market value exceeds the book equity acquired, goodwill necessarily arises.
When treated as a pooling of interests, however, the market value of the stock
issued is ignored; instead, the book value of the equity acquired is accounted
for, thereby avoiding any recognition of goodwill. The main distinction
between these accounting treatments then is quite simple: in a purchase the
accounting focuses on the price paid—that is, the cash paid or the market
value of the stock issued; in a pooling of interests, the accounting focuses on
the book value of that received—the purchase price is ignored.
Over time the “pooling-of-interests” concept has deteriorated far beyond
meaning. Initially intended to apply to the combination of corporations of
similar size, both of which might reasonably be viewed as continuing their
previous activities, management, and ownership interests in a modified legal
form,21 the “pooling of interests” treatment has now been extended to virtually
any acquisition by exchange of shares whatever the size, purpose, or expecta
tions. If there was any remaining concept or theory underlying the pooling
procedure, the practice of “partial pooling” has surely stretched it beyond all
reasonable bounds.
This extension to “partial pooling” may be illustrated by Eltra Corpora
tion’s acquisition of another company in two steps. Eltra purchased some
shares for cash and later acquired the remainder by exchange of shares.
Acquisition of part of the company has been accounted for on a pooling basis
and part of the acquisition of the same company has been accounted for on a
purchase basis. In Eltra’s case, the book value of the part deemed to be pur
chased was over $10 million greater than its cost, giving rise to the anomaly
of a “deferred credit” that is reported among Eltra’s liabilities and that is being
added to Eltra’s income at the rate of 3/4 of $1 million per year.
Extensions of the pooling accounting treatment (perhaps it would be
more correctly referred to as a non-accounting treatment) have also enhanced
the current popularity of the use of convertible securities in corporate acquisi
tions. Pooling is now acceptable when securities that merely have potential
for conversion into common equity are issued in exchange for the common
shares of the acquired company. One can readily appreciate the attractiveness
of issuing convertible preferred in exchange for common in acquiring other
companies. As long as the earnings derived from companies acquired by issu

21 For a brief historical review, see Arthur R. Wyatt, ARS No. 5, A Critical Study of Account
ing for Business Combinations (New York, American Institute of CPAs, 1963), chap. 3.
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ing convertible preferred are greater than the preferred dividend requirements,
such acquisitions are bound to be reflected in increased earnings per share on
the outstanding common shares. This delightful—perhaps illusory—phenome
non, however, may well be temporary; it disappears upon conversion. On the
other hand, as long as still other new acquisitions can be negotiated, each one
contributing earnings in excess of the preferred dividend requirement, the
process—and the illusion—may be perpetuated.
Reporting pro forma earnings per share figures that reflect potential
dilution in past results may be one solution for providing useful information
about such transactions. A more fundamental accounting issue, however, is
whether accountants have fully exercised their capabilities and fulfilled their
responsibilities when they fail to report the objectively measurable considera
tion involved in arm’s-length transactions—that is, the market value of shares
issued in corporate acquisitions.
To be sure, by avoiding reporting the exchange value of the acquisition
transaction, accounting for goodwill is obviated and, admittedly, accounting
measurements of goodwill are essentially meaningless. Amounts reported as
goodwill in statements of financial position are necessarily historical in nature
and partial in content. Reporting such amounts is not likely to serve an
important purpose; on the other hand, reporting such amounts is not likely
to do any harm.
Amortization of goodwill in the measurement of income is more danger
ous. The accountant’s role has never included a subjective valuation of good
will; neither should his role include a subjective estimate of the rate of its
decline. He has no special talent for clairvoyance. Including either the account
ant’s subjective judgment of the rate of decline of goodwill or any admittedly
arbitrary amortization of goodwill can serve only to make the income measure
ment less meaningful and the investor’s analysis more difficult. Indeed, the
crucial element inherent in the investment decision is the investor’s subjective
evaluation of corporate goodwill—internally created goodwill as well as
purchased. If corporate goodwill is on the decline, that will be reflected in
the measurement of income without compounding the trend and confounding
the user by deducting its amortization.

Summary
At the outset, an attempt was made to demonstrate the need in measuring
income for starting with the objectives to be served or the uses to be made of
the measurement. With objectives or uses established, the concepts with which
those uses are concerned can be formulated and relevant rules and measures
can be devised. The interrelated concepts of income, assets, and liabilities were
asserted to be fundamental in this scheme. Explicit principles of recognition
and measurement must be related to such a foundation.
Current practice in accounting for intercorporate investments was pre
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sented in order to consider the extent to which such an approach is and is not
manifested in practice and to consider the extent to which such an approach
might prove to be fruitful.
Is there an existing set of objectives, concepts, and principles that permit
recognition of changes in the quoted market value of temporary intercorporate
investments in one industry and not in another? Do the purpose of income
measurement and the concept of income to be measured call for recognition
only of cash dividends from 50 per cent owned affiliates or for recognition of
50 per cent of the earnings of such affiliates? Are the objectives of income
measurement served best by reporting historical cost of long-term investments
in less than 50 per cent owned affiliates and by reporting underlying equity for
long-term investments in more than 50 per cent owned affiliates? What is the
accountant’s responsibility for describing any special circumstances that he
accepts as justification for deviations from the norm? Must the meaningful
reporting of the acquisition of another corporation be sacrificed because of an
outmoded attitude about accounting for goodwill?
The “pooling or goodwill” dilemma provides a particularly challenging
opportunity for the application of an established framework for analysis. An
ad hoc solution to the “pooling or goodwill” dilemma, made without reference
to an analytical framework that is applied consistently to all accounting prob
lems is not likely to be satisfactory. Whether goodwill should be recognized,
as in accounting for a “purchase,” and whether recognized goodwill should
be permanently capitalized, amortized in the measurement of income, or
eliminated by lump-sum deduction from stockholders’ equity are questions
that can be satisfactorily answered only by reference to the fundamental
nature of assets, liabilities, and income and the objectives to be served by their
measurement. These issues cannot be resolved merely on the basis of the
personal preferences of those charged with their resolution. A convincing and
effective solution to such problems is much more likely to be obtained by
careful analysis based on established objectives, concepts, and principles.
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Critique
Of the Sprouse paper

By Robert M. Trueblood, Chairman, Policy Group, Touche, Ross, Bailey &
Smart, Past President, American Institute of CPAs, representing the American
Institute of CPAs

Dr. Sprouse’s paper on measurement of income identifies a number of
lacks in current financial accounting practices. He has pointed his finger at
the major logical inconsistencies in the present framework of generally ac
cepted accounting principles. Two such inconsistencies relate to the unreality
of the profession’s failure to take into account price-level changes, and to the
current acceptance of varying methods by which the realization concept is
applied in the recognition of revenue. In touching upon accounting practices
for goodwill, business combinations, and intercorporate investments, Dr.
Sprouse has underscored other areas of concern to both academicians and
practicing accountants interested in the improvement of general purpose
financial reporting.
It is inevitable that any description of current financial accounting is
going to sound like a catalog of accounting problems. But one might have
hoped for a more explicit program for correction and adjustment from Dr.
Sprouse. One feels that his erudite paper tends more to constitute simply
another exhortation for the profession to “get with it.” I concur in the import
of the exhortation. It is timely and it is needed. I would nonetheless have
preferred a more explicit roadmap for improvement from the mind and hand
of so distinguished an accountant as Dr. Sprouse.
It is a decade ago since the then leaders of the profession recognized that
the business community and professional organizations were not making suffi
cient progress in the improvement of financial accounting and reporting. In
recognition of that lack, the American Institute established the Accounting
Principles Board. The Accounting Principles Board, throughout its nine years
of existence, has been charged with a dual responsibility for establishing sound
basic concepts for accounting and for dealing with specific areas of practice.
Although the Board devoted much of its time during its first five years to
dealing with basic concepts, it was unable to reach agreement as to what the
basic concepts of accounting should be. In fact, during its first five years, the
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production of the Board was trivial, and such Opinions as were issued related
largely to practice as distinguished from concepts.
During the past four years, the Board has devoted itself primarily to
dealing with specific problems and has achieved a relatively good record of
production by issuing a number of reasonably significant Opinions. However,
for the most part, the Opinions issued during this period represent a codifica
tion of present practice—admittedly with some refinements and elaborations.
In my view, changes in practice recommended by recent Opinions have been
largely directed toward eliminating obvious abuses in financial reporting—
which, of course, is a good thing.
I do not mean to minimize the collateral efforts of the Board in the area
of research. However, the research effort, in most cases, has been long and
slow. I would observe that much of the research production of the Board has
been of a codifying or conversational nature. Valuable as such efforts may
be, it is my opinion that only Accounting Research Studies Nos. 1 and 3—
written by Drs. Moonitz and Sprouse—have contributed in any large way to
the enrichment of the literature.
Despite the admitted need for fundamental improvements in accounting,
institutional experience during the past decade almost seems designed to
preclude innovation. In order to protect the public from abuse and misuse,
the concept of generally accepted accounting principles has, in effect, been
limited to practices authorized in official pronouncements or having substantial
precedent in published reports. The requirement that CPAs must report
departures from APB Opinions, together with the SEC policy of refusing to
accept auditors’ reports with correctable exceptions, have had the desired effect
of bringing practice into prompt conformity with studied decisions. But the
requirement for disclosure of departures from APB Opinions also has the
effect of prohibiting experimentation with new accounting practices. In fact,
it is only in the rare situation in which an enterprise is involved in a completely
novel set of circumstances that new or differing accounting practices may be
developed.
It is becoming increasingly clear that, under our present Institute machin
ery and structure, some group or body—hopefully the APB—must assume a
responsibility for leadership in designing and suggesting basic improvements
in generally accepted accounting principles at the higher, broader levels. In
referring to such fundamental improvements, I mean changes which go beyond
the mere refinement of the present practices. It is essential that this larger role
be performed by professional institutions if significant change and adaptation
are to be experienced in the future. I say this because individual business
entities are largely and properly precluded from the role of innovator, and the
SEC probably does not desire to assume that role.
Forward-looking changes in generally accepted accounting principles
must, by their very nature, be evolutionary. A complete overhauling of basic
accounting principles on a given date is obviously not a practical possibility.
Too radical a change in fundamentals at any one time could not be tolerated
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because a precipitous change would create chaos in the securities markets,
would hamper efforts at comparability, and might well be an intellectual shock
not readily absorbed by the business community.
In order to accomplish an evolution toward a better and more logically
structured set of accounting principles, the Board must have clearly defined
goals. In my view, the Board preferably should reach forward and operate
intensively at a number of levels of production simultaneously:
1. Research is paramount. The desired research should be something more
substantive than codification and conversation. Such efforts should use
extensively the many talents of the academic community. Research at
both the conceptual and empirical levels—with interaction between the
two—is essential.

2. A brief statement of the general objectives and purposes of financial ac
counting should be issued by the Board.

3. A series of statements of accounting objectives in specific subject areas,
stated in terms of broad principles, should be formulated.
4. Practice bulletins, consistent with stated objectives and codifying currently
acceptable practice, should be prepared.
To illustrate my thinking about the interrelationship of these several
levels of output, one can turn to the issue of accounting for price-level changes.
The Board has already sponsored the publication of Accounting Research
Study No. 6. We might hope that at the next level of production the Board
will issue a statement of objectives for price-level accounting—which brings
together all of the reasons and arguments for restatement of financial data in
terms of current prices in a manner consistent with the broad objectives of
financial accounting. The Board might then issue a series of practice bulletins
which would, piece by piece and bit by bit, fit existing practice into the frame
work of the overall objective with respect to price-level accounting. The
Institute’s recent recommendation that personal financial statements carry an
optional column restating historical costs to current values would be an
example.
I think it important that all four levels of production be developed under
the auspices of the Accounting Principles Board. However, research should
be sponsored by the Board, as distinguished from being developed and pro
duced by the Board. This serves the necessary purposes of academic freedom,
elimination of bias on the part of Board members, and the stimulation of
thought.
The suggested releases on accounting objectives should be set forth in a
manner which makes clear that such objectives do not necessarily represent
presently acceptable practice. I think it essential that statements of objectives
be worked out in some detail, as distinguished from a series of broad philo
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sophical dissertations. The statements of objectives should be oriented largely
to the needs of the users of financial statements. And it is important that the
statements of objectives include criteria for judging proposed and separately
issued practice bulletins.
In the development of practice bulletins, it will be necessary to be quite
specific about tests for application and the details of procedural implementa
tion. Such a series would serve as the day-to-day working guide for the
practicing profession.
I would envision continuous change in both the stated objectives and in
the practice bulletins. It is reasonably logical and necessary to expect that
there should be a lag, probably a substantial lag, between currently acceptable
practices and those objectives considered to be ultimately desirable.
I think the reporting of earnings per share is a subject which illustrates
the usefulness of the separation of statements of objectives from practice
bulletins. The APB made a false start in Opinion No. 9 on this subject. The
Board is presently struggling with a revision of the earnings per share section
of Opinion No. 9—without the benefit of a concise, intelligent summary of
objectives. The new release on earnings per share is in the nature of a practice
bulletin—by my definition. And it will probably not be very useful if only
because it was not preceded by a thoroughly documented statement of objec
tives about the nature of complex securities and the purposes of earnings per
share calculations.
I agree with the implication of Dr. Sprouse’s paper that perhaps the
greatest need by way of improving financial accounting is to move toward the
use of current values. We have far too long relied exclusively on historical
cost data as a basis for most financial accounting. Again, using this need for
change as an illustration of the need for the revamping of our institutional
procedures, it is simply impossible on one day to abandon historical cost and
on the next to institute a requirement for current values. Following the pro
cedure I have proposed, we might expect that the profession could, with
relative ease, come to a long-range objective on the subject and then, over
time, implement that objective in manageable pieces.
Of next importance, I would classify materiality as a candidate for active
and hard work. I understand that the research study on this subject is not off
the ground, but I feel the Board would be derelict if some statement of objec
tives on the matter of materiality were delayed for more than two years.
Hopefully, practice bulletins on materiality would follow very shortly.
After many years of research, a study on the subject of goodwill has
recently been published. This completes the research which has been author
ized by the American Institute in the area of business combinations. Accord
ingly, the Board will shortly begin to consider the question of accounting for
business combinations. I am hopeful that a broad, philosophical, long-term
objective is developed before detailed and explicit practice bulletins are
released. Certainly the statement of objectives should not be delayed beyond
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a year. Clearly in this area, what we least need is a codification or refinement
of present practice. But a serious reconsideration of basic concepts is compellingly necessary.
There are many other topics on the agenda of the Board which have
been on that agenda far too long. A statement of objectives—or broad policy
—is needed promptly on extractive industries, inventories, depreciable prop
erty, intercorporate investments, and research and development expenditures.
In terms of specific industries, prevailing financial accounting practices in the
extractive industries are in most urgent need of fundamental change. The
many acceptable alternative practices in accounting for inventories and depre
ciable assets—with no significant guidance at the practice bulletin level—
present serious accounting problems for virtually all industries.
I do not assume that I am making a new or startling suggestion in recom
mending that APB Opinions, as we know them, be replaced by a series of
practice bulletins and by a series of releases on objectives. Certainly others
in practice share my dissatisfaction with the present concept of the develop
ment of APB Opinions. Many have encouraged a search for better procedures.
The time is short in terms of the future of our profession. And the
patience of a considerable number of practitioners may be even shorter. The
cost of the Board is tremendous. The efforts of firms and individuals involved
in the machinery are staggering to the uninitiated. Although there is no time
for a cessation of effort to do a review of the operations of the Board, I think
there is time to restructure the Board’s approach to improving financial
accounting and reporting. In my opinion, if we do not take enough time
shortly for self-appraisal and perceptive analysis, there will be no time for
the profession at all. And the Board will atrophy into a state of nothingness.
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By David Norr, Partner, First Manhattan Co., representing the Financial
Analysts Federation

Income Is a Set of Conventions
Time is what we measure with a watch. Income is what we measure
with a profit and loss statement. Simple and brutal. Of course, there are
concepts such as sidereal time, utilized by a handful. But for the bulk of us,
reference to a watch or a telephone time signal is adequate.
As Robert Sprouse points out, financial statements “are primarily in
tended to provide information that is helpful in making rational investment
decisions.” With the investor playing a primary role, it should be possible to
agree on the determination of income.
Thus, it should be possible for us to conduct our everyday affairs, to
invest wisely, without much of the confusion which shrouds alternative prac
tices. It should be possible to reach working conclusions without inordinate
delay, until a more basic study is done on some related topic. As underlying
principles are determined, whether of sidereal time or income, the working
definitions can be altered.

Organizing to Take Effective Action
It does little good for leaders of the accounting field to say, as they did
a few years ago, it is time to stop criticism, roll up our sleeves and go to work.
A few years have passed since then and the problems have not been solved;
the rate of progress is painfully slow.
Nor do professional investors appreciate being told, as the then president
of the AICPA said to the New York Society of Security Analysts a few years
ago, that there are only a handful of oil companies on the New York Stock
Exchange using unconventional accounting. To which we add that only ten
to 20 railroads use ICC accounting, only a handful of steels use accelerated
depreciation for shareholder purposes, only a few construction companies use
the completed contract method, and first-year depreciation for computer
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companies varies from 10 per cent to 40 per cent, but only a handful of
companies are involved.
The stakes are significant. The value of securities on the New York Stock
Exchange alone exceeds $600 billion. Twenty-four million investors and
their representatives in the financial community rely heavily on published
reports. A public trust and duty is involved. The investor needs comparable,
clear financial data.
In recent years analysts and accountants have often exchanged speakers
at their conventions. I am glad there is a dialogue, that we are learning more
of the other’s problems and pressures. And hopefully what is said may provide
new ideas and help. But is this enough? I do not think so.
The real question is this—how can we step up accounting research?
How can we put more resources to work on these complex problems? How
then can the attack upon problems be made? I have heard the chairman of
the Accounting Principles Board describe the very full schedule of preparation
and board meetings. Many firms have devoted time, measured in man years,
to topics such as pension accounting.
But is this the best way to be organized? If the APB works under a
crushing burden, is that conducive to the best research? Perhaps the reduction
of the 21-man Board to 19 and then 18 results in greater efficiency, but does
it pose a greater burden on the other members? Or, if the burden is not
increased on the remaining members, would an enlarged Board be capable
of more coverage?
These questions are asked, and must be asked, because of the urgency
of the problems. Whatever happened to the study on research and develop
ment costs? Does the combination of accounting research and maintenance
of an active practice mean that research must take a back seat?
Or take the work on materiality. Apparently a paper recommending
this as a topic for the APB was done four years ago. After three years a
subcommittee was formed which held its first meeting one year later.
When I look at the vast resources of the banking system I wonder if
other procedures might not be adopted. What would it cost for the banks,
in collaboration with the AICPA, to form study projects? Thus, several
years ago when the subject of research and development costs was recom
mended for study, adequate manpower and money could have been brought
to bear in an independent research project. Would not the task of the Institute
subcommittee have been eased if on the day the subcommittee was formed it
had been presented with a compilation of papers and writings comprising the
significant literature? Would not the research process be speeded if a study
group—composed of bankers, financial executives, etc.—had already studied
the subject of research and development costs for the last few years and then
turned its research over to the APB? Would we not be deeper into the
subject by now? This is suggested not as criticism but as an illustration of a
way to increase the total accounting research effort.
Certainly, had this been done in connection with materiality, we might
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be closer to solving some of our problems. Of course, these study groups
might find it useful to work with the American Accounting Association, the
Financial Executives and other groups active in accounting research. Co
operation, co-ordination and teamwork are always welcome.
What I suggest, in short, is a massive step-up in accounting research as
an aid to the Accounting Principles Board. Add money and manpower to the
research effort, whether through banks, contributions from AICPA members,
FEI grants and other devices. There is little doubt in my mind that this would
be helpful.
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants now spends
$300,000 to $400,000 on research in addition to the very substantial time
of the APB members and their assistants for which no charge is made. Can
we not increase this sum, whether done through the Institute or through
related organizations?
Does not the study, generously financed by the Financial Executives
Institute, of diversified companies provide a beacon light? The FEI con
tributed $118,000 for this purpose, hired an independent worker and produced
a worthy study of a complex issue. I do not believe that the APB had the
resources at that time to undertake the study and produce results in such
a short period. Diligent, thorough, independent research characterized the
output, although many of those sponsoring the study probably were not fond
of the conclusions, I would guess. Though financed by the FEI, I cannot
imagine questioning the integrity of the work.
I am encouraged by that and wonder if we cannot have more such help
from interested parties financing independent, scholarly research.
For example, one of the great problem areas largely ignored to date is
comparability within an industry. The American Petroleum Institute surveyed
the accounting practices of its members some time ago and then made recom
mendations to achieve greater comparability. I believe this was the first
industry to take such a step and is certainly a worthy achievement. (Unfortu
nately, as I understand it, one member objected to the elimination of full
cost accounting. As a footnote there has been a question in some areas that
this company adopted full cost accounting for foreign operations a few years
ago, with no material change and no disclosure of the event.)
This inventory of oil accounting practices has been followed by another.
Despite the lack of substantial progress, possibly posed by the limits of the
role of industry trade associations, all industries could be most helpful to the
cause of accounting research if they inventoried their accounting practices.
Even if these trade associations cannot achieve uniformity or cannot eliminate
unnecessary alternatives, the detail could be turned over to the APB for
further thought and study.
Consider some of the possibilities of improved reporting within a few
industries: (a) finance, (b) life insurance, (c) oil and mining companies, (d)
steel companies, (e) aircraft manufacturers, (f) electronics, (g) office equipment.
As Mr. Sprouse wrote, environmental circumstances do not explain many
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accounting variations. Indeed, I cannot believe the trend to straight-line
depreciation and consolidation of foreign earnings in the steel industry is
the art of judgment by accountants. Somehow the shadow of Jimmy Ling
crosses the page.
Thus all of us, financial executives, trade associations, bankers, account
ants, analysts, might embark on a stepped-up, co-ordinated, co-operative effort
designed to put more light on accounting problems.
But this increase in accounting research is not merely designed to hasten
the process. It also has a public relations aspect. If investment bankers enter
a meeting with a better understanding of residuals, are they not better able to
discuss problems more logically? If airline managements have better under
standing of the investment tax credit, bankers a better understanding of the
weaknesses in bank reporting, would we not have more light and less heat?
Would that not be true of all of us—investment bankers, bankers, investors,
and management—who may be faced with a drop in earnings based on a
change in accounting? Is not reform and change then easier to achieve?
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By Thomas A. Murphy, Treasurer, General Motors Corporation, represent
ing the Financial Executives Institute

Before considering the individual subjects covered by Professor Sprouse
in his paper on “The Measurement of Income,” it might be helpful to consider
first the purpose of financial statements. The first sentence of the paper states
that “the purpose of financial statements is to provide information which is
useful in making rational economic decisions.” This may well be a purpose,
but certainly it is not the primary purpose. Professor Sprouse comes closer
to the real purpose of financial statements when he subsequently states that
they are intended “for appraising past performance as a basis for predicting
future performance.” In this sense, they may form a basis for making economic
decisions but are primarily and initially to report on management performance.
To my mind then, the primary purpose of corporate financial statements
is to discharge management’s obligation to report to its stockholders on its
stewardship and to society on the progress of the business. This is a manage
ment privilege and responsibility as well as a management obligation. It is well
established that financial statements are the representations of management
and that the fairness of those representations is an implicit and integral part
of management’s responsibility. This position is supported by Statements on
Auditing Procedure No. 33 issued in 1963 by the committee on auditing
procedure of the AICPA and is consistent with the requirements of the SEC
proxy rules and the listing agreement of the New York Stock Exchange.
Further, it is inherent in the bylaws of corporations.
The fact that financial statements are an integral part of management’s
responsibility is most significant and of paramount importance in any con
sideration of the adequacy of corporate financial statements. Also, I think
it is important to bear in mind the responsibilities which management assumes
when it reports on its stewardship. Because of these responsibilities, manage
ment should not be placed in a straitjacket by accounting rules which must
be uniformly applied to all companies regardless of differing circumstances.
Corporate management has a duty to the owners of the business to select
those accounting principles which will best serve the interests of the business
and the owners and to disclose adequately the impact of those principles on
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the reported results. It also has the prerogative to develop accounting prin
ciples and it should exercise that prerogative to the fullest extent.
The essential difference between businesses engaged in similar activities
is management, not accounting principles and practices. Managers have many
organizational and operational choices available to them. One company may
operate with centralized management, others may be decentralized. One
may own its productive facilities while others may operate with leased property.
Degrees of integration, differences in manufacturing processes, and location
of facilities, to list a few differences, will create disparity in the reports of
similar businesses, and the use of uniform accounting principles will not make
them the same. There is no suggestion, nor should there be one, that businesses
engaged in similar activities must employ the same business methods. And,
similarly, there is no reason why they must employ the same accounting
principles in reporting the results obtained by the business methods they select.
Because of variations in management effectiveness, we have variations in
operating results. In investment evaluation, as Professor Mautz found in his
research on diversified companies, the investor places a high degree of reliance
on a company’s management and its performance.
Transactions, events, and situations can be viewed differently by different
managements. Accordingly, it is understandable that similar situations might
be reported differently by different managements. If, in the opinion of
management, a fair presentation results from the consistent application of
recognized accounting principles, management should be permitted to prepare
its financial statements based on those principles. Consistency, not uniformity,
is the key. Professor Sprouse’s paper does not appear to recognize the essential
difference between the two. For example, he states that part of APB Opinion
No. 9 “is a great step forward in creating some semblance of comparability
among companies and, perhaps more important, among a series of fiscal
periods for one particular company.” (Emphasis added.)
A good deal of Professor Sprouse’s paper focuses on aspects of financial
reporting which either do not exist or which are confined to isolated instances.
It carries forward the impression, created by vocal groups inside and outside
the accounting profession, that businessmen periodically pick and choose
those accounting principles and methods which give them the best results for
the most recent period or an artificial record of growth. In fact, responsible
businessmen follow consistent practices which create an atmosphere of reli
ability in the reported results, and it is an essential function of the independent
accountants to add to this atmosphere.
The standards of financial reporting adopted by most businesses in the
United States have been exemplary and the accounting profession and the
SEC have contributed importantly to this achievement. I think we should be
proud of this fact and, without being complacent, redouble our efforts to
assure a continuation of this condition. To this end, I believe it would be
most constructive if we all were—to use one of Professor Sprouse’s expressions
in a different context—to emphasize the positive and refrain from creating
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or contributing to the impression that all financial reporting is inadequate or
misleading. If there are cases where managements are abusing the privilege
of reporting on their results, the accounting profession should ferret them
out and insist that the reporting practices be corrected. This is the function
of the independent public accountant, just as it is the function of management
to advance the interests of its stockholders.
In this light, most, if not all, of the concerns expressed by Professor
Sprouse disappear. Any “suspicion that managements, being human like the
rest of us, tended to include in income extraordinary gains and to exclude
from income extraordinary losses,” should be dispelled, as should the sug
gestion “that companies have a tendency to use the cost method for joint
ventures during the early years of getting established while losses are likely
to be incurred and to switch to the equity method once the joint venture is
on its feet and showing earnings.”
Accounting and reporting practices may disguise a condition for short
periods of time but, since they must be applied consistently, not over long pe
riods. For this reason, the most meaningful and reliable measure of operations
is the company’s earnings record for an extended period, determined on a con
sistent basis.
These general observations on financial reporting cover broadly the
overall impact which I received from Professor Sprouse’s paper. They are
offered in the spirit of fostering the type of discussion which I believe the
professor had in mind. I would also like to offer in the same spirit a few
comments on specific areas.

Uses of Measurements
As previously stated, I doubt that there is general agreement that financial
statements published in corporate annual reports are primarily intended to
provide information for making rational investment decisions. Although such
statements are used in connection with the making of investment decisions, I
believe that the primary purpose is to discharge management’s responsibilities
to its stockholders on its stewardship and to society on its progress.

Concept of Income
Acceptance of the “stewardship” approach to financial statements pre
cludes the necessity of recognizing purchasing power or price-level changes
in preparing financial statements. I would not like to see financial statements
prepared on an “as if” basis; I think they should report transactions and events
as they actually existed. And I, for one, still feel “cost or market whichever
is lower” is a good guideline to follow. The goal of financial reporting should
be consistency and conservatism with adequate disclosure where necessary
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for a clear understanding of circumstances. However, statements may be
supplemented with price-level data when they are used for other purposes
which require such data.
In considering the dependency of income upon stockholders’ equity and
the dependency of stockholders’ equity upon assets and liabilities, we should
also consider the effect thereon of procedures resulting from the recently
adopted concepts of accounting for income taxes. It seems that the recognition
of large assets and liabilities as a result of interperiod allocation practices has
changed the significance of assets and liabilities.

Revenues
I agree that the constraint on recognition of revenues is the feasibility
of objective measurement; however, if a basis other than time of sale is used,
the risk of error in measurement can be great.

Expenses
The impact of changes in purchasing power and changes in the specific
value of assets are factors which must be considered in fiscal management, but
are they factors which should be considered in management’s financial state
ments? I think not.

Gains and Losses
This item is closely related to the subject of reporting for accounting
changes which is now under study by the APB. I feel that it will be unfortu
nate if that study concludes that adjustments are to be made retroactive to
prior year reported results, particularly in those circumstances where the
decision to initiate the change was made by management. In my judgment,
prior year adjustments should be avoided. Retroactive changes which affect
previously reported net income can present serious practical and legal prob
lems. I have in mind, specifically, the treatment to be accorded adjustments
in circumstances where a company’s profit-sharing or incentive plans are based
on reported net income. Changing previously reported results in the light of
subsequent events can hardly contribute to investor understanding or to the
stature of either the business community or the accounting profession.

Intercorporate Investments
If the activity in which a company had an investment were a whollyowned unincorporated unit of the company, the equity in the operations of
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the unit would automatically be included in that of the company. The fact
that the unit’s operations have been legally segregated is hardly a basis for
excluding the results of the subsidiary from the presentation of operations.
There is a definite distinction between the write-up of corporate assets to reflect
current values and the recognition of earnings realized by subsidiaries.
It is doubtful from a practical standpoint whether the ownership of 50
per cent of voting securities, as distinguished from the ownership of more than
50 per cent, is sufficient to justify the exclusion of the equity in a company’s
income.
Fair presentation appears to be the controlling factor in determining the
accounting and reporting requirements of investments involving less than
50 per cent.

Business Combinations
The pooling concept as originally defined was rational and justified, but
I agree it has been stretched beyond all reasonable bounds and has deteriorated
far beyond meaning. But that doesn’t mean that there are no situations where
application of the pooling concept would be proper. I think that the fault
lies within the accounting profession for agreeing with the shortsighted prac
tices of those who have gotten out of bounds.

233

Critique
Of the Sprouse paper

By Harry S. Long, Vice President, First Security National Bank of Beaumont,
Texas, Member of the National Conference of Bankers and CPAs, representing
Robert Morris Associates

In the traditional accounting sense, Dr. Sprouse has done a splendid job
in discussing the measurement of income. Unfortunately, he has done little
more than this. An objective of the Symposium and its writers is (1) to identify
the immediate problems involved in corporate financial reporting and (2) to
consider possible solutions to the problems. Dr. Sprouse’s paper falls short
of these objectives because in many instances he only raises problems.
It is my firm opinion that the accounting profession must broaden the
scope of its responsibility. It is not enough to confine its responsibility to
the reporting of just the assets and liabilities of a business and supposedly the
income earned during a period of time in managing these assets and liabilities.
An accountant must recognize that there is much more to a business than just
these items. The obvious and most important ingredient is business manage
ment—people.
Every corporation, if it is to be successful, has to recognize that it has a
service or services to perform and that the service or services have to be
wanted and needed by our society. This reason for existence may be the
manufacturing of a product, the performance of a service or the sale of
products. Something is being performed that society is willing to pay for.
If the corporation is to be successful, society must be willing to pay more for
its performance than it costs a corporation to render the performance. The
difference between these two is income.
How well the corporation performs will depend to a large degree upon
the abilities and capabilities of its management—how well it performs will
depend upon the makeup of its assets. In other words, what it has to work
with, how well it continues to perform over a period of time will depend on
how its management reinvests in itself and in its capital assets. Over the
short period, these investments can be curtailed and short-range income will
look better. By the same token, imprudent management could invest unwisely
in itself and in its capital assets, thereby causing an unwarranted contraction
of income—particularly future income. All of these things need to be recog
nized in the measurement of income.
Traditionally, the accounting approach has been to look to and weigh
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just assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses. Too little attention has been
devoted to the make-up of management, and to recognizing reinvestment in
itself, in technological changes and in its capital assets. I believe that the
accountant must find a way to (1) evaluate management and (2) to measure
management’s investment in its future self, in technological change, and in
capital investment. Admittedly, such measures will be hard to come by, but
they are vitally needed.
If such information can be added to the work that accountants now do,
our society, whether it be management, creditors, purchasers, investors, or
what have you, will be in a better position to evaluate the corporation. We
need to develop ways to measure management that we can add to our tradi
tional measures of liabilities, assets, revenues, and expenses. In other words,
I am saying that we need to add more measurements in our reporting. It is
this lack of more measurement that is ham-stringing us—not the way in which
we are presently reporting what we do report. Our society is insisting that
the accounting profession develop ways to measure management and ways
to determine if the business is reaching its optimum goals and maximizing
profits along the way.
A primary purpose of financial reports is to measure the performance
of management, and this measurement inspires and demands increased and
better performance in the future. Financial reports are a form of responsibility
reporting. They are a report card. The fact that financial reports are required
helps at least in a degree to improve management. Because our present reports
are so limited in scope, management is not fully measured. Society cannot
long endure this, and this is the reason the accountant is coming increasingly
under the gun.
We need to develop a generally accepted group of accounting principles
to measure management, which when coupled with our present generally
accepted accounting principles will provide objective meaningful reports that
fully account for how well management has performed in its preceding period.
Everyone agrees that full disclosure is of prime importance. Everyone
also agrees that objective measurement is a must. When the accountant limits
full disclosure to just the measurement of assets, liabilities, revenues, and
expense and holds these fully disclosed items out to society as a measure of a
business, full disclosure has not been complied with, because measurement of
management has been ignored. (Examples of things that could be evaluated
are its make-up, size, age, ability to change, and many other things.) How
well management has performed in terms of its optimum capabilities has been
ignored. Take an overly simplified example: A given business makes
$100,000. If it had had the best possible management and utilized its assets
in the best way possible, it might have made $200,000 or $500,000.
Brilliant scholars, like Dr. Sprouse, need to look beyond traditional
accounting and develop a way to measure the management of a business. The
corporations of today represent great globs of people, assets, services, and
liabilities. Unlike the individual proprietor who founded the business and had

235

his own well-being in mind, corporate management of today may or may not
have the same purposes in mind. Management of old in most cases also owned
the business. Management of today is usually far removed from ownership,
and new methods must be developed to insure proper and adequate manage
ment performance. This is our task today.
Dr. Sprouse starts his paper, “The purpose of financial statements is to
provide information which is useful in making rational economic decisions.”
As accounting reports stand today, they do provide information, but they
provide only limited information, not nearly enough to make rational economic
decisions. Is the accounting profession going to be content to provide only
half a loaf?
Dr. Sprouse makes the statement, “[Financial statements] are primarily
intended to provide information that is helpful in making rational investment
decisions.” Investment decisions are important, but any prudent investor in
his right mind will go much further than present-day financial statements in
gathering information to make rational investment decisions. If you doubt
this, look at an SEC prospectus. Looked at another way, I don’t think we
can say that it is the prime purpose of corporate annual reports to serve these
investors. The first purpose of a corporate financial report is that it is provided
to satisfy demands for reporting made by society. It is management’s way of
showing society how well it has performed. It is an accounting to society.
Other prime readers of the financial statements are business creditors.
They are vitally interested in the information. Dr. Sprouse says: “[What hap
pens after] the debt is settled need not concern the creditor. His interest
in the enterprise is essentially terminated when the debt is paid.” As a banker
and a creditor to business, I strongly disagree with the statement. Most
creditors have a continuing interest in a business they have helped finance.
It continues long after a given indebtedness has been paid. Future credit
will be needed. Future assets will be purchased and will have to be financed.
Seasonal credit is always needed. Credit was extended in the first place to
help the business grow with the hope that it would be a continuing customer
for many years. Somewhat similar to investors, many creditors invest their
time, talents, and assets in a business with a view of having a long and con
tinued relationship with the business. Bankers particularly fit this category.

Taxation and Income
In my opinion, more of the paper should have been devoted to the ques
tion, “Should income determination move more closely toward taxable
income? or vice versa?” The income tax bite for most large corporations
represents 50 per cent of its taxable income. It is just good business to
minimize this tax bite as much as possible, even at the risk of understating
corporate assets. The assets are still used in the business even though they
236

are understated, and in addition to this, the corporation still has the funds
that it would have had to pay in taxes in its working capital to help increase
its operating income.
Because of the impact of taxation in the operation of a business, income
determination should move closer to taxable income. Taxes are perhaps the
largest expense a business encounters and certainly for this reason, if no
other, warrant serious consideration. It is income after taxes that is used to
pay dividends or is used for growth. This is the income everyone is really
interested in.
Too much emphasis has been placed on the concept of deferred income
taxes supposedly caused by taking advantage of some favorable tax law. An
example is accelerated depreciation. In our society today where values con
tinue to go up, up, up, there becomes more basis for the reasoning that deferred
income taxes, because of the accelerated depreciation or what have you, will
never have to be paid, as the depreciated assets will continuously be replaced
by other high-cost assets, and as a consequence, the deferred income tax
liability will be deferred indefinitely. A similar argument can be made in the
installment sales situation as well as the investment tax credit. Regardless
of the position taken though, if full disclosure and sufficient detail are provided,
interested parties can recast the information for their own purposes and needs.

Valuation of Assets
Tax laws can have a very important bearing, and here I am referring to
Dr. Sprouse’s discussion concerning the value to place on corporate invest
ments. An increase in the carrying value of assets on a financial statement
can increase the economic cost of owning the asset, and as a result decrease
the business’s income. An example is the effect of the ad valorem tax in the
case of banks and the franchise tax in the case of other corporations. Carrying
value of assets is not nearly as important as knowing how they are valued.
Market value or other than book value can be given by footnote when these
values have significance.

Inventory Valuation

Inventory valuation can have a marked effect on the measurement of
income. Conservatism, uncertainty of sale, and tax savings all strongly dictate
that it be conservatively valued. It is said that an understatement of inventory
this year tends to offset and have an opposite effect on income measurement
the following year; however, the statement fails to recognize that a continued
undervaluation of inventory will perpetuate the tax savings and delay the
recognition of income indefinitely.
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Changes in the Dollar
Dr. Sprouse makes a number of statements on the changes in the value
of the dollar and concludes that accountants are capable of doing better
“with the current state of the art and the experience of accountants in other
countries.” At best, this statement needs more elaboration. Frankly, I can’t
see that any useful purpose can be served by converting the dollar cost to
some estimated figure.
He raised this question in several places, but I don’t believe he came up
with any answers. Overall adjustments for inflation would at best be guesses
and difficult to make. Users of financial statements need to consider the
inflation aspect, and if in a given situation, the accountant felt its effect to
be really material, it could possibly be covered as an adjunct to the statements
as a separate schedule or by notes to the statements.

Uniformity
A business as complex as the conglomerate Ling-Temco-Vought or
General Motors Corporation cannot be explained nor can its performance be
measured in two uniform reports consisting of a balance sheet and an income
statement. By the same token, the reporting for such businesses cannot be
put into a form simple enough for the non-professional to understand. Too
many items of important business significance are involved in such businesses
to permit a simplified uniform statement capable of intelligent use. Stated
simply, a complex business with many divisions, subsidiaries and what have
you, cannot be reported on in simple terms. By the same token, simple-minded
or unsophisticated people will never be able to analyze and interpret the neces
sary statements for such businesses. If such statements were put in a form
that such people could understand, they would become so vague and general
that the intelligent analyst would be unable to independently and properly
evaluate the business. In essence, such a simplified report becomes the pre
parer’s evaluations and conclusions about something that is really much more
complex. The preparer may or may not be right in his evaluations, summaries
and conclusions.
In their seeking to meet society’s needs, learned accountants and others
plead for uniformity in financial reports, the obvious reason being that if
Business A reports in a manner similar to Business B, the two businesses can
be compared and managements weighed. What we really must do is to find
a way to weigh managements independently from making the assets and liabili
ties they use uniform in financial statements. Businesses are not alike. Their
make-up is different, their needs are different, their management views and
objectives are different. It’s crying into the wind to get on this uniformity jag.
To be uniform is to be locked in, as there is just one way—the uniform way.
With rapid technological change in business today, it is idiotic to assume such
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a posture. Reporting needs change with the times. Educated people should
be permitted to make these changes when warranted.
All of this discussion can lead to only one conclusion, and that is financial
reports for corporations should be prepared in such a way that they present
fully and in detail all of the transactions of consequence as well as the financial
position of the business in such a way that intelligent people may be able to
make their own independent evaluations about the business. These people
are investors, account brokers, accountants, analysts, credit men, and bankers.
Speaking of summarizing information into one or a few simple state
ments raises the question of earnings per share. This question becomes particu
larly important in the conglomerate situation, where more often than not
convertible securities are issued. Frankly, there has been entirely too much
emphasis on earnings per share, and this has risen to a large extent through
the investment industry. There should be a little more caution in the use of
net earnings or net income and earnings per share with or without the con
vertible problem. Either way, the figures can be misleading unless the person
using them is aware of how they are computed, why they are computed that
way, and the relatively recent background of the company making the com
putation.
Much of the latter half of Dr. Sprouse’s paper is devoted to raising ques
tions and not suggesting answers, as this great man is eminently qualified to do.
To this extent, I am disappointed. To me, the Owens-Illinois investment
should be reported at its cost. Full disclosure by way of footnote or parenthesis
can give the market value and book value information. Book value figures in
this situation are no more realistic than the Owens-Illinois book value on its
statement inasmuch as it did not show the increased value of its own equity
in the ownership interest. Market value, on the other hand, deserves no more
than a footnote acknowledgment as the assets might never be sold, and dump
ing that large a block on the market might materially reduce the carrying
value of the asset. Looked at still another way, the company for management
reasons might not be able to sell the stock. It might have to keep it to maintain
needed relations with the company. Full disclosure is the answer in this area.
In the 50-50 investment situation, Standard reported properly; Atlas did
not, in my opinion. Solar followed the management practice of reinvesting its
earnings in expansion—a management decision that time might prove wise or
unwise. In either case, the measure Atlas took would be wrong. At best, the
information should be footnoted and not carried into Atlas’ statement. Even
though I disagree with the way Atlas reported this income, I can accept the
reporting, if enough detail was given to show exactly what was done, why,
and so forth (full disclosure with sufficient detail).

Consolidations
Beginning on page 214, Dr. Sprouse discusses whether or not statements
should be consolidated. This decision should be left to the independent judg
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ment of qualified independent CPAs in every instance. If consolidation more
accurately portrays the relation, it should be done. If, on the other hand, it
distorts proper financial information, statements should not be consolidated
based strictly on the percentage of ownership in a given situation. Here, full
disclosure is very important, particularly information concerning intercorpo
rate transactions, receivables, payables and consolidating data.
In the case of business combinations, full disclosure of the transaction
whether it be purchase or pooling because of merger is extremely important.
Reasonable people can disagree in these areas, and objective measurement is
often difficult if not impossible. Because of the very complexity of such trans
actions, there can be no simple way to show the information.

Miscellaneous Thoughts
Important Changes

Every so often a business makes a material change in its operations that
has a market effect on the measurement of income. These changes need to be
commented on in some detail. As a measure of management, were they
well-thought-out or impromptu?
Change in Management
Since financial statements can be used to measure effectiveness of man
agement, new management should not be “saddled” with mistakes of the old.
Examples: Overinvestment in fixed assets, excessive inventories, costly pension
plans, purchase contracts, union contracts, etc. All these can have a strong
bearing on the nature and measurement of income. If there is a significant
change in management, such things need to be carefully evaluated.

Perpetual Existence of a Business
Dr. Sprouse makes a statement that “Investors base their decisions on
the assumption that a business enterprise will have a perpetual existence.”
He also says, “An enterprise can continue to survive and prosper only if its
resources are maintained.” I submit that a business can survive, prosper, and
have perpetual existence only if it provides for adequate, confident, continu
ing future management and enough research and development work to take
care of technological change. It is not enough just to maintain resources.
Growth has to be provided for. In other words, resources have to increase.
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Summary
All through this critique, I have stressed strongly that the primary pur
pose of financial reporting is, or should be, to measure the performance of
management. I have also stressed that it is important that the accounting
profession broaden its scope and find better ways to measure management.
I emphasized that the accounting reports should show how management has
reinvested in itself and improved itself if that is the case. Business manage
ment, just like business assets, grows old and needs to be replaced. If this is
not done, the value of assets deteriorates and earnings suffer. In recent years,
many highly regarded old companies have been acquired by aggressive, young
management, and now in our society we have many conglomerate companies.
If management of these businesses had been aware of its deterioration
and because of meaningful reporting had been forced to improve itself, most
if not all would not be targets for outside purchasers. Many of the fantastic
bargains would not have been made. Be that as it may, however, the account
ing profession is faced with the matter of one corporation acquiring another
corporation, and then another, and another.
These tremendous bargains have to be recognized and recorded in the
consolidated reports. They are a fact of life. Management has either done a
good job in purchasing, or for some reason has paid too much. Either event
needs to be recognized and recorded in full detail. Reasonable people can
disagree as to the methods used; however, if the reporter has provided sufficient
detail and full disclosure, the users of the information can recast it as they
see fit.
When stock is issued in an acquisition, it is usually issued in fairly large
blocks. It is very questionable whether an issue of such size is readily market
able. However, if there is a market, it can be recognized by footnote. The
issuance of convertible securities is often necessary to effect a purchase from
the buyer’s standpoint; because of the tax break (interest is deductible, divi
dends are not for tax purposes), their issuance is cheaper. At least for a period,
the buyer’s equity owners do not have a dilution. On the other hand, the seller
has a period in which he can get out for X number of dollars and has a
reasonable return while he is waiting to see what he has gotten into. All of
these things are facts of life. Yes, they are fair. Yes, they are proper. Our
financial reporting should not be a vehicle for making mergers less attractive.
Financial reporting, however, should be a strong vehicle for making manage
ment of a business strong and continuous. This would help eliminate the
unrealistic bargain found in many mergers of today.
Every user of the financial information prepared by the accounting
profession has to recognize that the accountant is preparing information for
quite a few users. It is unfair to the accountant for a given set of users to
insist that the accounting information be prepared in just a certain way. At
best, any specific user only has the right to ask for full disclosure. If any given
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user has full disclosure, and perhaps a brief explanation that tells him why the
accountant reported in the way that he did, the user will be able to recast the
information to suit his own specific needs. If he lacks this ability, he has no
right to complain in the first place.
On the other side of the coin, the accountant has to recognize that the
financial information he prepares is necessarily relied on by many users. The
accountant, as a professional, has the right to use his best judgment in the
form he presents his information, but by the same token he, in my opinion,
also has an obligation to provide for full disclosure. He must recognize that
the information he uses is capable of different interpretations. He must give
enough information in his reports to permit specific users to recast that infor
mation for their own needs if they see fit.
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The Role of the Auditor

The Role of the Auditor
By Joseph L. Roth
Partner, Price Waterhouse & Co., Chairman, AICPA Committee on Auditing
Procedure, representing the American Institute of CPAs

It is the independent audit function which adds credibility to financial
statements. The auditor’s endorsement provides some degree of assurance as to
(1) the reliability of the financial data incorporated in the financial statements
and (2) the propriety of the presentation of such data including disclosure of
all pertinent information. Without this added credibility, how much reliance
could be placed on financial reports? If they were deemed to be of question
able reliability, on what basis could bankers and other credit grantors make
loans? Or investors supply capital? Or the government gather statistics
needed to perform intelligently its regulatory function? Although the account
ing profession has been subjected to frequent attacks of criticism, the basic
faith in the independent auditor’s objectivity and integrity has not been shaken
to any perceptible extent. The certified public accountant, in his function of
independent auditor, continues to perform a much needed service, and indeed
is doing it much more effectively.
If there is a problem concerning the auditor’s role in society today, and
I suspect there is, it is a lack of understanding, or more properly, some mis
understanding by most people outside of the profession of just what his role
really is. More specifically, there seems to be a lack of understanding of what
auditing involves and what auditors do and cannot do. Does the public
understand, for example, that auditors do not make management decisions?
Or that they do not assure the continued success of the business? Or even
that they cannot always be certain that they have gotten all the facts?

Auditor's Function
A half century or so ago, when independent auditing was developing into
a profession, the persons principally interested in having an audit made were
the owners of the enterprise. Usually they were few in number and most likely
were active in managing the business. The most important objective of the
audits at that time was the discovery of errors and irregularities or even fraud,
if it existed or was suspected. The auditor’s procedures consisted chiefly of
checking the details of transactions and tracing them into the accounting rec
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ords. The fairness of the financial statements prepared from these records and
the adequacy of the disclosures were probably considered of minor concern.
With the expansion of public ownership with non-owner management
and the development of stock exchanges, more attention was focused on
financial statements themselves. To an ever-increasing degree, the auditor’s
opinion on them became more important. This attention to financial state
ments and the auditor’s opinion was magnified as the need for sound accounting
principles began to be realized. The importance of the independent auditor’s
role in developing sound financial reporting was recognized. In the meantime,
the increasing size and complexity of businesses made it less and less prac
ticable for the auditor to examine individual transactions and the books and
records to the extent needed to provide any absolute assurance of discovering
fraud or other irregularities.
As a result of this progression, the primary purpose of an audit today
is to enable the independent auditor to express an opinion on the fairness of
the financial statements, their compliance with generally accepted accounting
principles and the consistency of their application. While the discovery of
irregularities may result, the auditor’s examination is not designed for that
purpose nor can it be relied upon to disclose defalcations or other similar
irregularities. In this connection, however, the auditor does assist management
in meeting its responsibility for safeguarding the company’s assets by suggest
ing improvements in the accounting controls and procedures to lessen oppor
tunities for defalcations and the possibility of errors and irregularities.

Auditing Standards and Procedures
The independent auditor’s examination, made for the purpose of express
ing an opinion on financial statements, is carried out in accordance with
auditing standards adopted by the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants.1 These standards are qualitative and not quantitative. They
may be summarized very briefly as:
1. General standards, which require that the services be undertaken by trained
people with professional competence who are independent of those being
audited.
2. Standards of field work, which require that the work be properly planned,
that an evaluation of the internal controls be made, and that sufficient
evidential matter be obtained.
3. Reporting standards, which prescribe the manner in which the auditor
must report on the results of his examination.

The determination of the type and extent of the auditing procedures the1
1 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Statements on Auditing Procedure No.
33, Chapter 2.
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auditor need apply in each circumstance to place him in a position to render
an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements depends entirely on his
professional judgment. In determining these procedures, he must be satisfied
that there is no basic conflict of interest between himself and management
which might influence his judgment; in other words, he must be truly inde
pendent. To be independent, he cannot have any financial interest in, or
serve as an officer or director of the company being audited. He must also
see to it that there are absolutely no limitations placed upon the procedures
which he might want to apply, or on the information which is to be made
available to him.
Since he must be satisfied that management is performing its job, the
auditor must evaluate the effectiveness of the internal controls which manage
ment has established. The extent of his other auditing procedures depends
very much on the results of this evaluation, since adequate internal controls
can reduce considerably the probability of irregularities. As part of his
appraisal he also reviews the functions of the internal auditors and examines
the reports on the results of their examinations.
Of the evidential matter which might be available to him, he is, of course,
more satisfied with that which is obtained from sources outside the enterprise
than that obtained from within. He is also more satisfied with that which he
can physically observe than with that which is represented to him. Usually
he must rely on evidence that is persuasive rather than convincing to the
degree of absolute certainty.
He must depend upon testing and sampling of a limited number of
transactions or recordings in confirming his judgments. He is forced to work
within economic limits in that he must perform his audit within a reasonable
length of time and at a cost which is not prohibitive or unreasonable in the
light of the circumstances.
The testing of evidential matter and the compilation of the amounts
which appear in the financial statements are only parts of the independent
auditor’s function. Besides these audit tests, he must also satisfy himself that
the accounting principles used are acceptable and that they have been followed
consistently. He must also be satisfied that the financial statements constitute
a fair presentation. Among other things, this involves reviewing the descrip
tion of amounts, their proper grouping and the adequacy of the disclosure
made not only in the statements but also in the notes accompanying them. He
must follow specifically prescribed rules for wording his report on the financial
statements. All of this involves the use of sound judgment based upon con
siderable professional training and experience.

The Computer
While the appearance on the scene of large-scale computers has not
changed the auditor’s basic approach to auditing, they have most certainly
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had an impact. They may be described as just another form of bookkeeping
machine, but their immense capabilities and great flexibility have required
auditors (both partners and staff) to devote considerable time and effort in
obtaining a knowledge of them. In many cases, computer experts have been
hired by auditing firms to assist in the education process and to advise clients
on the feasibility of installing them. Aside from this additional service which
the auditor has been able to render to his clients, the special expertise also
enables him to adjust his auditing procedures to fit the changed environment
of clients’ information systems.
There was some tendency at first for many auditors to audit around the
computer, i.e., to treat it much as another bookkeeping machine, ignoring the
attendant changes in the controls and the flow of data. Better understanding
enabled the auditor to evaluate the controls over the computer center and to
test the programming and the performance of the equipment. Gradually
auditors have developed the ability to use the computer to perform their tests
of the records produced.2 In some cases this has provided auditors with a
means of testing much larger samples of transactions and records, thereby
providing them with a greater degree of assurance.

The Auditor's Report
Do the users of auditor’s reports understand very much about this role
of the independent auditor? There seems to be plenty of evidence that they
do not. If so, why not? Doesn’t his report make clear what the auditor has
done and what responsibility he is assuming with respect to the financial
statements? Some of us are convinced that the present standard form of
auditor’s report not only does not make either of these clear but, unfortunately,
may even be a major contributor to the general misunderstanding. Public
relations counsel for the American Institute told the members attending the
annual meeting in 1964: “Too many stockholders haven’t the foggiest idea
what your certificate means, and, if I may say so, I think the time is ripe for
its revision in layman’s language and in the light of changed circumstances in
the past 30 years—particularly that of wide stock ownership.”
The standard short-form report3 (sometimes referred to as the “certifi
Gordon B. Davis, CPA, PhD, Auditing & EDP (New York, American Institute of CPAs,
1967), Chapter 12.
3 The standard short-form report suggested in Chapter 10 of Statements on Auditing Procedure
No. 33 reads:
“We have examined the balance sheet of X Company as of June 30, 19__ and
the related statement(s) of income and retained earnings for the year then
ended. Our examination was made in accordance with generally accepted audit
ing standards, and accordingly included such tests of the accounting records and
such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.
“In our opinion, the accompanying balance sheet and statement(s) of income
and retained earnings present fairly the financial position of X Company at June
30, 19__ , and the results of its operations for the year then ended, in conformity
with generally accepted accounting principles applied on a basis consistent with
that of the preceding year.”

2
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cate”) was adopted in substantially its present form 34 years ago. Considerable
accounting literature has been devoted to the wording used in it and its
intended meaning is fairly well understood by the accounting profession and
by the more sophisticated users of auditor’s reports. However, despite con
tinuous efforts on the part of the profession to educate the vast mass of less
sophisticated users—those who consciously, but somewhat innocently, rely on
the reports—the auditor’s role still seems to be mostly misunderstood. Most
users think of the financial statements themselves, and probably even more
so the notes, as comprising part of the auditor’s report rather than being the
representations of management. The report itself does little to dispell this
notion or to make clear that the auditor is only expressing his opinion on
management’s report.
The auditor’s report indicates that his opinion is based upon an exami
nation “made in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.”
While this assertion refers to the specific standards adopted by the AICPA,
referred to previously herein, the reader of the report is placed under an
obligation to either research the meaning of the phrase or make an assumption,
based on little personal knowledge of accounting and auditing, as to what
it means. The words which follow, “and accordingly included such tests of
the accounting records and such other auditing procedures as we considered
necessary,” while the wordiest phrase in an otherwise terse report, do not
communicate much about the standards. I, personally, would like to see word
ing that referred briefly to the basic standards, i.e., independence, professional
care, evaluation of controls and sampling and testing of evidential matter.
Specific, although brief, references to the basic standards would be more useful
than the vague wording now used which has no direct relation to them.
The opinion paragraph (or sentence) really receives the most criticism.
A Forbes editorial4 said in part: “All these certifications usually bear the phrase
‘according to generally accepted accounting principles,’ a phrase which is now
coming to be generally accepted as damned meaningless.” It is most unlikely
that the Accounting Principles Board of the AICPA, or any other body, is
ever going to define a whole set of “generally accepted accounting principles.”
But even if they were defined in technical literature of what use would even a
reference to such literature be in a report without some further clue as to the
justifications for their acceptability?
Take also the words “present fairly.” They also are not subject to easy
interpretation. Within the profession itself, some contend that the “fairly”
implies some approximation while others contend it is meant to imply honesty.
Much could be done to clarify, in layman’s language, the nature of the
auditor’s examination and its limitations, and the meaning of the opinion
expressed. A clearer report could do much toward bringing about a better
understanding of the auditor’s role.

4 Forbes, October 15, 1966.
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Adequacy of Scope
Regardless of how described, is the usual scope of examination of the
independent auditor sufficiently extensive as to justify the added credibility
it attaches to financial statements? This is a perfectly valid question to be
raised by users of auditor’s reports. Despite the occasional criticisms, I think
the answer must be strongly in the positive. The few isolated instances of
failure by auditors to discover material misstatements or omissions in financial
statements are highly publicized and overshadow the thousands of audits made
each year which cannot be questioned. The auditor’s efforts in seeing that
financial data are reliable and in insisting on proper statement presentation
are not evident since they are known only to himself and his client. The fact
that auditors seldom have to take exception to clients’ statements does not
mean that they readily accede to their clients’ views, but is evidence of their
persuasiveness. If this were not so, accounting principles would have totally
disintegrated.
The auditor’s greatest risk of being involved with misleading financial
statements is likely to stem from high-level fraud rather than from insufficient
auditing procedures. By this, I mean deliberate and clever concealment of
facts from the auditor or misrepresentations to him by top management. Such
deceit can be extremely difficult, if not impossible to uncover. Most highly
publicized scandals result from this type of fraud.

Understanding as to Scope of Audit
It is most important to the independent auditor that each of his clients
fully and clearly understand the role he plays and the extent of his responsi
bilities. While the scope of his examination, i.e., the auditing procedures and
the extent of tests, must be solely the decision of the auditor, the client should
be satisfied with the qualitative aspects of the examination made, i.e., the
degree to which the auditor observes the auditing standards previously men
tioned. Although the auditor is usually selected by the company officers, he
should be answerable only to the board of directors and stockholders since
it is management’s performance on which he is reporting.
To provide a means of communication between the auditor and the board
of directors, it has been recommended5 that an audit committee be appointed
from the board to deal with the selection of the auditor and the arrangements
for the engagement. An audit committee should review with the auditor the
scope of the examination in general terms, making sure, among other things,
that the auditor is following a consistent pattern of rotation of audit emphasis.
The committee should inquire into personnel assigned to the examination to
determine that there is sufficient continuity of staff to assure familiarity with
the organization but also due regard for rotation of supervision to attain a
5

“AICPA Executive Committee Statement on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors,”
The Journal of Accountancy, September 1967.
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fresh and independent approach to the examination. The committee should
also review the results of the audit to satisfy themselves that management
co-operated fully with the auditor in making available all records and informa
tion requested. It should also receive from the auditor any suggestions he may
have for improvements in controls, procedures and methods of operations
which the auditor is in a position to offer as a result of his work.

Effectiveness of the Auditor's Report
Despite the improvements which might be made in the specific wording
of the auditor’s standard short-form report, the reporting standards established
by the profession have been most effective in promoting better financial report
ing. These standards require that the auditor specifically state any exception
to compliance with generally accepted accounting principles he may have
with respect to the statements examined. A full explanation of his exception
and its effect on the financial statements must be included in his report. An
exception may relate to the accounting principle or practice followed in
determining amounts shown in the statements, to the description of the item
or the manner in which it is presented or to the adequacy of the disclosures,
including the information shown in the notes. If the exception is so material
as to affect the fairness of the statements as a whole he is required to render
an “adverse opinion,” i.e., he must say in so many words that the statements
“do not present fairly. . . .”
The auditor must also report specifically on any changes in accounting
principles and practices from those applied in the preceding period if the
change has a material effect on the comparability of the statements. The
effect of the change and his approval of it as an acceptable accounting treat
ment must be included in his report.
In addition to stating his views on the propriety of the accounting prin
ciples employed, he must report on any material restrictions imposed on his
audit scope and qualify his opinion with respect to the items affected by the
restriction. Again, if the restrictions are so material as to affect his ability to
report on the statements as a whole, he must disclaim an opinion.
These reporting requirements have had an important influence on the
financial reporting due to the reluctance of clients to have exceptions appear
in the auditor’s report on their statements. The refusal of the SEC to accept,
as a general matter, qualified reports on statements filed with it in connection
with security offerings bolsters the auditor’s position with respect to the state
ments. The result has been greater adherence to sound accounting principles.

Accountants' Legal Responsibility
While the profession is striving to create a better understanding of the
auditor’s role in connection with the examination of financial statements, there
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is some possibility that the courts may change some former concepts of the
auditor’s legal liability therewith. Such a development could have a consider
able effect on the auditor’s relationship to the statements and on the extent of
his auditing procedures. A recent study, “Accountants’ Liabilities for False
and Misleading Financial Statements,”67notes the increasing number of law
suits against auditors. It traces the development of both the common law and
statutory concepts of legal liability and reports on a number of important cases
currently in litigation. That auditors may be held to greater responsibility may
be a result of these actions. The recent decisions in the cases of Fischer v.
Kletz and Barry Escott v. BarChris Construction together with the civil and
criminal actions in connection with Continental Vending Machine Company
all have serious legal implications.
That the courts can have an influence on the role of the independent
auditor has been generally accepted. Mautz and Sharaf recognize this in the
following quote:
It is expected that a profession will have difficulty in establishing the
limits of its responsibility. The important role which judgment plays
in professional practice, and the exercise of judgment is never free
from unfortunate consequences, contributes to this. The continuing
adaptation of a profession to changes in its social environment and
its own methods and resources require continuing modification of its
relationship to clients and to others.1

In its own literature8 the profession has attempted to establish what it
considers to be its responsibilities. Any indication that decisions of the courts
might increase the auditor’s responsibilities particularly as to third parties
substantially beyond that heretofore contemplated, would certainly lead to a
reappraisal of the extent of auditors’ tests. This would particularly be so if
the courts established a criterion for materiality which entailed a degree of
accuracy greater than what has been considered up to now to be tolerable for
the purpose of being satisfied that the financial statements “present fairly. ...”

Unaudited Statements
A number of court cases involving auditors relate to statements they had
not audited but had associated themselves with through other services, such as
preparation of tax returns, assistance with preparation of monthly or quarterly
statements, etc. Official literature of the AICPA9 makes it clear that a CPA
Columbia Law Review (December 1967).
R. K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing (American Accounting
Association), Chap. 6.
8 American Institute of CPAs, Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33, Chap. 1.
9 Statement on Auditing Procedure No. 38 (September 1967).
6
7
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has no responsibility for performing any auditing procedures when he is
associated with statements under such circumstances and that he must disclaim
any opinion on them. Although the cases have not been publicized, there are
indications1011
that the courts may hold that the auditor has some responsibilities.
The extent of such responsibility apparently cannot yet be discerned from
individual cases. Should the profession find that an auditor has substantial
responsibilities, either to his client or to third parties, for unaudited statements
with which he is associated, there would be strong pressures toward avoiding
nonaudit clients since the fees would not be nearly commensurate with the
risks entailed. There may even be a reluctance by auditors to be associated
at all with statements they had not examined, even those of audit clients
which might be included in statements filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission covering interim periods. A strong feeling in this direction could
lead to the necessity for audits of interim periods for registration purposes.
Whether or not trends toward the extension of auditors’ auditing pro
cedures and avoidance of association with unaudited statements develop—and
if they do, the degree and speed to which they do—depends largely upon the
influences of court decisions. It can be assumed that the decisions will reflect
an increasing public demand for more credibility and greater accuracy in
financial reporting. To provide this, business enterprises will have to shoulder
the burden of added costs of audits and auditors will have to face the prospect
of increasing their staffs of trained personnel, a problem which is even now
most acute.

Expanded Role of Auditors
Coincident with the developing possibility that a reappraisal of the
auditor’s legal responsibility may tend to extend the scope of his usual exami
nation of financial statements is the likely prospect of an expansion of the role
of the independent auditor. Forbes11 referred to the “growing credibility gap”
in corporate earnings reports and pointed to the accounting profession’s re
sponsibility to make financial reports less flexible and more “precise.” The in
vestor’s demands, and those of his advisors, are for more and more information
from corporate management. The inclusion of ten-year summaries of earnings
and of a wide variety of statistical data in annual reports of public companies
is testimony to the recognition of these demands. The demand for profit
reporting by product lines for companies in diversified fields has led to the
SEC suggesting this as a requirement. Is it not likely that the “credibility gap”
will require an independent and objective report on the fairness of these data?
I have no doubt that any such demand will be met since there is no reason
10 Thomas W. Hill, Jr., LL.B., CPA, “The Public Accountants’ Legal Liability to Clients and
Others,” The New York Certified Public Accountant (January 1968).
11 Forbes (May 15, 1967).
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why the auditor cannot examine the data and report on it. More importantly,
it cannot be denied that his report would serve a useful purpose.
There are already instances where independent auditors report publicly
on the adequacy of their clients’ systems of internal controls, either separately
or in connection with their report on the financial statements. Some govern
ment agencies, including the SEC in certain instances, require a report by the
auditor on the effectiveness of the internal controls. Many CPAs resist this
trend toward reporting on controls, arguing that no criteria for determining
the adequacy of controls or standards for reporting on them have been estab
lished. The reply to this may well be that there were no established accounting
principles, or for that matter auditing standards, for years after auditors began
rendering opinions on financial statements. If the investing public or credit
grantors decide there is a need for some assurance as to accounting controls
and procedures, the need will have to be met. The practice will probably
develop gradually rather than by fiat. Except where required by a government
agency, any supplementary report on controls by the independent auditor
would be published initially on a voluntary basis, i.e., where both client and
independent auditor agree to do so. Naturally, the report would be given only
in cases where an affirmative opinion could be rendered. If the auditor recog
nized shortcomings in the controls, it is likely that his client would take prompt
action to remedy the deficiencies, as he now does deviations from generally
accepted accounting principles, in order that he might get a “clean” opinion.
The end result would be much improved controls. I must reject any argument
that the independent auditor would be under such undue pressure to report
favorably that he would capitulate to his client’s demands for such a report
when not warranted. For years, auditors have successfully maintained inde
pendence in reporting on financial statement presentation. I cannot see why
the same degree of independence and integrity cannot be expected in any
expanded role.

Management Performance
Independent auditors have, during the last twenty years or so, expanded
their services for clients far beyond auditing and the traditional tax work.
Referred to generally as “management services,” they provide a wide variety
of services such as computer feasibility studies, system design, cost control,
production and inventory controls, budgeting, organization structure, opera
tions research, and in some cases such things as plant layout, psychological
testing, market surveys, public opinion polls and executive recruitment. Some
question has been raised as to whether the performance of these services,
particularly the latter group cited,12 affects the auditor’s independence in

12 Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, SEC, “The SEC and Accountants: Co-operative Efforts to
Improve Financial Reporting,” at the Seventy-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American In
stitute of CPAs, Boston, October 5, 1966.
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carrying out his attest function, i.e., the audit of the financial statements. The
auditor’s training and experience with accounting records, internal controls,
cost systems, organization and operation of business enterprises generally
provided competence in these fields. The need for the services and the auditors’
intimate knowledge of their clients’ businesses made it a natural extension of
their services. As problems extended beyond the more normal fields of the
auditor’s knowledge, the larger firms, at least, hired engineers, mathematicians,
computer experts and other specialists to provide the necessary technical
knowledge to round out their ability to perform a complete job.
Any investigation, I am sure, would establish that the various auditing
firms have unquestionable competence in the particular fields of service each
may offer. Further investigation would also prove it extremely difficult to
demonstrate that the performance of any one of these services affects in any
way the independence of the auditor. On the contrary it would be easy to
demonstrate that the performance of these services has made a significant
contribution to the health of the business enterprises serviced and unquestion
ably redounded to the benefit of creditors, stockholders and probably the
economy as a whole. To challenge the profession’s rendition of any of these
services because they do not seem to fit the “image” of the independent auditor
is to ignore the needs of the business community.
It is possible, if not even probable, that, because of the auditor’s com
petence in the many fields of management in which he now renders consulting
or advisory services, he may in the near future be expected to provide objective
assurance, i.e., to attest to the adequacy and effectiveness of his client’s infor
mation system. How far this might extend will depend on the profession’s
willingness to accept the additional responsibilities. I am inclined to think,
however, that the independent auditor’s role as an auditor of management
performance as such, as suggested by John L. Carey,13 is more remote. Just
as the appraisal of an individual investment depends on the particular investor’s
objective, performance by management can be measured in many ways. Is
management producing good and steady income? Or is it building for greater
value in the future? Is it concentrating on one product line or in an industry
in which it has know-how and is established? Or is it diversifying in order to
spread the risk? Who decides which criteria to use? Each investor’s interest
may be different! Even if independent auditors had the capability of appraising
management performance, the practicality of reporting on it is not now
apparent.
On the other hand, reporting on the information system itself, i.e., the
organization, the processes and procedures by which management is provided
with data necessary for making informed business decisions, seems to be prac
tical. I expect that the practice would have to develop gradually and envision
its development much in the same way that I expect reporting on the effective
ness of internal controls will eventually come about.
13 John L. Carey, The CPA Plans for the Future (New York, American Institute of CPAs,
1965) pp. 201, 213.
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Budgeted Results
One single part of the information system as a whole which might be the
first step in expanded reporting by management, and if so, likely to be attested
to by independent auditors, is budgeted results for ensuing periods. If such a
proposal might shock managements, it is certain to horrify CPAs who are
more or less prohibited by their code of ethics from associating their names
with forecasts.
To deal with management first, the initial question will probably be,
Why publish forecasts? This idea is not original with me. Financial analysts
and other report users have been asking for forecasts and these requests have
been brought to the attention of the SEC. It is difficult to see how anyone
could seriously question the usefulness of supplying information as to manage
ment’s forecasts for the near future. Credit grantors and, perhaps even to a
greater degree, investors and potential investors are interested in past financial
results only as an indication of expected future performance. Granted that
past results can be measured with some degree of accuracy, whereas projec
tions are subject to considerable guesswork. Nevertheless, a reasonably
reliable projection, in addition to and related to current actual results, can be
most valuable in making investment decisions. The emerging generation, being
better educated, more mature and by and large disillusioned with traditional
ways, is going to demand more and more information—and get it.
What about the practicalities? Can companies provide budgeted figures?
The answer will be provided quickly. Management must prepare budgets in
order to run the business intelligently. Therefore, the information is, or should
be, available. Any admission that it is not would be a condemnation of man
agement. But are the credit grantors, or the investors, or their advisers in a
position to properly understand and evaluate the interplay of the many basic
assumptions which enter into the preparation of a budget? The answer to this
question might well be—give us the information and let us worry about that!
I suggest that managements will be rated quickly on the reliability of their
forecasts as actual performance is compared with previous forecasts. There
fore, the information will become more and more useful as time goes by.
Will publishing budgets, with the knowledge that they will be compared
later with actual results, not tempt managements to juggle figures to meet the
published budgeted results? This is where the attestor is needed. The CPA,
i.e., the independent auditor, has the necessary capability to evaluate the
effectiveness of the budgeting system and the procedures followed. He can
appraise the reasonableness of the relationships of income, costs, and expenses
based on clearly defined assumptions. He will be expected to find some way of
communicating the results of these efforts to third parties without misleading
them as to the degree of assurance he is providing.
As to the ethics of dealing with forecasts, a careful reading of Rule 2.04
of the Code of Professional Ethics of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants and of Opinion 10 of its committee on professional ethics indi
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cates that there are means available for reporting on forecasts. No doubt some
further guidelines and possibly a set of basic standards for reporting publicly
will be needed.

The Changing Role
In contemplating the auditor’s role, past, present and the likely future,
it becomes clear that it is in a constant state of evolution. The changes, though,
are responsive to the changing environment rather than to any conscious
attempts to alter the basic concepts of auditing or to achieve what would be
referred to in industry as diversification. The change from detail auditing to
examinations for the purpose of reporting on the fairness of financial state
ments resulted from the expanded reliance on financial statements by credit
grantors and investors. The development of more sophisticated accounting
principles and auditing procedures resulted from the growth in size and
complexities of businesses and, probably more so, on the recognition of a
responsibility to an expanded public ownership. These factors also brought
about the demands for more and more disclosure in financial statements.
The need for help with the establishment of more efficient accounting
methods and effective business controls, together with the advent of the
computer age, resulted in the rapid growth of management services by
independent auditors. They responded to the demand and expanded their
capabilities to meet them. The demands of an ever-growing and also more
sophisticated user group, backed up by a government dedicated to what it
considers best for the public interest, will tend to increase significantly the
amounts of financial information which businesses will have to furnish. Man
agements of publicly held business enterprises will have to adjust to being held
more and more responsible for their performance and to operating in a public
arena. The credibility gap will tend to submit them to more attestation, both
in breadth and depth, by their independent auditors. The auditors, on the
other hand, will have to be ready to expand the scope of their services and to
be willing to undertake the burden of the additional responsibilities. This
entails developing additional standards and guidelines. Although some man
agements and some auditors may look with alarm at these prospects, consider
the alternative. The additional safeguards for the investing public could be
provided by direct surveillance by government agencies.

Conclusion
In summary, the role of the auditor has been evolving in a changing
environment. His relationship to his clients and his responsibilities to third
parties have been fairly well established in practice and are understood within
his profession. His role is not as well understood by the users of financial
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statements and even less by the public as a whole. His standard short-form
report on financial statements does not help their understanding and possibly
adds to the misunderstanding. Changing environment, particularly as reflected
in court decisions, is likely to cause a reappraisal of the accountants’ responsi
bilities—particularly to third parties. Such a reappraisal may indicate an
increase in the extent of auditing procedures to provide the auditor with
assurance and satisfaction more commensurate with his increased risks. The
changing environment would seem also to indicate a broadening in scope to
include examination and reporting on controls, procedures, organization and
possibly budgets.
It becomes clear from a contemplation of the professional auditor’s role
that its evolution is not influenced significantly by the clients who bear the
burden of its cost nor by the profession itself but, to the greatest extent, by
outside influences such as the needs and demands of the users of its product,
the requirements of regulatory authorities and the judicial determination of
professional responsibility—all of which form a part of the social environment
in which the profession functions. To the extent that his role is expanded,
additional responsibility naturally attaches to the auditor. The profession
must be ever ready to assume this additional responsibility and I am sure it
presently is ready, as it has been in the past.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper

By Albert J. Bows, Partner, Arthur Andersen & Co., Former Chairman,
AICPA Committee on Auditing Procedure, representing the American Insti
tute of CPAs

A discussion of the role of the auditor must start with a determination
by the accounting profession of whether it will continue to be a profession or
become a business. If it is to be a profession, it must decide to remain inde
pendent of its clients in carrying out its role of expressing opinions on their
financial statements. It is difficult to see how this can be done if the auditor
undertakes such activities as plant layouts, psychological testing, market
surveys, and executive recruitment. The fact that Roth suggests that these
services are demanded by the business community is not a sound reason for
the profession to undertake them. How can an auditing firm really be inde
pendent of a corporate president that it has recently recruited for a substantial
fee? (See his comment on page 255.) What would an intelligent director or
stockholder think?
Whatever the ultimate fate of diverse management consulting functions,
there undoubtedly will be a requirement for expanded roles by the auditor
to cover information which is not now covered in the typical annual or SEC
report, including internal control. Most boards of directors should insist on a
report from their auditor on internal control and accounting controls as to
whether they are adequate. If a director is really interested in reliable informa
tion being released during the year, he should have this covered by an audit
discipline. He should also know whether interim statements are reasonably
accurate.
Even when more reports are required, the cost of independent audits
need not rise relative to other costs. The auditing profession must come to
grips with how it is performing its work. It must guard against the tendency
to become more detailed rather than more perceptive. Good audits should be
performed at reasonable prices by highly intelligent individuals who work on
a professional basis. Our real problem is to develop techniques that relate to
the big audit problems of each client.
I do not agree that the auditor should check corporate budgets, as Roth
suggests. As soon as several major companies do not meet their budgets, the
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public will obviously react to auditing for what it is in these situations—a
technical performance without substance. All we need to do as a profession
is to try to certify to projections and we will lose the remaining confidence the
public now has in us.
There is a great need now to require auditors’ opinions on quarterly
earnings reports and other statistical and financial information which are part
of complete reporting to investors and we should logically expand our services
in this way. It is not logical for much of this financial information to be
unaudited when stock trading takes place daily as a result of these releases.
The annual report is only one medium for communicating with the investing
public on one day of the year. The other forms of communication are at least
equally important. Even the creditor will rarely extend credit solely on the
basis of the annual report but may very well do so based on interim reports.
One of the major problems facing the auditing profession today is an
adequate definition of standards. We need to do a much better job of defining
and making the public aware of what we do and what we cannot do. These
standards, however, cannot be self-serving. If they are established primarily
for the purpose of avoiding legal liabilities, they will not be respected either
by the courts or the public. If they are sound and reflect the public need, they
will be respected.
It is unlikely that the profession will grow in stature by seeking to take
on less responsibility. There is a great danger in overreaction to current law
suits, and there is some evidence that too many of the profession’s actions today
are being undertaken to avoid legal liability.
The auditing profession can do a lot to protect itself from lawsuits and
lack of credibility by insisting on a more thorough check of inventories,
long-term contracts, disclosures of poolings, and affiliated relationships. More
attention needs to be paid to these critical areas of audits in order to be of
service to the public.
I would also suggest that the profession concentrate its energies on making
present accounting practices more useful to creditors and investors before it
delves into new fields. The work of the Accounting Principles Board and the
auditing procedure committee needs to be much further along before we reach
out for new and untried areas. We must solve the problem of reporting for
conglomerates, of earnings per share, of goodwill, poolings, and tax credits;
if we have the courage to come up with sound answers to these problems, then
the public may want us to do more.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper

By Louis M. Warlick, Vice President and Associate Director of Research,
Loomis Sayles & Co., Inc., representing the Financial Analysts Federation

As a professional investment analyst and adviser, I use accounting state
ments regularly as essential tools in the day-to-day work of evaluating company
operations. In a sense, therefore, I am in the position of a “customer” for the
accounting product and that fact undoubtedly colors my perspective on the
“role of the auditor.”
It is not surprising that most of Mr. Roth’s discussion of this subject is
devoted to well-documented support of the traditional function of auditing,
as I understand it, and the propriety of various steps that are accepted as good
auditing procedure and reporting.
This is a natural and entirely appropriate approach, but, frankly, I would
like to have seen some greater examination of possible need for change in
response to the present environment. As one example, in particular, I would
have welcomed more inquiry into the basic justification of auditing with
emphasis on the pros and cons for broadening the evaluation aspect of the
auditor’s work. As the function of accounting has enlarged and its complexi
ties increased, I believe that it has become insufficient to develop one set of
figures along one line of accounting practice and to just present this on a
“take it or leave it” basis.
It is a truism that no single earnings figure can ordinarily be exact (except
over the entire life of a corporation), and many sources have pointed to the
increasing element of discretion involved in deriving earnings results. It
appears to me that these circumstances call for some move by the auditor
toward placing a final earnings figure in the appropriate context of assump
tions, judgments, and necessary but arbitrary decisions used in preparation of
the accounting statements.
Certainly, there is little room to question the two primary objectives
which the author has set forth for the auditor. The importance of reliable
data is self-evident, and surely fairness of financial statements, reflecting sound
accounting principles consistently applied, is the major goal with which few
would disagree. It does seem, however, that these objectives do not go far
enough, that they are related more closely to the form than to the substance
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of accounting results, and that they are not sufficiently broad to deal adequately
with the increasingly fluid situation we find in corporate organization, opera
tions and financial reporting.
Certain contrary evidence undoubtedly can be cited, but I believe that
implicit in this more or less conventionally defined approach to the audit
ing function is the concept of greater precision or exactitude than the facts
justify. Certainly, problems of distributing allocated costs rationally to
product and time periods are not at all new, to mention just one aspect.
However, as most industry has become more capital intensive and new fixed
cost items such as research, expenditures, pensions, and so forth, have mounted
in importance, the weight of indirect costs has increased sharply in the profit
and loss equation. This alone, as I see it, has introduced an element of
variability to accounting figures that makes an increasingly wide range of
results defensible within “generally accepted accounting principles.” I believe
this will be true even if there is welcome progress through further refinement
and changes in the Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board toward nar
rowing the spread of acceptable treatment for many of these large indirect
costs.
Along similar lines, other changes in the accounting environment, par
ticularly the development of multi-line companies as major factors on the
corporate business scene, have tended to call for a broadened scope of responsi
bility for the auditor in connection with published financial statements. As
individual figures for widely disparate business operations are agglomerated,
whether in revenues or costs, the meaning of an unqualified final earnings
figure is necessarily diluted.
To represent that such developments affecting corporate accounting call
for a more interpretative role for the auditor is not to belittle the profession’s
role of setting accounting principles. In fact, this evolving situation seems to
call for more and increasingly specific guidelines to narrow areas of difference
and deficiency. Nor do I visualize an evaluation of the figures by the auditor
for their meaning relative to the company’s operation, which is the job of the
financial analyst. What I do suggest, however, is that instead of limiting his
qualifying comments to “exceptions” or their absence, the auditor might well
take a more positive approach attempting to put the figures in their proper
setting—highlighting decisions on accounting treatment and their general
significance where alternatives exist that would give materially different results.
This in essence would be giving some evaluation of the accounting application
and its effect. It does not seem realistic to just follow a procedure that would
tend to imply a “black or white” answer which I suspect is the result of current
accepted practice.
Stated another way and admittedly oversimplified, the present auditor’s
statement purports to convince those having use of the figures that the state
ments can be believed because the auditor has determined that they are fair
and consistently follow accounting rules. To me, this is not enough when so
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much accounting background information needs to be known before even
attempting an evaluation of the company’s operations from the figures. (The
author indicates some dissatisfaction with the present auditor’s statement but
not, I believe, along lines that would significantly broaden the auditor’s inter
pretative comments.)
Of course, it is general practice to include at least the most important
qualifications to the figures in footnotes to the accounting statements and with
sufficient diligence a trained accountant or analyst often could get the back
ground to put the figures in their proper perspective.
I submit, though, that accounting statements should not be prepared just
for such professional people and that it is a difficult, time consuming, and often
frustrating problem for analysts to search out all of the meaningful details.
Why should the auditor not take the lead and bring the salient points to the
forefront—highlighting accounting treatment important to an understanding
of the figures and, where pertinent, pointing to the consequences of alternative
approaches? At least, the possibility of some broadening of the auditor’s role
along these lines would seem a fruitful subject for inquiry.
I suppose one likely objection to such a proposal might be its adverse
ramifications for the auditor’s long-established client relationships. This brings
up another example of an area which I would think might appropriately be
examined relative to need for change. By repeated reference, the author
emphasizes the independent characteristic of the auditor, and I believe that the
executive committee of the AICPA has stressed this aspect by recommending
an audit committee of outside directors for publicly owned corporations both
to nominate auditors and to discuss matters not satisfactorily resolved by
auditors and management. Others, however, both from within and outside the
accounting profession, have pointed to management pressures for liberal
accounting treatment and their consequences. To minimize such circum
stances, might a policy requiring systematic rotation of auditors, say every
five years, have merit? Undoubtedly there are real advantages to a continuity
of auditors up to a point but a periodic change might have its advantages, too.
Again, this appears an area for constructive inquiry.
As a final example where change might get greater emphasis, several
events of recent months make me wonder whether the advent of wide-scale
computerization of accounting functions is being adequately handled in terms
of auditing approach and procedure. I refer specifically to three instances of
major corporations (Borden, Cenco, and May Department Stores) where very
substantial accounting charges have been required to adjust for cumulative
discrepancies in computerized accounting for accounts receivables. These may
be just isolated occurrences with no broader implications and I am certainly
in a position to do little more than raise the question as to their significance.
Possibly, they just indicate that effective auditing has revealed internal inade
quacies of computer programs and accounting checks. However, if uninten
tional shortcomings of this nature, presumably related to programing faults,
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can produce variances of such magnitude, there would seem to be some serious
risks if deliberate action were involved.
Undoubtedly the increased difficulty in following audit trails through
highly computerized accounting systems has been countered in many cases by
the auditor’s sophisticated computer programs that can make appropriate tests
of a client’s data processing systems. In any case, though, it appears an area
of significant change where the role of the auditor might properly come under
closer scrutiny.
I have touched briefly here on three aspects of the auditor’s work where
a degree of change appears in order or is at least a proper subject for inquiry.
Aside from the merit of each individual suggestion, however, and underlying
all of them is my thought that, in the role of the auditor as in so many other
professions, the increasing complexity of day-to-day problems and decisions
together with the greater involvement of the lay public in the final results has
brought the need for reassessment of accepted procedures and approaches and,
in particular, a broadened area of responsibility.
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Critique
Of the Roth paper

By R. E. Pfenning, Comptroller, General Electric Company, representing the
Financial Executives Institute

Mr. Roth has given us a broad and comprehensive discussion of the role
of the auditor. I will confine my remarks to two areas covered in his discussion.
It seems to me that the auditor has two basic reporting responsibilities and
they are to report what he did and to report what he found. In longer form
reports issued by public auditors or in reports such as those prepared by mem
bers of the corporate audit staff of General Electric Company, these two basic
responsibilities can be discharged with clarity and understandability. Mr.
Roth’s comments were concerned chiefly with the standard short-form report
by public auditors which is reproduced in millions of copies of corporate
annual reports. Here the auditor is the victim of space constraints as he tries
to discharge his two basic reporting responsibilities. In disposing of the respon
sibility to tell what he did, he uses the words, “generally accepted auditing
standards” and the other words to which the author referred. By usage, as
well as by AICPA definition, these words have acquired rather precise mean
ings just as all words associated with professional procedures have a habit of
doing. Undoubtedly there are many readers of auditors’ reports who are not
familiar with these precise meanings but I do not believe that this is a major
factor in the difficulties presently being encountered by auditors. There was
a time when the scope of an audit was a matter of negotiation between the
client and the auditor. Under such circumstances, there was considerable
question about what an auditor did on a particular assignment and whether
the scope of his work was adequate. However, some 30 years ago it was made
clear that the auditor had responsibility for determining the scope of work
necessary for examinations of financial statements and I believe it is now
generally assumed that he discharges this responsibility properly unless some
thing arises to indicate otherwise.
It seems to me that many of the difficulties presently being encountered
by auditors in the courts, the public press, and elsewhere revolve around his
responsibility to tell what he found as a result of his examination. The ques
tions are not confined to what he should have said in his formal report but
branch out into questions of, Did he or should he have informed major cred
itors? Did he or should he have informed the public prior to the issuance of
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his formal report?—and so forth. These are rather broad questions and their
resolution could well provide a major turning point in the responsibility of an
auditor to tell what he found.
Mr. Roth points out the inadequacies of the standard short-form report
as a medium for informing others as to what an auditor learned as a result of
his examination. Again, in the interests of conciseness, this form of report
uses words such as “generally accepted accounting principles” and Mr. Roth
and others raise a question as to whether the words have the preciseness of
meaning which the manner of their use would imply. I, for one, am inclined
to agree with the Forbes editorial that in many instances the words are
“damned meaningless.” I am not particularly concerned that it is most unlikely
the Accounting Principles Board is ever going to define a whole set of generally
accepted accounting principles. I am more concerned by the lack of attention
which is paid to those principles which they do establish and define. Also, I
personally feel that the certified public accountants must shoulder more blame
for this lack of atttention than we practitioners in industry.
Each Opinion which is issued by the Accounting Principles Board in
cludes notes with respect to the nature of generally accepted accounting prin
ciples and the action of the Council of the Institute with respect to disclosure
of departures from Opinions of the Accounting Principles Board. These notes
include the caveat that, “The Council action also requires that departures from
Board Opinions be disclosed in footnotes to the financial statements or in
independent auditors’ reports when the effect of the departure on the financial
statements is material.” I fully realize that the question of materiality is one
which is resolved by the exercise of judgment and I certainly am not one who
is inclined to determine that everything is material. However, some of the
accounting Opinions include requirements for disclosure of principle as was
the case in the Opinion on accounting for the cost of pension plans. Such
requirements do not lend themselves to the test of materiality. In addition,
any requirement for disclosure of principle in connection with pension costs
almost automatically qualifies as a material matter inasmuch as for most
companies the liability for pensions represents the company’s largest liability.
Accordingly, it was most disturbing to observe the very few instances in which
any attention was paid to the disclosure requirement on pension costs in 1967
annual reports. It was even more disturbing to me to observe that this lapse
went by unmentioned in the auditors’ reports. The best way for certified public
accountants to create a credibility gap is to deliberate at great length on
accounting opinions, publish them with great fanfare, and then disregard them.
In discussing the expanding role of auditors, Mr. Roth mentions the
likelihood that management will be required to publish forecast results which
would be attested to by independent auditors. He quickly mentions that such
a proposal might shock management and horrify CPAs. I’m neither shocked
nor horrified. I’m petrified at the thought of the hazards which would be
associated with this expansion of the auditors’ work. I do not doubt that the
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proposal will be made for a requirement that management publish forecast
results. That would be a natural outgrowth of all the discussion which has
taken place in recent years on segmented profitability reporting, the clamor
for more and more information by securities analysts and the promulgation
of the idea that the primary objective of accountants should be to improve the
predictive value of accounting. However, I am petrified by the thought that
anyone could contemplate, in Mr. Roth’s words, that:
. . . the independent auditor, has the necessary capability to evaluate
the effectiveness of the budgeting system and the procedures followed.
He can appraise the reasonableness of the relationships of income,
costs, and expenses based on clearly defined assumptions. He will be
expected to find some way of communicating the results of these
efforts to third parties without misleading them as to the degree of
assurance he is providing.

Sometimes our British cousins see things more clearly than we do. As
many of you probably know, the Council of the Institute of Chartered Ac
countants in England and Wales issued a “guidance” for auditors who are
asked to give reports on profit forecasts of companies. I would like to quote
the first three paragraphs of the introduction to that “guidance.”
1. Profit forecasts are normally prepared solely for internal use by the
managements of companies, but there may be occasions when, for fi
nancial reasons, they are disclosed to outsiders. In such circumstances
auditors or consultant accountants (subsequently referred to collec
tively as “reporting accountants”) may be asked to review and report
on forecasts to boards of directors.
2. It is emphasized that profit forecasts necessarily depend on sub
jective judgments and are, to a greater or less extent, according to the
nature of the business, subject to numerous and substantial inherent
uncertainties, which increase markedly the further forward in time the
forecasts stretch.

3. In consequence profit forecasts are not capable of confirmation
and verification by reporting accountants in the same way as financial
statements which present actual results, and there is no question of
their being “audited” in any sense, even though the reporting ac
countants may also be the company’s auditors. It is important that
reporting accountants should make this clear when they accept in
structions to review profit forecasts, and in the wording of their report
they should take care to avoid giving any impression that they are in
any way confirming, underwriting, guaranteeing or otherwise accept
ing responsibility for the ultimate accuracy and realization of forecasts.
Moreover, bearing in mind their special status and authority, report
ing accountants should do or say nothing to encourage directors, third
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parties or the public to place mistaken reliance on statements as to
future profits the achievement of which must always be subject to
uncertainty.1

You will note the stress which is placed on the uncertainties associated
with forecasts of operating results, a fact with which we in industry have been
coping for many years. This element of uncertainty was highlighted in London
by the release of some financial information at about the same time the Council
of the Institute issued its guidelines. About a year ago, when General Electric
Company, Ltd. (no kin of my employer) began its ultimately successful efforts
to acquire Associated Electrical Industries, the management of AEI opposed
the acquisition. As part of the proceedings, AEI asked its auditors to report
on the profit forecasts of the company to the merchant bank acting on their
behalf. According to an article in the September 1968 issue of Accountancy,
the auditors reported with a letter outlining what they had done to check the
forecasts in the limited time available and ended with the paragraph:
On the basis of our inquiries we have formed the view that the fore
cast profits of £10m, £16m, and in excess of £20m respectively for
the years 1967, 1968 and 1969 have been prepared on a fair and
reasonable basis and in a manner consistent with the principles fol
lowed by the company in preparing recent published annual accounts.

The financial news which broke this year was that instead of a profit of
£10 million for 1967, AEI sustained a loss of £4.5 million. The AEI manage
ment and the auditors apparently are now busily engaged in trying to explain
what happened.
I sincerely hope that it will be a long time in this country before manage
ment takes on the task of publishing forecast results, and I hope that it will
be even longer before our certified public accountants take on the task of
attesting to the validity of the forecasts. In my opinion, this would be one of
the better ways of destroying their credibility, not only with respect to forecasts
but with respect to their other activities.

1

“Accountants’ Reports on Profit Forecasts,” Members Handbook, the Institute of Chartered
Accountants in England and Wales (Gee and Company, London). This statement by
Council was also published in the September 1968 Accountancy (the journal of the Institute
of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales).
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Critique
Of the Roth paper

By Arthur L. Nash, Manager, Senior Credit Officer and Member of the Credit
Committee, Brown Brothers Harriman & Co., Past President of Robert Morris
Associates, representing Robert Morris Associates

The paper entitled, “The Role of the Auditor,” prepared by Joseph Roth,
covers this subject so adequately that it is difficult for me to be critical. How
ever, I am able to comment on, and expand upon, certain subject areas from
personal experience running back 40 years, both as a user of audits in credit
analysis, and lending, and an “amicus curiae” of the accounting profession.
Over this lengthy period, I have witnessed many of the changing philosophies
in auditing practice, and have been privileged to have had a minuscule part
in the formulation of some of the principles and standards currently in force,
through participation in joint discussions with committees of the American
Institute of CPAs and state CPA societies.
At the inception of his paper, Mr. Roth focuses on what would seem to
be a, if not the, major problem concerning the auditor’s role in society today.
This is a lack of understanding, or a real misunderstanding by unsophisticated,
and, perhaps, even knowledgeable readers as to what the auditor can, and
cannot do, and to what he is attesting.

The Certificate
To a major degree, in the opinion of the writer, this problem may spring
from the character and wording of the auditor’s certificate. The writer recalls
vividly the stresses, strains, and struggles which the committees of the pro
fession went through in the 1930’s in developing the certificates currently
recommended. Although it was recognized that it would be desirable, if
possible, to be specific in the description of the scope of the audit, the pro
fession chose to be general in phraseology in an effort to make the certificate
a “general purpose” certificate and to avoid possible criticism and questions
which would arise from the failure to mention, specifically, each and every
procedure undertaken by the auditor. Thus sprang the phrases “generally
accepted auditing standards,” and “generally accepted accounting principles,”
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which, as Mr. Roth points out, have meaning to most CPAs, but not to the
public.
Thus it would appear that the profession has been “hoist by its own
petard,” and they are now “damned if they do, and damned if they don’t.”
I believe that, in the public eye, their status as financial wizards may have
been magnified by the development of an image of financial acumen in uncov
ering fraud and misuse of funds. Such a picture has been created by the public
press, and other writers, in the past when reference has been made to “sending
in CPAs to check a company’s books,” when a company’s finances are in ques
tion or an embezzlement has taken place. Although this image may have been
diminished somewhat by recent publicity, I believe that many people still
mistakenly regard a CPA’s opinion as being, in effect, a guarantee of accuracy
of financial statements. Now, the profession finds itself in the position of
attempting to modify this image, without seriously impairing it. As Mr. Roth
states, the objectives have changed, and the primary purpose today is “to
express an opinion on the fairness of the financial statements, their compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles, and the consistency of their
application.” However, the public has not been kept abreast of these changes,
and still regards the CPA as a “financial policeman.”

Purpose
In the foregoing paragraphs, reference has been made to the certificate
as being a “general purpose” certificate. This brings to mind the fact that in
present day business, it would seem that “general purpose” audits are not as
useful as they have been in the past. Many bankers would like to have
“special purpose” reports, i.e., long-form, and I dare say that, with the more
complex corporate organizations, “special purpose” reports should be ex
tremely useful. Under such circumstances, it would appear that any changed
phraseology in the certificates might have to take into consideration whether
or not the audit was “general purpose,” or “special purpose.”

Scope
To the trained credit or security analyst, the word “examine,” as used in
the “scope” paragraph, should not be unclear, and the auditor’s opinion rela
tive to the “accompanying balance sheet” should not lead to the conclusion
that the auditor himself prepared the figures. However, it seems evident that
many users, certainly the “average reader” and the less sophisticated stock
holder, believe that the auditor has prepared the balance sheet, income
account, and surplus reconciliation and that they are his figures on which he
is expressing an opinion. Perhaps this implication might be clarified by such
introductory words as, “We have been furnished with the ‘balance sheet,’

270

‘income account’ and ‘surplus reconciliation’ of XYZ Company, as of--------- ,
19—, for the purposes of verification and audit. We have examined . . —
and so forth.
In a dream one night, in the midst of preparing this critique, I even
developed a scope paragraph which spelled out exactly what verification pro
cedures were carried out. Unfortunately, like many dreams, the factual
development of the words in cold daylight indicated the difficulties faced by
the profession in an effort to keep the scope paragraph to a reasonable length
and still cover the situation. One cannot help but be sympathetic with those
who have undertaken this task in rephrasing the certificate. There is, however,
little doubt that such a rephrasing is necessary. Mr. Roth’s question as to
whether the public understands that auditors “may not be certain that they
have gotten all of the facts,” is vividly pointed up in newspaper comments in
recent cases in which the accused auditors have indicated that they did not
know about certain matters until after the audit was certified. This problem
of being sure that all facts have been obtained will always be present, and it
does seem that if the auditing profession is to defend itself against the unsophis
ticated public, it should make clear, somehow, the frailties of the profession
in this direction.

Independence
Further, in the field of public understanding, is the matter of auditor and
management decisions. Mr. Roth implies that auditors do not make manage
ment decisions, and although this probably is generally true, it is a known fact
that in certain trades, in New York at least, the CPA is an integral part of the
management team, and that he makes arrangements for loans from banks
who would not otherwise lend money to the company without his presence.
Perhaps these are the exceptions which prove the rule.

Standards and Principles
It is doubtful if many financially “knowledgeable” people really under
stand the standards of the accounting profession, and certainly, insofar as ac
counting principles are concerned, some prominent CPAs have indicated that
there are too many “accounting principles” for handling the same situation.
Education and publicity will improve the understanding of standards, but much
work needs to be done in the area of clarifying “principles.” The profession is
cognizant of this, but the road towards simplification is likely to be long and
arduous. In the meantime, it does seem that the principles used, or approved
under certain circumstances, deserve some comment where there are several
possibilities, and, perhaps, where there is an alternative, the auditor should
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comment in some way in a footnote as to the effect of the alternative method,
or methods, on the statements, “if material.”

Materiality and Judgment
Materiality has been a sticky problem for the accounting profession and
for others for many years. Many efforts have been made to define materiality,
but, unfortunately, it has so far been almost impossible to find a definition
which will cover all situations. What is material to “A” may not be material
to “B” under the same set of circumstances, and, certainly under differing
circumstances, the variations of opinion might be even greater. Steps are
being taken in an effort to improve the definition of materiality, and a com
mittee of the American Institute is currently studying this in depth.
Materiality, at the present time, however, is unquestionably, a matter for
the judgment of the CPA on the engagement. His judgment is, of course, predi
cated upon conditions as he sees them, and at the time of his audit. In view
of this, then, reliance upon the competence of the CPA becomes important, and
those users who must rely on his competence should have a method of evalu
ating it. Unfortunately, at the present time, the available sources of informa
tion on individual CPAs or firms are limited. Steps have been recommended,
at times, for improvements in this area without startling success. Judgment
on the part of the CPA must be as much a guiding factor in the determination
of materiality in the future as it is now.

Credibility
Mr. Roth concludes that the usual scope of examination of the inde
pendent auditor in an unrestricted engagement is sufficiently extensive to justify
credibility for the financial statements. I do not wholly agree with Mr. Roth
that the “greatest” risk springs from high-level fraud, i.e., deliberate conceal
ment of facts, and misrepresentation of facts to the CPA by top management.
In reviewing some of the “financial wrecks” of the past, the writer observed,
from hindsight, that in many of those “wrecks,” there was evidence of clever,
if not fraudulent, practices on the part of corporate officers and employees.
Clearly these individuals so manipulated corporate financial affairs as to make
it difficult, if not impossible, for auditors to clearly develop the financial
structure.
In contrast to Mr. Roth, it is my opinion that a greater risk may spring
from problems created by the complexity of business today, the widespread
development of conglomerates, and the potentials for legitimate financial
sleight of hand through availability of varying accepted accounting principles
for the same set of facts.
Management, in a complex situation, has problems in keeping abreast
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of all the facets of the business, and although no misrepresentation may be
involved, it is possible to color a presentation by using different acceptable
accounting principles, with the result that the reader may be misled or con
fused. There has been much said by CPAs, themselves, about the differing
results possible in making a presentation, predicated upon applying different
principles. Therefore, it would seem that these risks continue until the ac
counting options are reduced.
With respect to the effectiveness of the auditor’s report, Mr. Roth clearly
brings out that standards specifically state that any exception to compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles must be stated, even to the extent
of requiring the rendering of an adverse opinion. Further, the auditor must
report all material restrictions or limitations placed on his audit scope, and
these reporting requirements presumably have had an influence on reporting
as clients do not like to have exceptions. However, among the critics of audit
reports are banks and bankers. Unfortunately, for competitive reasons, it is
known that banks have accepted unsatisfactory audits, and hence, have con
doned slipshod reporting through failure to insist upon more adequate financial
data, or by not engaging in a discussion with the client and the CPA as to the
bank’s requirements. It has long been a strong recommendation of the Robert
Morris Associates, and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
that banks discuss their requirements with the CPA and the client before
making major financial commitments. Furthermore, many users of reports
have not made a practice of ascertaining the independence and the competence
of the CPA (individual or firm) whose audit is being reviewed. As mentioned
previously, it is difficult to obtain satisfactory information along these lines.

Expanded Role of Auditors
Mr. Roth discusses the expanding role of the auditor in an able fashion.
As a user, the writer believes that most of the developments in the profession
are appropriate, provided that adequate communication exists between the
auditor and the reader, and that the reader understands the varying roles being
accepted by the auditor with respect to the client, and he makes clear any
possible conflicts.

Internal Controls
Although the tenets of the auditing profession stress the importance of
evaluating internal controls, I believe that too few users understand the extent
to which a responsible auditor, on an unrestricted engagement, checks these
elements. Perhaps some reference should be made in the certificate, or in a
footnote, to the adequacy of internal controls, instead of leaving this to be one
of the “vague” elements involved in the generalization of auditing standards.
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Many knowledgeable readers among bankers lack familiarity with the complete
scope of a proper questionnaire on internal controls, and internal check.

A Bank's Requirements
I believe that if we bankers were to spell out our “ideal” requirements to
the CPAs, most of us would opt for a “long-form” report containing:
1. A careful outline of scope with a more careful spelling-out of any limita
tions on the engagement, to the end that the reader will understand what
the CPA has done, and to what he is attesting. Not every reader knows
what accounting principles are, or what auditing standards may be.

2. Full disclosure of all material facts.

3. Clear, concise and understandable terminology.
4. Adequate and understandable footnotes. (No confusing wording.)
5. Complete independence and objectivity of opinion.

6. Intimation of any serious questions on internal controls.

Conclusion
In summary, the auditing profession has come a long way in the last 50
years. It has done a good job in policing itself and in evaluating professional
progress. To a great extent, significant changes have been brought about by
the profession, itself, as it has become aware of the changing requirements of
client and user. While there has been evidence, on occasion, of a lack of care
in some supervisory areas, the plethora of court cases in recent years would
seem to have been more frequently a product of the complexity of business,
plus a lack of understanding by users as to the auditor’s responsibilities. In
formed users, such as banks, and other creditors, who receive audit reports in
support of credit facilities, must accept some responsibility for any inadequa
cies, since they have not insisted upon meticulous, and responsible reporting,
and have condoned deficiencies in audit standards and procedures.
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